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Abstract 
 
This dissertation identifies a question which is undervalued, 
underexplored, and under-asked within the complex of laws that apply 
to fashion and in legal scholarship exploring fashion: how are fashion 
design objects cultural property? It answers this question by looking to 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects as a case study, 
primarily because the history of Italian fashion, the current activities of 
Italian fashion brands, and Italian cultural property law provide ready 
examples and tools through which to answer the question. Bypassing 
the more common question of whether fashion is art, the dissertation 
asks how fashion design objects might be of historic, artistic, or other 
cultural interest for the public under the law such that they may be 
preserved and valorized like other cultural properties. 
  
The first chapter gives a history of Italian fashion, spotlighting relevant 
key historical moments and constant tensions through Italian fashion 
history, including the complex nature of Italian fashion as both local 
and global, the relationship between traditional Italian craftsmanship 
and Italian brands and designers, the inspirational links between Italian 
cultural heritage and Italian fashion, and the almost inseparable links 
between intangible design and tangible properties. The second chapter 
examines the dilemmas surrounding the definition of cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law both throughout history and today – 
a boundless cultural interest, mechanisms of time, and an emphasis on 
things. This chapter also explores the relationship between Italian 
cultural property law and copyright in light of cultural property law’s 
rules on reproductions and its regulation of decoro. The links between 
intangibility and tangibility in the legal definition of cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law and the work of legal scholars which 
explains cultural property law with reference to text provide the 
groundwork for an exploration in the third chapter of how certain texts, 
despite usually being identified as intangible and therefore outside the 
proverbial cultural property “box”, may be tangible and therefore 
cultural property. Such an exploration is fruitful for how fashion design 
objects are cultural property since fashion design is often conceived of 
as intangible like text and may also incorporate text. The third chapter 
gives examples of text on a spectrum of intangibility and tangibility, 
with corresponding examples of fashion design. It crafts a standard for 
when and how fashion design objects might be cultural property or not. 
In addition to facilitating a test for when fashion design objects may be 
cultural property under cultural property law, this spectrum also 
provides an opportunity for new comparisons between cultural 
property and intellectual property, and more specifically between 
  ix 
cultural property and copyright and their corresponding legal regimes. 
This comparison is explored in chapter four, which recaps the spectrum 
of cultural property in terms of tangible text, visible images, intangible 
text or intangible images, and testaments having the value of 
civilization. The chapter examines conceptual separability in U.S. 
copyright law in particular with reference to this spectrum and the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, to show 
how conceptual separability seems, for the category of designs of useful 
articles eligible for inclusion in the category of pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, to be about identifying a possible public cultural 
interest in intangible parts of tangible objects, in fashion designs which 
are like visible images. In this sense, the dissertation envisions closer 
ties between copyright law and cultural property law and sees 
copyright as an at times ex ante cultural property regime. Chapter five 
explores how the history of certain historic preservation laws in the 
United States might allow for a future inclusion of fashion design 
objects as part of historic property and acknowledges that certain parts 
of Art Law and other sui generis norms may protect fashion design 
objects as cultural property.  
 
The dissertation suggests that while some fashion design objects can be 
currently included as cultural property under cultural property law, 
others cannot. Copyright may play a key role in the protection of 
fashion design objects as cultural property, both when these fashion 
design objects can and cannot be classified as cultural property under 
the law. These links suggest that protecting fashion design objects as 
cultural property and allowing this protection to inform the nature of 
fashion designs as copyrightable subject matter might result in a thin 
just as much as a thick copyright. Beyond cultural heritage law is an 
emerging field for the protection of fashion design objects as cultural 
property which will require considerations of how other legal regimes 
overlap with cultural property law as applied to fashion design objects, 
and the duties and obligations that members of the fashion industry 
have in protecting their fashion products as cultural property so as not 
to risk losing the cultural significance of fashion design objects for the 
future. 
  
  1 
Introduction 
Fashion as Cultural Property Beyond “Fashion Law” and other Legal 
Boundaries 
 
1. Protecting Fashion between Cultural Heritage and 
Copyright 
 
On July 5, 2019 the Italian fashion brand Dolce & Gabbana staged their 
Alta Moda Fall/Winter 2019 fashion show at the Temple of Concordia 
in Agrigento, Sicily [Figure 1].3 The result of a two year negotiation with 
the relevant Italian cultural authorities4, in the middle of this Italian 
cultural heritage site models walked down a runway in gowns and 
accessories created by two Italian designers known for harnessing the 
local traditions of Southern Italy. At the same time as the gowns and 
accessories embodied traditional Italian craftsmanship, local traditions 
and contemporary fashion and even luxury, the gowns and accessories 
also reproduced items of Italian cultural heritage as part of their very 
designs. These reproductions ranged from images of fine art, statues 
and pottery decoration on the skirts of gowns [Figure 2], to miniature 
temples and busts on hats [Figure 3]. Staged in a Greek temple on the 
island of Sicily that is classified as Italian cultural heritage (and as 
cultural property), the visual of these Dolce & Gabbana fashion design 
objects embody the fundamental question of this dissertation: how are 
these fashion design objects like other cultural property? What is it 
exactly that we might recognize as common to both the temples and 
these fashion design objects? In other words, how are these Dolce & 
Gabbana fashion design objects cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law? 
 
The answer to this specific question falls between some legal cracks, so 
to speak. This is so despite the recent advent of fashion law, the still 
longer history of legal tools to protect design through intellectual 
property law, conversations about how to protect parts of our culture in 
the legal academy, and even despite having cultural heritage law itself. 
The question is not one of cultural appropriation: the question is not 
                                               
3 Anders Christian Madsen, Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda, Autumn/Winter 2019, VOGUE UK, 6 
July 2019, https://www.vogue.co.uk/shows/autumn-winter-2019-couture/dolce-
gabbana-alta-moda.  
4 Hamish Bowles, Dolce & Gabbana Stage an Epic Alta Moda Show in 
Sicily’s Valley of the Temples , VOGUE, July 6, 2019, https://www.vogue.com/article/dolce-
and-gabbana-alta-moda-sicily-valley-of-the-temples (“The monument, of course, is a 
crown jewel in Italy’s cultural patrimony, so the negotiations to showcase the Alta Moda 
collection here, in Dolce’s native Sicily (where the collection was first launched in 
Taormina in 2012), were two years in the making and the preparations were 
extraordinarily elaborate.”) 
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whether Dolce & Gabbana has culturally appropriated Greek or Italian 
cultural heritage in their fashion designs.5 The question is not one for 
business law or even necessarily for intellectual property law in a 
traditional sense. Dolce & Gabbana is not accused of copying another 
designer’s work, it is not using another company’s trademarks, it is not 
engaging in a new business model. It is accurate to say that intellectual 
property law may apply. Parts of the hats and dresses might be 
conceptually separable and eligible for copyright protection, or eligible 
for a design patent. This does not yet, however, completely answer the 
question of these objects’ cultural interest under the law. Even the 
evidence of creativity does not yet necessarily make cultural heritage 
law applicable to these objects: these Italian fashion design objects are 
contemporary objects which, as they stand presented in a runway show, 
do not yet fulfill the criteria of individual objects of cultural property. At 
most cultural heritage law would now guide the negotiation for the use 
of the Temple of Concordia or perhaps the reproductions of the fine art 
and sculptures on the fashion design objects, without asking however 
what the cultural interest is in the fashion design objects themselves and 
where it lies. Contracts might tell us what the private and public parties 
cared about, but such negotiations are not the same as an administrative 
decision about the fashion design objects’ cultural value. Even if 
intangible cultural heritage law required safeguarding mechanisms for 
the artisanal work, that does not necessarily address how the objects 
themselves fit into the cultural heritage environment apart from their 
exemplary nature. With the question of how Italian fashion design 
objects are cultural property, we find ourselves on a legal fashion 
frontier. Answering the question requires cobbling together rules and 
norms from various legal fields in an as yet evolving legal space. 
 
At the same time as the rules and norms from various legal fields are 
cobbled together, it becomes clear that cultural heritage law, and Italian 
cultural property law at that, best hold the legal answers to how Italian 
fashion design objects are cultural property. An emerging part of 
cultural heritage, these fashion design objects bring fashion law, design 
law, and other intellectual property law regimes into the fold of cultural 
heritage law alongside more rules from administrative law, 
constitutional law and even international law. Overall, however, Italian 
fashion design objects require cultural heritage law to evolve and also 
                                               
5 Unlike other acts by Dolce & Gabbana which have been characterized as 
misappropriation or even outright racism, including their mischaracterization of a 
Chinese woman eating pasta in one of its ads. See Yuhan Xu, Dolce & Gabbana Ad (With 
Chopsticks) Provokes Public Outrage in China, NPR, December 1, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/12/01/671891818/dolce-gabbana-
ad-with-chopsticks-provokes-public-outrage-in-china.  
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gravitate towards cultural heritage law because of the cultural interest 
these objects hold for us.    
 
2. Background: “Fashion Law” and Legal Scholarship between 
Piracy, Protection and “Public” Law  
 
A logical place to look for rules governing the relationship between 
fashion and law is the eponymously named field, “Fashion Law”, which 
has taken on increased interest in the hallowed halls of legal academia 
since the early 21st century. Despite the existence of laws applicable to 
fashion for centuries outside a classroom6, Susan Scafidi of Fordham 
University School of Law is usually heralded as creating Fashion Law 
for the law school classroom in 2006 and founding the Fashion Law 
Institute at Fordham in 2010. 7 Of course, Scafidi was not alone in her 
interest in fashion and the law. Often cited concurrently to Scafidi’s 
work is that of Guillermo Jimenez, who, with Barbara Kolsun, 
published the first edition of Fashion Law: A Guide for Designers, Fashion 
Executives, and Attorneys in 2010.8 In addition, around the same time as 
                                               
6 As will be detailed in Chapter 1, infra, from a fashion history point of view. Legal 
scholarship also acknowledges that laws applying to fashion outside the “fashion law” 
field have existed for centuries. See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, 
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 116-117 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 
2006) [hereinafter Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design]; Susan Scafidi, Fiat 
Fashion Law! The launch of a label – and a new branch of law, in NAVIGATING FASHION LAW: 
LEADING LAWYERS ON EXPLORING THE TRENDS CASES, AND STRATEGIES OF FASHION LAW 8 
(Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2012) [hereinafter Scafidi, Fiat Fashion Law!] (“As long as 
there have been fashion houses- and almost as long as there have been people making 
clothes- there have been occasions to consult lawyers”); Charles E. Colman, The History 
and Principles of American Copyright Protection for Fashion Design: A Strange Centennial, 6 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. 225, 238 (2015) [hereinafter Colman, History and Principles] 
(examining copyright protection for fashion beginning with the analysis of the advent of 
copyright in the 16th century). Applying previous historical scholarship of the art market, it 
could even be said that early contracts for fashion objects and their raw materials might be 
the first evidence of a “fashion law.” See MICHELLE O’MALLEY, THE BUSINESS OF ART: 
CONTRACTS AND THE COMMISSIONING PROCESS IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 1 (2005) (noting 
through an exploration of the making of a work of art in Renaissance Italy that “contracts 
are the most fundamental and informative records we have about the nature of the 
decision-making process that lies behind the making of a work of art” and that tracing 
contract terms and stipulations over time and in different regions in Italy makes it 
“possible…to trace the cultural values of the period…”). Sumptuary laws, in effect since 
antiquity, testify to the regulation of fashions and clothing. For a study of sumptuary law 
in Italy see CATHERINE KOVESKI KILLERBY, SUMPTUARY LAW IN ITALY 1200-1500 (Oxford, 
2002).  
7 Newsroom, Not Just Catwalks: A Closer Look at Fashion Law L.L.M.s, FORDHAM LAW NEWS, 
January 9, 2018; About, FASHION LAW INSTITUTE, https://fashionlawinstitute.com/about 
(last visited July 16, 2019).  
8 FASHION LAW: A GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS, FASHION EXECUTIVES, AND ATTORNEYS 
(Guillermo c. Jimenez and Barbara Kolsun, eds., Fairchild Books, 2010) [hereinafter 
FASHION LAW: A GUIDE]. Both Scafidi and Jimenez are mentioned as early movers in the 
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the advent of the field of Fashion Law and separately to it, intellectual 
property scholars in the United States seemed to take an increased 
interest in the field of fashion. In 2006 Chris Sprigman and Kal Raustala 
published their seminal law review article The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design.9 The article essentially argues 
that a lack of intellectual property regulation (be it patent, trademark or 
copyright) for designs of apparel, not brands, is paradoxically good for the 
fashion industry because the copying of such designs promotes 
innovation, the proffered purpose of intellectual property protections, 
in the fashion industry; this allows fashion to thrive in a negative space 
of intellectual property protection.10 Sprigman and Raustala’s argument 
contrasts with but exists alongside arguments which emphasize the 
artistry or creativity of fashion, including apparel design, and, therefore, 
fashion’s worthiness of being protected like other works of art under 
copyright, often deemed the most appropriate intellectual property 
regime.11 Sprigman and Raustala’s article, along with their follow up 
work12 and a contemporaneous legislative debate about whether the 
U.S. Copyright Act should be amended to protect fashion designs from 
roughly 2006 to 201213, has, alongside Fashion Law, shaped the debate 
                                               
field of fashion law in Mark K. Brewer, Fashion Law: More than Wigs, Gowns, and Intellectual 
Property 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 742 (2017) [hereinafter Brewer, Fashion Law: More than 
Wigs] and the work of both is used to define fashion law in Joanna Buchalska, Fashion Law: 
A New Approach, 7 QUEEN MARY L. J., Special Conference Issue 13- 26, 14-15 (Autumn 
2016).  
9 Christopher B. Sprigman and K. Raustala, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design (hereinafter Sprigman and Raustala, The Piracy Paradox), 92 VA. 
L. REV. 1687 (2006). In their article Sprigman and Raustala do note Scafidi’s work on her 
blog, Counterfeit Chic, as part of the “few legal commentators [who] have considered 
fashion design in the context of IP.” Id. at 1690, n. 2.  
10 Id. at 1691- 1692.  
11 See The Piracy Paradox, supra note 9 and Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustala, The 
Piracy Paradox Revisted, 61(5) STANFORD L. REV. 1201, 1204, n. 5 (2009) [hereinafter 
Sprigman and Raustala, Paradox Revisited] (citing in part to Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as 
Information Technology 59 SYR. L. REV. 69 (2008)). Other examples which promote the 
artistry of fashion for copyrightability are Brief of Fashion Law Institute et al as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Star Athletica LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al, 
Docket No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (2017); Alexandra Manfredi, Haute Copyright: Tailoring 
Copyright Protection to High-Profile Fashion Designs, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111 
(2012) (arguing for the protection of some haute couture fashion designs in some 
circumstances).  
12 Sprigman and Raustala, Paradox Revisited, supra note 11 (responding to Scott Hemphill 
and Jeannie Suk’s The Law, Culture and Economics of Fashion); KAL RAUSTALA AND 
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 
(2012) [hereinafter THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY] (examining other field alongside fashion 
like comedy, cuisine, and football that also seem to thrive in the negative spaces of 
intellectual property law).  
13 Excerpts of testimony on the subject before the U.S. Congress are reprinted in 
Comparative Design Piracy Protection: U.S. and E.U. in GUILLERMO JIMENEZ AND BARBARA 
KOLSUN, FASHION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Carolina Academic Press, 2016) 
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about fashion design’s relationship with law in the United States into 
one that is, or at least was in the past, deeply concerned with fashion’s 
copyrightability. Most recently Scafidi’s work has attempted to move 
beyond this dichotomy by situating Fashion Law as a still broader field 
which includes more rules, social norms, and institutions in her forward 
Towards a Jurisprudence of Fashion.14 Today, an academic interest in 
fashion’s relationship to law seems to be increasingly subsumed into an 
academic interest in design, construed broadly and including any and 
all objects of industrial design.15  
 
An increased interest in fashion in academia during the first decades of 
the 21st century was also part of a wider cultural appreciation of fashion 
and its embrace by the masses. This cultural appreciation and embrace 
occurred apart from discussions of design. The legal protection of 
design has been relevant for most intellectual property legal scholars 
and business lawyers in practice arguably since the Industrial Age and 
perhaps even before.16 An interest in fashion and law more often than 
not necessitates a consideration of design and law.17 At the same time, 
however, thanks to the rise of the internet and increased digitization, 
                                               
[hereinafter FASHION LAW: CASES]. See also, for an overview of The Innovative Design 
Protection and Piracy Prevention Act as proposed by Senator Chuck Schumer, Cathy Horn, 
Schumer Bill Seeks to Protect Fashion Design, On the Runway: All Things Fashion, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 5, 2010, 10:43 PM, https://runway.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/schumer-bill-
seeks-to-protect-fashion-design/.  
14 Susan Scafidi, Towards a Jurisprudence of Fashion, 29(2) FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 429 (2019).  
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol29/iss2/1.  
15 See, as one recent example, Mark McKenna and Jessica Silbey, Investigating Design: A 
Qualitative Study of Professional Designers, forthcoming (a qualitative study of designers 
which seeks “to understand the [sic] how professional design work has evolved to 
encompass a combination of more traditional IP-rich fields, such as engineering, 
architecture, software and web design, product manufacturing, and graphic design”; in 
their presentation at the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference, McKenna noted 
that fashion designers were not explicitly included because of fashion’s industry 
particularities).  
16 For an acknowledgement of the historical exploration of what they term modern 
intellectual property law see GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS AND 
DESIGN LAW 3 (2010) (citing to BRAD SHERMAN AND LIONEL BENTLEY, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1999) (also discussing this law in terms of 
intangible property) [hereinafter TRADE DRESS]. See also the recently published A HISTORY 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 50 OBJECTS (Claudy Op den Kamp and Dan Hunter, eds., 
2019) (including objects from the Pre-Modern era in an essay on Murano Glass by Stefania 
Fusco and a separate essay about the Mona Lisa which explores the overlap between the 
Mona Lisa as a prized real property of cultural interest and the increasing claims of 
copyright in its digital reproductions).  
17 See, for example, Veronique Pouillard and Tereza Kuldova, Interrogating Intellectual 
Property Rights in Post-war Fashion and Design, 30(4) J. OF DESIGN HISTORY 343 (2017), doi: 
10.1093/jdh/epx014.   
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the increased mixing of high and low styles, or maastige18, fast fashion, 
and an evolving appreciation of fashion in pop culture19, decoding 
fashion has become almost a global pastime in the 21st century. The 
public is more aware of the links between celebrity, image-making and 
fashion.20 Online forums dedicated to fashion have multiplied 
exponentially and they include those dedicated to the business of 
fashion and the legal rules surrounding it.21 Most importantly for the 
purposes of this dissertation, members of the public now have many 
more tactile and didactic interactions with fashion’s increasingly 
elevated status and with its complex of meanings both in museums and 
in other cultural, non-retail spaces.22 This seems to have created a 
                                               
18 ERICA CORBELLINI AND STEFANIA SAVIOLO, MANAGING FASHION AND LUXURY 
COMPANIES 116 (Milano, Rizzoli, 2009) [hereinafter MANAGING FASHION] (defining 
maastige as “mass business logic tak[ing] on prestige connotations”, or trading on the 
ideas of luxury for generic products, or “a fashion statement that mixes both mass-
produced and prestigious clothes”).  
19 There has been a proliferation of documentaries. See as just some examples THE FIRST  
MONDAY IN MAY (Magnolia Pictures, 2016); VALENTINO: THE LAST EMPEROR (Medusa 
Film, 2008); THE DIRECTOR: AN EVOLUTION IN THREE ACTS (RabbitBandini, 2013); JEREMY 
SCOTT: THE PEOPLE’S DESIGNER (Vladar Company, 2015). Movies and TV shows have been 
dedicated to the inner workings of the fashion industry and those that write the sartorial 
code in which we live our lives, with perhaps the best early 21st century example being 
THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Fox 2000, 2006) a movie iteration of a tell-all book about 
working in the industry. 
20 To name just two popular television shows which have showcased this, PROJECT 
RUNWAY (Miramax) and AMERICA’S NEXT TOP MODEL (Bankable Productions). 
21 See THE BUSINESS OF FASHION, www.thebusinessoffashion.com; THE FASHION LAW, 
www.thefashionlaw.com. Magazines such as Women’s Wear Daily also have business and 
legal sections. See Legal, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, http://wwd.com/business-news/legal/. 
22 For example The Museum of the Fashion Institute of Technology and The Costume Institute at 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art (recently renamed the Anna Wintour Costume Center ) in 
New York City and SCADFASH, the fashion museum of the Savannah College of Art and 
Design in Savannah, Georgia. Not only has the Met Gala, the annual charitable fundraiser 
for the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Costume Institute, gained increased importance, as 
have the Met’s exhibits such as Alexander McQueen: Savage Beauty (2011), but the 
popularity of fashion exhibits in areas of the United States outside of metropolitan cities 
has proliferated (for example, Dressing Downton: Changing Fashion for Changing Times, a 
traveling exhibit of the costumes of the popular PBS drama Downton Abbey successfully 
toured from 2016-2017). The Art Institute of Chicago also hosted the Fashion exhibit 
Impressionism, Fashion and Modernity, which had a record number of visitors. See Johnny 
Oleksinski, Big crowd of visitors makes a run for Art Institute, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, October 13, 
2014, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/museums/chi-art-
institute-crowd-20141013-story.html (“While final attendance figures weren't available, 
director of public affairs Rebecca Baldwin said the museum last saw such large crowds 
during the “Impressionism, Fashion and Modernity” exhibition in summer 2013.”). Retail 
spaces also now include exhibitions of fashion design objects, as with the recent reseller 
Stockx displaying a “Fakes Halls of Fame” in their Nolita pop-up store. See Fashion Law 
Institute @FashionLawInstitute), INSTAGRAM, June 21, 2019, 
https://www.instagram.com/p/By8raFzBcrY/ and other still more complex luxury 
examples like Salvatore Ferragamo’s display of a working artisan in one of their flagships. 
See images of the 2016 re-opening of the Ferragamo boutique on Avenue Montaigne in 
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cultural moment for law, fashion, and public cultural interest.  
  
Because fashion is connected to design and other disciplines the 
discussion in legal academia about fashion has benefited from the work 
of many other legal scholars in different legal fields. These legal scholars 
have investigated intellectual property and fashion from a historical 
point of view and/or imagined the relationships between different 
intellectual property regimes as applied to fashion; they have 
investigated how we might think of fashion with respect to other, 
perhaps unexpected legal rules, including those of public law. Charles 
Colman23 has written extensively on the history of copyright and design 
patent as applied to fashion, taking a distinctly historical and theoretical 
approach that also employs gender studies.24 Chris Buccafusco and 
Jeanne Fromer have investigated the relationship between fashion, 
function and different legal regimes of intellectual property25, to 
spotlight just one example of their work.26 Barton Beebe has brought 
historical and interpretative gravitas to legal academic explorations of 
fashion with his articles on aesthetic progress and modern conceptions 
of sumptuary law.27 Still further, Ruth Robson has explored 
                                               
Paris from Getty Images. Re Opening of Salvatore Ferragamo Boutique Montaigne, GETTY 
IMAGES, https://www.gettyimages.it/immagine/ferragamo-avenue-
montaigne?phrase=ferragamo,%20avenue%20montaigne&sort=best#license.   
23 For a biography and a list of publications see Charles E. Colman, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI’I 
AT MÃNOA WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://www.law.hawaii.edu/person/charles-e-colman.    
24 See, for example, Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric as 
Metric-Part 1, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 419 (2015) and Colman’s series’ The History and Principles of 
American Copyright Protection for Fashion Design, 6-9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. (2015-
2018).  
25 Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer, Fashion's Function in Intellectual Property Law 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2017).  
26 Buccafusco and Fromer also contributed to an issue of The University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review Online along with Jane Ginsburg, Mark McKenna and others which 
discussed separability in light of the Star Athletica v. Varsity case. See Christopher 
Buccafusco and Jeanne C. Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 119 
(2017) (seeming to discuss the importance of materiality through functionality: 
“Ultimately, the medium in which design features are fixed affects their functionality and 
thus their copyrightability. A court should not conclude that just because a design is non-
functional in one medium it is necessarily non-functional in all media…Copyright should 
extend to only reproductions of the design in media where it does not have a function.” Id. 
at 126.) 
27 Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Power of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of American 
Copyright Law, 117(2) COLUMBIA L. REV. 319 (2017) [hereinafter Beebe, Bleistein, The Power 
of Aesthetic Progress]; Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code in 
(123)4 HARVARD L. REV. 809 (2010) [hereinafter Beebe, Sumptuary Code]. See also THE 
LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Barton Beebe, et al eds., Oxford 
University Press, 2015) (also holding a contribution from Susan Scafidi, The Scholarship of 
Envy: How the Framing of Fashion Leaves a Legal Lacuna 
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constitutional legal issues as they are applied to fashion.28    
 
Indeed, as Susan Scafidi herself admits, Fashion Law is not just about 
fashion’s relationship to intellectual property. Fashion law certainly 
imagines that it covers multiple legal fields and more besides. In 
addition, it desires to apply to an expansive definition of fashion. Under 
Scafidi’s direction, Fordham’s Fashion Law Institute has identified four 
pillars of fashion law: intellectual property, business and finance, 
international trade and government regulation, and consumer culture 
and civil rights.29 On her blog Counterfeit Chic, the think tank, if you will, 
for Scafidi’s early brainstorming on the field, Scafidi defined the 
discipline as “the field that embraces the legal substance of style, including the 
issues that may arise throughout the life of a garment, starting with the 
designer's original idea and continuing all the way to the consumer's closet.”30 
According to Scafidi the discipline also comprises “mergers and 
acquisitions, securities law, international trade, tax, mediation, employment 
law, or any number of fields that we have made part of the fashion law 
curriculum.”31 Jimenez and Kolsun break Fashion Law into three groups: 
fashion intellectual property law, fashion business law, and fashion 
public law.32 Jimenez and Kolsun also note that while “[i]ntellectual 
property…issues are at the heart of fashion law, many other legal 
specialties are called into play…”33    
 
The space where Fashion Law includes other legal disciplines allows for 
a consideration of how modern and contemporary fashion design 
objects are cultural property under cultural property law. Fashion Law 
is, however, not the exclusive field of my dissertation, nor the only one 
of interest. Fashion is a place where intellectual property law and real 
property law meet. It is in the legal overlap of properties, and a 
comparative consideration between two different jurisdictions, that the 
                                               
and Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustala’s How Can Brands Flourish in the Knockoff 
Kingdom? What China Tells Us About the Bad - And Good - Effects of Luxury Goods 
Counterfeiting). Other scholars’ work is also of importance for this discussion, including 
that of Mark McKenna, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Mark Janis, to name just a few.  
28 RUTH ANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES (2013).  
29 See Susan Scafidi, Fiat Fashion Law!, supra note 6 at 17; MSL in Fashion Law, FORDHAM 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23328/msl_in_fashion_law (last visited March 27, 2019); 
see also Brewer, Fashion Law: More than Wigs, supra note 8 at 755 (attributing these pillars 
to Susan Scafidi).   
30 So what is fashion law?, Welcome to Counterfeit Chic, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, 
http://intro.counterfeitchic.com (last visited March 27, 2019).  
31 Scafidi, Fiat Fashion Law!, supra note 6 at 17.  
32 FASHION LAW: CASES, supra note 13 at 4-9 (Carolina Academic Press, 2016). 
33 Id. at 3.  
  9 
dissertation is particularly placed. The dissertation envisions how 
Italian cultural property law applies to a specific slice of the fashion pie, 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects. As part of the 
broader discourse of how fashion is regulated or not by rules and norms 
in Fashion Law, intellectual property law, constitutional law, business 
law, and still other fields, this dissertation’s exploration of how modern 
and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are cultural property 
under Italian law necessarily includes a discussion of the ramifications 
that such a regulation would have for other regulations of fashion 
design objects, such as the regulation of fashion by U.S. copyright law. 
Moreover, even more than Fashion Law aspires to, Italian cultural 
property law embraces many diverse legal fields, including 
administrative law, constitutional law, private and public law, business 
law, and international law.34 Italian cultural property law also lends 
itself to a consideration of overlaps between legal regimes, with fashion 
as a microscope under which to examine them.  
 
The application of cultural property law to fashion is by no means as 
unexpected as one would at first think. To the contrary, a deep dive into 
Scafidi’s early work reveals an interest in cultural appropriation and 
authenticity and the legal protection, or lack thereof, of cultural 
products, which for Scafidi include fashion objects. In her book Who 
Owns Culture? Appropriation and Authenticity in American Law, Scafidi 
looked at the counterfeit goods sold on Canal Street in New York, which 
include “ ‘Prada’ bags [and] ‘Fendi’ wallets.”35 Scafidi imagined that the 
reason consumers purchase almost identical fashion objects for a higher 
price lay in the fact that the higher priced items, not sold on Canal 
Street, were 
 
‘authentic’ goods [that]- even when compared with virtually identical 
and much less expensive counterfeits- offer the purchaser a certain 
intangible value. The consumer who shuns Canal Street and opts to 
purchase the genuine article advertises her individual ability to 
distinguish real from the mass-produced fake, her aristocratic 
intolerance for invisible flaws, her appreciation of fine craftsmanship, 
her economic position, and her membership in an elite society 
welcomed into the most exclusive retail venues. For the creator of the 
original product, an assertion of authenticity may thus compensate for 
an inability to secure or protect ownership of an embodied idea, 
                                               
34 Casini, The Future, supra note 1 (although referring to cultural heritage law more 
broadly).  
35 SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN 
LAW 52 (2005) [hereinafter SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?].   
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creation, or design.36 
 
Taking a perspective of fashion as communication similar to that of 
fashion scholar Malcolm Barnard37, Scafidi has already emphasized one 
out of many intangible values of fashion objects- authenticity- as part of 
her discussion of a wider category of cultural products.38    
 
In addition, Scafidi has also entertained how cultural products that are 
similarly situated to fashion objects span the legal categories of 
intellectual property and cultural property, albeit by defining 
intellectual property and cultural property in a rather broad but limited 
way.39 Citing the work of John Henry Merryman and Patty Gerstenblith, 
Scafidi has noted Merryman’s definition of cultural property as “ 
‘objects of artistic, archeological, ethnological, or historical interest’”40 
and Gerstenblith’s emphasis on “the one constant” in cultural property, 
“the physical embodiment of culture in tangible objects”41, without 
however necessarily referencing source nations’ complex cultural 
property codes which bring needed nuances to characterizations of 
cultural property as unique objects and to characterizations of 
intellectual property as embodied intangible ideas. It is these nuances 
between cultural property law and intellectual property law that this 
dissertation explores. Looking at the Italian Code of Cultural Property, 
for example, it becomes apparent that cultural property under the law is 
not only “characterized by its association with a particular cultural 
group”; nor does it “need not consist of physical objects at all.”42 Italian 
                                               
36 Id. at 52.  
37 See generally, MALCOLM BARNARD, FASHION AS COMMUNICATION (Routledge, 2nd ed., 
2001) (grounding fashion’s communicative ability in social agreement and context and not 
material essence). Scafidi cites to Barnard in her work as an example of how scholars 
outside the field of law examine fashion’s communicative ability in all its diversity: Susan 
Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 78 (2008) 
[hereinafter Scafidi, F.I.T].  
38 SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?, supra note 35 at 52.   
39 Scafidi refers to intellectual property as “a protected category of intangible ideas 
embodied and reproduced in tangible form” and to cultural property as “[t]he traditional 
category of cultural property…[involving] the embodiment of intangible cultural values, 
albeit in specific unique objects.” Id. at 48. As we will discuss infra, such definitions may 
be misleading with reference to Italian cultural property law, which elaborately 
categorizes works, and therefore nuances the use of the qualifier “unique”. 
40 Id. at 48 (citing to Merryman, Two ways). 
41 Id. (citing to Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural 
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995).)  
42 As noted by Susan Scafidi in Introduction: New Dimensions of Cultural Property in 31(3) 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 684, 684 (2007) [hereinafter Scafidi, Introduction: New Dimensions]. A 
flattening of the concept of cultural property in English might also be thanks to challenges 
in the translation of the term. This is implied in John Henry Merryman, “Protection” of 
Cultural “Heritage”?, 38 THE AM. J. COMP. LAW 513, 520 (1990) [hereinafter Merryman, 
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cultural property law allows for the regulation of additional intangible 
values in modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects, over, 
above, and in addition to values of authenticity. It also offers a complex 
negotiation process between an intangible public cultural interest and 
tangible properties. The exploration of Italian cultural property law’s 
nuances can only benefit academic discussions of how fashion should 
be regulated (or not) as a cultural product. Indeed, these nuances can 
also help us understand why, in certain circumstances, fashion is not 
(and should not) be regulated by intellectual property at all, especially 
by copyright; and, for that matter, why even cultural property law 
should not regulate it at all times. 
 
The nuances that Italian cultural property law can reveal about the 
relationship between intellectual property and cultural property when 
cultural property law is applied to fashion certainly build on 
observations made in Scafidi’s previous work. Regarding the 
relationship between the mechanisms of time in each, Scafidi has noted 
“intellectual property law protects only new ideas, and then for a limited period 
of time, while cultural property law protects historical objects that have 
acquired cultural significance over time.”43 In terms of authorship, “while 
objects of cultural property are often created by an individual, their status as 
cultural property derives from community recognition rather than Romantic 
genius.”44 Using architecture as an example, Scafidi further elucidates 
the relationships between the two: architectural plans are classified as 
copyrightable and therefore part of intellectual property; the cross in the 
architectural plan for or in the physical embodiment of a church may be 
a “replicable cultural product”; while “a particular architectural 
structure of historical or artistic importance” is cultural property.45 At 
the same time as these explanations are helpful, Italian cultural property 
law gives us a more proper shovel to dig deeper into these observations, 
and fashion provides the fertile ground. Might, for example, there be a 
more explicit hand-off between copyright and cultural property, given 
Italian cultural property law’s express mention of copyright in its legal 
rules and the overlap between the time of application of Italian cultural 
property law and copyright law? Are copyright and cultural property 
really so distinct in terms of authorship, when Italian copyright law 
uses collective cultural criteria linked to the cultural sphere and Italian 
cultural property law itself as an indicia of copyrightability in certain 
                                               
“Protection”] and in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 193 
(Barbara T. Hoffman, ed., 2006) (citing to Frigo).  
43 Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 813 (2001) 
[hereinafter Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products].  
44 Id.  
45 SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?, supra note 35 at 48- 49.  
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instances? Even an emphasis on cultural property as unable to be 
replicated compared to intellectual property46 might be tweaked, given 
Italian cultural property law’s regulation of the intangible cultural 
interest caught up in tangible properties and the replication of them.47 
Does Italian cultural property law at times act like a copyright regime, 
and might copyright be best understood as a type of cultural property 
law? 
 
Some might call the exploration of how modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects are regulated by cultural property law in 
Italy an exploration of cultural appropriation by another name. Cultural 
appropriation, as applied to fashion, is usually understood as the 
unauthorized use of clothing or accessories with religious or other 
cultural meaning for specific groups of people; these groups are usually 
indigenous peoples or groups otherwise understood as needing 
protection in part thanks to historic or contemporary discrimination.48 
Asking how modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects 
are cultural property, however, significantly flips the arguments of the 
usual cultural appropriation debate. It does not ask whether Gucci, for 
                                               
46As Scafidi explains, “The unprotected category of cultural products resembles both cultural 
property and intellectual property, but it is distinct from either of them. All three involve 
protection of intangible human creations that may be embodied in tangible form. In the case of both 
cultural property and cultural products, the intangible good is the Volksgeist or the self-
imagination of a particular community; in the case of intellectual property, the intangible good is a 
new artistic creation or invention. Cultural property and cultural products also share a 
participatory structure of creation or at least recognition, while intellectual property looks to 
individual genius. Turning to tangible embodiments, intellectual property and cultural products 
are designed to be replicated; the physical forms of cultural property are unique. Each of the three 
categories also offers a distinct temporal paradigm. Intellectual property protects the new and 
innovative; cultural property protects the old and venerated. Cultural products derive from 
ongoing expression and development of community symbols and practices, and are thus neither 
new nor old, but in a sense both. Any extension of intellectual property law to cultural products 
must consider the singular configuration of this category of intangible property.” Scafidi, 
Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, supra note 43 at 813- 814. 
47 Art. 107, Decreto legislativo, 22 Gennaio 2004, n. 42, G.U. Feb. 24, 2004, ALTALEX 
[hereinafter CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004].  
48 See for example, descriptions of Gucci’s appropriation of a Sikh turban, Any Lingala, 
Op-Ed | Another Season, Another Cultural Appropriation Controversy, THE BUSINESS OF 
FASHION, February 27, 2018, https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/opinion/op-
ed-%E2%80%8Banother-season-another-cultural-appropriation-controversy. Win 
Gruenig, The illogic of cultural appropriation, JUNEAU EMPIRE, March 8, 2018, 
https://www.juneauempire.com/opinion/the-illogic-of-cultural-appropriation/ 
(Interviewing Susan Scafidi in the context of critiques of a wearable art show in which a 
design seemed to perpetuate Asian stereotypes; “Fordham law professor Susan Scafidi 
defines cultural appropriation as “taking intellectual property, traditional knowledge, 
cultural expressions or artifacts from someone else’s culture without permission including 
… dance, dress, music, language, folklore, cuisine, traditional medicine, religious symbols, 
etc.”). 
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example, is inappropriately presenting a Sikh turban.49 Instead, it asks 
whether certain examples of Gucci’s designs, like the Flora or the Bamboo 
Bag, are themselves of such cultural interest, like Dastaars are for the 
Sikh culture, that we must protect these fashion design objects as 
cultural property, as part of our cultural heritage.  
 
For fashion in general, given the contested nature of its regulation by 
intellectual property law, this question is loaded. As Christopher 
Sprigman has recently said, “Cultures inevitably interact. They take 
from one another, learn from what they take, and define themselves 
both through contrast and assimilation. In most instances this is not 
only desirable, but an important part of human progress.”50 Indeed, 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects may need to 
travel both practically and proverbially, not only to survive but also to 
be what they are: fashion. Sprigman’s comments, and the doubts it 
raises about the ability to “own” cultural material “outside the kind of 
materials that IP protects”51, raise logical and important doubts about the 
wisdom of protecting Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law. They suggest that fashion, no 
matter its cultural importance, might not, or should not be, owned at all, 
whether through intellectual property law or through cultural property 
law, for the very reason that fashion displays a cultural interest. They 
also suggest that if fashion is, in some way, “owned”, that that 
ownership must take into account the importance of “cultural 
interchange” and the difficulty of capturing the situations in which 
cultural appropriation, especially the reverse of cultural appropriation 
presented here, is wrong in “legal code.”52  
 
Parsing the intangible and tangible divide that hangs over these 
academic debates like a black cloud is central to engaging with these 
legitimate concerns. Understanding the intangible and tangible divide is 
                                               
49 Lingala, supra note 48.  
50 @CJSprigman, TWITTER, June 14, 2019 (images of tweets on file with author); Sprigman’s 
comments were precipitated in part by accusations by the Mexican Minister of Culture 
that Carolina Herrera has culturally appropriated traditional Mexican embroidery. 
Vanessa Friedman, Homage or Theft? Carolina Herrera Called Out by Mexican Minister, ON 
THE RUNWAY, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/fashion/carolina-herrera-mexico-
appropriation.html.  
51 @CJSprigman, TWITTER, June 14, 2019 (images of tweets on file with author).  
52 @CJSprigman, June 14, 2019 (replying to @TimberlakeLaw and @kavalsultana_jd) 
(images of tweets on file with author). This also brings up arguments that copyright is 
about cultural conversation, as implied in the work of Abraham Drassinower and Carys 
Craig. See ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015); CARYS J 
CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE TOWARDS A RELATIONAL THEORY OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW (Elgar, 2011).  
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also important to problematize how modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects are cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law and their ensuing relationship to parts of intellectual 
property law. Indeed, when we speak of cultural appropriation we are 
usually speaking of the theft or unlicensed use of intangibles. The theft 
of tangible cultural property might not even be susceptible to such 
rationalizations- just think of the outrage, and not support, that follows 
most restitution claims. In this sense, a theory of property is needed 
which incorporates a notion of a cultural interest that is capable of 
negotiating between these tangible and intangible worlds. This notion 
of cultural interest needs to help us imagine how Italian fashion design 
objects, so associated with intangibility, can be tangible cultural 
property. This theory of property would need to acknowledge a 
property’s cultural importance, both for its “owners” and its 
“appropriators”, while allowing the cultural interest to travel when 
appropriate. The theory of property under Italian cultural property law, 
seen through the subject matter of modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects, can, at the very least, provide an initial 
foundation for such a theory of property.53  
 
There is also, of course, a hierarchical concern to equating modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects with other culturally 
appropriated heritage. It is a concern of perpetuating high fashion 
hierarchies over artisanal production, of supporting urban realities over 
regional traditions, of protecting global conglomerates over local 
businesses.54 Italy again, however, with its rich, sometimes still 
problematic, history, and long evolution of legal norms for cultural 
heritage generally, provides us with ways to address these concerns. 
These ways, moreover, do not necessarily mean protecting or 
                                               
53 Such a new theory of property is in line with other legal scholars’ interest is developing 
new theories of property which will address changes brought on by technology. Data, for 
example, is seen as a new kind of property that necessitates a new legal definition. See 
Christina Mulligan with James Grimmelman, Data is Property, a working paper presented 
at the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (defining property as an “institution 
for organizing resources in Society”).   
54 In some ways this is a complaint levied or challenge addressed by those who seek to 
solve the inadequacy of the term property applied to material aspects of cultural heritage. 
For a discussion of the challenges of thinking about cultural property between community 
property and traditional, ownership-based property in the United States see Kristin A. 
Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal and Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118(6) YALE L. J. 
1022 (2009) (“offer[ing] a stewardship model of property to explain and justify indigenous 
peoples’ cultural property claims in terms of nonowners’ fiduciary obligations towards 
cultural resources”); Michael F. Brown, Culture, Property and Peoplehood: A Comment on 
Carpenter, Katyal and Riley’s ‘In Defense of Property’, 17 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 569 
(2010) [hereinafter Brown, Culture, Property and Peoplehood]; Michael F. Brown, Can Culture 
Be Copyrighted? 39(2) CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 197 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, Can 
Culture]. 
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preserving modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects to 
the detriment of a market, a culture, a people, or society at large.  
 
Fashion Law has today been exported to Italy. Concurrently to Scafidi’s 
and Jimenez’s efforts two Florentine lawyers published Il Diritto e la 
Moda, with a preface by Ferruccio Ferragamo, President of Salvatore 
Ferragamo, s.P.a. in 2006.55 In Italy, Scafidi’s work on fashion law has 
been taken up with gusto by scholars such as Barbara Pozzo, who has 
written her own book Fashion Law56 and begun courses in the subject at 
the Università degli Studi dell’Insubria.57 Other courses in fashion law 
have recently appeared over time in Italy. Most recently LUISS in Rome 
has started a Masters in Fashion Law58, on the heels of Fordham’s 
Masters of Laws in Fashion Law program59, and Milan and Florence also 
offer continuing legal education courses and seminars in the subject.60 
Over the past few years, more books on Fashion Law have also 
appeared in Italy, such as Silvia Segnalini’s Le Leggi della Moda and 
Angelo Maietta’s Il Diritto della Moda.61 More than simply adding a 
European gloss, however, to Fashion Law, Italian law provides legal 
tools as yet undervalued in the Fashion Law arsenal. As Fabio Moretti 
has explained, the archives of Italian companies might have items of 
cultural property in them, or, at the very least, things protected by 
intellectual property and moral rights which need to be properly 
evaluated during a company’s public offering or properly construed as 
                                               
55 MARIA GRAZIA ANTOCI AND ANDREA ORCIANI, IL DIRITTO E LA MODA: ASPETTI LEGALI 
ESSENZIALI PER OPERATORI DEL SETTORE [Law and Fashion: Essential Legal Aspects for 
Operators in the Sector] (2006). 
56 FASHION LAW: LE PROBLEMATICHE GIURIDICHE DELLA FILIERA DELLA MODA [Fashion 
Law: Legal Problems of the Fashion Supply Chain] (Barbara Pozzo and Valentina 
Jacometti, eds.) (Giuffrè 2017).  
57 The course at the Università degli Studi dell’Insubria is also mentioned in Brewer, 
Fashion Law: More than Wigs, supra note 8 at 747, n. 55. See also Corso di perfezionamento in 
Fashion Law - Le problematiche giuridiche della filiera della moda, UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI 
DELL’INSUBRIA, https://www.uninsubria.it/postlauream/corso-di-perfezionamento-
fashion-law-le-problematiche-giuridiche-della-filiera-della (last visited March 27, 2019).  
58 The new master's program in Fashion Law, LUISS, February 25, 2019, 1:24pm, 
https://www.luiss.edu/news/2019/02/25/new-masters-program-fashion-law (last 
visited March 27, 2019).  
59 See supra note 29.  
60 See, for example, the Milano Fashion Institute, a consortium of universities including the 
Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi and the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 
which offers a short course in Fashion Law. See Fashion Law, MILANO FASHION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.milanofashioninstitute.com/short-courses/fashion-law, last visited March 
27, 2019; Fashion Law. Diritto e Cultura nella Filiera della Moda, DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE 
GIURIDICHE, UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI FIRENZE, https://www.dsg.unifi.it/vp-550-
fashion-law-diritto-e-cultura-nella-filiera-della-moda.html (last visited March 27, 2019).  
61 SILVIA SEGNALINI, LE LEGGI DELLA MODA: GUIDA AL DIRITTO PER IL MONDO DELLA MODA 
[The Laws of Fashion: A Guide to Law for the Fashion World] (2012); ANGELO MAIETTA, 
IL DIRITTO DELLA MODA [The Law of Fashion] (2018).  
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assets of a company foundation.62 Italian cultural property law, which 
would restrict the alienation of such items or impose obligations for 
their preservation would affect the nature and activity of fashion 
businesses, fashion brands, and even fashion not for profit foundations. 
These effects would be beyond those already exerted by intellectual 
property law. American lawyers and legal scholars dealing with fashion 
and law benefit from a knowledge of such cultural property rules. These 
cultural property rules also have the ability to change how we think 
about fashion itself- both as part of design and as part of the objects in 
which we live our lives. In addition, modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects are only proliferating in spaces of public trust, 
like museums. They are also crucial parts of company archives, private 
museums, and exhibitions which serve the ends of for-profit companies 
while also involving the public and its collective cultural interest.63 
Modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are, whether 
or not they are protected by intellectual property law, aging in to Italian 
cultural property law’s requirements for cultural property. 
Understanding how modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
objects are the subject matter of cultural property law, with reference to 
one area of intellectual property law, copyright, will help us to properly 
inherit our future cultural heritage and define cultural property under 
the law for that future and for our present.   
                                               
62 Fabio Moretti, Gavin Llewellyn, Javier Garcia | Union Internationale des Avocats, 
Lecture: Heritage in the fashion world. IP, contractual and corporate issues (April 12, 2019) (part 
of the course FASHION LAW: DIRITTO E CULTURALE NELLA FILIERA DELLA MODA, Università 
degli Studi di Firenze).  
63 While an exhaustive list of exhibitions involving modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects is beyond the scope of this dissertation, since 2015 major exhibitions 
have been held both in Italy and in the United States which prominently featured Italian 
fashion in places of public trust, beyond traditional museums. These include 
Couture/Sculpture, an exhibition of Azzedine Alaïa’s work at the Villa Borghese in Rome in 
2015 and Italiana. L’Italia vista dalla moda 1971- 2001 at Palazzo Reale in Milan. See 
Azzedine Alaïa, GALLERIA BORGHESE, 
http://galleriaborghese.beniculturali.it/it/news/azzedine-alaia; see also ITALIANA. ITALY 
THROUGH THE LENS OF FASHION 1971- 2001 (Stefano Tonchi, ed., 2018). In addition, private 
museums belonging to Italian fashion brands have remained opened, facilitating research 
(such as the Museo Ferragamo) or have closed (such as the Museo Gucci, now the Gucci 
Garden or Gucci Galleria). Italian fashion brands continue to lend their design objects to 
museums in the United States, often playing a crucial role in the message of fashion not 
only as art but as on par with other items of ascertained cultural property. One example is 
the exhibit Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and the Catholic Imagination at The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in 2018. See Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and the Catholic Imagination, THE 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/listings/2018/heavenly-bodies. The 
Heavenly Bodies exhibition also presents an example of how fashion design objects can 
reveal the same competing interests as other cultural properties that are also of religious 
significance and in religious use, like chapels. See LORENZO CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO: 
DILEMMI SUL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE [Inheriting our Future: Cultural Heritage 
Dilemmas] 27 (2014) [hereinafter CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO]. 
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3. Aim and Scope of the Dissertation 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to trace the legal links that exist between 
cultural property and Italian fashion design objects in Italy and in the 
United States. The primary legal links examined are those of Italian 
cultural property law as applied to Italian fashion design objects, 
although Italian copyright law is also contemplated. The reason to 
compare cultural property law and copyright, and not, for example, 
cultural property law and design rights, or even cultural property law 
and trademark law, both of which might also be appropriate, among 
still other regime comparisons, is twofold. First, Italian cultural 
property law, which is the closest legal regime to define Italian fashion 
design objects as cultural property for territorial reasons, namechecks 
copyright law within its legal code. Italian cultural property law 
deliberately carves out a negative space for itself and lets copyright law 
act in its stead or alongside it in certain circumstances.64 Second, recent, 
but also historic65, calls to extend copyright protection to fashion designs 
in the U.S., a recent U.S. Supreme Court case holding certain features of 
cheerleading uniform designs copyrightable subject matter, and the lack 
of a comprehensive body of cultural property law for non-indigenous 
movable objects not on public property but of American cultural 
significance in the United States, all point to copyright law as an 
important legal field for fashion design and, therefore, for fashion 
design objects. In addition, U.S. copyright law’s complex framing of 
itself as an intangible property which embodies certain intangible 
expressions fixed in a tangible finds a partner in Italian cultural 
property law’s own parsing of tangibles and intangibles.     
 
The chosen law might have been contained to Italian legal sources and 
Italian legal doctrine, but the nature of modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects calls for a comparative legal framework. 
Indeed, the history of Italian fashion and the nature of cultural property 
highlight how other countries, including France and the United States, 
played a crucial role both in the presentation, dissemination and 
acceptance of Italian fashion around the world and, separately, in the 
presentation and evolution of Italy’s cultural property legal framework. 
                                               
64 Art. 107(1), CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004.  
65 For a description and historical reconstruction of an extension of copyright protection to 
fashion in the United States see C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, The Fashion Originators’ 
Guild of America: Self-help at the edge of IP and Anti-trust in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP (Rachel Cooper Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg, 
eds.) 159- 179 (2014) [hereinafter Hemphill and Suk, The Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
America]; see generally Colman, History and Principles, supra note 6 (also with some 
references to design rights).  
  18 
 
A comparison between France and Italy in terms of how modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects are cultural property under 
the law would be apt. Not only does France now deliberately collect 
examples of contemporary French fashion as part of its governmental 
support of French cultural heritage66, but France has an extensive 
cultural heritage legal framework in place which has recently allowed 
for the acquisition of certain costumes as part of French cultural 
heritage.67 In addition, the status of Paris as the capital of fashion until 
World War II, in the fashion imaginary at the very least if not, 
sometimes, in fact68, has informed contemporary discussions of fashion’s 
artistry and comparative legal explorations of its copyrightability.69 
                                               
66 Joelle Diderich, French Government to Buy Five Designer Items Every Season, WOMEN’S 
WEAR DAILY, April 28, 2017, WWD database (discussing this collecting as part of “a 
permanent collection to be housed at the National Center for Visual Arts” alongside the 
initiatives of private French fashion houses, such as the Yves Saint Laurent museum and 
Dior Heritage; also mentioning the institution of a “French Fashion Heritage label to 
underline the exemplary nature of the conservation work carried out by certain couture 
houses and luxury brands”). The notion of haute couture as part of French cultural heritage 
is visible in an article in French Vogue in 1980, Robert F. Caillé (and Ministre de la 
Culture, Monsieur Jean-Philippe Lecat), Le Point de Vue de Vogue : Le Haute Couture Notre 
Patrimoine, VOGUE FRANCE, March 1980 at 283- 285.  
67 Collection « Un trésor national au musée de l'armée », L'ÉCHO DU DÔME 
#31 MUSÉE DE L’ARME INVALIDES, OCTOBRE 2014/JANVIER 2015, https://www.musee-
armee.fr/echo-du-dome/31/html-accessible/actualites/collection-un-tresor-national-au-
musee-de-l-armee.html (describing the acquisition of a ceremonial uniform, as the result 
of the French government’s acquisition after the heirs attempted to sell it and export it 
from France). See also L’habit et le manteau de cérémonie du maréchal Ney, LE BLOG DES 
ACTUALITÉS DU MUSÉE DE L’ARMÉE, MUSÉE DE L’ARMÉE INVALIDES, December 13, 2014, 
http://actualites.musee-armee.fr/non-classe/lhabit-et-le-manteau-de-ceremonie-du-
marechal-ney/. For a codification of the French law governing cultural patrimony see 
Ordonnance n° 2004-178 du 20 février 2004 relative à la partie législative du code du 
patrimoine [Ordinance n. 2004-178 of the February 20, 2004 on the legislative part of the 
Cultural Heritage Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], February 24, 2004, p. 37048.  
68 For an overview of Paris as a capital of fashion see VALERIE STEELE, PARIS, CAPITAL OF 
FASHION (Bloomsbury, 2019) but also VALERIE STEELE, PARIS FASHION: A CULTURAL 
HISTORY (Bloomsbury, 2017).  
69 Susan Scafidi partially underlies the differences in copyright protection for fashion 
designs in France and the United States in a historical presentation of France as a past and 
current capital of fashion and the United States as a nation of copyists with a fashion 
industry fighting for cultural recognition. See Scafidi, Intellectual Property 
and Fashion Design, supra note 6; Raustiala and Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 9 
discuss both the history of copying French fashions in the United States and the legal 
protections available in the United States at their writing, concluding that increased legal 
protection for fashion designs would not change the practices of fashion copying on either 
side of the Atlantic; C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk Gersen in The Law, Culture, and 
Economics of Fashion, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 1147 (2009) (arguing for an extension of 
protection for fashion designs which would consider close copying as copyright 
infringement, note that such a protection in Europe does result in less close copies, both in 
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Historical explorations of the differences between the United States and 
France in terms of the protection of fashion under the law already exist 
as a part of the literature.70 A direct examination of legal protections for 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects under French 
law is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that perhaps the earliest example of a work 
dedicated to “fashion law” as a field is found in the French text by 
Jeanne Belhumeur, Droit International de la Mode.71 
 
Instead, the dissertation explores Italian cultural property law as 
applied to modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects in 
comparison to U.S. law. The primary reasons for this are two-fold. First, 
the United States and Italy have enjoyed their own special relationship 
which has allowed for the evolution and acceptance of Italian fashion 
both on the market for it and in other more explicitly cultural spheres. 
The exploration of this special relationship has certainly occurred in 
fashion history and fashion studies literature72 and in legal scholarship, 
particularly that exploring cultural property and cultural heritage.73 
Such a comparative endeavor still has even more insight and 
information to contribute. Indeed, how modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects are cultural property from this 
comparative law perspective can uniquely answer the “clash of cultures 
                                               
Europe and the United States, while characterizing European based fast-fashion firms 
such as H&M as designers and U.S. based ones such as Forever 21 as copiers.) 
70 For example, NANCY J. TROY, COUTURE CULTURE: A STUDY IN MODERN ART AND 
FASHION (2004) (especially Chapter 3, Fashioning Commodity Culture, a historical exploration 
of the differences between haute couture and art and their copying in addition to their 
protection under intellectual property law in France with reference to Poiret); ALEXANDRA 
PALMER, COUTURE AND COMMERCE: THE TRANSATLANTIC FASHION TRADE IN THE 1950s 
(2001) (challenging “entrenched mythologies of couture” by historically contextualizing 
the appearance of haute couture dresses with labels from both sides of the Atlantic); 
Pouillard and Kuldova, supra note 17 (an overview of the special issue of the journal 
exploring from a historical perspective and through cases how “protection of design and 
fashion creations is situated between high and low authorship, or else, ‘at the edge of 
intellectual property’, as the lawyers Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg put 
it.”)  
71 Although this work lacks an explicit exploration of cultural heritage law. See JEANNE 
BELHUMEUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA MODE (Canova, 2000) (exploring the legal 
protections afforded to fashion from a comparative intellectual property perspective 
between France, Italy and supranational and international law with reference to fashion 
history, aesthetics and art; the work is an evolution of Belhumeur’s PhD dissertation at the 
University of Geneva).  
72 As but one example, NICOLA WHITE, RECONSTRUCTING ITALIAN FASHION: AMERICA AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ITALIAN FASHION INDUSTRY (Oxford: Berg, 2000). 
73 Just one example of the work of John Henry Merryman, not only as applied to cultural 
heritage but also with reference to his considerable comparative scholarship alongside 
Italian colleagues such as Mauro Cappelletti, will suffice. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN, JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 
(1967).  
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and notions of property”74, which is of fundamental concern to fashion 
and cultural heritage under the law. The second reason is that, unlike in 
France, in the United States it is hard to find an exact legal framework 
comparable to Italian cultural property law as it applies to movable 
objects of intangible cultural interest. Indeed, the United States, despite 
its historic preservation law and sui generis protections for Native-
American movable objects and other laws protecting movable objects 
found on public lands, does not have a body of law easily identifiable as 
cultural property law.75 Indeed, United States legal scholarship has had 
in some sense no choice but to follow a comparative and international fil 
rouge when discussing most movable cultural property on its own 
territory because of this very lacuna. Indeed, the lack of a body of law 
which conceives of movable objects in the United States as national 
cultural property seems to naturally filter conversations about the 
cultural significance of objects in the United States into disciplines 
which deal with similarly situated objects, like art, and therefore into 
“Art Law”, the field founded by John Henry Merryman and Albert 
Elsen.76 In the face of this lacuna, and our American way of 
implementing the cultural property protections of other jurisdictions77, 
Italy provides an excellent legal toolbox. Italy has already engaged with 
many of the legal issues at the heart of protecting both a vast cultural 
heritage and many challenging iterations of cultural property, from 
Dante’s text to architecture, furniture and even contemporary art. These 
are sound reasons to look to the Italian jurisdiction as an example.  
 
Exploring the legal links between cultural property and Italian fashion 
design objects through Italian cultural property law and U.S. copyright 
law does not mean that these two legal regimes, as they exist in 
different legal jurisdictions with different histories and contexts, are 
necessarily the same. At the same time, however, the lack of an obvious 
cultural property law framework for non-indigenous movable objects of 
cultural interest in the United States leads to a search for the reasons, 
purposes and public interest at the heart of Italian cultural property law 
in unexpected legal regimes in the United States. The work of Patty 
                                               
74 Brewer, Fashion Law: More than Wigs, supra note 8 at 763.  
75 As Merryman has said, the United States is an exception to the rule that “[a]lmost every 
national government…treats cultural objects within its jurisdiction as parts of a ‘national 
cultural heritage’.” Merryman, Two Ways, supra note 2 at 832. See also Merryman, 
“Protection”, supra note 42.   
76 Albert E. Elsen, In Honor of John Henry Merryman: Founding the Field of Art Law, 39 
STANFORD L. REV. 1086 (1987).  
77 This references the U.S.’s implementation of the cultural property claims of other source 
nations, in, for example, enabling legislation such as The Protect and Preserve 
International Cultural Property Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (2016) and in The Convention on 
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2603.  
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Gerstenblith and Joseph Sax has already partially provided ways to 
envision how legal regimes in the United States might be changed, 
expanded or re-interpreted to protect certain properties of cultural 
interest in the United States for new categories of objects, such as 
architecture, public art, books, presidential papers and library 
collections.78 W.W. Kowalski has suggested that while “copyright law 
should not strive to replace or even compete with cultural heritage 
law”79 it could be seen as “responsible for the protection of valuable 
works of art in the interim period- before the work of art is considered 
cultural heritage but when its protection is in the public interest.”80 
More recent scholarship has, in the face of increased digitization, 
explored how restrictions on the copying of works in the public domain 
may “curtail the dissemination of knowledge about artistic works 
whose materiality hitherto inhibited their circulation.”81 Other work has 
imagined how traditional garment design might gain increased 
copyright protection in part by allowing historic preservation or 
cultural property terms to inform copyright terms.82 Such scholarship, 
while not explicitly applied to fashion, already implies that there is 
some connection between legal protections of certain intangible 
property and certain tangible property across cultural property law and 
copyright law. 
 
                                               
78 Gerstenblith, in her article Architect as Artist: Artists’ Rights and Historic Preservation, 
explores what might be a better legal mechanism to “protect the past” of architecture: 
“architects’ rights in their capacity as artists” or further protection of specific “examples of 
architecture.” Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists’ Rights and Historic Preservation, 
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 431, 432 (1994). Joseph L. Sax’s excellent Playing Darts with a 
Rembrandt looks especially to the specific examples of architectural heritage, presidential 
papers and library collections to question the deference to private ownership in the 
United States and reframe the relationship in the United States between public and private 
interests in property. Shifting the conversation from economic rights to “a right to decide 
the fate of an object” and the importance of a public domain, Sax links what he sees as the 
foundation of intellectual property law with a discussion of the regulation of personal 
property: whereas a “recognition that our accumulated knowledge and insight should be 
viewed as elements of a common heritage undergirds the basic premise of intellectual-
property rules…”, no such notion of a common heritage underlies “ownership of physical 
things” in the United States. JOSEPH L SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 3, 9 (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan 
Press, 1999).   
79 W.W. Kowalski, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Retained Rights of Artists, 38 
VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1141, 1168 - 1169 (2005). 
80 Id.  
81 Charles Cronin, Possession Is 99% of the Law: 3D Printing, Public Domain Cultural Artifacts 
and Copyright, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 711 (2016). 
82 Saharah F. Farnezah, Cultural Appropriation of Traditional Garment Designs in the Post-Star 
Athletica Era, 37(2) CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 415, 419 (2019) (exploring how indigenous 
fashion garments may have increased protection post Star Athletica and arguing a court 
deciding a copyright case could use terms from NAGPRA).  
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Hence then the comparison between U.S. copyright law and Italian 
cultural property law. The comparison is small in scope due to its 
explicit application only to modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects. It explicitly compares one form of intellectual property- 
the copyrightable subject matter of pictorial graphic and sculptural 
works- with one form of Italian cultural property- movable things of 
historic or artistic interest, or those things which are also testaments 
having the value of civilization. Contrary to criticisms of the use of the 
word “property” to identify and protect parts of our cultural heritage 
under the law83, the dissertation imagines that the use of such a term, in 
a comparative sense, can be helpful. Helpful primarily because it allows 
a reconceptualization of dichotomies such as “real, personal, and 
intellectual…tangible, intangible”84 that have hitherto been deemed 
unnecessary or too problematic.85   
 
Of course, the scope of the dissertation’s inquiry is also naturally 
limited by many of the same practical legal issues that are at the heart of 
its conclusions about how modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
designs are cultural property under the law in Italy and in the U.S. 
Information about and access to modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects is often controlled, thanks to the law, by the 
Italian corporations which produce and sell them. This can at times 
frustrate a study of them by uninterested third parties. Copyright 
owners are also not the only barrier. The U.S. Copyright Office only 
allows the images of registered pictorial, graphic and sculptural works 
deposited to be shown to researchers on site and at cost, with the 
permission of the copyright holder, during pending litigation, or if the 
researcher is an attorney representing a party in the case.86 
Compounding matters is that these modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects, both in their tangible and intangible parts, may 
be of fundamental importance to the business activities of Italian 
fashion corporations. This leads, at the very least, to a confidentiality 
which at times frustrates a truly transparent academic analysis. 
                                               
83 Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?, 1 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 307, 310- 311 (1992) (“ ‘Property’ does nothing to counteract the 
concentration on commercial value whereas ‘heritage’, while not of course capable of 
doing away with it, can lessen the impact.”). 
84 Id. at 313.  
85 Id. (noting these dichotomies “[are] largely unhelpful in that cultural complexes often 
flow across the classifications in a way that the legal system has not been constructed to 
cope with”).  
86 E-mail to author from Records, Research and Certification at the U.S. Copyright Office, 
copycerts@copyright.gov, February 6, 2019 at 2:28 pm (noting “to get copies of registered 
works you would need permission from the owner or submit a Litigation statement. 
Applications, registrations, correspondence and recorded documents are public record so 
we can provide that information.”) 
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Moreover, given the commercial nature of Italian fashion design objects 
and the peculiarities of Italian copyright law, most Italian fashion 
design objects seem to not have been registered as literary, scientific and 
artistic property at the time of their creation. If they had been they 
would have appeared on the register maintained by the most 
comparable administrative agency to the U.S. Copyright Office in the 
Italian instance, the Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali in Italy.87 In 
addition, even fashion museums and other cultural institutions who 
collect fashion in the public interest and keep records of Italian fashion 
design objects are affected by the need to maintain good working 
relations with Italian fashion companies who donate their fashion 
design objects or sponsor exhibitions. As detailed in the 
acknowledgements, where possible these natural research restrictions 
have been circumvented by obtaining information from publicly 
available archives and registers, such as the Archivio Centrale dello 
Stato in Rome, the New York Public Library in New York City and the 
U.S. Copyright Office in Washington, D.C. The generosity of certain 
museums, including the Museum at the Fashion Institute of 
Technology, the Archives of The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York City, and the Galleria degli Uffizi, has been invaluable.   
 
4.. Research Question and Methodology  
 
The primary and overarching research question is  
 
§ How are certain modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects cultural property under Italian cultural property 
law?  
 
Recently there has been a marked acceptance of Italian fashion’s 
importance as part of Italian cultural heritage. This has been especially 
so thanks to Italian fashion’s inclusion in public and private museums 
in Italy. Some studies on tourism and in business literature have 
explicitly entertained how fashion and cultural heritage interact for the 
                                               
87 The Ferragamo legal office has noted they are not aware of Salvatore Ferragamo 
registering any of his fashion design objects under copyright law during his lifetime. See 
Interview with Ferragamo Legal Office, Giselle Stoecklin and Avv. Giacomo Bucciarelli 
(May 11, 2019) (notes on file with author). See also e-mail to author from Segreteria Ufficio 
Registro Pubblico Generale delle opere protette, Servizio II - Patrimonio bibliografico e diritto 
d'Autore, Direzione Generale Biblioteche e Istituti culturali, Ministero per i beni e le attività 
culturali, February 19, 2019, 12:23 pm (citing to its duty to maintain a registry open to the 
public for literary, scientific and artistic works and to periodically publish the list of such 
works in an official bulletin in “L’art. 41 del Regolamento per l’esecuzione della L. 22 
aprile 1941, n.633 per la protezione del diritto d’autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo 
esercizio (approvato con R.D. 18 maggio 1942, n. 1369)”).   
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benefit of tourism and corporations, in Italy and elsewhere.88 In 
addition, fashion studies has also taken up the link between Italian 
fashion and Italian cultural heritage.89 Some of the literature, especially 
the work of Daniela Calanca, has come close to fully examining the legal 
issues surrounding how Italian fashion is part of Italian cultural 
heritage under the law, especially with regards to private fashion 
corporations and at times in a way connected to the heritage of even 
other Italian corporations in the Museimpresa group.90 Separately, 
Antonio Leo Tarasco has envisioned how design is a testament having 
the value of civilization under Italian cultural property law and how 
fashion shows can be tools of valorization for cultural property.91 The 
recognition of Italian fashion as part of Italian cultural heritage has been 
made in statements by the Director of the Uffizi galleries Eike Schmidt 
and by past and current Italian Cultural Ministers. In 2016, upon the 
                                               
88 Daniela Calanca, Italian Fashion History and Cultural Heritage: Data for a Tourist Guide 5 
ALMATOURISM: J. OF TOURISM, CULTURE AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT (2012) 
(proposing Italian fashion as an Italian cultural heritage that can be promoted for tourism 
with an excellent overview of the fashion museums and archives in Italy and 
contextualizing the proposal with reference to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding 
of Intangible Cultural Heritage); Andrade R.M et al, Fashion and Cultural Heritage in 
Perspective: 1st Seminar on History and Historiography of Fashion and Dress. University of São 
Paulo (USP)/Federal University of Goiàs (UFG) (June 2013), 7 ALMATOURISM: J. OF TOURISM, 
CULTURE AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 157 (2013) (also discussing the contribution of 
Daniela Calanca at the University of Bologna to the presentation of fashion as of historical 
significance and therefore as cultural heritage); Anne-Sofie Hjemdahl, Fashion Time: 
Enacting Fashion as Cultural Heritage and as an Industry at the Museum of Decorative Arts and 
Design in Oslo, 8(1) FASHION PRACTICE 98 (2016), doi: 10.1080/17569370.2016.1147695 (a 
historical analysis of how the fashion industry and fashion museums developed their 
relationships, “help[ing] to legitimize each other”, using the case study of a 1933 “dress 
event at the Museum of Decorative Arts and Design in Oslo”). See also MONICA AMARI, I 
MUSEI DELLE AZIENDE. LA CULTURA DELLA TECNICA TRA ARTE E STORIA (2001) (mapping 
corporate archives and museums throughout Italy).  
89 Eugenia Paulicelli, Fashion: The Cultural Economy of Made in Italy, 6(2) FASHION PRACTICE 
155- 174 (2014). See also CALANCA, infra note 90. 
90 Daniela Calanca and Cinzia Capalbo, Fashion and Cultural Heritage 8(1) ZONEMODA VI 
(2018) (defining cultural heritage according to Article 2 of the Italian Code of Cultural 
Property and Landscape, citing to DANIELA CALANCA, LA STORIA SOCIALE DELLA MODA 
CONTEMPORANEA 17- 47 (2014) and mentioning the challenges that can result when a 
fashion company manages their own heritage). See also Daniela Calanca, Moda e 
Patrimonio Culturale in CALANCA, supra at 17- 47 (extensively citing to the Italian Code of 
Cultural Heritage and Landscape, including Article 10 and Article 13, to note how Italian 
fashion is cultural heritage as an “inventario ingente” and also discussing the Europeana 
and Fashion: Discover Europe’s Fashion Heritage project in 2012 and intangible heritage 
more generally). 
91 Antonio Lei Tarasco, Il disegno quale testimonianza della civiltà italiana nel mondo [Design as 
a testament having the value of Italian civilization in the world] in 2 AEDON [Art and Law 
Online], http://aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2017/2/tarasco.htm; ANTONIO LEO TARASCO, 
IL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE: MODELLI DI GESTIONE E FINANZA PUBBLICA [Cultural Heritage: 
Models of Management and Public Finance] 70 n. 45 (2017) (also exploring how “tessuti 
d’epoca” are “beni culturali minori” Id. at 57.).  
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renaming of the Museo del Costume in Palazzo Pitti to the Museo della 
Moda e del Costume Eike Schmidt noted the dual role of this new 
museum vision, one in which  
 
“il nuovo Museo della Moda di Firenze, oltreché radunare e mettere in 
mostra il patrimonio storico della moda italiana, con il programma di 
allestire due grandi mostre l’anno, aprirà le porte a giovani designer e 
ricercatori, interessati a studiare questi abiti che hanno fatto la storia 
della moda.”92   
 
In 2017 the Minister of Culture Dario Franceschini noted, upon the 
donation of funds for the restoration of the Boboli Gardens by the Gucci 
company that,  
 
Anche la moda è parte del patrimonio culturale e della storia del 
nostro Paese… dove il gusto, l'eleganza e l'educazione al bello fanno 
parte del nostro quotidiano. Il legame tra moda e arte è sempre stato 
molto stretto e ha spesso favorito occasioni di incontro suggestive e 
uniche. Come avviene oggi con un marchio prestigioso dello stile 
italiano che decide di investire in modo significativo su una grande 
istituzione culturale nel pieno rispetto della sua missione.93  
 
Taking an even broader perspective on the cultural value of Italian 
fashion for Italy grounded in fashion’s value for current Italian creative 
industries, the previous Minister of Culture Alberto Bonisoli made 
Italian fashion an integral part of his plan for the Ministry.94  
 
The founding of the digital archive, Archivi della Moda del Novecento in 
200995 [Figure 4] has certainly led to the identification of Italian fashion 
                                               
92 Enrica Roddolo, Schmidt: «Ecco come sarà il nuovo Museo della Moda di Firenze», CORRIERE 
DELLA SERA, 13 maggio 2016 (modifica il 18 maggio 2016, 12:10), 
https://www.corriere.it/cultura/eventi/notizie/schmidt-ecco-come-sara-nuovo-museo-
moda-firenze-5dbada30-18ff-11e6-a60e-5fac25fd8ba7.shtml.  
93 [Press Release] Franceschini, Da Gucci Investimento Significativo per Giardini di Boboli: 
Anche la moda parte del patrimonio culturale, Ufficio Stampa MiBACT (4 aprile 2017) 
http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/MiBAC/sito-
MiBAC/Contenuti/MibacUnif/Comunicati/visualizza_asset.html_1737793921.html.  
94 Perhaps the most recent manifestation of this is the institution of a Commission to Study 
the Identification of Public Policies for the Protection, Conservation, Valorization, and Use of 
Italian Fashion as Cultural Heritage. See Decreto Ministeriale 12 Dicembre 2018, n. 551 (on 
file with author). A recent short summary of the Commission’s work is available here 
http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/MiBAC/sito-
MiBAC/Contenuti/MibacUnif/Comunicati/visualizza_asset.html_1132902770.html. As 
will be discussed infra Italian legal scholars like Grisolia and Cassese note the possibility 
of including parts of the fashion system (namely the traditional arts and customs) into 
cultural heritage law.  
95 The archive is available here, http://www.moda.san.beniculturali.it/wordpress/.  
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design in an archive as cultural property.96 This identification seems not, 
however, to have fully parsed whether cultural property is fashion in its 
intangible nature (the images of the fashion designs, the designs 
themselves, even the digital collection of fashion) or in its tangible 
nature (shoes, accessories, and other ephemera as properties only later 
shared through images as a tool for valorization).   
 
Modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are not yet, 
however, explicitly recognized as cultural property in the text of Italian 
cultural property legislation. This is notwithstanding the awareness of 
Italian fashion’s value as part of a national cultural heritage, its embrace 
in digital archives, brick and mortar museums, and the history of Italian 
cultural property law’s consideration of the many iterations of cultural 
property on the Italian territory. Fashion is not a category specifically 
named like certain iterations of photography or film.97 In this sense, the 
main research question is also beneficial for Italian cultural property 
and the Italian territory, even outside of the dissertation’s comparative 
framework. Examining how certain modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects are included or excluded from the proverbial 
cultural property “box” under Italian law, especially outside the 
museum or archive, helps to problematize issues for Italian fashion 
design objects which Italian law has affronted throughout history for 
other objects. These issues include whether fashion design objects 
should be conceived a priori as part of a cultural activity or as a cultural 
property, whether public or private ownership of fashion design objects 
should lead to different legal requirements for its preservation and 
valorization, whether fashion design objects need to reach a certain time 
threshold to capture our cultural interest and, most importantly, where 
and how to identify our intangible public cultural interest in Italian 
fashion design objects. Indeed, it is not a foregone conclusion that 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects, outside a state 
museum collection or public archive, are cultural property under Italian 
cultural property law at all.  
 
Underneath and at times concurrently to the primary and overarching 
research question are also other research questions which follow from it:  
 
§ What is the relationship between cultural property protection in 
Italy and copyright protection in Italy, especially for modern 
and contemporary Italian fashion design objects? 
§ Is there an overlap between the modern and contemporary 
                                               
96 Donato Tamblé, Intervento alla Conferenza Nazionale degli Archivi, Progetto “Archivi della 
moda del ‘900”, Gruppo di Lavoro Archivi e Moda, Bologna, 20 Novembre 2009 at 3. 
97 Art. 10(4) and Art. 11, CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004. 
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Italian fashion design protected by Italian copyright law and 
U.S. copyright law?  
§ Is there some common element in the subject matter of Italian 
cultural property law and U.S. copyright law as these laws are 
applied to modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
objects?  
§ What might any commonalities or differences mean for the 
treatment of Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
in Italy and in the United States?  
 
Of course, answering the primary and overarching research question as 
well as the secondary ones entails defining some terms in them, 
primarily modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects and 
cultural property. 
 
Modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects refers to the 
union of intangible designs and tangible fabric, clothing, or accessories 
by Italian designers or Italian fashion companies in Italy or elsewhere 
which date from the early 20th century to the present day. The primary 
definition of fashion is as “a social phenomenon affecting the way 
members of a culture or society behave”98 which is characterized by the 
acceptance by a large number of people for a short period of time.99 This 
large number of people need not be Italian but are rather any large 
number of people anywhere in the globe who accept a certain Italian 
fashion design object for a short period of time. A short period of time 
can refer to the first time an object is accepted by a large number of 
people. But it must be observed that an Italian fashion design object 
may be accepted thusly at distinct periods of time for a short while, or it 
may be accepted once for a short period of time or accepted once, not 
                                               
98 Phyllis G. Tortora, History and Development of Fashion in BERG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD 
DRESS AND FASHION 159- 170 (Joanne B. Eichner and Phyllis G. Tortora, eds.). Accessed 
through Bloomsbury Fashion Central. There are, of course, other ways in which to define 
fashion design and choosing one definition is, as Charles Colman has noted, inherently 
artificial. See Colman, History and Principles, supra note 6 at 228, n. 6 (citing to Paulicelli 
and Palmer). Tortora also notes the differences between costume, clothing, dress and 
fashion, which the dissertation does not particularly delve into. We could also define 
fashion according to Valerie Steele, as “’the cultural construction of the embodied 
identity,’”, and more directly explore the nexus of fashion, identity and cultural property, 
as Vittoria Barsotti has aptly suggested during the viva of this dissertation. See Valerie 
Steele, Preface in THE BERG COMPANION TO FASHION (Berg 2010 (accessed through 
Bloomsbury Fashion Central). While acknowledged in a discussion of hierarchies in some 
parts of this work, a full consideration of fashion, identity and cultural property is beyond 
the scope of the present dissertation, but certainly an area for future work. 
99 Id (describing these two elements as common across different definitions of fashion). See 
also MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 18 (Milano, Rizzoli, 2009) (noting from a 
business management perspective how fashion is characterized by change while luxury 
has comparatively more permanence).  
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for forever, but for a longer period of time. Recurring Italian fashion 
design objects are still fashion, but a constant Italian fashion design 
object may not be fashionable in the classic definition of the term. This 
may, then, affect a modern and even contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects’ classification as cultural property under the law. Here is 
the tension between fashion as an embodiment of the past and present 
and even as meaningful for the future, which other authors have treated 
from a philosophical point of view.100   
 
Other authors have deeply engaged with the etymology of the term 
fashion, both in English101 and in Italian.102 The term fashion design 
objects builds on these previous constructions and deliberately 
acknowledges the unity between form and function that is characteristic 
of design and that, therefore, also informs fashion.103 Indeed, design can 
be fashion, and fashion is, in our case, most often design.104 At the same 
                                               
100 WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ARCADES PROJECT (Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, 
trans., Rolf Tiedemann, ed., 1999); Eun Jung Kang, The Dialectical Image: The Redemption of 
Fashion, 18(3) FASHION THEORY 341 (2014); Ulrich Lehmann, Tigersprung: Fashioning 
History, 3(3) FASHION THEORY 297 (1999). See also Andrade et al, supra note 88 (discussing 
the work of Daniela Calanca).  
101 Etymologies and Definitions of Fashion as Clothing in BARNARD, supra note 37 at 8- 26.  
102 EUGENIA PAULICELLI, WRITING FASHION IN EARLY MODERN ITALY: FROM SPREZZATURA 
TO SATIRE 5-6 (ASHGATE, 2014); MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 4-5.   
103 Penny Sparke, Design in GROVE ART ONLINE, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gao/9781884446054.article.T022395 (also noting “[design] has 
become increasingly identified with product design for industry…and is seen as an 
essential part of the process of making, marketing, and selling mass-produced goods.”) 
Sparke’s entry mainly focuses on the Anglo-American conceptions of design and treats 
other traditions, including the Italian one, mainly in a comparative light. Loschek also 
gives an overview of the relationship between fashion and design. INGRID LOSCHEK, 
WHEN CLOTHES BECOME FASHION: DESIGN AND INNOVATION SYSTEMS 173- 176 (2009), 
noting fashion is an added layer of social agreement about design. Although Loschek 
notes the importance of materiality in design, the majority of her chapter When is Fashion 
Design? is devoted to presenting fashion in terms of design styles and eras. Design itself is 
also increasingly dematerialized and the challenges it presents for law, in its union of 
tangible things and intangible processes, characterized as “blendy”, is investigated in 
much of Mark McKenna’s work. See, for example, the work in progress Investigating 
Design: A Qualitative Study of Professional Designers by Mark McKenna and Jessica Silby, 
presented at the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference.    
104 Program Report, The Fashion Group’s Fourth International Focus: “In Pursuit of Style, 
The Fashionable Object”, June 7, 1988, Fashion Group International records. Manuscripts 
and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden 
Foundations, Box 89, Folder 10. Conversations such as these between designers envision 
fashion as an addition to design which acts on objects and also call out the stratified yet 
overlapping nature of discussions of fashion. Designed objects can also be fashionable 
while fashion objects are designed in one way or another. (From Functional to Fashionable in 
Program Report, The Fashion Group’s Fourth International Focus: “In Pursuit of Style, 
The Fashionable Object” in Id. at 2; The Manufacturing Problem in Program Report, The 
Fashion Group’s Fourth International Focus: “In Pursuit of Style, The Fashionable Object” 
in Id. at 3).  
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time, the relationship between the tangible and intangible that informs 
fashion design objects is at the heart of its challenging categorization for 
cultural property law. Italian fashion design objects are at once tangible 
objects with an intangible design, an intangible design that is 
necessarily connected to a tangible object, and an intangible social 
agreement about an intangible design in a tangible object. In addition, 
Italian fashion design objects are often related to Italian style or to Made 
in Italy, which are intangible concepts that are descriptors of Italian 
fashion design objects. To engage with this complex nature of Italian 
fashion design objects and how Italian cultural property law should 
apply to them, the dissertation refers mainly to fashion studies 
literature, but also references art historical and business literature. In 
keeping with the definition of cultural property as a liminal notion105, 
descriptions of products by Italian companies themselves, including in 
patent applications and copyright registrations, official communications 
and marketing campaigns, and in exhibitions staged with or without 
museums, also inform the cultural property presentation of Italian 
fashion design objects. 
 
Cultural property here means movable objects of an intangible public 
cultural interest, whether historical, artistic or thanks to their ability to 
be testaments having the value of civilization. These objects can be in 
public or private ownership. The definition of cultural property is that 
contained in Articles 2 and 10 of the Italian Code of Cultural Property 
and Landscape. The dissertation also relies a great deal on Italian legal 
doctrine as well as on the history of Italian cultural property law and 
case law, where appropriate, to inform an understanding of the legal 
notion and of its application to Italian fashion design objects. What the 
dissertation finds to be legally determinative for individual objects to be 
classified as Italian cultural property in the greater context of Italian 
cultural property law is that the object be of some public cultural 
interest.106 The importance of this public cultural interest must be 
balanced with other interests, of, for example, the fashion corporations 
who already preserve but continue to valorize Italian fashion design 
objects as part of their business activities. How that public cultural 
interest is identified and how that balancing act then takes place is a 
case by case determination that can frame current and future cultural 
property legislation and even procedures of administrative law. The   
same methodology is applied to Italian copyright law. While U.S. 
copyright law is greatly informed by the work of American legal 
                                               
105 As will be discussed infra. See for example Lorenzo Casini, “Italian Hours” The 
Globalization of cultural property law, 9 ICON 369, 378 (2011). 
106 Id. at 375 (citing to Giannini). In other words, a combination of the publicness and 
immateriality which Casini describes.  
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scholars the analysis is also informed by copyright circulars, 
applications found through the U.S. Copyright Register, and case law.  
 
The dissertation also uses the term cultural heritage, the larger category 
into which cultural property is included as tangible cultural heritage, 
and intangible cultural heritage, as it is defined in international legal 
instruments. Intangible cultural heritage is defined as the union of 
cultural property and the “practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and 
cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in 
some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage” 
which can be manifested in, among other categories, “traditional 
craftsmanship.”107 In addition, this dissertation’s work is informed by 
that of Janet Blake and Prott & O’Keefe on international cultural 
heritage law. The latter refer to cultural heritage expansively as 
“manifestations of human life which represent a particular view of life 
and witness the history and validity of that view.”108 While other authors 
have already envisioned how copyright law in the United States 
unsuccessfully operates as a form of intangible cultural heritage 
protection109, as mentioned above, the main research questions choose to, 
instead, concentrate on the relationship between tangible cultural 
property and copyright.   
 
5. Structure of the Dissertation  
 
In Italy and the United States today individual fashion design objects 
are increasingly being displayed as on par with other objects of cultural 
property, from fine art to the decorative arts and other categories of 
objects.110 At the same time, emphasis is also placed on the artisanship, 
                                               
107 For all these definitions see Convention for the Protection of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage, art. 2, 17 October 2003, UNESCO MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14, 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  
108 Prott and O’Keefe, supra note 83 at 307.  
109 Erin K. Slatterly, Preserving the United States' Intangible Cultural Heritage: An Evaluation of 
the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as a 
Means to Overcome the Problems Posed by Intellectual Property Law, 16(2) DEPAUL J. ART & 
ENT. LAW 201, 229- 236 (2006). 
110 Such a display does not, of course, mean that everyone accepts these fashion design 
objects as like other cultural property. One recent example is comments surrounding the 
exhibit of Azzedine Alaïa’s work Couture/Sculpture at the Galleria Borghese in 2015. For 
conflicting opinions about the exhibit Couture-Sculpture: Azzedine Alaia in the History of 
Fashion at the Galleria Borghese in Rome see Vanessa Friedman, Azzedine Alaïa: Blending 
Fashion and Art in ‘Couture/Sculpture’, THE N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/fashion/azzedine-alaia-blending-fashion-and-
art-in-couture-sculpture.html (praising the exhibit, noting “What is striking is the way the 
clothes sneak up on you, processed in the grand scheme of the panorama not as foreign objects but 
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the craftsmanship, the creative process, and the social participation that 
characterizes fashion and design. This emphasis on different parts of 
what we might term the fashion design universe presents challenges. 
How do we understand the products of fashion, the objects it acts upon 
and which it creates, as part of cultural heritage under the law, as 
cultural property? Central to the dissertation’s exploration of fashion 
and cultural heritage are the problematics of categorizing fashion 
design objects under cultural heritage law, given that cultural heritage 
law, both at the international level and in Italy, generally distinguishes 
between intangible cultural heritage and tangible cultural property. 
 
Italy, with its strong tradition of craftsmanship and artisanship, its 
many fashion brands and luxury brand goods companies, and its 
historic cultural property legislation which has consistently evolved 
over the 20th century, provides fertile ground for an examination of how 
Italian fashion design objects may be classified as cultural property 
under the law. While not providing a perfect cultural property 
legislation, Italy helps us frame our discussion of how modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects are cultural property 
primarily because it identifies an intangible public cultural interest as at 
the heart of cultural property as a legal category. At the same time, 
Italian cultural property law also preserves and regulates entire objects 
which have both tangible and intangible, or reproducible, elements as 
cultural property.  
 
Notwithstanding the focus on Italian fashion and Italian cultural 
property law, Italian fashion design objects are not confined to the 
Italian territory. One of the hallmarks of fashion design objects is their 
ability to travel both proverbially and practically. At the same time as 
fashions and fashion designs may be copied and imitated, so are the 
objects which form them imported and exported, sold and exchanged. 
Thinking about where we locate our public cultural interest in fashion 
design objects in order to classify them as cultural property necessarily 
involves taking into account this proliferation of Italian fashion design 
objects in our lives. And this proliferation of objects also includes an 
awareness of what we might term “counterfeits”, “fakes” and 
“imitations”, with great caveats and an awareness of the false 
dichotomies these terms imply. This awareness, however, does not 
                                               
rather objects that have earned inclusion on their own merits.”) versus Marta Pettinau, 
Montanari senza censure sulla mostra di moda alla Galleria Borghese. E Anna Detheridge gli 
risponde con una lettera aperta: “Sono d’accordo con te, ma…”, ARTRIBUNE, August 9, 2015, 
available at http://www.artribune.com/2015/08/montanari-senza-censure-mostra-
moda-galleria-borghese-anna-detheridge-risponde-lettera-aperta/ (describing readers’ 
debate: “Ha senso che sia un’istituzione culturale ad affermare che tra un marmo di Bernini e una 
maglia di Alaïa non ci sarebbe differenza?”).  
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mean identifying the “real” fashion design object as cultural property. 
The “real” is not a bright line indicator of authenticity or cultural 
interest. Indeed, this dissertation is not about fighting against 
counterfeit fashion design objects or ascertaining which fashion design 
objects are “real” or not, whatever that means. Instead, an awareness of 
the multiple Italian fashion design objects made by multiple Italian 
artisans, brands, designers, and other members of society, is a tool in 
this dissertation to identify the scope and function of cultural property 
protection for fashion design objects. As will be shown, this leads to 
counterintuitive results for those who fight against fakes. Some Italian 
fashion design objects are potentially so culturally significant generally 
that “fakes” should not, and perhaps even cannot, be forbidden, either 
through cultural property law or, as some scholars would like, through 
copyright law. Other Italian fashion design objects are so culturally 
significant in their specificity that the very application of the words 
“fake” to other fashion design objects which attempt to copy it might be 
practically impossible.     
 
The dissertation proceeds in the following way. The first chapter gives a 
history of Italian fashion. This history reveals that Italian fashion has 
been, since its inception, characterized by strong links to Italian cultural 
heritage, both through its use of craftsmanship and thanks to 
inspiration from objects of fine art like Renaissance paintings. In 
addition, this short history reveals that the Italian territory does not 
lend itself to a homogenous definition of what Italian fashion is. 
Individual cities and local traditions have strongly shaped the tangible 
iterations of Italian fashion design objects. This reliance on local 
traditions continues today in modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects created by Italian fashion brands and luxury brand goods 
companies. Both lean on local workmanship and are inspired by specific 
cities, regions, and traditions in Italy. It also becomes apparent from this 
short history of Italian fashion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
separate the tangible from the intangible within an Italian fashion design 
object itself. It is hard, for example, to decide whether Missoni’s 
celebrated chevron shape is tangible or intangible, given that its visual, 
much like a painting’s composition, may be reproduced in many spaces, 
and yet is also closely tied to the yarn and fabric of which it is made.  
 
The second chapter explores the Pandora’s Boxes of Italian cultural 
property law: cultural interest, time, and things. It explores the 
legislative history of Italian cultural property law, its text, its evolution 
and its application in certain cases and its interpretation by legal 
scholars. It becomes evident in this chapter that none of these “boxes” 
resolve the dilemma of what is cultural property on their own. Instead, 
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cultural interest, mechanisms of time, and an emphasis on tangibles all 
work together to determine whether the necessary cultural consensus 
exists to classify an object as cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law. Moreover, practical realities are also taken into 
consideration in the preservation and regulation of cultural property 
and in the very definition of it. Definitions of cultural property which 
would stifle the evolution of the very cultural consensus which defines 
cultural property tend to be avoided. This chapter also notes how Italian 
cultural property law purports to regulate only the intangible parts of 
properties in certain circumstances by regulating their commercial 
reproduction. This control of the relationship between the public’s 
cultural interest in an object and the unicum of intangible elements and 
tangible elements that characterizes it as a cultural property leads to the 
question of whether Italian cultural property law might be, at times, 
inappropriately acting like a copyright regime.  
 
The third chapter turns more explicitly to the assumptions which seem 
to underlie and shape the categories of Italian cultural property –the 
assumptions that there are separately identifiable tangible and 
intangible things. Looking at classic examples of Italian cultural 
property and also at examples of Italian fashion design objects, this 
chapter explores how our public cultural interest may converge on 
intangible elements in tangible property, just as much as it might 
converge on an entire unicum of tangible property with intangible 
elements. A comparison between different Italian fashion design objects 
reveals the problem of scope in cultural property law. If we have many 
different objects which are similar, how do we decide that an object is of 
cultural interest to us? Where do we decide to locate the cultural interest 
of objects that exist in multiples? This exercise is a delicate slicing of the 
proverbial cultural property pie. The chapter asks where we should 
locate our public cultural interest in Italian fashion design objects - in 
their intangible elements or in an unicum of intangible fashion design 
and tangible dress, accessory or other material? There are some objects 
which do not easily fall into the tangible and intangible categories 
which now characterize conceptions of cultural property, even as those 
categories exist in the work of such legendary Italian cultural property 
scholars as Massimo Severo Giannini. Looking to the history of the 
appearance of written texts and building on the work of previous 
scholars, the chapter uses text as an example and point out how not all 
text is intangible or reproducible in all circumstances. In other words, some 
text’s meaning and communication is materially dependent and 
therefore requires the preservation of the material upon which the text 
is printed in addition to the text itself in order to fully understand the 
text’s meaning. Taking a cue from examples of these types of tangible 
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text throughout history, the chapter then turns to examples of fashion 
design that seem materially dependent and, therefore, eligible for 
inclusion within the cultural property “box”. These fashion design 
examples challenge the notion that we should always think of all 
fashion design as intangible. Sometimes, the cultural message of and 
our cultural interest in a fashion design may need to be understood on a 
specific material and in relation to a specific object. This means that an 
unicum exists and a fashion design object may be tangible enough to be 
classified as cultural property. At the same time, however, there are 
some Italian fashion designs which seem to require proverbial travel 
and reproduction for their communication or for their cultural interest 
to exist. Moreover, certain aspects of fashion design objects, 
characterized with reference to the terms style and schema, may not need 
to be preserved as cultural property at all. At the end of the chapter, in 
the context of this plethora of examples of Italian fashion design objects, 
a legal standard emerges by which it might be decided whether modern 
and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are cultural property. 
Italian fashion design objects that include text might be evaluated 
according to their particular circumstance, in light of their specific place, 
support, message, and at times context, to determine whether our public 
cultural interest is sufficiently tied to a design that is materially 
dependent. If it is determined that a design is sufficiently materially 
dependent and that our public cultural interest attaches to that design, 
then an Italian fashion design object may be classified as cultural 
property as an unicum of design and tangible dress, accessory or other 
material. In this sense, Giannini’s differentiation between intangible text 
and objects of aesthetic, historic interest or testamentary value that can 
be classified as cultural property is expanded. Some text or design is not 
only of public cultural interest but is also sufficiently materially dependent to 
be classified as cultural property. In this sense, there are some so-labeled 
tangible texts which do not need to be indirectly protected through the 
preservation of manuscripts as testaments having the value of 
civilization. Some Italian fashion designs are like tangible text and may, 
therefore, be considered eligible for classification as cultural property. 
This legal standard forms the main proposal of the dissertation. Some 
Italian fashion designs may be considered like tangible text, like visible 
images or like testaments having the value of civilization. They may, 
therefore, be protected as cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law.  
 
The fourth chapter categorizes the objects that exist in the Italian 
cultural property regime into four categories: tangible text, visible 
images, intangible text or intangible images, and testaments having the 
value of civilization. These categories are mapped on to Italian fashion 
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designs and Italian fashion design objects. Tangible text represents a 
union of the public cultural interest in certain intangible texts whose 
meanings are, however, tied to the material upon which they are placed. 
These “new” tangible texts are cultural property. The original is the text 
and the object. In a sense, tangible text cannot be copied because its 
meaning is so materially dependent. The placement of the same text on 
a different object no longer means the same thing and is not of the same 
public cultural interest. Some fashion designs that incorporate text can be 
identified as like tangible text and therefore as cultural property. Visible 
images, on the other hand, represent a union of the public cultural 
interest in tangible properties which have, however, separable 
intangible elements. Paintings and compositions are, here, the main 
example. These visible images are cultural property. The unicum of the 
tangible property with its intangible elements, such as a painting with 
its composition, is considered the original, while the composition alone 
is considered a copy. Some fashion designs that incorporate text or images 
might be identified as like visible images and therefore as cultural property. A 
third category, intangible text or intangible images, which we may in 
some circumstances term schema or style, represents a union of the 
public cultural interest with intangible properties alone. These 
intangible texts or intangible images are not cultural property. The text 
or the image is understood as always an original and never a copy, or as 
copies which always mean the same thing no matter where they appear. 
Most fashion designs are like intangible text or intangible images and are 
therefore not cultural property. The fourth and last category, testaments 
having the value of civilization, may be tangible iterations of intangible 
text or intangible images. These testaments having the value of 
civilization are cultural property, but they do not preserve the 
intangible text or intangible image directly. Some fashion design objects 
might be testaments having the value of civilization and, therefore, cultural 
property.  
 
These categories indicate a fine differentiation between the intangible 
and the tangible. Because of Italian cultural property’s interest in 
regulating the reproduction of certain cultural properties, the lack of a 
similar cultural property legal regime in the United States and the 
fashion industry’s and legal literature’s general concern with the 
question of whether fashion design is copyrightable in the United 
States, the dissertation then turns to explore whether there might be 
some similarities between U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural 
property law in the same chapter. Namely, the chapter explores 
whether the conceptual separability test in U.S. copyright law is about 
identifying whether a potential intangible public cultural interest 
attaches to the intangible elements of tangible property. In other words, 
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it argues that conceptual separability applied to fashion designs is about 
deciding whether a fashion design is like a visible image.  
 
Caveats exist as part of this comparison. U.S. copyright is seen as 
primarily economically driven and there is as yet no evidence that its 
enabling constitutional clause contemplated or contemplates actuating 
the protection of cultural property. At the same time, however, as we 
can see through Italian cultural property law, economic concerns do not 
necessarily preclude or negate the concerns which are characteristic of 
the preservation and regulation of cultural property. In addition, this 
comparison and the hypothesis it engenders are limited to one category 
of objects under U.S. copyright law, namely pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works, and more specifically to designs of useful articles that 
seek to enter the pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works category. In 
this narrow category of copyrightable subject matter, the chapter argues 
that U.S. copyright law seems to seek to protect categories of objects that 
fall into the tangible text or the visible images category.   
 
This suggestion, however, does not explain why U.S. copyright does not 
apply to certain fashion designs that are like intangible texts, the 
category it should in fact protect the most. Chapter four explores how 
this refusal to protect fashion designs which might be like intangible 
texts or even intangible images may be grounded in the 
idea/expression dichotomy, as applied to fashion. Fashion designs 
which are like intangible text seem to not need materials to be 
understood or communicated. They also seem to need to be outside of 
copyright protection in order to be preserved and exist. A design of a 
Birkin bag, to give a French example, or even a design of a Gucci 
Bamboo Handle, are evocative of the idea of themselves, of their very 
identity. Such designs are such stereotypes that, in Paola Antonelli’s 
words111, U.S. copyright chooses not to apply to them. In this sense, 
Italian copyrightable subject matter is broader than U.S. copyrightable 
subject matter as applied to fashion designs. As evidenced in recent cases, 
Italian copyright law protects industrial designs that are of creative 
characters or artistic value, which is evaluated in cultural heritage terms 
by considering a fashion design’s historic or artistic significance and its 
iconic value in the unicum of the design and object.  
 
U.S. copyright law is certainly not the only legal regime that might 
partner with Italian cultural property law to apply to Italian fashion 
design objects for the public’s benefit. Chapter five examines how other 
more traditional historic property legal regimes which are already in 
                                               
111 Paola Antonelli, Who’s Afraid of Fashion? in ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN? infra note 604 at 
20.  
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place in the United States are more similar to Italian cultural property 
law in their legislative purpose. It examines how these historic 
preservation or “Art Law” rules could be expanded to apply to Italian 
fashion design objects. U.S. historic preservation law, at all levels- 
federal, State and local- could be amended to include movable objects 
like fashion design objects. We could contract for rights in fashion 
design objects, in terms of its unicum or its separate parts, for the public, 
perhaps by attaching easement-like conditions to individual fashion 
design objects.112 Statutes like the California Art Preservation Act may 
effectively give certain American communities a way to actuate their 
public cultural interest in fashion design objects. We might extend 
moral rights to designers, although this is problematic since moral 
rights follow a person and not an object. Moral rights might already 
attach to fashion designs declared to be copyrightable under the Italian 
diritto d’autore regime and may provide a model. Extending moral rights 
to Italian fashion designers begs the question, however, of whether 
alterations of certain Italian fashion design objects would be prohibited. 
Such distinctions might have the effect of erasing the blurred lines in 
fashion between a vintage dress to be altered for contemporary wear 
and a vintage dress as an object of historic interest. While perhaps 
considered a middle ground between cultural property law and 
copyright law, moral rights may not sufficiently legally distinguish the 
object as of public cultural interest. Moral rights may instead only allow 
the designer as artist to control the historical significance or artistic 
interest in their works after copyright has expired. This deference to the 
artist seems contrary to the public cultural interest at the heart of 
cultural property.  
 
We might expand public trust doctrine, or even look to other 
administrative guidelines like those applying to the National Archives 
to protect individual objects, in collections or not, as cultural property. 
Sui generis regimes might be crafted to protect our public cultural 
interest in fashion design objects when they are outside of museums. At 
the same time, our public cultural interest in certain Italian fashion 
design objects might be best actuated when protection of the tangible 
and intangible elements of the object are in a negative space of the law- 
a Wild West where practically no legal rules or norms apply.  
 
The conclusion proposes an emerging legal framework for fashion 
design objects as cultural property, with some considerations of what 
                                               
112 As will be discussed infra in Chapter 5 with regards to the proposed Ellis rule. See 
Adrian Ellis, Should a Museum Be Allowed to Cash In on Its Art? Yes, But on Two Conditions, 
ARTNET, January 18, 2018, https://news.artnet.com/opinion/deaccessioning-adrian-ellis-
ellis-rule-1202147.  
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this might mean for overlaps with other legal regimes, the fight against 
counterfeits, and the preservation of fashion for the future.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CULTURAL PROPERTY “FRONTIER” 113 OF 
ITALIAN FASHION DESIGN  
 
This first chapter gives a short historic presentation of Italian fashion 
design within the scope of the dissertation’s inquiry as to how 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law. While not an exhaustive 
history, the goal is to spotlight key historical moments and constant 
tensions throughout Italian fashion design which should be taken into 
consideration when any law, whether cultural property law or 
copyright law, seeks to protect a public cultural interest in the subject 
matter at its origin or in practice. 
 
1. Fashion on a “Borderland” and Frontier114 of the Cultural 
Heritage “Map”  
 
Imagine cultural heritage on a map. It might prove difficult to draw 
distinct boundaries around a place where Italian fashion design 
objects would appear. In one sense, this is due to the nature of 
cultural heritage and its connections to culture itself. Often unmoored 
to any particular territory, place or even people, “le frontiere culturali 
(lingua, religione, civiltà) non coincidono quasi mai con le frontiere 
internazionali.”115 Indeed, cultural heritage, and even cultural property 
today, thanks to digitization, travels just as often as it is identified 
with one physical place. In addition, while individual legal 
instruments may lay claim to one area of cultural heritage, often the 
subject matter that those individual legal instruments seek to regulate 
lend themselves to multiple legal rules or potentially none at all. This 
is especially so with Italian fashion design objects which could be 
protected in different parts and in different ways under Italian law as 
part of an intangible cultural heritage, a tangible cultural property, or 
as a cultural activity. Spaces within the cultural realm seem to be in 
constant need of negotiation and re-negotiation; the cultural heritage 
map is always being redrawn. In this sense, fashion design objects are 
                                               
113 See supra note 1 for the origins of this term in the literature. See also FEDERICO RAMPINI, 
LE LINEE ROSSE (2017) (referring to fashion as part of a discussion of the boundaries of 
globalization).  
114 Id.  
115 ATLANTE DELLE FRONTIERE 48- 49 (Bruno Tertrais and Delphine Papan, eds., Marco 
Aime, trans., ADD Editore, 2018). The authors include a map which they title Frontiere di 
Civiltà?, while noting that “il concetto stesso di aree di civiltà è discutibile” [citing to Bernard 
Lewis and Samuel Huntington] and that even frontiers of culture may have pockets of 
different cultures in their midst.  
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part of frontiers or borderlands on the cultural heritage map. 
 
Both these terms are used primarily for linguistic reasons. Defined in 
English in part as a region that forms the margin of a settled or 
developed territory”, as “the farthermost limits of knowledge…in a 
particular subject”, and as “a new field for exploitative or 
developmental activity”116, Marco Aime in the recently published 
Atlante delle Frontiere draws a difference between border and frontier 
in the English language compared to their descriptors in Italian.  
 
“In inglese…border e boundary indicano delle line di demarcazione, 
mentre frontier è lo spazio aperto, quello da conquistare, quello su cui 
si è costruita l’intera epopea del West”117… [mentre] [n]ella lingua 
italiana, come in quella francese, confine e frontiera sono diventati 
sinonimi.”118        
 
Fashion and design have been described as “borderlands …[which] 
can better frame the legal problems underlying the very notion of 
cultural heritage.”119 Indeed, existing on a borderland or on the 
frontier of cultural heritage, fashion design objects may require the 
importation, adaptation and drafting of legal rules on a case by case 
basis to ascertain how certain aspects of them may be legally 
classified, if at all, as cultural property, one part of the greater frontiera 
culturale of cultural heritage under Italian cultural property law. The 
following sections explore how Italian fashion design objects have 
already begun to be treated as part of cultural heritage, as items of 
cultural property, in recent fashion history. While the main research 
question of this dissertation is not confined or particularly concerned 
with how modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects are 
cultural property inside the museum, the history begins there since it 
is a common starting point for much of the fashion studies and 
fashion history literature. Inclusion in a museum is not definitive for a 
revelation that individual fashion design objects are of a public 
cultural interest, however, necessary under cultural property law. 
  
                                               
116 See Frontier in MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/frontier. Other definitions of frontier 
include “a border between two countries”, the “obsolete: a stronghold on a frontier” and 
“a line of division between different or opposed things.”  
117 Marco Aime, Prefazione, in ATLANTE DELLE FRONTIERE, supra note 115 at 15; see also 
Frontiere Ereditate in Id. at 26.  
118 Id. at 15.  
119 Casini, The Future, supra note 1.  
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 1.1  Fashion beyond Museums   
 
As foreshadowed in the introduction the general embrace of 
fashion as part of cultural heritage is not, of course, absolutely 
new. Indeed, the museum, that treasured space of public trust, 
has done much to frame the embrace. Suzy Menkes, writing for 
The New York Times in 2011, has dated the “beginning of 
fashion’s acceptance as not just a decorative art, but as part of 
cultural heritage” to circa 1983 when Pierre Berger and others 
began to found fashion house archives after the Yves Saint 
Laurent show curated by Diana Vreeland at The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.120 The 1980s is the decade which Daniela 
Calanca also points to when discussing the founding of 
“historical archives and company museums.”121 The Museo della 
Moda e del Costume in Florence also registers a number of 
donations of Italian fashion design objects from Italian fashion 
companies beginning in the 1980s, when it too was founded.122  
 
At the same time as the 1980s is deemed the beginning of 
companies’ explicit preservation of the objects they produce, the 
1980s is also a continuation of previous attitudes towards 
fashion by the wider public. Even prior to individual fashion 
houses’ explicit preservation of their own individual design 
objects as a cultural heritage, whether in a museum or an 
archive, certain museums had already embraced fashion 
through temporary and permanent museum exhibitions on par 
with other objects they collected and displayed. As another 2011 
article written prior to Menkes’ noted  
 
some [museums], including the Museum of the City of New York 
and the Chicago History Museum, have been doing [fashion 
exhibitions] for years. It’s not surprising that design museums, like 
the gallery at the Bard Graduate Center (scheduled to host a 
Stephen Jones hat show) and the Cooper-Hewitt National Design 
Museum (now showing Van Cleef & Arpels jewelry and the designs 
of Sonia Delaunay) regularly work clothing into their rotation… 
                                               
120 Suzy Menkes, Gone Global: Fashion as Art?, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/fashion/is-fashion-really-museum-art.html.  
121 Calanca and Capalbo, supra note 90 at x.   
122 Notes taken while visiting the Museo della Moda e del Costume and consulting its 
collections database in the Fall of 2017 (on file with the author). The Museo was founded 
in 1983, see History | Museum of Costume and Fashion | Pitti Palace, LE GALLERIE DEGLI 
UFFIZI, https://www.uffizi.it/en/pitti-palace/costume-and-fashion-museum (last visited 
July 17, 2019).  
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But suddenly it seems as if a world of tomboys just discovered 
dresses…123 
 
One year before the Yves Saint Laurent event used by Menkes 
to date the “beginning of fashion’s acceptance…as part of a 
cultural heritage”124, the Museum at the Fashion Institute of 
Technology’s 1982 Givenchy exhibition revealed a general 
acceptance of both fashion’s place in a treasured space of public 
trust and of a public cultural interest in fashion design objects. 
This was despite what some criticized as the commercialization 
of the museum space when fashion entered it. As Valerie Steele 
has observed, this acceptance was directly related to FIT’s 
connections to the fashion industry, as a fashion school within 
the fashion system.125 The fuss that surrounded the Yves Saint 
Laurent show at the Metropolitan Museum of Art did not 
accompany the Givenchy show, nor apparently the line of 
Givenchy clothes at Bloomingdales developed especially for the 
occasion.126    
 
If, however, we were to use the establishment of fashion 
museums and the staging of fashion exhibitions as the dates for 
the beginning of “fashion’s acceptance…as part of a cultural 
heritage” we would certainly need to look back even earlier 
than 1983. Before the establishment of the Design Laboratory, 
the precursor to the Museum at FIT, the Museum of Costume in 
                                               
123 Geraldine Fabrikant, Museums are Finding Room for Couturiers, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 
2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/fashion/21MUSEUMS.html?action=click&conten
tCollection=Fashion%20%26%20Style&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&
pgtype=article.  
124 See supra note 120.  
125 First founded as a Design Laboratory in 1969 for the inspiration of the students at FIT 
and for the use of the faculty, the Museum at FIT’s history is itself a testament to the 
evolving acceptance of fashion objects as pieces of cultural property which need to be 
preserved, studied and held in trust and not used as a functioning piece of clothing. For a 
history of the Museum see History of the Museum, THE MUSEUM AT FIT, 
http://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/about/history.php. See also Tentative Proposal of a 
Design Laboratory, FIT Request and other Memos in Box 5, Folder 15 (Fashion Institute of 
Technology proposal. October 1962), Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art Archives (testifying to divergent opinion about the founding of the 
Museum at FIT by staff at the Metropolitan Museum of Art). The ethical obligations of 
museums when displaying fashion design objects has been explored elsewhere in Felicia 
Caponigri, The Ethics of the International Display of Fashion in the Museum, 49 CASE WESTERN 
RESERVE J. OF INT’L L. 135 (2017).  
126 Valerie Steele, Remarks as part of speech “Exhibitionism: 50 Years of The Museum at 
FIT” at The Museum at the Fashion Institute of Technology’s Symposium Exhibiting 
Fashion (March 8, 2019) (livestream available at 
https://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/events/symposium/exhibiting-fashion/index.php.)  
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Bath was established in 1963.127 Before that the temporary 
exhibition of the Museum of Costume at Rockefeller Center in 
New York was founded in 1937 and later became The Costume 
Institute at The Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1946.128 Before 
that, the founding of the collection at the Victoria & Albert 
Museum in London, which dates to the mid to late 19th century 
or early 20th century.129 Still, before that, at the 1906 Universal 
Exposition in Milan Rosa Genoni first displayed “abiti…che si 
ispiravano alla cultura e all’arte italiane.”130 And before that the 
exhibitions of historic dress at the Universal Exposition in Paris 
in 1900.131  
 
Dating or explaining fashion’s status as cultural heritage based 
on an appearance of fashion in museums is particularly 
problematic and unhelpful for Italian fashion design objects. As 
Simona Segre Reinach, Grazia d’Annunzio and Eugenia 
Paulicelli have already respectively noted, the existence of 
multiple capitals of Italian fashion and the lack of one national 
fashion museum in one particular place has frustrated a concise 
definition of Italian fashion and an ability to critically think 
through Italian fashion.132 In addition, as Simona Segre Reinach 
has further noted, the proliferation of various cultural spaces 
inside the museum and outside of it that promote the cultural 
importance of Italian fashion has led to problematic 
                                               
127 Rosemary Harden, From Museum of Costume to Fashion Museum: the Case of the Fashion 
Museum in Bath, in FASHION AND MUSEUMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 130 (Marie Riegels 
Melchior and Birgitta Svensson, eds., 2014). 
128 Harold Koda and Jessica Glasscock, The Costume Institute at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art: An Evolving History, in FASHION AND MUSEUMS, supra note 127 at 22-25. 
129 Lou Taylor, Doing the Laundry? A Reassessment of Object-based Dress History 2(4) FASHION 
THEORY 340 - 341 (1998) (Taylor makes a distinction in her article between the collecting of 
textiles prized for their designs in the mid to late 19th century and the collection of 18th 
century dress in the early 20th century).  
130 Figure 17 of Chapter 2, Per una moda italiana: dall’Esposizione Universale di Milano del 1906 
all’insegnamento e design moderno in EUGENIA PAULICELLI, ROSA GENONI LA MODA È UNA 
COSA SERIA: MILANO EXPO 1906 E LA GRANDE GUERRA (Deleyva editore, 2015).  
131 Musée Rétrospectif des Classes 85 & 86, Le Costume et ses Accessoires à l’Exposition 
Universelle Internationale de 1900 à Paris in Special Collections at the Fashion Institute of 
Technology.  
132 Simona Segre Reinach, Remarks as part of speech "Fashion Exhibitions in Italy" at the 
Museum at the Fashion Institute of Technology’s Symposium Exhibiting Fashion (March 8, 
2019) (livestream available at 
https://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/events/symposium/exhibiting-fashion/index.php); 
Grazia d’Annunzio, Paris and the Tale of the Italian Cities forthcoming in PARIS CAPITAL OF 
FASHION (forthcoming, 2019); Paulicelli, Fashion: The Cultural Economy of Made in Italy, 
supra note 89.  
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contaminations and challenges.133 Indeed, this lack of one 
cultural space perhaps makes control of Italian fashion 
companies over their Italian fashion design objects even more 
pronounced, frustrating disinterested evaluations of their 
importance for the public and an easy or even equitable loaning 
of them to cultural institutions. Museums are not immune from 
having to negotiate for loans in the shadow of real and 
intellectual property law, as deeds of gift from The Museum at 
the Fashion Institute of Technology make clear.134  
 
One agreement governed by the laws of the State of New York 
entered into between the Museum at FIT and a company 
incorporated in Italy explicitly removes any intellectual 
property rights from assignment as part of the donation of a 
fashion design object, but does allow the Museum at FIT to 
“publicly display the Objects” without restraint and to “take 
photographs of the Objects” and distribute them as related to 
the activities of the Museum without prejudicing or 
compromising the “high quality” of the Objects or the company 
itself and its marks.135 Shaping behavior between the United 
States and Italy and its legal regimes that regards a fashion 
object which is of some type of cultural interest to the museum, 
this agreement operated in a cultural property law no man’s 
land in the United States while operating in the shadow of 
Italian cultural property law and U.S. copyright law, which do 
not necessarily explicitly apply to the Italian fashion design 
object in question. 
 
As a first matter here, we see an Italian company ceding control 
over the tangible object, a hallmark of the Italian cultural 
property regime. Indeed, preservation of the object is required 
of private property owners and of not for profits in Article 30 of 
the Italian Code of Cultural Property and Landscape.136 In 
addition, notwithstanding the right to photograph the object 
and reproduce that photograph as part of the museum’s 
“educational, archival and documentary purposes”137, the right 
to reproduce images of the object remains with the private 
                                               
133 Simona Segre Reinach, Remarks as part of speech "Fashion Exhibitions in Italy" supra 
note 132.  
134 See “Deed of Gift” Appendix B. These deeds of gift were kindly shared by Sonia 
Dingillian, Register at The Museum at FIT, who, along with Valerie Steele, gave 
permission to reproduce them in the hardcopy version of this dissertation.  
135 Section 2, Intellectual Property Rights in “Deed of Gift” in Appendix B.  
136 Art. 30(2) and Art. 30(3), CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004.  
137 Section 2(b) in “Deed of Gift” in Appendix B. 
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owner. This follows Italian cultural property law to a certain 
extent, which recognizes that the State may approve 
commercial reproductions of the cultural property in their 
possession, excepting the rules given under diritto d’autore or 
Italian copyright.138 For this object in this agreement, for this 
Italian fashion design object copyright law exists alongside 
cultural property like rights and obligations in Italian cultural 
property law, even if Italian cultural property law may not yet 
apply to the object. Individual negotiations between museums 
and Italian fashion companies shed light on the fact that, 
notwithstanding an inapplicability of Italian cultural property 
law, the nature of museum activities139 and the nature of 
intellectual property rights may shape the treatment of certain 
Italian fashion design objects as de facto cultural property for 
certain rights and duties. This inference, of course, follows some 
definitions of cultural property under Italian cultural property 
law, which presume that objects in public and not for profit 
museum collections are cultural property.140 At the same time, 
the rules of the agreement are not completely inspired by Italian 
cultural property rules, nor are they necessarily in 
contravention of them. Public display, for example, is not 
necessarily required of private owners under Italian cultural 
property law.141 In this sense, museum obligations and activities 
may also raise the standards of legal duties under Italian 
cultural property law for certain Italian fashion design objects.      
  
At the same time as this agreement might hint that some 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects may 
already be treated like cultural property even in the absence of 
Italian cultural property law thanks to the activities of a fashion 
museum, it can also help us parse more clearly where the public 
cultural interest in Italian fashion design objects may lie. In the 
tangible Italian fashion design object, in the intangible design 
caught up in it, or in some combination of the two? The fact that 
the Italian company keeps certain rights to the design might be 
indicative of the importance of that design for its business 
activities but also for some other cultural purpose associated 
with the company as part of Italian cultural heritage. At the 
same time, the museum’s insistence on certain intangible rights 
                                               
138 Art. 107(1), CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. 
139 Which include references to professional codes of conduct, ethical guidelines, and 
collecting management policies, as detailed in Section 4 in “Deed of Gift” in Appendix B. 
140 Art 10(1), CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004. 
141 Art. 38, CODICE, D.L. n.42/2004.  
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in the object, such as its reproduction, and its negotiation of the 
right to publicly display and act on the physical object without 
interference from the Italian company may also testify to the 
location of a public cultural interest in the tangible object, with 
the design in it. While the museum represents one side of this 
negotiation, such an inquiry about where the public cultural 
interest lies is not necessarily tied to the modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design object’s appearance in a 
museum or its status as part of a museum collection. Indeed, it 
is perhaps even more important to locate the public cultural 
interest in modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
objects as they exist outside the museum.  
 
1.2 The Acceptance and Timeliness of Fashion Design Objects 
as Cultural Property Today 
 
Italian fashion design today exists as part of a complex web of 
images, fashion films, runway shows and, yes, stores, 
museums, archives, and even foundations. An Italian fashion 
design object is imagined, created, photographed, displayed, 
sold, collected, re-bought, displayed, perhaps leveraged as an 
asset, and perhaps even sold again as part of this complex web. 
The increasing appearance of Italian fashion design objects in 
museums is only one part of this greater life of the Italian 
fashion design object. At some point, however, as an Italian 
fashion design object ages, as many of them are doing now, it 
must be imagined how instances of this life of an Italian fashion 
design object should exist with respect to the public cultural 
interest we already identify in Italian fashion and design by 
protecting it as cultural property when it is in a public museum 
or public archive. In other words, we should consider how the 
public cultural interest we know is in Italian fashion design 
objects when they are part of a public museum collection142 
squares with (sometimes the same) Italian fashion design 
objects we find elsewhere.  
 
There are a few reasons why this squaring of the different ways 
in which to treat Italian fashion design objects under cultural 
                                               
142 One example of the proof of this statement is in the application of Art. 107, regulating 
the reproduction of cultural property in the possession of the Italian State, to a dress 
designed by Rosa Genoni in the collection of the Museo della Moda e del Costume in the 
Galleria degli Uffizi. See Nota 398/2018 of the Galleria degli Uffizi in Appendix B 
(granting the right to use a digital image of Rosa Genoni’s Pisanello dress to the Museum 
at FIT under art. 107(1) and art. 108 of D.L. n.42/2004). Kind permission to cite this form 
from Susi Piovanelli and the Director of the Gallerie degli Uffizi. 
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property law is particularly important today. First, Italian 
fashion design objects, like other fashion design objects or dress 
or costume, as they may be referred to in dress history and by 
costume historians143, is also understood through its 
representations and its reproductions in other media.144 This 
notion is something that Anne Hollander explored, before the 
advent of social media and the Instagram platform which has 
exacerbated the situation, in her book Seeing Through Clothes.145 
Representations of dress, costume, and even drapery and 
nudity convey a “perceptual knowledge” that a tangible dress 
or costume, even perhaps on a person, may not.146 This added 
importance of representation applies to Italian fashion design 
objects today, especially as they are part of an elaborate image-
making process that is individual as well as collective. We 
might go so far as to say that Italian fashion design objects are 
not only chosen for how they look on the wearer today in 
person, but are judged based upon how they will be 
photographed and how they will be disseminated.147 Such a 
digital element, therefore, is not only part of the cultural 
consensus or collective judgment that Italian doctrine tells us is 
necessary for fixing our cultural interest on a tangible object and 
deciding it is cultural property148, but, as we have seen from the 
Museum at FIT donation agreement above, it is also crucial to 
later valorize an Italian fashion design object. In other words, 
intangible reproduction is crucial both at the identifying stage 
                                               
143 For an explanation of this different terminology, identifying dress as all kinds of 
adornment and costume as dress or apparel that is in a museum collection, as opposed to 
fashion which is social in nature, see Tortora, History and Development of Fashion, supra note 
98.   
144 See, for example, Introduction in FASHION AS PHOTOGRAPH: VIEWING AND REVIEWING 
IMAGES OF FASHION (Eugénie Shinkle, ed., 2008).  
145 Cited to infra. 
146 Introduction in ANNE HOLLANDER, SEEING THROUGH CLOTHES xii (1993) (“…the formal 
properties of a work of art itself do not mask but, rather, illuminate the basic evidence 
about what people used to wear…Such formal elements demonstrate not how clothes 
were made but how they and the bodies in them were supposed and believed to look. 
Even actual garments themselves, old or new, offer only technical evidence and not 
perceptual knowledge. In a picture-making civilization, the ongoing pictorial conventions 
demonstrate what is natural in human looks; and it is only in measuring up to them that 
the inner eye feels satisfaction and the clothed self achieves comfort and beauty.”) 
147 For explorations of how social media helps to convey not only an individual’s image 
but the general fashion imaginary see generally the work of Agnès Rocamora, such as 
Agnès Rocamora, Mediatization and Digital Media in the Field of Fashion, 21(5) FASHION 
THEORY 505 (2017), DOI: 10.1080/1362704X.2016.1173349 (exploring, in part, how 
Instagram, Snapchat, and live-streaming fashions shows, among others, have changed the 
production of fashion design).  
148 MICHELE CANTUCCI, LA TUTELA DELLE COSE D’INTERESSE ARTISTICO O STORICO 100- 103 
(1953). 
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of cultural property law as applied to modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects and it is also crucial 
at the valorization stage.  
 
Italian fashion design objects as cultural property may not, 
therefore, be completely comparable to other cultural properties 
like pottery, tapestry, furnishings, architecture or even useful 
articles themselves.149 At the same time, dissemination through 
images and the image-making of fashion may also not be 
completely determinative of a public cultural interest in Italian 
fashion design objects.150 If it were, we would arguably not need 
tangible objects of fashion design at all- a picture would suffice. 
Museums would be alright with pictures of fashion designs and 
not the fashion objects themselves. This is not the case- public 
cultural interest in fashion design seems to focus on various 
iterations of fashion design objects both as they appear in 
tangible form and as they are reproduced.  
 
It is important to address this relationship between image and 
tangible design object for Italian fashion today in order to 
understand what needs to be preserved and how to accomplish 
that preservation for the future. The public cultural interest 
might be spliced into different drawers in the cultural property 
“box”. An image of an Italian fashion design object may be, in 
some circumstances, of greater public cultural interest than the 
Italian fashion design object itself. If this is so, however, what 
does preserving that image look like? Perhaps dissemination 
here is a tool of preservation, perhaps valorization alone is 
preservation enough. But, if valorization and dissemination are 
a form of preservation of the fashion design object, because its 
public cultural value is in its intangible image, then are any 
restrictions on reproduction, especially on sites such as 
Instagram and Facebook, or on use, justified?       
 
The second reason it is important to square the different ways 
in which we treat fashion design objects under cultural 
property law is that the material of fashion design, Italian 
fashion design objects, are extremely important for diverse 
                                               
149 HOLLANDER, supra note 146 at xiv (observing the inadequacy of these comparisons for 
her own argument that “any such [Western] garment has more connection with the 
history of pictures than with any household objects or vehicles of its own moment- it is 
more like a Rubens than like a chair”, and giving these examples). 
150 This nuances Hollander’s argument which seems to put primary importance on dress, 
costume, nudity’s etc. links to and representations in figurative art. Id.  
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players in the fashion industry and in society at large. Fashion 
design objects, despite being reproduced and captured in 
digital images and fashion films, are sold and collected in their 
tangible iterations; they are worn and altered; they are 
reproduced and re-created. As we have seen in the Museum at 
FIT donation agreement, control over the object itself, without 
interference by a number of actors, is crucial to manage it on the 
basis of a public cultural interest. To deem one specific Italian 
fashion design object cultural property only based on its 
ownership, its appearance for example in a museum collection, 
is to potentially allow private actors, like Italian fashion 
companies, to treat similar objects that would otherwise be 
recognized as cultural property in an adverse way. If we deem 
Italian fashion design objects cultural property no matter to 
whom they belong, even with specific procedural safeguards 
like particularly important or exceptional cultural interest151, we 
might potentially frustrate a valorization of these objects in 
limited editions by Italian fashion companies or even require 
Italian fashion companies to become cultural institutions, with 
preservation obligations that are at odds with certain resale 
activities they engage in. Gucci, for example, as part of its new 
Gucci Galleria, sells older bags that it has bought back.152 The 
vintage market, which may operate apart from the fashion 
houses which originally produced the Italian fashion design 
object, is a prosperous business which, like a market for antique 
furniture or other antiquities, might be unreasonably restricted 
if we protect any and all fashion design objects as cultural 
property, no matter where they are located. On the other hand, 
not protecting certain fashion design objects might risk the loss 
of the specific information these objects can provide, which an 
examination of the explanation of a design alone may not. This 
is the case with Salvatore Ferragamo’s Invisible Sandals: 
although the patent for the shoes describes at least two 
processes, an examination of the shoes as objects shows that 
Ferragamo and his artisans overwhelmingly chose to use one of 
the designs over the other.153 Modern iterations of the shoes use 
                                               
151 As Italian cultural property law does in Art. 10(3) and Art. 13 (dichiarazione). See Art. 
10(3) and Art. 13, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004.  
152 See images of Gucci Galleria store (on file with the author).  
153 See Patents n. 426001 (invenzione), of October 17, 1947; n. 26446 (modello d’utilità) of 
March 29, 1947 and n. 26655 (modello industrial) of May 10, 1947. Archivio Ferragamo. 
These observations are the result of a close object analysis of the shoes in the Ferragamo 
Archive in December 2018 and February 2019. 
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yet another process.154 We should decide whether we should 
understand all these differences as dispositive for a 
classification of Italian fashion design objects as cultural 
property, or as separate instances of preservation and 
valorization. Not addressing these questions in a systematic 
way has the potential to frustrate Italian fashion companies’ 
businesses or to allow Italian fashion companies increased 
unregulated control over certain objects which should be 
managed in the public interest, unlike other Italian fashion 
design objects sold on the market. 
 
The third reason lies in the complex nature of Italian fashion 
design objects as global and local. Italian fashion design objects 
may at once be Italian yet of interest to the international 
community and, at the same time, of interest to the international 
community, yet identified as Italian. The nature of fashion 
companies’ incorporation and management adds nuance to this 
issue which is common for many items of cultural property. A 
French luxury conglomerate, for example, now owns Gucci; the 
American Michael Kors, as Capri Holdings, now owns 
Versace.155 Restrictions we might apply to Italian fashion design 
objects as cultural property outside the museum have the 
potential to, like restrictions on other cultural properties, move 
beyond legal jurisdictions and affect the ways in which fashion 
companies and cultural institutions around the world handle 
these design objects and their reproduction. How would 
protecting Gianni Versace’s design objects, for example, as 
cultural property under Italian law, have affected Donatella 
Versace’s re-creation of them for Spring/Summer 2018156 and 
therefore Michael Kors’ future bottom line? If we decide the 
reproduction of such design objects is a preservation 
                                               
154 The following information, in the form of answers to my questions posed to the head of 
the artisanal production of Ferragamo, was kindly shared with me by the Museo 
Ferragamo on April 16, 2019 (answers to questions on file with author) 
155 For a details on the acquisition of Gucci by PPR, now Kering, see The Battle for the Gucci 
Group: "One of the Most Bitter Fights in Corporate History", THE FASHION LAW, January 25, 
2018, http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/the-battle-for-the-gucci-group-part-
i?rq=the%20Battle%20for%20the%20Gucci%20Group (Part I of a three part article). For the 
acquisition of Versace by Michael Kors see Game On: Michael Kors Acquires Versace for $2.1 
Billion, THE BUSINESS OF FASHION, September 25, 2018, 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/game-on-michael-kors-
acquires-versace-for-2-billion.  
156 Osman Ahmed, From Versace to Helmut Lang, the Rise of Re-Issues, THE BUSINESS OF 
FASHION, October 12, 2017, 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/intelligence/from-versace-to-helmut-lang-
the-rise-of-re-issues.  
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mechanism, on what grounds might Italian cultural property 
law restrict it, and through what legal means?  
 
The fourth reason is connected to the third: local and regional 
craftsmen currently create Italian fashion design objects under 
contract or as employees of Italian fashion design companies. 
These same local and regional craftsmen often do similar types 
of work for non-Italian fashion companies. If we preserve and 
valorize an Italian fashion design object, we might recognize 
local and regional craftsmen or we might not. Recognizing 
Italian fashion design objects as cultural property or 
recognizing only the reproduction of these objects as of cultural 
interest, whether as another object or in image form, risks 
assimilating Italian craftsmanship into Italian fashion and 
therefore identifying them as one. But not all Italian 
craftsmanship is Italian fashion, and not all Italian fashion is 
Italian craftsmanship. This difference is especially important 
outside of a museum, where geographical marks and 
indications and fiscal incentives are often used to prop up 
otherwise unsustainable or barely thriving local Italian 
businesses or to identify Italian fashion companies as indicative 
of such traditions.157 Imagining the differences between Italian 
craftsmanship and Italian fashion design outside a museum 
through individual cultural property protections is important 
so as not to risk conflating, and potentially losing, different and 
important areas of Italian cultural heritage. 
 
Outside museums Italian fashion companies increasingly found 
their own archives and exhibit strong control over their fashion 
design objects, both through intellectual property law and real 
property law, while equating their fashion design objects with 
other categories of cultural heritage in campaigns called Forever 
Now (by Gucci) [Figure 5]158, in fashion shows within cultural 
properties [Figure 6]159, in fashion images and marketing 
                                               
157 See Moda Made in Italy. Le Misure Doganali in MAIETTA, supra note 61 at 89- 108. For one 
example of fiscal incentives and safeguarding mechanisms for artisan business in Italy, 
which operate as a type of cultural heritage protection, see Legge n. 443/1985 (Legge-
quadro per l’Artigianato) and Legge regionale n. 76 del 11 Novembre 2016 (Toscana).    
158 See Forever Now in GUCCI: THE MAKING OF 368 (Frida Giannini et al, eds., Rizzoli, 2010). 
159 Ferragamo recently staged its Men’s Spring/Summer 2020 show in Piazza della 
Signoria, while Gucci has staged its Cruise 2018 fashion show in Palazzo Pitti. Ferragamo al 
Pitti, la sfilata in piazza della Signoria, CORRIERE.IT, https://www.corriere.it/foto-
gallery/moda/pitti-uomo-2019/19_giugno_12/ferragamo-pitti-sfilata-piazza-signoria-
3b8ca9fa-8cee-11e9-98ba-037337dafe50.shtml (last visited July 16, 2019). See also the 
discussion of Dolce & Gabbana supra in Introduction.   
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campaigns [Figure 7].160 Along with this, individuals and 
members of the public are increasingly displaying a cultural 
interest in Italian fashion design objects both inside the 
museum161 and outside of it.162 In the context of fashion 
exhibitions, some fashion industry publications have already 
noted that “[p]ublic interest in fashion exhibitions is surging.”163 
Imagining how Italian fashion design objects are cultural 
property inside the museum is not enough to fully preserve and 
valorize a public cultural interest in Italian fashion design 
objects. For these reasons, like for other categories of Italian 
cultural heritage like film, photography, and contemporary art, 
it is crucial to imagine how, or how not, to protect Italian 
fashion design objects as cultural property outside of the 
museum.   
 
2. Italian Fashion History between Tradition and Innovation   
 
An imaginary walk through Italian fashion history reveals many of 
the same dichotomies we identified above as reasons for the timely 
exploration of how Italian fashion design objects are cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law outside the museum. Namely, 
Italian fashion design seems to have always existed at a crossroads 
                                               
160 Gucci’s latest fashion campaign for its Pre-Fall 2019 shows Gucci bags in front of ancient 
temples in Sicily. See Symposium in Selinunte, GUCCI, 
https://www.gucci.com/us/en/st/stories/advertising-campaign/article/prefall-19-
campaign.  
161 The Metropolitan Museum of Art, for example, consistently reports that the Costume 
Institute’s shows, which also include Italian fashion design objects while not being 
exclusively about Italian fashion design, are the most highly attended. [Press Release] 
1,659,647 Visitors to Costume Institute’s Heavenly Bodies Show at Met Fifth Avenue and Met 
Cloisters Make It the Most Visited Exhibition in The Met’s History, THE METROPOLITAN 
MUSEUM OF ART, October 11, 2018, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/press/news/2018/heavenly-bodies-most-visited-
exhibition.  
162 This conclusion might be drawn by the number of users whose purchases are 
influenced because of the heritage of a brand. Although an investigation into these 
numbers is beyond the scope of this dissertation, others have commented on the role of 
museums, heritage marketing campaigns, timelessness as luxury, and even aesthetics in 
fashion companies sales generally and in the impact of retail space. See Floriana Iannone 
and Francesco Izzo, Salvatore Ferragamo: An Italian heritage brand and its museum 13(2) 
PLACE BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 163 (December 2016, published January 2017), 
doi: 10.1057/s41254- 016- 0053-3; Jonathan Deschenes, Annamma Joy, John F. Sherry Jr., 
and Alladi Venkatesh, The aesthetics of luxury fashion, body, and identity formation, 20 J. OF 
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 459 (2010); Anamma Joy, Jeff Jianfen Wang, Tsang-Sing Chan, 
John F. Sherry, Jr., Geng Cui, M(Art) Worlds: Consumer Perceptions of how Luxury Brand 
Stores become Art Institutions, 90 J. OF RETAILING 347 (2014). 
163 BOF Team, Inside Valentino Garavani’s Virtual Museum, THE BUSINESS OF FASHION, 
December 7, 2011, https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/digital-
scorecard/digital-scorecard-valentino-garavani-virtual-museum.  
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between the tangible and the intangible (objects and reproductions; 
manners and things); the local and the global (especially regional and 
national). 
 
2.1 From Rosa Genoni to Gucci, Ferragamo and World War II 
 
Before tracing the beginnings of a uniquely Italian fashion on 
the Italian territory in the early 20th century, it must be admitted 
that evidence of fashion was present in Italian Renaissance 
courts and city states before the production of Italian fashion as 
we recognize it today. Baldassare Castiglione’s 16th century The 
Book of the Courtier contains various sections on dress in 
addition to manners: in the form of a conversation between 
members at court he recounts not only a description of 
appropriate dress, but also differences between the French, 
Germans, Spaniards and Italians, who can improve on the 
clothes of other traditions and yet be still subject to the same 
fashions of their locality.164 With gems such as “l’abito non fa il 
monaco”165, Castiglione’s text and its emphasis on manners as 
much as clothing in a fashion universe is ripe for a discussion of 
how habits in fashion166 should be classified as intangible 
cultural heritage or through tangible cultural property. While 
acknowledging the historical underpinning of Italian fashion in 
the Renaissance, however, the chapter chooses to concentrate, 
because of the dissertation’s emphasis on how Italian fashion 
produced today may be recognized as cultural property, on the 
20th century. Indeed, the fashion products of the Italian 
Renaissance, because of the passage of time, provide less of a 
challenge for a classification as cultural property under the law: 
Venetian shoes such as those in the Palazzo Davanzati in 
Florence [Figure 8] or Eleonora di Toledo’s funerary dress in the 
Museo della Moda e del Costume in Florence, are more readily 
understood as cultural property and beyond, in some sense, the 
dilemmas described later.167 
 
The appearance of uniquely Italian fashion design objects in the 
early 20th century cannot be understood outside the historical 
dominance of France and Paris in fashion. Early signs of 
                                               
164 BALDASSARE CASTIGLIONE, THE BOOK OF THE COURTIER 103- 104 (1528) (Leonard 
Eckstein Opdycke, trans., Scribner’s, 1901), 
https://warburg.sas.ac.uk/pdf/enh660b2449259.pdf  
165 Id. at 105.  
166 Already discussed in terms of Castiglione’s work in PAULICELLI, supra note 102.  
167 See infra Chapter 2.  
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discontent with this dominance are evidenced in Ada Gigli 
Marchetti’s history of fashion which details how, even at the 
height of “francomania” in Italy as French artisans and stylists 
fleeing the French Revolution catered to the Milanese elite in 
the late eighteenth century, a group of Milanese called the 
“bosinade…lamentava la mania dei milanesi di trovare bello e di voler 
seguire ad ogni costo tutto ciò che proveniva dalla Francia…”168 In the 
early nineteenth century certain editorials in fashion magazines 
distributed in Italy began to take up a proverbial call to arms 
against French and Parisian fashion. 
 
‘Vergogna’- scriveva nel 1804 la compilatrice di uno dei più 
prestigiosi e longevi giornali femminili editi a Milano, il ‘Corriere 
delle dame’, rivolgendosi alle modiste italiane. ‘L’Italia, maestra in 
tutti i tempi ed in tutti i generi dell’arte divina del bello va ad 
accattare in prestito dai parigini le mode? Allontanativi una volta 
da queste dipendenze in fatto di toletta. Se anco la sempre variante 
invenzione della moda fosse un vizio, e non un bisogno dei ricchi, ed 
un sostegno delle arti, io vi direi abbiatevi dei vizi italiani senza 
prenderli altrove…’169 
 
Indeed, slowly but surely certain distinctively Italian fashions 
became noticeable alongside Parisian fashion on the Italian 
territory. Gigli Marchetti’s history notes, in the summer of 1807, 
the popularity of a straw hat from Florence “alla Pamela” and 
green sunglasses.170 Such facts shared by Italian fashion 
historians add nuance to narratives of fashion history in which 
Paris is dominant. They also, however, raise questions about the 
relevant Italian community for Italian fashion design objects 
and the dominance of cities in creating Italian fashion 
narratives, two questions which are relevant for our exploration 
of how to classify Italian fashion design objects as cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law.  
 
Valerie Steele has noted a relationship between political 
unification in Italy and an identifiable Italian fashion in these 
                                               
168 ADA GIGLI MARCHETTI, DALLA CRINOLINA ALLA MINIGONNA: LA DONNA, L’ABITO E LA 
SOCIETÀ DAL XVIII AL XX SECOLO 40 (CLUEB, 1995) (which was in part for political 
reasons).  
169 Id. at 59 (citing to ‘Corriere delle Dame’, 7 Ottobre 1804). Marchetti also lists many other 
periodicals published in Italy in the earlier eighteenth century including Giornale delle 
Donne, Giornale delle Mode, Giornale delle Nuove Mode di Francia e d’Inghilterra, Giornale di 
Mode e Aneddoti, Il Giornale delle Dame e delle Mode di Francia, and La Donna Galante ed 
Erudita, Giornale dedicato a Bel Sesso.  
170 Id. at 63. 
  55 
years.   
 
Historical forces delayed the subsequent development of a unified 
nation state in the Italian peninsula…One of the consequences was 
that by the eighteenth century, Italian fashion had become derivative 
of French fashion (for women)…Beautiful clothes were still 
produced in Italy…but the dominant trends in fashion were set 
elsewhere. Regional costume enjoyed a revival throughout western 
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and Italian folk 
dress, in particular, was much appreciated by artists, but folk 
costume was marginal to the course of fashion history, which was 
essentially the history of urban dress.171 
 
At the same time, however, studies on sumptuary law indicate 
the existence of a public interest in fashion in early Italian 
Renaissance-era city states172 and even the existence of what 
even Steele calls fashion systems.173 Furthermore, as Eugenia 
Paulicelli has already written, codes of dress, style and 
comportment produced in Italy in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, such as the famous Book of the Courtier by 
Baldassare Castiglione and texts observing differences in dress 
in other cultures, such as Cesare Vecellio’s costume books, 
indicate that Italy played an important role in shaping fashion 
even outside of the production of material objects.174 The 
emphasis on Made in Italy and Italian craftsmanship has, in a 
way, grown out of the need to emphasize what Italy can 
uniquely contribute to the greater fashion system given its 
historical relationship to Parisian and French fashions.  
 
Made in Italy and Italian craftsmanship does not, however, 
facilitate an easy tool of identification for a cultural interest in 
Italian fashion design objects, even historically. The term Italian 
craftsmanship, far from indicating only artisanal, one of a kind 
products, is in fact a more nuanced term which may also apply 
to objects produced in a series by large industry. The advent of 
objects which cross the boundaries between industry and 
culture in Italy has only increased since the late 19th century 
when Italy first embraced industrialization. As Luca Cottini has 
described, the complementary relationship between industrial 
objects and traditional craftsmanship and art in Italy has been 
                                               
171 VALERIE STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE 4 (2003).  
172 KILLERBY, supra note 6.  
173 STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 3-4. 
174 PAULICELLI, supra note 102 at 3, 52, 92. 
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present since the 1880s when objects began to be newly 
aestheticized by authors such as Serao and d’Annunzio and as 
products came to represent Italian style at Universal 
Expositions.175 The raw materials of fashion design and its 
production played an important part in Italy’s representation of 
self at the start of the industrial age. Local products such as 
“silk from Como” and “straw hats from Carpi”176 were some of 
the country’s most renowned exports and it was in 1878 “with 
the passage of [its] first protectionist law on domestic textile products, 
[that] the Italian state began to openly support the industrial 
project.”177  
 
Fashion design was but one way in which Italians sought to 
represent themselves in this new era. D’Annunzio himself, the 
same author who had used descriptions of objects in his novels 
to communicate specific aesthetic feelings and sentiments in a 
new modernity filled with commodities178, designed “clothes for 
himself and his lovers…[and] craft[ed] customized pieces.”179 Cottini 
also points to Mario Fortuny and the painter Giovanni Boldini 
as others for whom “[i]n parallel with d’Annunzio…the space of art 
also became an experimental workshop of fashion design…”180  
 
In the historical fashion narrative which emphasizes Parisian 
dominance in this period, the example of the Spaniard Fortuny 
who settled in Venice often stands out for Italian fashion 
design, even if his creations are characterized as “only an artistic 
alternative to fashionable dress”181 and not as fashion proper. 
Perhaps most striking about these early examples of Italian 
fashion design objects is the use of raw textiles, an increasingly 
industrial product, as the canvas or material for Italian cultural 
expression and new aesthetics.182 Moreover, despite the lack of 
                                               
175 LUCA COTTINI, THE ART OF OBJECTS, 14, 18-24 (2018).  
176 Id. at 14.  
177 Id. at 13.  
178 Id. at 19- 20 (describing d’Annunzio’s description of objects, including antiquities and 
collectibles, in his novel Il piacere).  
179 Id. at 20. Cottini has interpreted this as “an approach…of a designer creatively 
transforming commercial matter into art and of a style maker fashioning trends around 
himself and his lovers.” Id.  
180 Id. 
181 STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 7.  
182 Giulia Chiostrini, a textile conservator at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, has 
described costume as three-dimensional textile. See Audio, Il Tempo e il Tessuto, Il 
Tessuto come Arte Public Program, FONDAZIONE PALAZZO TE (November 12, 2017), 
https://www.centropalazzote.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Il-Tempo-e-il-
Tessuto_Summary.pdf (on file with author).  
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an established or agreed upon Italian fashion at the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, an increasing 
number of corporations and associations produced shirts, 
intimates and outerwear in Italy.183 Indeed, Ivan Paris notes that 
a clear approximation of the appearance of abbigliamento pronto 
is not easy, especially given the overlap between sewing and 
more industrial production at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in Italy184 and the false dichotomy between abbigliamento 
pronto/industrial production and abito su misura/artisanal 
product.185  
 
The porous boundaries between objects, aesthetics, culture and 
industry in Italy are further evident in other early 20th century 
examples. As part of a wider “Italian decorative industry”186 
early fashion experiments in Italy benefited from a holistic 
concept of Italian decorative arts as “an original fusion of 
aesthetics and production”187. At times this benefit meant a 
repudiation of traditional notions of Italian cultural heritage. 
The Futurists, for example, within the context of their disgust 
with Italian museums and their characterization of objects of 
the past as belonging in a cemetery-like space188, designed and 
promoted a fashion that, while nationalistic in its embrace of 
Italy, ruptured with the past. As Eugenia Paulicelli has 
described, “the Futurist [fashion] project…sought to effect deep 
ruptures in the symmetry of the cut in order to allow the wearer more 
movement and dynamism”189 and to challenge through the most 
brilliant colors. [Figure 9]190  
 
In contrast, Maria Monaci Gallenga and Rosa Genoni both 
created and promoted a fashion that explicitly embraced more 
traditional Italian cultural heritage, drawing on treasured, 
                                               
183 IVAN PARIS, OGGETTI CUCITI: L’ABBLIGIAMENTO PRONTO IN ITALIA DAL PRIMO 
DOPOGUERRA AGLI ANNI SETTANTA 44-46 (2006).  
184 Id. at 29- 30; 41-42 (describing the statistical and data challenges).  
185 Id. at 25- 26.  
186 COTTINI, supra note 175 at 23.  
187 Id. at 22.  
188 See F.T. Marinetti, MANIFESTO DEL FUTURISMO (1909).  
189 EUGENIA PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM 33 (2004). 
190 Id. at 34 (quoting from The Futurist Manifesto of the Italian Hat). Paulicelli’s book also 
describes the relationship which certain Futurists and their manifestos later had with the 
Fascist state’s promotion of certain textiles and an Italian fashion. See Id. at 112- 113. 
Valerie Steele has characterized this Futurist fashion as a recognition of the “cultural 
significance of fashion.” STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE, supra note 171 at 11.  
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recognized items of Italian cultural property191 like Renaissance 
motifs and paintings, such as Botticelli’s Primavera [Figure 10] 
and other Greco-Roman artifacts [Figure 11].192 In these 
examples, firmly established Italian cultural expressions and 
cultural heritage were both the inspiration and, we might say, 
the raw material for objects considered to be part of an Italian 
decorative industry that fully embraced beauty and usefulness 
and “a new idea of ‘industrial art’ as a serialized form of 
artisanship.”193  
 
Within the prevalent and slippery justification that fashion is of 
cultural interest because it is like art, it must be admitted that 
the work of the Futurists, Gallenga and Genoni might be 
considered non-industrial and more susceptible to a 
classification as “art” and therefore lend themselves to this 
view. While some of the Futurists’ designs were embraced by 
avant-garde French fashion, they were not accepted and adopted 
by a large collective of people in Italy.194 Genoni’s own fashion 
designs and products were not necessarily accepted and 
adopted by a large collective of people in Italy. 
Notwithstanding this, Genoni was recognized for her work at 
Expositions in Milan in 1906195 and also worked for Milanese 
firms like “Dall’Oro” and Bellotti, creating costumes for La 
Scala, and the prominent fashion house Maison H.Haardt et Fils, 
which copied Parisian designs for an Italian clientele196, and even 
created her own designs for celebrities of the time such as Lydia 
Borelli.197 Gallenga, after the recognition of her fashion designs 
and objects at the 1925 Exposition in Paris198, did go on to open 
                                               
191 COTTINI, supra note 175 at 161 and 24; STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE, supra note 171 at 
7; PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM supra note 189 at 31-32; EUGENIA PAULICELLI, 
ITALIAN STYLE: FASHION & FILM FROM EARLY CINEMA TO THE DIGITAL AGE 33 
(Bloomsbury, 2017).  
192 As evidenced by Genoni’s Tanagra dress. See Drappeggio e taglio: Tanagra, l’abito dinamico 
in PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130 at 58 - 64.   
193 COTTINI, supra note 175 at 23 (citing to Camillo Boito’s Arte italiana decorativa e 
industriale).  
194 PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM, supra note 189 at 33 (“The experiments and 
creations of painters like Giacomo Balla and others such as Fortunato Depero and Ernesto 
Thayant (who designed for Madeleine Vionnet), but which did not become part of 
mainstream fashion at that time, were a far more elitist form of rupture and transgression, 
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195 PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130 at 50-53.  
196 Id. at 33, 35, 42, 53.  
197 Id. at 61.  
198 COTTINI, supra note 175 at 161.  
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her own boutique in Paris in 1928.199 Similarly other Italians like 
Elsa Schiaparelli melded art with their design to create fashion 
in Paris.200 In this sense, notwithstanding their embrace as part 
of an Italian cultural heritage in museums201 and literature, these 
early examples may not even fit a definition of Italian fashion 
design objects as cultural property due to their limited 
adoption.  
 
Notwithstanding this, Genoni’s work especially gives us insight 
into the ways in which Italian cultural heritage was used in an 
attempt to found a national Italian fashion design. In her 
collected writings Per una moda italiana, which was both a bi-
lingual book, text included with her display of dresses at the 
1906 Milan Exposition, and the subject of Genoni’s speech at the 
Congresso Nazionale delle Donne Italiane in 1909202, Genoni speaks 
of an Italian fashion in the context of how Italy was, at the time, 
“vigorosamente affermando nelle scienze, nelle arti, nelle industrie, 
nel commercio, e palpita d’un rigoglioso sangue di rinnovellata vita.”203 
Citing the example of nature, Genoni encourages a fashion 
which takes its form from trees, icebergs, waterfalls, leaves and 
flowers.204 Noting how industry and art could and must 
complement each other, Genoni used Leonardo da Vinci as an 
inspirational example of how industry and art can become one.205 
Genoni’s La storia della moda attraverso i secoli from 1925 contains 
images of ancient Greek vases and sculptures and even patterns 
for the drapery on the Statue of the Victory of Samothrace.206 
                                               
199 Id. at 162.  
200 For highlights of Schiaparelli’s work within a comparison between art and fashion in 
the Italian cultural context see ACROSS ART AND FASHION (Stefania Ricci, ed., 2016). 
201 The Futurist vests were displayed as part of the Museo Ferragamo’s exhibit Tra Arte e 
Moda. See ACROSS ART AND FASHION, supra note 199. Genoni’s Primavera dress is part of 
the collection of the Museo della Moda e del Costume. See The Spring (evening gown), LE 
GALLERIE DEGLI UFFIZI, https://www.uffizi.it/en/artworks/evening-gown-la-primavera.     
202 PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130 at 73, 100-103.  
203 Cited to in Id. at 48. Genoni’s activities as part of the Womens’ Congresses or as a 
Socialist, although it is an important part of the history of her work and fashion design, 
are beyond the scope here. More information about this part of Genoni’s work can be 
found in Paulicelli’s book LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA. For a history of the world through 
the eyes of women, and a few observations on fashion in medieval times, and the 19th and 
20th centuries see GEORGES DUBY AND MICHELLE PERROT, STORIA DELLE DONNE IN 
OCCIDENTE (3RD ed. 1996) (see especially Volumes 2, 4 and 5).    
204 PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130 at 102 (quoting and citing to Per 
una moda italiana. Relazione al I Congresso Nazionale delle Donne Italiane in Roma della 
Signora Rosa Genoni, delegata della Società Umanitaria di Milano). 
205 Id. at 104 (quoting and citing to Vita d’arte nella Moda).  
206PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130, images numbered 52 and 53; 
ROSA GENONI, LA STORIA DELLA MODA ATTRAVERSO I SECOLI (DALLA PREISTORIA AI TEMPI 
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Indeed, long before Anne Hollander examined the importance 
of drapery in Seeing through Clothes207, or Dolce & Gabbana 
reproduced it in their Alta Moda, Genoni made such links 
evident for her students, and a wider public, in Italy.  
 
The link Genoni makes with the past brings up the issue of the 
scope of the notion of cultural property in Italian cultural 
property law. Where new creativity builds on cultural heritage 
of the past, our cultural interest in it might be amplified or 
reduced. But Italian cultural property law does not necessarily 
measure innovation or creativity or originality. In this sense, 
cultural property law is not, or at least, it should not, be about 
promoting innovation or about allowing private actors to police 
the expressions that are part of creative contributions. Italian 
cultural property law primarily privileges control over objects, 
although, as we have seen, in some instances it may extend the 
right to prohibit commercial reproductions of cultural property 
when it is in the hands of the State. Such reproduction rights are 
not extended, at least in the Code, to private cultural property 
owners. There can be as many different iterations of cultural 
property that are of cultural interest to the public for small to 
infinitesimal to large reasons, be they historic, artistic, or other. 
In this sense, the scope of Italian cultural property law is broad- 
it allows almost every and any cultural interest into its purview, 
no matter how small of a contribution compared to the giants of 
the past.208 Modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
then need not reinvent the wheel to be classified as cultural 
property. While a comparison between Botticelli’s Primavera 
and Genoni’s The Spring [Figure 12] may help to identify 
Genoni’s contribution and the historic or artistic interest or 
testamentary value we assign to it, that comparison does not 
necessarily limit the scope of design objects which can be 
classified as cultural property.  
 
This same reasoning of the non-discriminatory nature of 
cultural property protection under Italian cultural property law 
also potentially applies to Italian fashion that was made abroad 
by Italians and which took inspiration from cinema while using 
a hybrid form of production between artisanship and 
industrialization. Salvatore Ferragamo, who emigrated to the 
                                               
ODIERNI) (Bergamo: Istituto italiano d’arti grafiche, 1925) (consulted at the Gladys Marcus 
Library at the Fashion Institute of Technology).  
207 See generally Drapery in HOLLANDER, supra note 146 at 1- 81.   
208 Although as will be explained infra in Chapter 2 there are some limits.  
  61 
United States from his small Italian town of Bonito outside of 
Naples209, along with many other Italians during the late 19th and 
the early 20th centuries, is a testament to this. Many of 
Ferragamo’s early shoes were designed for American cinema, 
but a comparison of them to the epoque which they are meant to 
represent is not meant as a limit on the cultural interest that we 
fix on Ferragamo’s design objects as a public. Rather, such a 
comparison, under Italian cultural property law, might reveal 
the nature of our public cultural interest in the object while not 
reflecting on the validity or scope of the public cultural interest 
itself. Skipping a bit ahead chronologically will help to elucidate 
this point. During Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and 
the scarcity of raw materials for shoe supports that it 
engendered, Ferragamo engaged in a creative process, 
designing shoes with the decorative foil wrapped around 
chocolates210 and, it seemed, inventing the cork wedge soles.211 In 
1950, however, Ferragamo discovered the soles had been worn 
centuries before thanks to an archeological excavation at Villa di 
Boccaccio outside Florence.212 Rather than penalize Ferragamo 
for the creation of a sandal actually created centuries before, 
Italian cultural property law would still protect and valorize a 
pair of Ferragamo’s sandals with cork wedge soles if the public 
had a sufficient cultural interest in it. In this sense, Italian 
cultural property law is the opposite of a copyright legal 
regime. Historic, artistic or cultural interest is not even based on 
copyright’s independent creation doctrine. Rather it is based on 
context and is judged in relation to the past and present 
historical moment. Two objects, exactly alike but from different 
time periods, could both potentially be cultural property. 
 
Genoni’s arguments for the importance of an Italian fashion 
may at first seem complementary to the Italian fascist project of 
creating a national fashion industry. They were not, however, 
fully embraced given that Genoni’s socialist and pacifist 
activities did not enthrall the Italian Fascist party or State, nor 
did Genoni obviously support the party.213 Notwithstanding the 
tense relationship, one of Genoni’s proposals, “the formation of a 
                                               
209 The following details of Ferragamo’s life are primarily taken from his autobiography 
SALVATORE FERRAGAMO, IL CALZOLAIO DEI SOGNI 212 (3rd ed, 2010).  
210 Id. at 131- 132.   
211 Id. at 132- 134 (the cork in Italian is called “sughero sardo” by Salvatore Ferragamo). 
212 Id. at 134.  
213 See PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130 at 84, 87 (describing early 
governmental surveillance of Genoni prior to the advent of Fascism in 1919 and later 
surveillance of Genoni during the Fascist period in 1935).  
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state-controlled institution charged with organizing the [Italian] 
clothing and textile industry”214, was embraced by the Fascist state.  
 
In 1935 the Fascist government founded the Ente Nazionale della 
Moda, a national association described by Sofia Gnoli as 
“[d]esigned to promote the progressive establishment of Italian 
fashion.”215 Eugenia Paulicelli has more specifically described it 
as a mechanism through which the Fascist government sought 
to “control the entire productive cycle of textile and fashion….[and] to 
persuade female consumers and dressmakers to seek inspiration in 
Italy’s domestic roots and traditions.”216 The association had grown 
out of an earlier one meant to in part stage bi-annual fashion 
exhibitions and shows, and the Fascist regime’s awareness of 
the fashion industry was by no means contained to its 
founding, nor was it as clear cut as one would think.217 The 1927 
census indicates the overlaps and fine lines between the 
regime’s definitions of luxury, productions in series, sartorie, 
sarti, fabbriche and case di moda.218 A later 1929 study of the 
fashion industry by the Confederazione Generale Fascista, as 
detailed by Ivan Paris, also reveals the challenge of organizing 
industrialized and still artisanal productions during this period 
that were driven by the law of fashion, or the variability of 
trends.219 Other studies of the links between film and fashion 
during this period reveal that Italian fascism’s insistence on a 
certain type of Italian cultural ideal may not have even been 
successful in practice.220       
 
Part of the Fascist state’s instruments to protect a new Italian 
fashion industry and promote an Italian fashion from 1935 to 
1937 included creating a register of fashion designers and their 
                                               
214 PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM supra note 189 at 28.  
215 SOFIA GNOLI, THE ORIGINS OF ITALIAN FASHION 1900-45 73 (2012). See also MARCHETTI, 
supra note 168 at 218.  
216 PAULICELLI, ITALIAN STYLE, supra note 190 at 78. The success of this Ente can also, 
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never realized 1940 conference which highlights his ability to continue to sell his shoes 
abroad, despite the existence of the Ente. Id. at 137.  
217 Id.; PARIS, supra note 183 at 48, footnote 95.  
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designs, a portion of which had to be eligible for “ ‘a mark of 
guarantee’ that certified the Italian provenance of their design and 
production.”221 Interestingly, the Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
America in New York City in the same period attempted to do 
the same thing, restraining copies of designs registered with 
their organization and ultimately disbanded in part thanks to a 
1941 Supreme Court ruling that the Guild violated U.S. federal 
anti-trust law by restraining the copying of fashion designs and 
therefore the production of certain fashion design objects.222 
Similar to the complaints surrounding the Fashion Originators’ 
Guild, this register of fashion designers and their designs in 
Italy, and the requirement that a portion of designs be of 
certified Italian provenance, caused some protest from members 
of the fashion industry who complained that the measures did 
not distinguish between “important ateliers” and “retail 
shops.”223 This criticism seems to have had much to do with a 
hierarchy of imitation and originality. As Gnoli reports 
 
Ester Lombardo, editor of Vita Femminile…. [wrote] Alongside the 
dresses and hats of important ateliers we can find the little hats from 
retail shops and off-the-peg dresses produced by the dozen, so that a 
lady can be dressed to look almost like her own cook, all in the name 
of Italy. This is a sacrifice we should not ask of any lady.224   
 
Other legislation passed by the Fascist regime included Textorit, 
a “certificate of guarantee for Italian textiles”, sanctions against 
fashion designers who copied designs registered with the Ente 
Nazionale della Moda, a second “certificate of creation…given only 
to couture clothing that was particularly outstanding for its 
originality and italianità”, and still other rules on the quantity of 
imported fibers that could be used along with innovative fibers 
produced in Italy.225 During the same years the Italian 
                                               
221 GNOLI, supra note 215 at 75. Gnoli cites to specific laws instituted by the Fascist regime: 
Law n. 1293 of 31 October 1935 (“chang[ing] the constitution of the Autonomous Body for 
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the New Deal see Hemphill and Suk, The Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, supra note 
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1936) at 9].  
225 PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM supra note 189 at 107- 108. While Italy’s colonial 
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government also built on a previous 1911 collection of 
traditional and popular arts in Italy, which included local 
costumes; the collection would eventually become the museum 
of the same name still open to the public today in Rome as part 
of the Museo della Civiltà.226 The Ente Nazionale della Moda also 
produced thoughts on Italian fashion design as compared to 
other markets and cultures, as papers written for an unrealized 
conference in 1940 attest. These papers, written by various 
members of the fashion industry, argue that Italian fashion 
could only truly be defined in relation to other cultures; that 
could address its potential success and identification as such on 
an international and global market;227 and proposed that Italian 
fashion could, moreover, only continue to develop with 
reference to more inspirations than those only found in Italian 
cultural heritage.228 
 
Words and images surrounding fashion were also crucial in the 
eyes of the Italian government at this time. The Ente Nazionale 
della Moda published Cesare Meano’s Commentario Dizionario 
Italiano della Moda in 1936 and then in a second edition in 1938.229 
The primary purpose of this dictionary was to strike any French 
words from the Italian vocabulary of fashion design. Meano’s 
commentary included a Guida per la versione delle voci e dei modi 
stranieri, which substituted English and French fashion terms 
with Italian ones.230 Italian cultural heritage and cultural 
property was crucial to creating this new imaginary lexicon. As 
Eugenia Paulicelli has described, Meano’s entries and his use of 
historical vignettes within them harken back to Italian literature 
and other cultural traditions in an attempt to fix a uniquely 
                                               
importance for continuing discussions of diversity in fashion, an analysis of that aspect of 
Italian fashion during the 1930s is beyond the scope of my dissertation.  
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Italian fashion in line with the goals of the Fascist regime and 
the cultural mores prevalent in 1930s Italy at the time.231 For 
example, one of Meano’s entries, which seems to describe an 
accessory previously highlighted in Marchetti’s history of 
fashion, is for the “Pamèla”, which he describes as  
 
un cappello femminile di paglia, a tesa larga e mole, giovanilmente 
ricadente fin quasi alle spalle, fu già chiamato Pamèla, nome di 
donna sempliciotta e casalinga, ma nobilmente d’arte (Goldoni) e 
asceso a sinonimo di buona figliola sospirosa.232 
 
These actions of the Italian government and its affiliates 
towards fashion in the 1930s all highlight how a public cultural 
interest in individual Italian fashion design objects was not 
easily confined to its material components or to its intangible 
reproductions, nor to its local elements or its more national 
ones. Words and images alongside and in addition to material 
objects were equally important in creating Italian fashion and in 
the creation of Italian fashion design objects. To acknowledge 
that all these different facets are equally important in a 
definition of Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law, is to be in a potential 
conundrum. Preserving everything, inasmuch as Italian fashion 
design objects are of interest for their tangible and intangible 
elements, is not possible, especially given Italian cultural 
property law’s emphasis on tangible objects. It may be too 
much of a stretch to preserve words and images.  
 
In the years after World War I during the advent of the Fascist 
party and the Fascist state in Italy, two Italian brands were 
founded which continue to produce premiere examples of 
Italian fashion design objects to this day: Gucci and Ferragamo. 
Indicative of the strength of Italian fashion design objects and 
their continued malleability between the tangible and 
intangible, the local and the global these two companies in their 
early years also embodied the issues relevant for a classification 
of Italian fashion design objects as cultural property today.  
 
In 1921 Guccio Gucci opened his first boutique of leather goods 
in Florence.233 Increasing its stores in the 1930s, Gucci expanded 
its original location on Via della Vigna Nuova in 1932 and 
                                               
231 PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM supra note 189 at 59-60.  
232 Pamèla in MEANO, supra note 230 at 326.  
233 1921 in GUCCI: THE MAKING OF, supra note 158 at 10. 
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created a separate production facility on Lungarno Guicciardini 
11.234 First known for luggage and travel accessories influenced 
by stylistic reputational forces outside of Italy- English 
refinement and elegance- Gucci also seems to have aligned itself 
with the modernist aesthetic gaining steam in Italy at the time. 
Rather than supporting a perception of its products as 
“handicraft”235,  
 
Guccio [Gucci] preferred to be associated with technology, and this 
lead [sic] him to Milan in 1935, where he presented his products at 
the Italian textile company Linifico & Canapificio Nazionale, an 
Italian textile company and one of the pioneers of Italian industry of 
the day.236 
 
 Salvatore Ferragamo, a shoemaker from Southern Italy, 
returned to Italy in 1927 from Hollywood, where he had catered 
to the stars and studios at his Hollywood Boot Shop.237 Creating 
accessories influenced by American glamour and star power 
Ferragamo in particular capitalized on his American 
connections even during these years. In May of 1938 American 
VOGUE featured a spread on his wedge sole, spotlighting, 
among other iterations by other designers, two shoes designed 
by Salvatore Ferragamo for Saks Fifth Avenue.238  
 
 During the 1930s in fact many articles in American fashion 
periodicals testify to links between the modern Italian fashions 
produced at the time and Italian cultural heritage. In 1937 an 
article in American VOGUE entitled Fine Italian Hand for Shoes 
included an image of shoes falling from a shop behind the 
sculpture of Neptune located in Piazza Signoria in Florence.239 
The article describes the scientific and technical process 
employed by Ferragamo to produce his shoes and emphasizes 
the hand-made process over production in series, which 
Ferragamo also shares in his biography.240 Yet another article in 
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235 Id. at 24.  
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American VOGUE in 1938 entitled Light on your feet compares a 
pair of Ferragamo’s shoes to Venetian gondolas 
 
Turned up at the tip, like the prow of a gondola, these suede pumps 
(which make your foot look inches smaller) demand a sophisticated 
foot. They are photogenic, too, for the “prow” is more pronounced in 
the photograph than it is on the foot.241      
 
Other examples from the same year referred to Ferragamo’s 
shoes, alongside others, as “works of art” which readers would 
collect “… like costume jewelry- special ones for special 
costumes…One common bond- they all look straight from an artisan’s 
hand.”242  
  
Although Italian fashion may have continued in fits and starts 
during World War II, Americans, following fashion narratives 
which cast American fashions as suffering from an imagined 
case of inadequacy in comparison to their European 
counterparts243, still tried to keep track of what their European 
counterparts were wearing even as they attempted to create a 
strong American fashion in New York.244 Italian fashion played 
a part in these observations.  
 
These observations were not always positive. Interestingly, 
American VOGUE seems to report disparagingly on the cork 
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Box 73, Folder 1, President's report: Winifred Ovitt (retiring), 26 January 1938. In terms of 
Paris’ status as a capital of fashion compared to New York, Valerie Steele notes how 
World War II and the lack of “fashion information from the Paris couture” led Americans 
to create new trends such as the “Victory Suit” and that “[f]or the first time in history, 
American designers began to carve out their own sphere of influence, centering on 
sportswear.” STEELE, PARIS FASHION, supra note 68 at 236.  
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shoes of Ferragamo in a report on shoes available in Lisbon in 
1944 by noting  
 
[f]or some reason, the texture and the color of the cork [of ready-
made shoes in Lisbon] take away the club-foot quality that spoiled 
the wedge shoes we once imported from the Italian, Ferragamo.245   
  
Soon after the war, however, Gucci and Ferragamo’s products 
were once again center stage in American fashion publications.  
 
2.2 Post War Success and Cultural Interest in Italian Fashion 
 
Promoted as an example of Italy’s unique talents and cultural 
legacy, the United States showcased and embraced Gucci and 
Ferragamo products as well as Italian fashion more generally 
soon after World War II. Such a promotion was also embraced 
by individual designers. In an open letter written in a 1945 issue 
of the Italian fashion magazine Bellezza, for example, Salvatore 
Ferragamo insists on Italy’s and his own ability, to continue, as 
before the war, to propose shoe designs at the height of 
fashion.246 After the war, American VOGUE announced the 
return of Ferragamo’s shoes in strategically placed layouts. A 
November 15, 1946 spread titled The Italian school showcased 
separate images of a Gucci bag and a Ferragamo shoe in front of 
the Ponte Vecchio [Figure 13] with the accompanying text  
 
This is what Italy makes, and what it has made for centuries: shoes, 
bags, perfections in leather. Interrupted by war, Italian leather 
makers have returned to their craft- and from the celebrated school 
of shoemaking that gave us the wedge sole, the thong-sandal, come 
these handmade leather accessories.247  
 
Italian fashion objects, indicative of an Italian fashion, were 
soon embraced wholeheartedly, especially by American 
audiences who saw them not only as less expensive compared 
to Parisian fashions but also as uniquely complementary to 
                                               
245 Marya Mannes, In Lisbon- ‘Dressed for Reaction’, Vol 104, Issue 4, VOGUE, September 1, 
1944, at 140.   
246 Open letter from Salvatore Ferragamo, BELLEZZA, November 1945 at 63, reproduced in 
FERRAGAMO, supra note 209 at 177.  
247 The Italian School, 108 VOGUE No. 9, November 15, 1946 at 166-167 (also reproduced in 
GUCCI: THE MAKING OF supra note 158 at 28) (also referred to in the VOGUE Database as 
part of a larger article entitled British Appointments). 
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American sportswear.248 It is in post-World War II Italy that the 
majority of Italian fashion scholarship recognizes the birth of 
Italian fashion and Made in Italy. Nicola White has presented the 
case that the popularity and very creation of Italian fashion 
after World War II had much to do with an economic and 
ephemeral promotional support from the United States.249 Many 
of the fashion histories written about Italian style during this 
time emphasize the role which movies played in supporting 
and amplifying a love for Italian style in America.250 Italian 
fashion’s links with the United States after World War II were 
also calculated thanks to the Marshall Plan, to a cheaper 
product relative to France, and to a receptiveness to Italian 
designs that deliberately incorporated sportswear and a casual 
aesthetic which Americans appreciated.251 The existence of 
Italian-American communities outside of Italy, and even the 
presence of Italian workers in New York’s garment district, set 
the stage even before the 1950s for creative dialogue and 
exchange between the United States and Italy.252 Like earlier 
moments in Italian fashion history, however, the birth of Italian 
fashion design continued to be marked not only by links to a 
wider Italian cultural heritage but also to the unique history of 
Italy, which frustrated one concise definition of Italian fashion.  
 
While some important Italian fashion shows in the late 1940s 
strategically emphasized the connections between Italian 
fashion and Italy’s heritage of art and culture253, the usual given 
date for the birth of Italian fashion is February 12, 1951 when 
                                               
248 See STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 1, 16 (observing “Deeply 
ambivalent about French high fashion, Americans ardently embraced the casual elegance 
of Italian fashion.” and “[while stereotypes of Italian aristocratic women were still seen as 
not as ‘imaginative or arresting’ as Paris] Gucci’s prestigious bucket bag and Ferragamo’s 
shoes were praised, as were sexy Italian playsuits: ‘little-girlish but in no way innocent.’ 
And the prices (about $100 a dress and $200 for an evening dress) ‘are far lower than in 
Paris.’”).   
249 WHITE, RECONSTRUCTING ITALIAN FASHION, supra note 72.  
250 See, for example, PAULICELLI, ITALIAN STYLE, supra note 190; Luigi Settembrini, From 
Haute Couture to Prêt-à-Porter in THE ITALIAN METAMORPHOSIS,1943- 1968 (Germano 
Celant, ed.) 485 (1994); Valerie Steele, Italian Fashion and America in THE ITALIAN 
METAMORPHOSIS, supra. 
251 Settembrini, From Haute Couture to Prêt-à-Porter, supra note 250 at 486 (describing 
Giorgini’s guidance to Italian fashion designers on how best to create products marketable 
to American buyers); STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 16 – 17.  
252 PAULICELLI, FASHION UNDER FASCISM supra note 189 at 129. See also a video touting the 
links between Italy and the United States, Più che un’amicizia (1957), 
https://patrimonio.archivioluce.com/luce-web/detail/IL3000095783/1/piu-che-
amicizia.html.  
253 STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 17.  
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the first fashion show was staged by Giovanni Battista Giorgini 
for American buyers.254 This date also explains why the 
discussion of Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
today is relatively recent. Not even seventy years, the time 
threshold required for most individual objects under Italian 
cultural property law, have passed since the first event 
generally accepted as the beginning of Italian fashion design.  
 
Giorgini’s shows, which would go on to be staged in Palazzo 
Pitti’s Sala Bianca in 1952255, the same space which now houses 
the Museo della Moda e del Costume, introduced more Italian 
fashion objects than just accessories: the designers who 
showcased at the event included the Sorelle Fontane and Emilio 
Pucci, among others.256 Other names which debuted at these 
shows at the Sala Bianca that have also found a place in Italian 
fashion design history including Roberto Capucci and Emilio 
Schubert.257 In fashion scholarship that discusses these fashion 
shows, a continuity with the Italian past and the complex 
relationships between Italian craftsmanship and Italian fashion 
are apparent, despite Giorgini’s implementation of a new 
presentation model primarily for American buyers. The local 
and regional traditions of craftsmanship and the unique 
aesthetic tied to specific Italian territories exerted its effects. 
Emilio Pucci’s success, for example, derived in great part from 
his production of patterns “with the help of craftsmen from 
Capri.”258 When Luigi Settembrini discusses the boutique 
collections presented alongside, and sometimes by the same 
creators of alta moda in these years, he mentions “skirts made of 
ribbons”, “trompe-l’oeil effects” on textiles, and “earrings made 
of raffia and colored stones.”259 Indeed, the Italian innovation 
which took root in the 1930s and during World War II 
continued to evolve and affect Italian fashion especially to an 
American public. In 1947 Salvatore Ferragamo won the Neiman 
Marcus Fashion award for his Invisible Sandal, produced with 
                                               
254 The ‘Birth’ of Italian Fashion at the Sala Bianca in Florence in STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN 
STYLE supra note 171 at 17; La sala Bianca e la nascita della moda italiana, GOOGLE ARTS & 
CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/la-sala-bianca/QQLC37-ZgO-
wJg?hl=it (last visited March 23, 2019); Luigi Settembrini, From Haute Couture to Prêt-à-
Porter, supra note 250 at 485 . See also GUIDO VERGANI, LA RENAISSANCE DE LA MODE 
ITALIENNE, FLORENCE, LA SALA BIANCA, 1952- 1973 (Electa, 1993). 
255 For this date see Settembrini, supra note 250 at 485.  
256 Id.   
257 Settembrini, supra note 250 at 485, 487.  
258 Id. at 486.  
259 Id. at 487.  
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nylon thread, and his shoes held a prime place in fashion 
presentations in the Sala Bianca.260 Again, these examples reveal 
that Italian fashion design during these years was defined by 
what we might characterize as an unicum of tangible quality 
and intangible style. In these years when so-called Italian style 
began to gain ground, Italian fashion design objects were still 
crucial to that intangible qualifier.  
 
The unique history of the Italian territory with its strong 
regional identities also affected the presentations in the Sala 
Bianca soon after their inauguration. Alta Moda soon moved its 
presentations to Rome.261 As Italian fashion evolved in the 1960s 
and 1970s the fragmentation of Italian fashion centers and the 
establishment of even more small to mid-sized family run 
manufacturing and designing enterprises shaped it.262 Just as 
Rome began to show alta moda so Milan and Turin began to 
increasingly compete with Florence for the attention of 
America. At the same time, the appearance of names in alta 
moda who first debuted in Florence, like Valentino, but would 
go on to create and contribute just as much to the ready-to-wear 
world shaped Italian fashion design objects. 263 A complex web of 
cities, individual designers, manufacturers and cultural 
influences, Italian fashion very much depended on the city in 
which it was shown or located and the specific people, 
association or organization at its helm.    
 
The innovations of design in Italian fashion which made an 
impression on the United States and the rest of the world from 
the 1950s on were also part of a much larger context of 
innovative industrial design. As Valerie Steele has detailed, Life 
magazine reported in 1961 that “ ‘Italy in a few brief years has 
changed the way the world looks – the cars, buildings, furniture and, 
most universally, the women.’”264 Such a continuity of design 
across sectors, is in line with Italian design throughout history, 
                                               
260 For details of the inspiration for the Invisible Sandal, made of an innovative material 
but not completely related to the deprivations of World War II see FERRAGAMO, supra note 
209 at 212. For a description and photographs of Salvatore Ferragamo at presentations of 
Italian fashion at the Sala Bianca, see the recent exhibit Fashion in Florence from January 10, 
2017 to March 5, 2017 showing images taken by the photographic agency Foto Locchi in 
which Salvatore Ferragamo’s shoe designs accompany dress designs by the Italian 
designer Schubert.   
261 STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 20.  
262 Steele, Italian Fashion and America in THE ITALIAN METAMORPHOSIS, supra note 250 at 496. 
263 Settembrini notes that Valentino debuted in Florence in 1959. Settembrini, supra note 
250 at 491.  
264 Steele, Italian Fashion and America in THE ITALIAN METAMORPHOSIS, supra note 250 at 502.  
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as Cottini has detailed the advent of industrial objects in Italy 
decades earlier at the beginning of the 20th century. It would 
seem an Italian legacy exists that is not necessarily connected to 
specific objects but instead connected to some reproduction 
across materials. Despite objects’ functionality or non-
functionality, their use on the market, there is a common 
creativity in their creation but then, in addition, a common 
public cultural interest that may attach to them, separate from 
their use on the market. Often a period of time must pass before 
this public cultural interest appears, as apparent with 
appreciations of the historic import of certain Italian fashion 
design objects during this time but, with others, the historical 
impact and therefore interest may be evident immediately. 
 
When thinking of Italian fashion design objects individually as 
cultural property under Italian cultural property law, it may be 
tempting to subscribe to some sort of hierarchy to facilitate the 
identification of those objects worthy of the public cultural 
interest. It might seem reasonable to base decisions of cultural 
interest on alta moda or specific designers, specific places or 
brands, which might also signify luxury for us. Histories of 
Italian fashion deny an ability to draw a bright line rule such as 
this, however. The links between the manufacture and 
production of ready-to-wear Italian fashion designs bely such 
easy labels. Walter Albini, for example, a designer who is 
characterized as anticipating the full beginning of Italian ready-
to-wear, began his career in Italy by working for the brand 
Krizia, founded by Maria Mandelli, which showed boutique 
collections at the Sala Bianca in the 1950s and 1960s before 
moving its fashion shows to Milan.265 Later Albini designed for 
multiple names which all showed on the Sala Bianca catwalk at 
the same time.266 Notwithstanding this, or perhaps because of it, 
Albini is often described as the first stylist and as the instigator 
of the importance of a designer’s griffe or signature.267 An easily 
                                               
265 For a description of Walter Albini’s early career see Biography, WALTER ALBINI, 
http://walteralbini.org/en/biografia/ (last visited March 25, 2019) (noting “At Krizia he 
experimented in industry methods, from knitwear to the study of yarns, from production 
to garments to the study of fabrics.”); see also STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 
171 at 54 (noting Krizia’s decision, along with others, to show in Milan beginning in 1964).  
266 Biography, WALTER ALBINI, supra note 265 (noting “Towards the end of the 1960’s he was 
designing for the main Italian fashion houses, for Billy Ballo, Cadette, Cole of California, 
Montedoro, Glans, Annaspina, Paola Signorini and Trell.”); STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN 
STYLE, supra note 171 at 55 (“In 1968, Albini was represented at the Pitti Palace by five 
collections for five different companies.”).   
267 Nello Barile, Made in Italy: da country of origin a metabrand in FATTO IN ITALIA: LA 
CULTURA DEL MADE IN ITALY (1960- 2001) 140 (Meltemi, 2006). An exploration of the work 
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identifiable public cultural interest based on designer, brand, 
place, or even type of object here is almost impossible.  
 
Still other fashion brands founded in this period, such as 
Missoni, were, and still are today, indelibly tied to the textiles 
which make up the material of their fashion product, both in 
terms of their business model and aesthetically. Such an unicum 
frustrate a bright line rule that public cultural interest in Italian 
fashion design objects is always in raw materials or the finished 
product. Founded in 1953 by Rita and Ottavio Missoni, Missoni 
grew out of Rita and Ottavio’s direct work with a factory in 
Gallerate in which they experimented with yarns and knits of 
all colors and materials to produce their highly identifiable 
multi-colored chevron print.268 Notwithstanding descriptions of 
Missoni’s prints as “an inspired combination of art and industry”269, 
separate elements of art and industry are hard to identify in 
Italian fashion objects which are such an unicum of tangible 
textile and intangible visual color. [Figure 14]  
 
The experiments which grew out of a vertical integration 
between manufacturing, production and design in Italy in the 
1960s and 1970s led directly to the advent of Italian ready-to-
wear. According to Elisabetta Merlo and Francesca Polese, this 
vertical integration was an important factor in the establishment 
of Milan as the winning Italian fashion capital; the existence of 
larger “firms” which produced fashion and a strong network of 
trade associations, international business groups like the Italian-
American Chamber of Commerce, and La Rinascente supported 
the city’s prominence.270 The importance of textiles, 
                                               
of Antonio Ratti, crafting designs and silk scarves for Italian brands, still today, also 
complicates a division between designers, artisans and manufacturers. See TEXTILE AS 
ART: ANTONIO RATTI ENTREPRENEUR AND PATRON (2017).   
268 See Missoni, s.P.a., SISTEMA INFORMATIVO UNIFICATO PER LE SOPRINTENDENZE 
ARCHIVISTICHE, MIBACT, http://siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it/cgi-
bin/pagina.pl?TipoPag=prodente&Chiave=51367&RicFrmRicSemplice=missoni&RicSez=
produttori&RicVM=ricercasemplice (last visited March 25, 2019); see also Lindsay Talbot, 
Inside Angela Missoni’s Rainbow Colored World, N. Y. TIMES, August 14, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/t-magazine/angela-missoni-fashion-designer-
inspiration.html (“Starting with a few simple chevron-patterned wovens produced in a 
small factory in Gallarate, Italy, Rosita and Ottavio Missoni pioneered the now widely 
used space-dying technique for yarn — still the magic ingredient in the house’s signature 
kaleidoscopic knits.”) 
269 STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 51 (also quoting Richard Martin).  
270 Elisabetta Merlo and Francesca Polese, Turning Fashion into Business: The Emergence of 
Milan as an International Fashion Hub, Vol. 80, No. 3, THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, 415, 
433-434 (Autumn 2006). Merlo and Polese also mention how important trade and business 
publications were at this time.  
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manufacturing and general business to Italian fashion 
introduced many new characters into the Italian fashion design 
lexicon and even new conceptions of Italian fashion.  
 
Elio Fiorucci who has been characterized as more of a 
businessman than a designer271, created his store as much for a 
fashion experience as to purvey Italian fashion design objects, 
which were not necessarily only clothing or accessories.272 The 
Fiorucci t-shirt with an image of two cherubs has been dubbed, 
along with the Ferragamo Vara and other Italian fashion design 
objects like Prada’s backpack as “must haves.”273 Giorgio 
Armani, began his career by designing his own line 
manufactured with the Gruppo Finanziario Tessile, a 
manufacturer of textiles from Turin which decided to continue 
its historic production line of textiles and clothing while 
producing designer-named fashion objects.274 In the same time 
period, Gianni Versace created a similar model of production 
with the manufacturer Genny after designing under other 
brand names which showed at Palazzo Pitti.275 
 
While the 1970s is generally seen as a time of growth for Italian 
ready-to-wear, the 1980s are usually cast as a time of 
consolidation. Italian fashion was recognized both in the ready-
to-wear fashion of Armani’s characteristically tailored suits in 
grey and black and in Versace’s Southern Italian sexy and 
sensual Medusa aesthetic. The 1980s also gave rise to licensing 
deals and distribution agreements where the intangible logo of 
an Italian brand attached itself to various types of materials, 
from ready-to-wear to alta moda and other diffusion lines.276 In 
this sense, intangible logos became synonymous with Italian 
fashion design, but were not necessarily indicative. Indeed, for 
                                               
271 Simona Segre Reinach, Fatto in Italia: La cultura Made in Italy (1960–2000) by Paola 
Colaiacomo (ed.)/Oggetti cuciti: L'abbigliamento pronto in Italia dal primo dopoguerra agli anni 
Settanta by Ivan Paris [Book Review], 13( 1) FASHION THEORY 121, 123 (2009), doi: 
10.2752/175174109X381382.   
272 See Luisa Valeriani, Colazione da Fiorucci in FATTO IN ITALIA, supra note 266 at 26- 64; see 
also FIORUCCI (David Owen, ed., Rizzoli, 2017).  
273 The Italy of Objects, ITALIANA, supra note 63 (referring to the wall text in the exhibition).  
274 For this characterization of the Gruppo Finanziaro Tessile see SIMONA SEGRE, MODE IN 
ITALY: UNA LETTURA ANTROPOLOGICA 22 (1999). For observations on Armani and the 
Gruppo Finanziaro Tessile see Barile, Made in Italy: da country of origin a metabrand supra note 
267 at 140-141; MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 40, 50, 53-54.  
275 MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 53; Francesco Bogliari, La vera storia dei Versace, 
BUSINESS PEOPLE, http://www.businesspeople.it/People/Protagonisti/La-vera-storia-dei-
Versace-2961 (last visited March 25, 2019).  
276 MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 54.  
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some companies such as Gucci, which found itself increasingly 
relying both on licensing deals and local production in Tuscany 
as family disagreements affected the management of the Gucci 
brand, the link with various manufacturers and a lack of strict 
vertical integration proved, at times, to be more challenging for 
the cultural value and interest in the fashion design objects they 
created than positive.277 In contrast, after Salvatore Ferragamo’s 
death in 1960, Wanda Ferragamo’s management of Salvatore 
Ferragamo, s.P.a., with her children produced a relatively 
smooth-sailing business which, in the 1960s, provided the 
environment for the design of the Vara shoe, a new logo and 
identified with a design of the Ferragamo brand only imagined 
after the founder’s death.278       
 
The history of the post-World War II ascent of Italian fashion 
design objects and the intricate contaminations between 
designers, brands, manufacturers and cities in Italy only further 
indicates how the public cultural interest in Italian fashion 
design objects is hard pressed to confine itself to one facet of 
Italian fashion design. A public cultural interest in Missoni 
prints, for example, might be informed by the visual impact of 
them, which is, however, related to the way in which that print 
is produced and the fabric of which it consists. To decide to 
preserve such a print, we must decide whether preserving an 
image of it to capture the visual impact is enough or if the 
tangible material of a dress, scarf or even pillow with the design 
is necessary. Moreover, preservation of the one might affect 
preservation or valorization of the other.  
 
Complicating matters further is the fact that the Italian fashion 
design objects first created during these years often survive the 
life of their designer by being assigned to a brand. Under Italian 
law, business activities are usually outside the definition of 
what can be protected as cultural property279: a company or 
                                               
277 An early disagreement about shares in the Gucci family between Grimalda Gucci, 
Guccio Gucci’s daughter, and her brothers in described in Guccio Gucci in GUCCI: THE 
MAKING OF supra note 158 at 16 (Frida Giannini et al, eds., Rizzoli, 2010). Rula Jebreal’s 
Introduction in the book makes these disagreements more explicit, noting the 
communications with licensees between family members about not producing Paolo 
Gucci’s designs for Flora dresses in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 4-6.  
278 Constance C.R. White, Fiamma Ferragamo, 57, Dies; Shoe Designer for the Elegant, N. Y. 
TIMES, September 30, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/30/world/fiamma-
ferragamo-57-dies-shoe-designer-for-the-elegant.html (last visited March 25, 2019).  
279 Cons. Stato Sez. VI, Sent., 26/07/2016, n. 3363, LEGGI D’ITALIA (denying the 
classification of a building historically home to a boutique of men’s fashion as a cultural 
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person cannot be forced to engage in a specific activity or 
business even if it is of cultural interest.280 Notwithstanding this, 
we might, however, classify modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects themselves as cultural property apart 
from their continued inclusion in the activities of a brand. But 
we would still need to address our criteria for authorship and 
the specific time threshold that would operate. A Versace dress, 
for example, re-issued in 2017, might not qualify at all because it 
is made today, however the fabric on it, if old enough, may 
qualify as a cultural property. Drawing these hard lines, and 
imagining the impact they would have on brands, is what 
classifying Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law entails.  
 
2.3 Contemporary Italian Fashion and Heritage 
 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s a further implicit 
recognition of Italian fashion as a part of Italian cultural 
heritage or as akin to other categories of cultural property has 
developed both in the fashion industry and in fashion 
museums. A natural sort of historicization has occurred for 
continued productions of different Italian fashion design objects 
which are still accepted by specific groups of people for 
relatively short periods of time as fashion. This embrace might 
be contextualized within the changing fashion values rejecting 
the hedonism and excess of the 1980s which Segre recognizes281, 
and an increasing emphasis on sustainability and style versus 
fashion trends282 which has continued in fits and starts until 
today and morphed into green fashion and an increased 
awareness by Italian fashion companies of the effect their 
production has on the environment.283 At the same time, 
however, read in the greater history of Italian fashion, the 
historicization of certain Italian fashion design objects seems 
naturally related to Italian fashion design’s links to its territory, 
                                               
property because the classification was seemingly made on the basis of the business 
activity occurring inside the building).  
280 Id.  
281 SEGRE, MODE IN ITALY, supra note 274 at 39- 43.  
282 Id. at 40.  
283 Many Italian fashion companies, for example, have pledged to go fur-free. See Sophia 
Benson, Why 2019 Could Be a Watershed Year for Fashion and Sustainability, ANOTHERMAG, 
January 8, 2019, https://www.anothermag.com/fashion-beauty/11404/why-2019-could-
be-a-watershed-year-for-fashion-and-sustainability. In this sense, corporate museums 
have often been described as social actors with a social function. See Mariacristina Bonti, 
The Corporate Museums and their Social Function, 1 EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC J. 141 (2014).   
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to the Italian context and to the unique marriage between 
artisanship, design and object.   
 
Gucci’s recent repositioning under Alessandro Michele’s 
direction is a good example of this. While the Flora print is still 
sold as a scarf in the almost same iterations as its inception in 
the 1960s, Michele has re-envisioned the Flora print [Figure 15] 
in a new bohemian style while also re-interpreting classic parts 
of Gucci’s heritage, such as the Bamboo Bag and colored stripes, 
including them in other fashion design objects.284 The cultural 
value of individual Italian fashion design objects seems to have 
uniquely tried to straddle the needs of a current creative market 
and the needs of those who see Italian fashion companies as 
cultural institutions. Modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects are indelibly tied to the creative industry which 
produces them (textile manufacturers, local artisans, fashion 
houses and brands, individual designers or creative directors) 
and the flurry of that industry’s complementary tools (fashion 
films, advertising, trade shows). At the same time, modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects are held up as 
objects of artistic and historic and other cultural interest 
alongside works of art and other museum-worthy objects 
whether in spaces of aesthetic contemplation or not. Today’s 
Italian fashion world is characterized by an overlap between the 
fashion industry and fashion museums. At the same time, 
intangible processes and untouchable creativity define Italian 
fashion design objects, as do material aspects of the tangible 
objects in all their materiality and accompanying historic and 
artistic meanings. 
 
While the discussion of counterfeits and fakes pervades Italian 
fashion companies’ policing of their products, what concerns 
the dissertation’s inquiry is not Italian fashion companies 
assuring a public trust in the authenticity of their product in the 
products’ materiality through proper stitching or materials or in 
the use of proper trademarks. Instead, the historical narrative of 
Italian fashion since the 1980s points to Italian fashion 
companies’ embrace of a public cultural interest and, therefore, 
                                               
284 For images of Michele’s runway styles see Gucci, VOGUE,  
https://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/designer/gucci. For images of a Bamboo Bags 
with a Dionysus clasp and the green-red-green stripe see Dionysus medium top handle 
bag, GUCCI, https://www.gucci.com/us/en/pr/gifts/monogramming/dionysus-
medium-top-handle-bag-p-
448075CAOHN1065?position=10&listName=SearchResultGridComponent&categoryPath
=Gifts/Monogramming.  
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trust in their design objects which may not be the same as a 
public trust in authenticity on the market. Italian fashion 
companies now increasingly regulate certain iterations of their 
Italian fashion designs not just for their authenticity but for 
their ability to convey a cultural message as cultural objects, 
whether they are bought or not. Increased collaborations with 
other cultural institutions only highlight this. 
 
This most recent period of time in Italian fashion history also 
reveals that the question of how Italian fashion design objects 
are cultural property, or a part of Italian cultural heritage, is not 
even new or novel for Italians themselves in the sector. At the 
Florence Biennale Il Tempo e la Moda in 1996 the organizers 
anticipated the issue. “Where are the cultural programs for 
contemporary fashion that are givens in contemporary art, film, 
and architecture?”285 In other words, is modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion a cultural activity, a cultural 
property, or a property which straddles the two? An essay in 
the catalog, Looking at Fashion, with Art went on to compare 
fashion to photography.286 Away from a discussion of fakes and 
counterfeits, this brings an interest in the overlap between 
intellectual property law and cultural property law full circle. 
Comparing Italian fashion design objects to photography, 
which Italian cultural property law preserves in certain aspects 
like its physical negative that displays rarity and preciousness 
might prove beneficial for understanding fashion design objects 
as cultural property.      
 
Today, the current Italian fashion industry and its players as 
well as museums and their officials around the world shape the 
public cultural interest in Italian fashion design objects. We 
might say the Italian fashion industry and fashion museums 
exist in a symbiotic (and even at times parasitic) relationship.287 
The complexities of this relationship are even more pronounced 
when Italian fashion museums are run by the same Italian 
fashion houses whose design objects they exhibit. They are also 
further complicated by digital iterations. In addition, the 
                                               
285 Germano Celant, Luigi Settembrini, Ingrid Sischy, Looking at Fashion, with Art in 
ART/FASHION 10 (New York, Guggenheim Museum SoHo, March 12- June 8, 1997) 
(catalog of the 1996 Florentine Biennale as repeated at the Guggenheim in NY curated by 
Germano Celant).  
286 See supra.  
287 There are, of course, different ways of characterizing this relationship, including in 
museological terms: as “fashion museology” as opposed to “dress museology.” Marie 
Rieghels Melchior, Introduction, in FASHION AND MUSEUMS, supra note 127 at 9. 
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behavior of Italian fashion companies towards their design 
objects which are of public cultural interest is not uniform, 
resulting in potential losses for the public. 
 
Armani/Silos run by Armani and founded in 2017 is an 
excellent example of the challenges that occur when a fashion 
company essentially becomes a cultural institution.288 Without 
“museum” in its name, the “exhibition space” as it is called on 
the website289, consists of a permanent display and collection of 
Armani clothing and accessories from the past forty years on 
multiple floors. It is divided into sections including 
Androgynous, Stars, Daywear and Ethnicities, which are linked 
to Armani’s continued minimalist design output today.290 Films 
are regularly projected, linking Armani’s history of 
collaborating with Hollywood, in a screening room on the top 
floor of the exhibition space, where computers also house the 
digital archives, sketches and relevant images of Armani’s 
design objects both as they appear on Hollywood stars and on 
the hangar. Armani/Silos is certainly an exercise in preserving 
and valorizing Armani’s design objects which have not yet aged 
in to the current Italian cultural property “box” under Italian 
cultural property law because their designer is still living. 
Operating outside, yet seemingly in the shadow of, Italian 
cultural property law, it still, however, leaves unresolved the 
question of how exactly a public cultural interest in Armani’s 
design objects attaches to these design objects. Presenting a 
factual narrative still divorced from comparison with other 
contemporaneous designers and their work, Armani, through 
Armani/Silos, still allows its individual design objects to be 
caught up in a designer myth, albeit in an aesthetically pleasing 
and beautiful Milanese minimalist style where anyone, if they 
pay the price of admission, may feel welcome. The public 
cultural interest in these individual Italian fashion design 
objects here are practically unidentifiable when they are still 
controlled as real property by their designer.    
 
                                               
288 ARMANI/SILOS, https://www.armanisilos.com. See also About Us, ARMANI/SILOS, 
https://www.armanisilos.com/about/. See also ARMANI/SILOS booklet (on file with 
author). See also Eric Wilson, Created to be Curated INSTYLE 125- 126 (December 2015) 
289 Wilson, Created to be Curated, supra. (spotlighting designer museums in a section “A 
Fashion Lover’s Guide to Art” and noting “Now major companies with the resources to 
build up their archives are driving prices for important historical costumes sky-high and 
taking control of their narratives by curating their own exhibitions.”)  
290 Permanent Collection, ARMANI/SILOS, 
https://www.armanisilos.com/exhibition/permanent-exhibition/.  
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In addition, when Italian fashion museums run by the designers 
of the design objects they display go digital, as in the case of the 
online Valentino Garavani Museum launched in 2011291, these 
complexities are amplified by a dichotomy between images of 
Italian fashion design objects and the material parts of Italian 
fashion design objects. Whereas in Armani/Silos the digital 
archive reproducing images of individual design objects and 
other ephemera amplifies an examination of the design objects 
in their materiality, here reproductions of Valentino’s dresses 
replace design objects’ materiality completely. [Figure 16] While 
the negotiations which were engaged in founding the digital 
museum upon Valentino’s retirement are unknown292, 
intellectual property law, especially copyright law, at the very 
least in the software, plays a role in the creation of these 
reproductions of the design objects, their perception, and the 
understanding of the public’s cultural interest in them. As the 
website’s general terms section notes   
 
The Site as a whole, and any single element on this Site, is protected 
by copyright, trademark rights and other intellectual property rights 
either owned by AVGA [Association Valentino Garavani Archives] 
or by third parties licensed to AVGA. Such elements include, 
among others, photographs, designs, testimonials, images, texts, 
video and audio clips, logos, trademarks and software programs 
used for the management and development of the Site. The elements 
contained in the Site are reproduced for information and/or 
promotional purposes only. The Site is for personal use only.293 
 
Here, albeit likely under more restrictive French law which is 
outside the scope of this dissertation294, Valentino Garavani 
                                               
291 The Museum can be downloaded and viewed on a computer by visiting 
http://www.valentinogaravanimuseum.com.  
292 Silvia Stabile formerly of the Negri-Clementi studio legale and today at Bonelli/Erede 
in Milan negotiated an agreement for the founding of the online museum between the 
company and Valentino as a designer but was unable to provide me with copies of it due 
to confidentiality. Interview with Silvia Stabile, Spring 2017 (e-mails on file with author). 
For information about Valentino see Valentino Garavani, BUSINESS OF FASHION, 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/community/people/valentino-garavani; see also 
Inside Valentino’s Virtual Museum, THE BUSINESS OF FASHION, December 7, 2011 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/digital-scorecard/digital-scorecard-
valentino-garavani-virtual-museum (discussing the launch of the virtual museum, noting 
its funding by Valentino and his partner Giancarlo Giammetti and that the two no longer 
had any financial stake in the Valentino company).  
293 General Terms, http://www.valentinogaravanimuseum.com/general-terms.  
294 The Credits section, which includes a data sharing notice, notes that at least the Privacy 
Policy has been drafted “in accordance with the French law CNIL.” Credits, VALENTINO 
GARAVANI MUSEUM, http://www.valentinogaravanimuseum.com/credits.  
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effectively presents reproductions of his design objects, and 
reproductions of their accompanying ephemera, as of public 
cultural interest, more so or in a way equal to the tangible 
designs objects which he displayed elsewhere, such as at the 
Ara Pacis in Rome in 2007, on other occasions.295   
 
The now defunct Gucci Museo and restricted archive is another 
example. During Domenico de Sole’s tenure at Gucci in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the company made a point of buying 
back many early Gucci handbags and other accessories in 
private hands “with the aim of reconstructing Gucci’s history as 
a fashion house, a brand, and a manufacturer.”296 In 2011, on the 
heels of a Forever Now campaign which promoted Gucci as 
continuing a 90 year tradition of craftsmanship, Frida Giannini 
opened the Gucci Museo in Florence, Italy.297 Subscribing to a 
brand museum ideology, Gucci Museo divided the design 
objects on display into intangible identifiers: Logomania, the 
Flora design, and Bamboo are just three examples.298 Grouping 
the objects with the GG logo together, the objects with the Flora 
design together, and purses with bamboo handles together 
seemed to suggest that the cultural interest Gucci ascribed to 
these objects was not confined to specific design objects. For a 
number of years after its opening, the Museo did not display 
any Gucci design objects by Tom Ford, effectively erasing him 
from the company’s history. Remedied in 2016 with an 
installation by Maria Luisa Frisa in the Museo299, the Museo was 
then closed and reinstalled as a gallery in 2018. There is no 
access to a digital archive of the Museo, nor is there access to 
corporate ephemera, let alone the tangible design objects for 
study. These Italian fashion design objects are under the Gucci 
corporation’s lock and key. While the current Gucci Galleria has 
a store, Gucci Garden, selling design objects from recent 
                                               
295 Valentino a Roma, 40 Years of Style, Museo dell’Ara Pacis, MUSEI IN COMUNE, ROMA, 
http://www.arapacis.it/it/mostre_ed_eventi/mostre/valentino_a_roma. See also  
VALENTINO: THE LAST EMPEROR, supra note 19. 
296 Historical Archive in GUCCI: THE MAKING OF, supra note 158 at 362.  
297 For details of see Forever Now, supra note 158.  
298 MUSEO GUCCI BOOKLET (on file with the author).  
299 Akanksha Upadhyay, Gucci Makes Room for Tom Ford, LIVEMINT, June 24, 2016 
https://www.livemint.com/Consumer/0S1AMe5WjcHDz8Ek9SeMDI/Gucci-makes-
room-for-Tom-Ford.html; as opposed to Suzy Menkes, Gucci Feeds Its Florentine Roots, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/fashion/gucci-opens-a-brand-museum-in-
florence.html (“As for [Gucci’s] quarrelsome family, the collapse of the label into airport 
duty-free fodder, its revival in the 1990s by Tom Ford and Domenico De Sole — they are 
simply air brushed out of history.”)  
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collections and vintage Gucci bags, the Gucci Museo had an 
Icon Store, which sold recreations of the more historic objects 
displayed in the Gucci Museo300 and emphasized the inclusion 
of its Gucci moccasin with horse-bit in The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.301  
 
The comparison between design objects in the collections of 
these different cultural institutions unmasks the real issue: 
objects which aspire to be cultural property, and their 
reproductions, are being treated in very disparate manners by 
different actors on different sides of the Atlantic who pretend to 
recognize similar types of public cultural interests in these 
design objects.    
 
The relationship between Italian fashion design objects on the 
market and Italian fashion design objects as of public cultural 
interest on a separate yet complementary plane is one that is 
fraught with negotiation. In a letter from Richard Martin dated 
July 12, 1997 to Ed Filiposki at the New York public relations 
firm Keeble Cavaco and Duka about the loan of a Versace dress 
for the 1997 exhibit Wordrobe at The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, Martin writes 
 
As I mentioned yesterday on the phone, the next show in The 
Costume Institute is ‘Wordrobe’, an exploration of words, letters, 
and numbers in clothing…It would be sensationally and absolutely 
to the point of the show to be able to borrow one Versace Atelier 
piece from the collection show earlier this month in Paris. I know 
this is asking a very special favor as we would want to have the 
garment from the end of August to the end of November, effectively 
removing it from its perfect moment to be sold. (That’s the reason I 
ask you and Gianni to think of one piece you can spare and one piece 
that is most indicative to you.) Researchers have contacted or will 
contact you about earlier pieces as well. I just felt that, knowing the 
very special favor of setting current work aside immediately, I 
                                               
300 Icon Store in MUSEO GUCCI BOOKLET supra note 298 (“…la Icon Collection, una linea 
esclusiva di accessori in edizione limitata appositamente creata per il Gucci Museo. La 
Icon Collection include una serie di icone molto amate, gli appassionati di borse possono 
scegliere tra la New Jackie, la New Bamboo- classici reinterpretati in chiave 
contemporanea…”).  
301 Id. There is also correspondence between attorneys supposedly fighting infringement 
cases and The Metropolitan Museum in Letter from Patton Boggs to the Museum from 
August 1, 1997 in Box 53, folder 19 (Harold Koda, Correspondence with Designers), 
Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Archives.  
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wanted to ask for this one personally.302 
 
Here, Martin, in his continuing negotiations for a loan of a 
Versace Atelier dress, emphasizes the significance of the 
Versace gown for the message of the exhibition he is curating 
while also admitting the relevance of that gown on the 
marketplace. The relationship between the ability of the Italian 
fashion object to be both of cultural interest inside a treasured 
space of public trust and of an economic interest to its owner, 
Versace, on the market, as a piece of cultural property would be 
to a collector, is evident. Such a dual existence requires the 
balancing of a variety of different interests. 
 
Indeed, examples of Italian trade associations lobbying 
American museums to stage Italian fashion exhibitions make 
such balancing acts even more complex. The Italian Trade 
Commission proposed one such exhibit in 1996 to the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art entitled An Exhibition of Italian 
Renaissance Velvets.303 In 2003 the Italian Trade Commission was 
successful in staging Italian Style at the Museum at the Fashion 
Institute of Technology.304 
 
At times, of course, cultural institutions working with Italian 
fashion companies can overcome any minefields which would 
compromise or frustrate the public’s appreciation of Italian 
fashion design objects’ cultural interest. This is evidenced in 
preparations for The Metropolitan Museum of Art’s exhibition 
dedicated to Gianni Versace after the designer’s untimely death 
in 1997.305 In a letter dated November 14, 1997, to Richard 
Martin prior to the opening of the exhibition, Donatella Versace 
                                               
302 Letter from Richard Martin to Ed Filiposki, July 12, 1997, Costume Institute Box 203, 
Folder 8, Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Archives.  
303 The proposal is available in Italian Trade Commission 1994- 1996, Costume Institute 
Box 40, Folder 10, Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Archives. 
304 For a record of this sponsorship see the Catalogue of the exhibition: Beniamino 
Quintieri, Introduction in STEELE, FASHION, ITALIAN STYLE supra note 171 at 20 at ix (noting 
“This exhibit is an important part of the marketing campaign ‘Italia- Life in I Style’ 
recently launched to promote Italian products and the Italian lifestyle on the U.S. market. 
This long-range program not only celebrates a beautiful product, whether it be a scarf, a 
purse, a pair of glasses, or an evening gown, it is also a wonderful opportunity to discover 
and celebrate the Italian flair for sophistication, exquisite craftsmanship, and 
technology.”). Records of the exhibition are available in Special Collections, The Fashion 
Institute of Technology.  
305 The correspondence is preserved in folders in Box 204, Gianni Versace (December 11, 
1997-March 22, 1998), Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan Museum of Art 
Archives.  
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wrote that she was “confident that we are all working on something 
that people will not forget easily.”306 Dividing the exhibition in his 
outline into The Landmarks, Art, History, Materials, Word and 
Image, Men and The Dream, Martin mediated and choose 
between different iterations of cultural significance as applied 
to specific Versace design objects. Landmarks were, for 
example, described as Versace’s fashion design objects divorced 
from “celebrity and star power” which stand as “manifestations 
of our time”307, such as the dress worn by Elizabeth Hurley in 
1994. Standing alone, according to Martin, at least one iteration 
of this dress is significant for its ability to testify to a moment in 
history. [Figure 17]  
 
The Museo Salvatore Ferragamo, founded in May of 1995 and 
still operational today,308 takes a very different approach that 
seems to balance all these different interests appropriately. Its 
mission is “to acquaint an international audience with the 
artistic qualities of Salvatore Ferragamo and the role he played 
in the history of not only shoes but international fashion as 
well”309 but the Museo Ferragamo also is not shy about its role in 
promoting “corporate heritage and celebrating the essence of 
‘Made in Italy’”, which has also been analyzed by business 
scholars.310 What sets the Museo Ferragamo apart, however, is its 
program of exhibitions and its openness to researchers. First, 
the Museo organizes yearly exhibits which use both corporate 
ephemera related to Ferragamo’s designs, life and his time at 
his eponymous company, in conjunction with tangible objects 
in their corporate archive to inform wide-ranging and even 
critical investigations into subjects related to the Ferragamo 
brand and history also relevant for other cultural spheres. One 
recent exhibit, Tra Arte e Moda did not shy away from the 
questions of whether fashion is art and the problematics that 
collaborations between designers and artists imply.311 In 
                                               
306 Letter from Donatella Versace to Richard Martin, November 14, 1997, Box 204, Folder 3, 
Costume Institute Records, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Archives. 
307 Catalogue Draft, 1997- 1998, Box 205, Folder 4, Costume Institute Records, The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art Archives. 
308 History of the Museum, MUSEO SALVATORE FERRAGAMO, 
https://www.ferragamo.com/museo/en/usa/discover/history_museum/# (last visited 
March 25, 2019).  
309 Id.  
310 Iannone and Izzo, supra note 162.    
311 The exhibit also showcased objects such as Genoni’s Primavera dress and videos of the 
1996 Biennale were shown at the exhibition at the Museo Salvatore Ferragamo Tra Arte e 
Moda. For images see ACROSS ART AND FASHION, supra note 199. Google Arts & Culture 
has also digitized the exhibit. See Salvatore Ferragamo: La moda è arte?, GOOGLE ARTS & 
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addition, the Museum’s work is supplemented by the 
Fondazione Ferragamo, founded in 2013 as a separate non-
profit entity meant to support programs for young craftsmen 
and designers following Salvatore Ferragamo’s legacy.312 Its 
archive is open to researchers by appointment and it is quite 
transparent with its materials. While the decision to museify 
Ferragamo’s past products and create an archive of the shoes 
and other corporate ephemera such as promotional materials, 
photographs and artisanal tools used during Salvatore 
Ferragamo’s lifetime was, in some senses, the first of a trend for 
Italian fashion brands, the Museo Ferragamo’s constancy in its 
approach and its commitment to preservation and valorization 
makes it a model for other Italian fashion companies, of which 
there are now many who are concered with their heritage.  
 
Within this framework of historical import of Italian fashion 
design objects, and the differing treatment of the historical 
interest in them by Italian fashion companies and other cultural 
institutions, the need to decide whether and how to preserve 
certain Italian fashion design objects themselves exists.  
 
Some Italian fashion design objects naturally raise this question 
because of their age. Take a hypothetical discovery of Rosa 
Genoni’s Tanagra dress designed in 1909.313 Fashion scholarship 
on Italian fashion tells us that this dress is culturally significant, 
but in order for it to enter the cultural property “box”, no 
matter who owns it, under Italian law we need to decide 
whether it is a testament having the value of civilization, a 
unique example of Genoni’s creativity, or an object of artistic or 
historic interest whose cultural value is caught up with the 
material of the object and cannot be just as well preserved in a 
drawing, for example, or in a recreation of the design.314  
 
The Futurist vest with its bright lines and colors is also noted as 
breaking with tradition by fashion history and, dated to the 
                                               
CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/salvatore-ferragamo-la-moda-è-
arte/kAJycQUu8JEELw?hl=it. For other discussions of the links between fashion and art 
from a fashion studies perspective, from an aesthetic and historic perspective in fashion 
studies, see Sanda Miller, Fashion as Art: is Fashion Art? 11(1) FASHION THEORY 25-40 (2007) 
(connected to Sung Bok Kim, Is Fashion Art? 2(1) FASHION THEORY 51-72 (1998).  
312 Obiettivi, FONDAZIONE FERRAGAMO, 
http://www.fondazioneferragamo.it/sezioni/102/obiettivi.  
313 Tanagra 1909 in PAULICELLI, LA MODA È UNA COSA SERIA, supra note 130.  
314 As has been recently done as part of The Fabric of Cultures: Systems in the Making 
exhibition, see https://vimeo.com/238100852.  
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1920s with a non-living author, Fortunato Depero315, it could also 
fulfill the time thresholds and requirements to age in to the 
cultural property “box”. At the same time, like with Missoni’s 
prints, it is unclear whether our public cultural interest is in 
Depero’s unique fiery design alone which could be reproduced 
on other materials or in the Italian fashion design object in its 
tangible and intangible design elements.  
 
Ferragamo and Gucci accessories also bring up similar 
questions. Arguably first designed in 1946316, the bamboo handle 
is again, according to fashion history, important for its 
innovative qualities317, but also for the way in which it is 
produced. At the same time, this creation of the bamboo handle 
in bamboo might be a myth- many design patents for the look 
of the bag or similar bags do not mention bamboo as a material 
but imitate the famous notches of bamboo.318 [Figure 18] With 
this information we may not identify, therefore, the bamboo 
handle itself as of interest but, rather, its design which can be 
reproduced in multiple material iterations and therefore 
indicates a need to preserve the design for the Bamboo Bag or 
for a handle of a bag itself.  
 
Ferragamo’s Invisible Sandals, designed in 1947, are deemed 
significant by fashion history for their use of innovative 
materials and their invention by an Italian designer and his 
workshop. The shoes are a unique mix of modernity and 
tradition. Again, Ferragamo described two processes for 
creating the shoe upper out of nylon thread in his design 
                                               
315 See Italian Futurism 1909- 1944: Reconstructing the Universe, THE GUGGENHEIM, 
http://exhibitions.guggenheim.org/futurism/futurist_reconstruction_of_the_universe/.  
316 One of the earliest design patents found thus far in a search at the Archivio Centrale 
with a similar handle dates to the 1950s. See Soc.r.l. Guccio Gucci, Modello Industriale 
Ornamentale, n. 4945 of 1958, ARCHIVIO CENTRALE DELLO STATO, although others also 
reveal similarities with the bamboo shaped handle. Interview, Claudia Pelli, Intellectual 
Legal Counsel of Gucci, July 3, 2019 (responding that she was unable to answer a question 
regarding the exact date of the invention of the Bamboo Bag and handle due to 
confidentiality).  
317 GUCCI MUSEO BOOKLET (on file with the author).  
318 For example, Id (“Il manico (8) é semicircolare rigido realizzato in legno, parzialmente 
ricoperto di cuoio nella parte superiore (9) montati su supporti in metallo (10) a duplice 
forchetta con perno laterale per consentire lo snodo.”) But see Soc.r.l. Guccio Gucci, 
Modello Industriale Ornamentale, n. 92627 of 1961, ARCHIVIO CENTRALE DELLO STATO (“Il 
modello rappresentato nelle accluse fotografie si riferisce ad una borsetta per signora di 
forma quadrangolare semirigida caratterizzata dal manico (I) che è formato da tasselli in 
legno o bambù snodati tra loro ed intercalati l’un l’altro da elementi di metallo.”)  
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patent319, but the material embodiments of the shoe, both in their 
past and present iterations as part of the Ferragamo Creations line 
clue us in to more nuances of the design process and are even 
different in their materiality, with the nylon threads existing 
differently in each iteration depending on the design that is 
used. Such differences in materiality and such an unicum 
between design and design object may mean we can preserve 
each Invisible Sandal as a cultural property in every iteration or 
in none.  
 
As we move to our contemporary times, more Italian fashion 
design objects offer us clues as to how we might negotiate this 
relationship as required by Italian cultural property law. Jeremy 
Scott’s 2015 design for the Italian label Moschino with the text 
“I HAD NOTHING TO WEAR SO I PUT ON THIS EXPENSIVE 
MOSCHINO DRESS” [Figure 19] hints at the relationship 
between the material elements of an Italian fashion design 
object and an oft-characterized intangible design which cannot 
be separated.  
 
Such a complex of Italian fashion design objects not only 
requires careful application of Italian cultural property law on 
the books today, but a consideration of how it might be 
modified in the future if it is to apply to these Italian fashion 
design objects.  
 
3. Fashion Design Objects as part of Italian Cultural Heritage  
 
Italian fashion design objects’ place today in Italy is certainly related to 
Italian culture generally. Made in Italy is celebrated as a product of 
Italian tradition and innovation and plays a role in how Italy defines 
and presents itself to the world320; this applies not only to fashion and 
design but to food, wine, olive oil and art more generally. Within this 
general appreciation of Made in Italy, Italian fashion brands have 
deliberately placed themselves as part of a larger Italian lifestyle and 
cultural tradition. The reasons for this are, in part, economic: Italy has 
been a purveyor and manufacturer of the raw material for fashion as 
early as the Renaissance when Lucca merchants provided the velvet for 
                                               
319 See Patents n. 426001 (invenzione), of October 17, 1947; n. 26446 (modello d’utilità) of 
March 29, 1947 and n. 26655 (modello industriale) of May 10, 1947. Available in the 
Archivio Ferragamo and at the Archivio Centrale dello Stato.  
320 For some numbers see MINISTERO DELLO SVILUPPO ECONOMICO, Pride and Prejudice, 
#theforceofexport, https://www.mise.gov.it/images/stories/documenti/MISEUK5.pdf 
(last accessed July 17, 2019).  
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fashions in Europe321, at the time of its unification Italy’s cotton 
production and other textile industries were only growing.322 Today, 
Italy’s ability to produce the raw material of fashion is still evident. Not 
only do French fashion brands regularly use Italian manufacturers and 
artisans, as Christian Louboutin does for his shoes323, but manufacturers 
like Antonio Ratti, S.p.A., who both produce raw silk, continue to 
design and produce silk accessories for Italian fashion brands, and 
whose founder amassed his own textile collection, blur the lines 
between technical and creative culture, and suggest that Italian 
entrepreneurs and companies can create objects important for 
civilization.324  
 
Most recently, Italian fashion brands have made a point of presenting 
their products within Italian cultural properties, sites and spaces, 
affiliating themselves with Italian cities and territories along with their 
respective imaginaries. Apart from the example of Dolce & Gabbana’s 
recent Alta Moda show mentioned above, Fendi recently made the 
Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana in Rome its headquarters325, and staged its 
recent Fall/Winter 2019-2020 Couture collection in a runway show in 
front of the Colosseum in Rome.326 Ferragamo not only emphasizes its 
historic relationship with Florence through its location in the Palazzo 
Spini Feroni but also recently shot a fashion ad on the Ponte Vecchio for 
its fragrance Amo Ferragamo.327 Gucci, under Frida Giannini’s direction, 
had its Forever Now campaign, emphasizing the historic links with 
Florentine craftsmanship, but even Alessandro Michele has staged a 
fashion show in Florence’s Palazzo Pitti as recently as 2017.328 The 
placement of Italian fashion products as part of Italian cultural heritage 
                                               
321 G.L. Derisseau, Velvet and Silk in the Italian Renaissance in 17 CIBA REVIEW 595- 599 
(January 1939) (in the Special Collections of The Museum at FIT, the Ciba Review was 
produced by a Swiss dying company as a way to promote the history of fashion as they 
sold new dying mechanisms and colors of textile).  
322 CALANCA, supra note 90 at 50- 53. 
323 IN LOUBOUTIN’S SHOES (Netflix, BBC, Michael Waldman, dir., 2015).  
324 See Stefano Baia Curioni, Homo Faber- Homo Poeticus, The Relationship Between Business 
and Culture in the Story of Antonio Ratti in TEXTILE AS ART: ANTONIO RATTI ENTREPRENEUR 
AND PATRON 23- 36 (2017).   
325 FRANCO LA CECLA, PALAZZO DELLA CIVILTÀ ITALIANA (Rizzoli, 2017) (describing Fendi’s 
decision to move in to the building and renovate it after signing a rental agreement with 
the municipal corporation EUR, S.p.A. which owns the building).  
326 Oscar Holland, Fendi stages couture fashion show amid ruins of ancient Rome, CNN, July 5, 
2019, https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/fendi-couture-fashion-show-rome-temple-
venus/index.html.  
327 Salvatore Ferragamo, Amo Ferragamo- The New Fragrance, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRYb4UcmxeQ.  
328 Gucci Cruise sfila a Palazzo Pitti tra fiori colorati e ispirazione rock 'n roll, IL MESSAGERO.IT, 
https://www.ilmessaggero.it/moda/sfilate/gucci_cruise_2018_palazzo_pitti_sfilata-
2474763.html.  
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and, more importantly, alongside such pieces of Italian cultural 
heritage, shows visually equating the two is not new. As early as the 
1940s after World War II Gucci and Ferragamo were consciously 
repositioning their products within the Italian cultural landscape in 
American publications. 
 
What is new, however, about these links between Italian fashion and 
Italian culture, Italian fashion design objects and Italian cultural 
heritage, is that conversations are now deliberately envisioning how 
Italy’s cultural property law can play a role in protecting and valorizing 
Italian fashion design and its objects. It is true that Italian cultural 
property scholars had already, as early as the 1930s, deliberately 
imagined how traditional Italian craftsmanship might be protected as 
Italian cultural heritage under the law329 and, in keeping with the 
historical advent of manners, habits, and customs as part of an early 
modern fashion in Renaissance Italy had mentioned that customs might 
also be part of cultural heritage broadly.330 An importance of laws and 
norms and social customs in shaping what is fashion has been a 
hallmark of fashion and fashion studies but also of fashion itself; not 
only was sumptuary law as early as the Italian Renaissance regulating 
what was worn based on social status and occasion, but more 
customary rules dictated by society and not a legislative body have 
shaped the fashions that have been chosen on the Italian territory. In her 
social history of contemporary fashion, Daniela Calanca notes how 
Italy’s diversity upon its unification led to codes of manners and social 
etiquette.331 These codes morph into fashion magazines and periodicals 
in Italy, which then become part of a fashion network including fashion 
department stores in urban cities like Milan, which also have a political, 
nationalistic bents as economic foils to Parisian models.332 While social 
norms, customs, laws and cultural heritage have shaped fashion 
throughout its history in its dynamic evolution, fashion is now also 
contemplated as a distinct facet of cultural heritage, an important part 
of history, which much be preserved as well as supported in its 
evolution.  
 
The passing of the 2004 Code of Cultural Property seemed to precipitate 
a consideration of how fashion in Italy was a part of cultural heritage 
under Italian law. Daniela Calanca details how with the purpose of 
                                               
329 See infra discussion of Grisolia in Chapter 2. 
330 See Sabino Cassese, I beni culturali da Bottai a Spadolini [Cultural Property from Bottai to 
Spadolini] [hereinafter Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini], RASSEGNA DEL ARCHIVIO DI STATO 
[Review of the State Archive] 116, 137 (Jan/Dec 1975). 
331 CALANCA, supra note 90 at 50- 56. 
332 Id. at 68- 70.  
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cultural heritage protection and valorization in the law as “preservare la 
memoria della comunità nazionale e del suo territorio e a promuovere lo 
sviluppo della cultura”333 it seemed obvious that fashion’s links to history 
and culture found a philosophy of fashion that aligns it with such legal 
preservation purposes.334 In this context projects of preservation and 
valorization come to fruition. In 2004 the Italian State created a museum 
network of fashion and costume consisting of already existing museums 
throughout the Italian territory with a supporting foundation.335 
Supranational initiatives also help to support fashion’s status as cultural 
heritage outside of Italy and for the European community as with, as 
Calanca describes with the Mark of Common European Heritage in 
2011.336 The digital archive of Italian fashion of the 20th century went 
online in 2011.337 In 2012 the initiative “Europeana Fashion: Discover 
Europe’s Fashion Heritage” digitized information and images of European 
fashion design objects, designers, materials, and history.338 In 2019 a 
Commission was tasked by the Minister of Cultural Heritage with the 
“identification of policies for the protection, conservation, valorization 
and use of Italian fashion as cultural heritage.”339 In its decree instituting 
the Commission the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage defined Italian 
fashion broadly as “the information, experiences, technical and design 
knowledge, products, events, publications, hardcopy and audiovisual 
materials as a whole that testify to the characteristics of the sector.”340  
 
At the same time as fashion and cultural heritage are linked through 
law in the Italian perspective, so is design. The Museo Triennale in 
Milan dedicated to design opened in 2007.341 As Antonio Leo Tarasco 
noted at the opening of the exhibit Serie fuori Serie in 2017, Superga 
shoes first designed in 1934, the bottle for Campari designed in 1932, a 
Borsalino hat from 1932, and Bialetti’s Moka from 1933 are all 
testaments having the value of civilization as it is understood under 
Italian cultural property law.342  
                                               
333 Id. at 17 (citing to Art. 1, CODICE, D.L .n. 42/2004).  
334 Id.  
335 Id. at 21, 22 (describing “legge del 6 febbraio 2004, approvato dalla Camera dei deputati 
che prevede l’Istituzione del Sistema museale della moda e del costume italiani e interventi per la 
formazione e la valorizzazione degli stilisti”).    
336 Id. at 23.  
337 Id. at 25.  
338 Id. at 24 (The project can be accessed at 
https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en/collections/fashion. See also 
https://pro.europeana.eu/project/europeana-fashion) 
339 Art. 1(1), D.M. n. 551/2018 (translation my own).  
340 Preamble in Id. 
341 Tarasco, Il disegno supra note 91.  
342 Id (“Proprio perché i beni qui esposti sono stati prodotti industrialmente per un 
pubblico di clienti-intenditori, la loro larga diffusione nella società italiana testimoniata 
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These references to and presentations of Italian fashion as part of Italian 
cultural heritage, alongside the characterization of Italian fashion as a 
complex of ephemera, products, archives and things in many tangible 
and intangible forms that testify to fashion history and culture, reveals 
how complex it is to actually think about how Italian fashion is cultural 
heritage. Perhaps out of all the things mentioned in the Commission’s 
founding document as definitive of Italian fashion, nothing embodies 
this complexity more than Italian fashion products, which are, like other 
design objects such as a Moka or Campari bottle, a complex union of 
intangible design and tangible property, design knowledge and design 
execution, information and experience, and still other influences. 
Unpacking how fashion design objects, these products of Italian fashion, 
might be classified as Italian cultural property is, given Italian fashion 
history and its contemporary concerns, a timely endeavor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
dagli acquisti e dal vasto collezionismo confermano sul concreto piano esperienziale che 
quelle stesse cose costituiscono effettivamente una "testimonianza avente valore di 
civiltà", al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio, e pur a prescindere dalla dichiarazione di 
interesse culturale che, come sopra spiegato, è tecnicamente assente: si pensi alla scarpa 
Superga risalente al 1934 (che ha raggiunto la produzione di tredici milioni di paia 
all'anno nel momento di maggiore successo); alla bottiglietta della Campari Soda disegnata 
nel 1932 dall'artista Fortunato Depero, tipica per l'assenza di etichetta e per la stampa in 
rilievo sul vetro; alla Moka Express della Bialetti prodotta ininterrottamente dal 1933 con 
vendite che hanno superato i 280 milioni di esemplari; al cappello da uomo Borsalino, 
risalente al 1932; al televisore della Brionvega Algol 11, disegnato da Zanuso e Sapper nel 
1964, superato solo dall'evoluzione tecnologica e non certo per le forme; alla 
mitica Lambretta 125 c.c. della Piaggio, costruita nel 1951, primo esempio italiano di 
motorizzazione di massa.”).   
  92 
CHAPTER 2 
PANDORA’S BOXES: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 
DILEMMAS IN ITALY AS APPLIED TO FASHION 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES  
 
This second chapter explores the major dilemmas of cultural property 
law- cultural interest, time, and material iterations of properties- which 
are often characteristic of a definition of cultural property in Italian 
cultural property law. Exploring these dilemmas leads to some 
unexpected similarities and overlaps with copyright law.   
 
1. Cultural Property Law between Italy and the U.S.  
 
An awareness of Italy’s unique cultural property law in the United 
States is most often made in the context of the illegal exportation of 
cultural properties and Italy’s claims for the repatriation of its cultural 
property objects to the Italian territory.343 Italian laws have been applied 
in U.S. federal courts under federal statutes and thanks to choice of law 
principles.344 International treaties at the very least require the United 
States to respect Italy’s definition of what constitutes its cultural 
property. Other forms of what might be termed “self-help” like 
bilaterial agreements345 allow the definition of cultural property under 
                                               
343 For an overview of Italian cultural property law in this context see Lauren Fae Silver, 
Recapturing Art: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Italian Model for Cultural Property 
Protection, 23 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 15- 25 (2010).  
344 For an application of U.S. statutory law prohibiting importations of goods made under 
false statements applied to the importation of an antique gold platter from Sicily see 
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 1997 (S.D.N.Y. 1997 
(reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT EDWARD ELSEN, AND STEPHEN URICE, LAW, 
ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 289 – 296 (Kluwer Law, 2007) [hereinafter LAW, ETHICS, 
AND THE VISUAL ARTS]) For one example of how a U.S. federal court engages in a choice of 
law analysis in a stolen cultural property case see Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church 
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 286- 287 (7th Cir., 1990) (cited to in 
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS, although applying Swiss law in a choice of law 
exercise which ultimately privileged Indiana law). For some discussion of how Italian law 
may be chosen in a choice of law scenario see Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex 
Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUMBIA J. OF L. & THE 
ARTS 111, 115 (2008) (citing to Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 
496. a case in which an English court applied Italian law to apply the good faith purchaser 
rule to stolen Japanese artifacts found in Italy in the context of the lex situs rule). Of course, 
acknowledging territoriality here is also important. While cultural property rules may be 
applied in other territories and rules may be imported, as Charles Colman has noted for 
copyright, this does not strike the inherent territoriality of some legal regimes. Colman, 
History and Principles, supra note 6 at 233, n. 22.  
345 For a discussion of Italy’s bi-lateral agreement with The Metropolitan Museum of Art 
see LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS supra note 344 at 404- 413. See also Silver, supra 
note 343 at 36- 39.  
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Italian cultural property law to affect what Americans and American 
cultural institutions consider to be their property. Comparative 
scholarly work in Art Law and awareness-raising campaigns provides 
perhaps the greatest awareness of Italian cultural property law for an 
American audience. As one example of scholarly endeavors, John 
Henry Merryman asked and answered whether and how the legal 
institute of cultural property could be identified within the United 
States in his article “Protection” of the Cultural “Heritage”?, highlighting 
the differences in terminology between cultural property and beni 
culturali, and Unites States administrative agencies’ inability to take the 
place of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage.346  
 
Imagine in this light for a moment that certain Italian fashion design 
objects made prior to 1949 were classified as cultural properties under 
Italian cultural property law. The restrictions Italy imposes on their 
cultural property would potentially have wide-ranging direct effects on 
American cultural institutions and on American individuals’ everyday 
interactions with these design objects. The exportation of Ferragamo’s 
Rainbow Sandal, for example, made in 1938 for Judy Garland and owned 
by Salvatore Ferragamo s.P.a., would have to be approved by the Italian 
State both under Italian cultural property law and under EU regulations 
for it to be displayed in an exhibition in the United States as it was in 
CAMP: Notes on Fashion.347 In addition any donation or sale of the 
Rainbow Sandal, any definitive exportation, would require both a 
certificate of approval for its exportation and an export license under 
Italian law and EU law348, while also allowing the Italian State to block its 
exportation from the Italian territory.349 Fashion museums in the United 
States already need to comply with U.S. customs rules that restrict the 
importation of fashion design objects incorporating ivory or feathers.350 
                                               
346 Merryman, “Protection”, supra note 42 at 520 (citing also at 513, n. 5 to S. Rodotà, The 
Civil Law Aspects of the International Protection of Cultural Property).  
347 Art. 66 and Art. 67, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004.  
348 See Decreto Ministeriale 17 Maggio 2018, n. 246  
https://www.altalex.com/~/media/Altalex/allegati/2018/allegati%20free/ministero-
beni-culturali-dm-17-maggio-2018-numero-246%20pdf.pdf; For a short overview of these 
additions and revisions to the Code see Alessandro Tognetti, Le nuove regole 
dell’esportazione delle opere d’arte, ALTALEX, March 1, 2019, 
https://www.altalex.com/documents/leggi/2019/02/07/nuove-regole-esportazione-
opere-arte. The applicable EU regulation is n 119/2009. A deeper evaluation of the scope 
and depth of these exportation provisions is beyond the scope of my dissertation.  
349 Art. 65, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. 
350 Interview with Sonia Dingilian, Museum at the Fashion Institute of Technology, August 
30, 2018 (notes on file with author) (referring to the Endangered Species Act, codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 1539 (noting in part that antique objects over 100 years old that incorporate a 
prohibited material are an exception to the general rule that certain species cannot be 
imported into the United States). See also Prohibited and Restricted Items, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/us-citizens/know-before-you-
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Adding another bureaucratic layer to this process may frustrate 
knowledge and dissemination of certain Italian fashion design objects in 
the United States while, at the same time, incentivizing their retention 
on the Italian territory. These concerns, moreover, do not even begin to 
address what would happen to a market for vintage fashion goods and 
whether they should become, under Italian cultural property law, more 
like a market for contemporary art objects or like a market for 
antiquities.  
 
At the same time as classifying certain Italian fashion design objects as 
cultural property might frustrate their ability to physically travel, it 
would also frustrate their ability to proverbially travel through images 
and other reproductions. American fashion museums already feel the 
need to seek permission to reproduce images of Italian fashion design 
objects due to personal relationships with brands, uncertainty over 
copyright law, and uncertainty over fair use principles.351 This seeking of 
permission generally also applies to individual scholars, although they 
may be more apt to argue fair use for academic publications of their 
work.  
 
When an Italian fashion design object is in an Italian public or not-for 
profit collection it is already presumed to be cultural property and 
Italian museums enforce the rules of Italian cultural property law 
mandating their approval of the reproduction and payment of a fee.352 
The nature of copyright law, both in Italy, where designs of industrial 
objects having creative character and artistic value are copyrightable 
                                               
go/prohibited-and-restricted-items and Endangered Species Act | Overview, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/.      
351 This may, of course, be peculiar to fashion museums who find themselves having to 
cultivate close relationships with fashion houses, unlike libraries of other cultural 
institutions who may find themselves, because of time and distance, operating more 
comfortably with fair use principles. See Preservation and Reuse of Copyrighted Works, 
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Congress 41-42, 44 (2014) (Statement of James G. Neal) 
(arguing fair use which is used for preservation activities sufficiently supplements 
copyright exceptions for libraries and archives). Such an observation does not even begin 
to touch the complexity of the layers of rights which also attach to fashion design and its 
use by museums in images or fashion films. For a discussion of the challenges of 
attribution this may cause, separate from fashion design, see Preservation and Reuse of 
Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Congress 78, 99 (2014) 
352 See Nota 398/2018 of the Galleria degli Uffizi, supra note 142. For another example of 
these regulations as applied to specific museums see the Regulations of the CSAC of 
Parma, 
https://www.csacparma.it/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Regolamento_riproduzioni.pd
f;  
https://www.csacparma.it/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Modulo_riproduzioni.pdf.  
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subject matter353, and in the U.S., where fabric designs, images of fashion 
and, since the Star Athletica case certain pictorial, sculptural and graphic 
features of designs of useful articles like clothing are copyrightable 
subject matter354, already puts pressure on American cultural institutions 
and individuals to seek permission to reproduce and display images of 
Italian fashion design objects from the many people they feel might 
hold copyright in Italian fashion design objects – from the original 
designer, to the brand and company, to an archive or library which hold 
its material aspects. While Italian cultural property law does not extend 
a right to control reproduction to private owners of cultural property, 
even when copyright protections expire, physical control of an object 
often requires interaction and permission from the owner to obtain a 
publishable or even good image of the property. Physical control over 
an object and its potential chaining to the Italian territory also risks that 
it will never be photographed at all and that certain Italian fashion 
design objects may, therefore, go the route of the Salvator Mundi355 or 
other artworks whose exact location are unknown.  
 
Understanding how Italian fashion design objects are cultural property 
in Italy under Italian cultural property law has serious ramifications for 
Italian fashion design objects’ presence on the territory of the United 
States and for Americans’ reception of Italian fashion design. This 
impact can be immediately understood even if the concept of cultural 
property may, at first, seem too dispersed in the United States.356  
 
Indeed, the general dilemma with speaking about cultural property to 
an American audience, especially with reference to a subject matter like 
fashion that is so associated with intellectual property, current times, 
and an economic market, is that we may be more apt to think of items 
on our territory in market nations terms, as art, instead of in source 
nation terms, as cultural property. As John Henry Merryman aptly 
noted, as a market nation357 the United States does not generally think of 
                                               
353 Article 2, clause 10 of diritto d’autore L n. 633/1941. For a recent case classifying an 
Italian fashion design objects as copyrightable subject matter under the clause see Tecnica 
v. Anniel, Tribunale Sez. Spec. Impresa, - Milano, 12/07/2016, discussed further infra.   
354 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. et al, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (2017) (majority 
opinion) [hereinafter Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ ]. Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 
infra.  
355 Kenny Schachter, Where In the World Is ‘Salvator Mundi’? Kenny Schachter Reveals the 
Location of the Lost $450 Million Leonardo, ARTNET, June 10, 2019, 
https://news.artnet.com/opinion/kenny-schachter-on-the-missing-salvator-mundi-
1565674.  
356 Merryman, “Protection”, supra note 42.  
357 Merryman, Two Ways, supra note 2 at 832 (noting “The United States is one of the few 
nations in the world that does not “treat cultural objects within its jurisdiction as parts of a 
‘national cultural heritage.’” Id. at 833.) 
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itself in source nation terms. It is still accurate to say that while we 
might find references to the Liberty Bell as a cultural property358, 
preserve the original flag which inspired The Star-Spangled Banner by 
Francis Scott Key359, or prominently display the Declaration of 
Independence within the National Archives Museum360, we are still hard 
pressed to think, let alone label, these objects as “cultural property” 
under the law. That having been said, there are still common threads 
between the United States and Italy’s treatment of certain objects which 
they consider to be of public cultural interest.  
 
Archeological objects361, Native-American objects362, large objects like 
                                               
358 The Liberty Bell has been referred to as such by Judith Benderson in her Introduction to 
Cultural Property Law for the United States’ Attorneys Bulletin. See Judith Benderson, 
Introduction 64(2) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 3 (March 2016), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/file/834826/download (“Just so you remember that there 
can be cultural property crime and vandalism close to home, here is an item that you will 
all recognize. [Figure 5 shows an image of the Liberty Bell]. It is the Liberty Bell in 
Philadelphia, which rang to announce the first public reading of the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776. In 2001 a suspect struck Liberty Bell several times with an 8 lb. 
hammer, leaving at least five dents on the flare near the bottom of the bell.”) 
359 About Us, SAVE AMERICA’S TREASURES, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090801134800/http://www.saveamericastreasures.org:8
0/about.htm (a caption notes “The flag that inspired "The Star-Spangled Banner" will be 
preserved for future generations through the generous support of Save America's 
Treasures Corporate Partner, Polo Ralph Lauren.”)  
360 Founding Documents, National Archives Museum, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
https://museum.archives.gov. It is interesting to consider how the Declaration of 
Independence is an American cultural property. One of the earliest laws passed in regards 
to it dates to 1876, the centennial of its writing, when a joint resolution by both houses of 
Congress notes it was held in the U.S. Patent Office. No. 19, Joint resolution providing for the 
restoration of the original Declaration of Independence, August 3, 1876, 44TH Congress, Session I, 
LEXISNEXIS. A full analysis of the role the U.S. Patent Office may have played as a 
repository of U.S. cultural objects is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be 
acknowledged again in the dissertation’s discussion of the Mazer v. Stein case infra 
Chapter 4.   
361 Archeological objects found on public lands belonging to the federal government 
cannot be excavated or removed without permission. See The Archeological Resources 
Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §470aa-470mm.  
362 For example, the Native American Graves Protection Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §3001-3013. 
For a discussion of the challenges of thinking about cultural property between community 
property and traditional, ownership-based property in the United States see Carpenter, et 
al, supra note 53 (“offer[ing] a stewardship model of property to explain and justify 
indigenous peoples’ cultural property claims in terms of nonowners’ fiduciary obligations 
towards cultural resources”); Brown, Culture, Property and Peoplehood, supra note 53. See 
also Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural 
Property, 17 INT’L J. OF CULT’L PROPERTY 581 (2010); Michael F. Brown, Heritage as Property, 
supra note 1. It is worth noting that legislation has recently been introduced to stop the 
exportation of Native-American objects from the United States, a proposal in line with 
Italian conceptions and treatment of cultural property. See See S. 1400 §2(d), 115th 
Congress, 1st Session (2017); Press Release, Members of Congress, Senators introduce Bipartisan, 
Bicameral STOP Act to Safeguard Tribal Items, July 18, 2019, https://lujan.house.gov/media-
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statues that are deemed historic property363, and objects found on public 
land364, are all treated in ways similar to how Italy treats its own cultural 
property in public hands identified as objects of historic interest.365 
Depending on the object, their removal from land (or excavation), their 
sale, and their permanence are regulated or, at the very least, in the 
purview of some sort of U.S. administrative action or guidance. Where 
the Unites States particularly falls short in terms of cultural property 
protection is in its treatment of non-indigenous movable objects not on 
public lands or otherwise in public possession. Indeed, despite having 
historic preservation law, local historic ordinances, and even Art Law, 
which helps us problematize how rights surrounding works of art and 
the public sphere overlap for public art366, the United States seems not to 
have a comprehensive set of legal rules, like Italy, that negotiates the 
boundaries, or in layman’s terms, helps to think about367, how movable 
objects are in or out of an American cultural property “box.” Such a 
thinking through is important for modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects because these design objects fall through the 
cracks of so many laws in the United States that currently protect some 
                                               
center/press-releases/members-of-congress-senators-introduce-bipartisan-bicameral-
stop-act-to-safeguard-tribal-items. 
363 For a description of the definition of objects that can be listed on the National Register 
and therefore protected as historic property see NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 
IN A NUTSHELL 41 (Bronin and Rowberry, eds., West Academic, 2018) (citing to 54 U.S.C. . 
§30201 and How to Apply the National Register Criteria, NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN 
(1990), https://www.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/pdfs/nrb15.pdf) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW].  Recent discussions surrounding confederate 
monuments reveal how the classification of some objects as historic property is not only 
contested but also uncertain in preservationist terms: their classification may not 
necessarily forbid their removal. For an inside look at the removal of the Beauregard 
equestrian statue in New Orleans listed on the National Register of Historic Places see 
generally MITCH LANDRIEU, MAYOR OF NEW ORLEANS, IN THE SHADOW OF STATUES: A 
WHITE SOUTHERNER CONFRONTS HISTORY (Viking, 2018). 
364 See supra note 361. See also the Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §431, although 
resulting in different case law finding the terms of the Act unconstitutionally vague. See 
Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage 28 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 63, 67- 68 (1993-1994), available via HEINONLINE (citing to United States v. Diaz, 499 
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 843 (1979).)  Objects found underground can also result in windfalls to private 
individuals, however, when there are agreements between the government and private 
actors. See the description of the Dinosaur Sue case in SAX , supra note 78 at 193. 
365 See Art 10(1), CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. See also Merryman, “Protection”, supra note 42 at 
514- 520 (discussing U.S. rules which largely apply to protect “cultural property” at the 
state and federal levels).  
366 The most prominent example of this may be the Richard Serra case, while the most 
recent might be the Fearless Girl and Charging Bull debate. See LAW, ETHICS, AND THE 
VISUAL ARTS supra note 344 at 778- 785. For a discussion of the Fearless Girl see Isaac 
Kaplan, Fearless Girl Face-off Poses a New Question: Does the Law Protect an Artist’s Message?, 
ARTSY, April 13, 2017, https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-fearless-girl-face-off-
poses-new-question-law-protect-artists-message.  
367 Merryman, Two ways, supra note 2.  
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properties like cultural property in source nations. Most fashion design 
objects are unable to be compared to indigenous objects because of their 
status as part of a more commercial and what might be termed 
mainstream or dominant American historical narrative; while 
regulating a public cultural interest in fashion would likely not mean 
prohibiting its excavation, for example.  
 
The fact that American public museums collect items of fashion that are 
of significance to American history also indicates that, like for Italian 
fashion design objects, it may be time to entertain how American 
fashion is also part of American cultural heritage and how it is cultural 
property. As Ralph Lauren and his brand celebrate fifty years368, and 
American fashion continues to evolve369, understanding how American 
fashion design objects should or should not be regulated with cultural 
property like protections outside of the museum in the specific 
American cultural context may soon be timely.  
 
Understanding American fashion design objects as part of a category of 
American cultural property leads to fruitful comparisons with other 
objects that is also beneficial for defining what is American cultural 
property in general. What makes both the Declaration of Independence 
historically significant and a painting in the National Gallery 
significant? What is the difference, if any, between a Monet in the Art 
Institute of Chicago and a Monet in the National Gallery? Why exactly 
does the Smithsonian have Jackie O’s Chanel suit which she wore on the 
day JFK was assassinated, and Amelia Earhart’s flight suit? Why does 
the Costume Institute at The Metropolitan Museum of Art display and 
collect modern and contemporary American fashion objects alongside 
other objects of its collection? While Italy has a comprehensive legal 
framework that operates outside the museum, in the United States we 
usually find ourselves having to answer the tough question of why 
individual objects are culturally significant to us or not during 
deaccessioning debates, when these movable objects are set to exit the 
museum after they have been deemed incompatible with a museum 
collection policy or mission.370 In some ways, however, this act of 
                                               
368 Leah Chernikoff, Inside Ralph Lauren’s Epic Star-Studded 50th Anniversary Celebration in 
Central Park, ELLE, September 8, 2018, https://www.elle.com/fashion/a23037985/ralph-
lauren-celebrates-50-years-with-an-epic-retrospective-runway-show-in-central-park/.  
369 Cathaleen Chen, What Tom Ford’s CFDA Post means for American Fashion, THE BUSINESS 
OF FASHION, https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/tom-ford-
succeeds-diane-von-furstenberg-as-cfda-chairman (sharing Ford’s comments that “"What 
American fashion needs to become in order to be more relevant in the world is to think of 
itself as not just American but as international.")  
370 For a recent example of such a discussion and the uproar it caused see notices of the 
Berkshire Museum case, Colin Moynahan, Berkshire Museum’s Planned Sale of Art draws 
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deaccessioning is much like Italian cultural property law’s 
administrative procedure of verifica, in which the public cultural interest 
of some, but not all, objects presumed to be cultural property belonging 
to not-for profits is evaluated so that they may potentially exit the 
proverbial cultural property “box.”371  
 
Despite the differences between the U.S. as a market nation and Italy as 
a source nation, there are similarities and commonalities between the 
laws in each country regulating the public cultural interest in certain 
objects. These commonalities can help us to think through how cultural 
property law already decides how properties can enter into a notion of 
cultural property, how that notion of cultural property is defined, and 
what changes might have to be made in order for new subject matter, 
like modern and contemporary Italian fashion objects, to be explicitly 
regulated as cultural property. We can think through how fashion 
design objects are cultural property first with reference to Italy under 
Italian cultural property law and then, as a second matter, with 
reference to the United States, even under unexpected legal regimes.    
 
2. The interconnected dilemmas of Italian cultural property law  
 
Despite its formulation of a specific theory of cultural property that 
might be considered unique to its territory, Italian property law reveals 
specific links and references to the work of U.S. legal scholars in the 
work of its own legal scholars.372 In this sense, exploring a theory of 
property in Italian legal scholarship does not negate the fact that U.S. 
law may have theories of property which support a consideration of the 
legal institute of cultural property in the United States as applied to 
                                               
Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/arts/design/berkshire-museum-art-auction-
criticized.html; see also Rockwell v. Trs. of the Berkshire Museum, 2017 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 208 (in which Norman Rockwell’s heirs attempted to stop the sale and 
deaccessioning; registering the Attorney General’s complaints about the behavior of the 
trustees’, the deaccessioning and the sale, which was ultimately allowed to go forward). 
Merryman notes that these types of discussions also occur when objects that are 
unprotected, like a Jackson Pollack painting, leave the U.S. territory. See Merryman, 
“Protection”, supra note 42 at 519- 520.   
371 Art. 12, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. See also CODICE DEI BENI CULTURALI E DEL PAESAGGIO 
143 (Maria Alessandra Sandulli, eds.) (Giuffrè, 2012) (citing to the D.M. 23 Gennaio 2005 Criteri 
e modalità per la verifica dell’interesse culturale dei beni immobili di proprietà delle persona 
giuridiche private senza fine di lucro, ai sensi dell’articolo 12 del d.lg. 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 for 
criteria to be used in the administrative process).  
372 For references and an exploration of, for example, Charles Reich’s seminal article The 
New Property in Italian property law scholarship see La logica proprietaria tra schemi 
ricostruttivi e interessi reali in STEFANO RODOTÀ, IL TERRIBILE DIRITTO: STUDI SULLA 
PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA E I BENI COMUNI 47- 72 (Mulino, 3rd ed. 2013).   
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fashion design objects.373 The following exploration is not meant as a 
simple reiteration of what Italian legal scholars might already know. 
Rather, the purpose of this section is instrumental, and aims to show the 
degree of sophistication and refinement with which Italian law has 
attempted to answer problems which are already evident in U.S. 
historic preservation law374, and which are crucial for thinking about how 
fashion design objects may be part of a legal category of cultural 
property in the United States.    
 
2.1 The boundless public cultural interest  
 
Justifications for why we protect certain properties as cultural 
property are seemingly rock-solid, but, as other authors have noted 
before, the reasons we preserve are for a variety of interests375 and 
can also be linked to politics376, and bring about counterintuitive and 
contradictory results at odds with preservation itself.377 While we 
might say that something is historically important, or of artistic 
merit, what does that really mean and how do we go about 
deciding it? Italian cultural property law here provides us with 
detailed answers which, while supporting the idea of a public 
cultural interest, also reveal a nuanced complexity and far from 
sanitized way in which public cultural interest is actually decided, 
located and then protected. Italian cultural property law negates the 
existence of a common, specific cultural interest that applies across 
all categories of cultural property, and instead allows for case by 
case determinations. A nuanced understanding of public cultural 
interest allows us to embrace complexity within a decision of how 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects may be 
placed in the cultural property “box.”  
 
While the majority of Italian doctrine correctly speaks of the 
prominence of an aesthetic evaluation as the defining barometer for 
cultural property before the 1966 Commissione Franceschini’s 
                                               
373 With the caveat, as Merryman says, that such a question of kinds of property may be 
too wedded to the legal realist tradition. See Merryman, “Protection”, supra note 42 at 521.  
374 See discussion infra, Chapter 5.  
375 John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339 (1989) 
[hereinafter Merryman, Public Interest] (giving as types of public interest truth and 
certainty, memory, survival, pathos, identity, and community).  
376 Id. at 350.  
377 Perhaps best evidenced by the example of the Elgin marbles, which keeps a cultural 
property in the United Kingdom using a universalist argument. Merryman, Two ways, 
supra note 2 at 837, 846 (citing also to John Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin 
Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1903-05 (1985)). See also WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND 
THE PUBLIC TRUST (James Cuno, ed., 2006).  
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work378, the beginnings of cultural property law on the Italian 
territory indicate that various cultural interests were deemed to be 
at stake early in the preservation effort. The earliest preservation 
edict passed by Cardinal Pacca in Rome in 1820 before the Italian 
unification, often cited as the beginning of modern cultural property 
law in Italy379, applied to a variety of objects and justified limits on 
their exportation through a variety of cultural interests. Only one 
part of a long evolution of cultural property laws on the Italian 
territory prior to unification, earlier Papal Bulls in the 15th century 
before the Pacca Edict had also concerned themselves with limiting 
the circulation of objects of certain cultural interest.380 Various 
regions and kingdoms in Italy up to Italian unification had 
prohibited the exportation of certain objects of cultural interest.381 
But it is Cardinal Pacca’s 1820 edict, often cited among all of these 
as the model for later Italian cultural property laws passed during 
the Italian unification and as the inspiration for its contemporaries382, 
that gives us the first inklings of the breadth of a public cultural 
interest in objects that would justify their special treatment. 
Contextualizing the edict within the general loss of antiquities and 
art objects from the Roman territory and the constant legal activity 
of the Papal States to combat these losses383, on its face the edict 
                                               
378 See Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 136; T. ALIBRANDI AND P.G. FERRI, I 
BENI CULTURALI E AMBIENTALI 25 (Milano, 2001) [hereinafter ALIBRANDI AND FERRI]; 
DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE 31- 32 (Carla Barbati, Marco Cammelli, Lorenzo 
Casini, Giuseppe Piperata, and Girolamo Sciullo, eds., Il Mulino, 2017) [hereinafter 
DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE]; CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO, supra note 63 at 47- 
50. 
379 ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 4. See also Editto Cardinal Pacca, 
http://www.ssb.vt.it/compendio%20legislativo/EDITTO_CARDINAL_PACCA.pdf.  
380 CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO, supra note 63 at 27.  
381 ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 4 (describing laws in the Kingdom of Naples in 
1822, Tuscany in 1854, Lombardo Veneto in 1745, 1818, and 1827, Parma in 1760 and 
Modena in 1857). For an exhaustive compilation of the various edicts and laws emanated 
in Italian city-states from 1571 to 1860 see ANDREA EMILIANI, LEGGI, BANDI E 
PROVVEDIMENTI PER LA TUTELA DEI BENI ARTISTICI E CULTURALI NEGLI ANTICHI STATI 
ITALIANI 1571- 1869 (1996). In his introduction Emiliani notes how even these laws were 
characterized by the tension between preservation and promotion, safeguarding and use. 
Id. at 11. Despite Alibrandi & Ferri’s note that most of the regions followed the Pacca 
edict’s model, Emiliani’s analysis also emphasizes the peculiarities of regions’ laws and 
indicates acts strongly connected to the needs of individual territories. Id. An examination 
of these earlier laws is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which primarily concentrates 
on Italian cultural property law from 1902 onwards in order to compare it to United States 
law of similar periods and because the history of Italian fashion proper begins in the 20th 
century.  
382 ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 4.  
383 CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO: supra note 63 at 27 (citing to even earlier Papal Bulls in 
the 15th century). See also JANET BLAKE, INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 2 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) and Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49(1) 
THE INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 61 (2001). Some international compilations cite to even earlier 
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mentions not only ancient monuments and fine art objects, but also 
objects that are of interest for scholarship.384 It deliberately uses a 
layered language which refers to objects of antiquity as of both 
artistic or educational interest385, cites to the potential art historical 
merit of marble sculptures by non-living authors386, cloths and 
mosaics387, and the potential merit of certain “Massi ragguardevoli dei 
Marmi” due to their size or presentation of an antique work.388 Far 
from being interested in only artistic or historic merit, cultural 
property law on the Italian territory classified properties due to ab 
ability to be of multiple cultural interests as early as 1820.   
 
While a comprehensive national law for the protection of cultural 
property was not passed in Italy until 1902, perhaps thanks to 
ideological clashes with the principles of private property enshrined 
in the constitutional document the Statuto Albertino389, the importance 
of preserving Italy’s cultural heritage was apparent in the newly 
formed States’ agenda. The Italian State passed regulations allowing 
it to seize uncared for monuments in 1865.390 In 1872 it presented a 
draft law for the protection of objects of art and antiquity and 
established a consultative body which interacted with regional 
commissions on general administrative matters.391   
 
Italy’s 1902 law reveals a similar concern with multiple types of 
                                               
laws in ancient times. See also J. Jokilehto, Definition of Cultural Heritage: References to 
Documents in History, ICCROM Working Group ‘Heritage and Society’, 
http://cif.icomos.org/pdf_docs/Documents%20on%20line/Heritage%20definitions.pdf.    
384Editto Cardinal Pacca, supra note 379 (Noting in reference to past objects which were lost, 
“Ma quelle stesse passate vicende, che fecero temporaneamente perdere a Roma molti e 
molto stimabili e preziosi Capi d'Opera per Arte, per Antichità e per Erudizione…”) See 
also Art. 9 in Id. (In reference to those things to which the Edict applies, “Le Commissioni 
prenderanno cura diligente di visitare generalmente presso qualunque Proprietario e 
Possessore gli Oggetti di Antichità, e ritrovandone di singolare e famoso pregio per l'Arte 
o per l'Erudizione, dovranno di essi dare a Noi una speciale descrizione, ad effetto di 
vincolare i Proprietari e Possessori suddetti a non poter disporre di tali Oggetti…”)  
385 Id.  
386 Art 17 in Id. Interestingly, the Edict also draws a line around modern restorations to 
historic buildings, which are not deemed to be taxable or interfered with since they are 
“una industria dei moderni Artefici, non vogliamo che ne risentano aggravio.” See Art. 15 
in Id.  
387 Art 20 in Id. 
388 Art. 18 in Id.  
389 ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 4. 
390 Id.  
391 Guido Melis, Dal Risorgimento a Bottai e a Spadolini. La lunga strada dei beni culturali nella 
storia dell'Italia unita [From the Risorgimento to Bottai and Spadolini, the long road of 
cultural property in the history of Italian unification], 3 AEDON [ARTE E DIRITTO ONLINE] 
[ART AND LAW ONLINE] (2016), 
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2016/3/melis.htm.   
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cultural interests on its face. While a catalog and its accompanying 
lists were the main way in which cultural properties were 
identified392, the reasons for inclusion on the list were varied. Indeed, 
not only did the 1902 law apply to movable objects of antique or 
artistic merit393, but it also applied to single objects of archeological 
merit394, and also to collections of things of art and antiquity.395 The 
inclusion of these different types of objects raises logical questions 
as to why they are of interest and how. Reasons for inclusion on a 
list should be justified just as much as reasons for a declaration that 
an individual object is cultural property.396  
 
Indeed, any argument that a cultural interest in specific cultural 
properties should result solely from their being on a list is denied 
by the public and private divide used to classify cultural property in 
the 1939 law.397 Alongside this, the slow but sure increase in the 
types of objects to which Italian cultural property law applies over 
time also points to a varied, complex and nuanced cultural interest 
at the heart of preservation under the law. The 1909 law expanded 
the subject matter of Italian cultural property law to movable things 
that “abbiano interesse storico, archeologico, paletnologico o artistico.”398 
In contrast, the 1902 law had named as its primary subject matter 
only “oggetti mobili che abbiano pregio di antichità o d'arte.”399 Here, in 
the 1909 law, we also see the first sign of the word “interesse” as 
definitive of the things to which the law applies. Regulations and 
decree-laws passed after the 1909 law but before the 1939 law 
slowly but surely expanded the scope of the subject matter, 
                                               
392 See supra. Art. 23, Legge 12 Giugno 1902 n. 185 in G.U. n. 149, Venerdì 17 Giugno 1902. 
393 Art 1, L. n. 185/1902.  
394 Art 2, L. n. 185/1902 (described based on their ownership by mainly ecclesiastical 
entities).  
395 Art 2, L. n. 185/1902. See also Art. 15, L. n. 185/1902. (seemingly combining the 
categories of objects of antiquity and objects of art when objects were discovered as part of 
excavations: “Nei casi di scoperte di monumenti, o di oggetti d'arte antica…”).   
396 The practical challenges of a list were the reason for its eventual death, as evidenced by 
Rosadi’s presentation of the 1909 law: not only would assigning degrees of cultural 
interest based on a list be difficult, but it risked giving owners an argument for the 
exclusion of their property from Italy’s cultural heritage completely. See EMILIANI, supra 
note 381 at 213.    
397 See Legge 1 Giugno 1939 n. 1089 in G.U. 8 Agosto 1939 n. 184, 
http://augusto.agid.gov.it/gazzette/index/download/id/1939184_P1.   
398 Art 1, Legge 20 Giugno 1909 n. 364 in G.U. 150 del 28 Giugno 1909, available at  
http://augusto.agid.gov.it/gazzette/index/download/id/1909150_PM. According to the 
legislative history, the use of the term movable things was meant to be expansive, with 
manuscripts , numismatic items and even gardens included, but the unique needs of these 
objects were deemed better legislated by sui generis laws. EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 205- 
206.    
399 Art 1, L. n. 185/1902. 
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including to “i codici, gli antichi manoscritti, gli incunabuli, le stampe e 
incisioni rare e di pregio e le cose d'interesse numismatico”400 in 1927.   
 
Different objects were increasingly included as of a public cultural 
interest for different reasons (whether historic, artistic, or other). 
Historic interest was increasingly perceived as expansive and 
broad. This highlights an answer to an inherent dilemma of how to 
understand the public’s cultural interest in different cultural 
properties. Far from being divorced from the context of their 
creation or crystalized as cultural property at some point in time, 
Italian cultural property law shows us that the decision to preserve 
certain objects is progressively based on a recognition that these 
properties have something to contribute for our future, because of 
their life, context or other aspect of their being.  
 
Context and specificity are important when deciding whether the 
public’s cultural interest exists in a property. Bottai explored this in 
his presentation of the 1939 cultural property law to the Italian 
government by using the word “interesse”. With the use of the term 
“interesse” with added qualifiers such as “artistico, storico, 
archeologico, o etnografico…”401, the law intended to refer both to a 
public concern and also to private rights.402 Explaining the reasons 
that the government should indeed concern itself with this subject 
matter and the drafting of the rules within the law itself, Bottai 
emphasized that the State cannot be disinterested in objects of 
artistic or historic interest because they are a precious spiritual and 
non-spiritual asset of Italy.403 At the same time, however, the public 
interest in artistic and historic objects must also exist in tandem 
with the rights of private citizens and institutions.404  
 
Degrees of artistic and historic interest in Italian cultural property 
law exist in order to balance these public and private interests. 
While the public interest in these objects is superior to a private one, 
Bottai explained that an equitable balance between the two is still 
necessary.405 In addition, the public’s cultural interest not only takes 
various public and private needs into account, but it must also be 
                                               
400 Art 1, Testo coordinato, L. n. 364/1909.   
401 Art 1, L. n. 1089/1939. 
402 Disegno di legge: “Tutela delle cose d’interesse artistico e storico” (n. 154), La normative, 
La legge sulla tutela delle cose di interesse artistico e storico in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE 
CULTURALI IN ITALIA NEGLI ANNI TRENTA VOL 1 334, 408-409 (Vincenzo Cazzato, ed., 
2001) [hereinafter ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI]. 
403 Id at. 408.  
404 Id.  
405 Id.  
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seen in relation to administrative action. 406  
 
The concept of balancing between public and private interests is 
particularly important for classifying the category of fashion design 
objects as cultural property under the law. Restraints on material 
iterations of Italian fashion design objects, outside of Italian cultural 
property law, already seemed to negatively affect the development 
of Italian fashion itself. Seen as forcing women to “dress like their 
cook”, regulation of Italian fashion designs alone by the Ente 
Nazionale della Moda and other laws were historically criticized as 
stifling individual creativity and expressive freedom. Recognizing a 
public cultural interest in a tangible iteration of an Italian fashion 
design such that it would qualify as cultural property would 
potentially mean subtracting that object from a market where it 
could be sold and worn, the real world where it could continue to 
develop, evolve and even change. Administrative action may 
unnecessarily stifle public interest in fashion design and in the 
objects in which it is embodied instead of preserving it. “Freezing” a 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design object as cultural 
property may, in effect, mean “freezing” the very essence of 
fashion. At the same time, it might not: fashion design might also be 
just as communicative or useful if it is in a museum or protected 
individually as an object. These questions are part and parcel of the 
balancing of public and private interests at the heart of Italian 
cultural property law. 
 
Various cases in which judges have been called to review 
administrative designations of cultural property underscore the  
importance of balancing private and public interests when 
classifying objects as cultural property. The reasoning in the cases 
reviewing administrative action emphasize the reasons for 
designation but also the logic behind it. The cases reveal that when 
the balancing Bottai presenst as part of public cultural interest is put 
into practice, it may not be as equitable as one would think. For 
example, a Villa’s classification as a cultural property under the 
1939 cultural property law progressively led to an indirect 
protection of its garden and the prohibition of building a parking 
garage at a certain distance from the villa and its garden without 
accompanying acts of reconstitution of the garden.407 The court, 
                                               
406 Id. at 409 (“la determinazione e l’accertamento dell’interesse storico o artistico che qualifica le 
cose contemplate dal disegno della legge… può, nei casi concreti, presentare una intensità diversa, 
dalla quale si deve tener conto, giacché essa traduce in una esigenza di tutela, che varia in relazione 
alle specifiche forme di ingerenza dell’Amministrazione.”) 
407 Cons. St., Sez VI, n. 6488/2004 in DEJURE.  
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deferring to the administration’s judgment, noted that the Villa’s 
direct preservation was ensured by an indirect preservation of the 
garden under the later 1999 Testo Unico “per consentire anche alle 
future generazioni la visione e la fruizione dei valori artistici” and also to 
“evitare che, all'interno del complessivo perimetro dell'edificio 
monumentale, abbiano luogo le alterazioni dello stato dei luoghi 
incompatibili col loro valore testimoniale.”408 Both the external 
perspective and the internal view of the Villa served the public 
interest. If we were to imagine this same reasoning applied to a 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design, we might be 
concerned about what an external and internal point of view might 
be. Would it translate to protecting the outside of a bag and the 
inside of a bag? Or would it mean protecting the external view of a 
dress and the internal way in which it fits the wearer? Could we 
draw boundaries of intervention on a dress like we could on a villa 
or on a garden, when people might still live their lives in modern 
and contemporary Italian fashion objects just as people still inhabit 
buildings that are cultural property? Such fine line decisions made 
in the public interest as applied to Italian fashion design objects 
seem hard pressed to walk an easy road in equity. At the same time, 
the court in this case seemed convinced that the administration’s 
actions were not beyond its powers, in part thanks to consistent and 
explanatory administrative action. The fact that the administration 
would have allowed the construction of the parking garage upon 
certain conditions, the replanting of certain trees, for instance, drew 
a sufficient balance in the court’s eyes.409 Perhaps clear explanations 
and accommodations would be enough to strike the balancing of 
interests: individual private owners of Italian fashion design objects 
might, for example, be allowed to alter the interiors of garments 
classified as cultural property, as long as the garments looked the 
same on the outside. At the same time, limits on the destination of 
use are definitive of cultural property, so an owner could also 
potentially find themselves unable to wear a dress at all.410  
 
Still other administrative declarations of how private properties 
exhibit a cultural interest today reveal interpretative limits to the 
historical links which the administration will find for private 
                                               
408 Id. (at p. 4 of the PDF of the opinion). 
409 Id (at p. 5 of the PDF of the opinion).  
410 Cons. St., Sez VI, n. 741/1993, in CONSIGLIO DI STATO, I, 1306. Such limits of use as duties 
of conservation are also already visible, separately, in museum ethical guidelines. In this 
sense, some fashion museums in the United States are already faced with explaining that 
the fashion in their collections is not available to be worn. See Valerie Steele’s comments 
during 50 Years of the Museum at FIT: Fashion as Cultural Heritage, March 14, 2019 (video on 
file with the Museum at FIT).   
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properties.411 In the Cinema America case, the Ministry of Cultural 
Heritage declared a private movie theater owned by a private real 
estate company to be of particularly important interest for its 
reference to history under the current Article 10, clause 3(d) of the 
Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape. Italy’s highest 
administrative court, the Consiglio di Stato, overturned this 
determination, noting that the private movie theater could not even 
remotely be considered of the historical interest referred to in that 
clause, given that the historical reference should be to the history of 
public, collective, or religious institutions.412 General references to 
the movie theater’s place in a resurgence of Cinecittà were not 
enough.413 The nexus between public and private here was a 
defining line for the courts; it indicated Cinema America’s placement 
outside the cultural property “box.” But what this might mean for 
an Italian fashion design object is unclear- would being owned and 
worn by private persons exempt Italian fashion design objects from 
classifications as cultural property, at least under Article 10, clause 
3(d)? Would this make a difference under Article 10, clause 3(a), 
which the court noted would allow for a classification of a common 
                                               
411 For a discussion of this Cinema America case and others see Lorenzo Casini, Jeux avec les 
frontiers: le role de la jurisprudence administrative dans la construction du droit italien du 
patrimoine culturel in DROIT PUBLIC ET PATRIMOINE LE RÔLE DU CONSEIL D’ÉTAT 199- 212, 
205 (2019). 
412 Cons. St., sez. VI, 14/06/2017, (ud. 04/05/2017, dep. 14/06/2017), n.2920 
 DEJURE (“È fondato anzitutto il primo motivo di appello, che è riferito al capo di sentenza 
che decide sul ricorso n. 2251/2015 di primo grado, ed è incentrato sull'asserita mancanza 
dei presupposti di legge per imporre il vincolo. Per chiarezza, si riporta la norma invocata 
dall'amministrazione. Ai sensi dell'art. 10 comma 3 lettera d) del d. lgs. 42/2004, "Sono ... 
beni culturali, quando sia intervenuta la dichiarazione prevista dall'articolo 13: ... d) le 
cose immobili e mobili, a chiunque appartenenti, che rivestono un interesse, 
particolarmente importante a causa del loro riferimento con la storia politica, militare, 
della letteratura, dell'arte, della scienza, della tecnica, dell'industria e della cultura in 
genere, ovvero quali testimonianze dell'identità e della storia delle istituzioni pubbliche, 
collettive o religiose." Sempre per chiarezza, va evidenziato che l'ipotesi pertinente al caso 
di specie è quella prevista dalla prima parte della lettera riportata, ovvero il "riferimento 
con la storia"; si può invece pacificamente escludere, e per vero nemmeno è stato 
ipotizzato, che il cinema di cui si tratta, una struttura privata destinata allo svago, possa 
essere in qualche modo collegato con "istituzioni pubbliche, collettive o religiose.") 
413 Id. (“…suggeriscono un possibile valore artistico dell'immobile, che però non viene in 
nessun modo argomentato o anche solo affermato; viceversa, alla storia della struttura 
sono dedicati accenni limitati praticamente ad un solo passo, in cui si dice che "negli anni 
cinquanta e sessanta", intendendosi del secolo scorso, "si assiste a Roma ad una vera e 
propria espansione dell'industria cinematografica: Cinecittà diventa la seconda capitale 
mondiale del cinema, preceduta solo da Hollywood", tanto che a Roma si contavano più 
di 250 sale (sempre doc. 28 in I grado, cit.)…In tali termini, manca del tutto il riferimento 
ad uno specifico evento storico, quale che ne sia il rilievo nella storia generale della città e 
del nostro Paese: la struttura è vincolata con riferimento ad un'epoca generica, nemmeno 
precisamente individuata, tanto nell'estensione temporale, quanto con il richiamo a 
personaggi o eventi che la contraddistinsero.”) 
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object as cultural property because it revealed a historical 
connection to a celebrity who owned it?414  
 
Such questions also reveal the subjectivity inherent in designations 
of cultural property and the privileging of certain historical 
narratives over others. Who is a fashion celebrity that should be 
recognized as part of a historical narrative? Do we risk privileging 
mainstream or commercial fashion historical narratives over others? 
This substantive concern, which pervades other types of cultural 
and historic property today, might even be seen in Bottai’s 
presentation of the law and his characterization of Italy’s cultural 
property itself, which was, to a certain extent, indicative of the 
corporative spirit which characterized the Fascist state.415 
Notwithstanding this, however, the equitable balancing of the 
superior public interest with private interests in the 1939 law was 
embraced after the war with changes in its application, subject 
matter, and administrative institutions and actions brought on by 
the times. In addition, Italian legal scholars after the war took the 
opportunity to expand on how to conceptualize the equitable 
balancing of these interests beyond the specific historical context of 
its drafting, applying the balance to Italy’s present and future 
cultural property. 
 
Michele Cantucci was one of the Italian legal scholars who helped 
Italian cultural property to evolve past its 1939 iteration, in part 
through his book La tutela delle cose di interesse artistico e storico in 
                                               
414 Id. (“Ciò posto, come è noto, il vincolo appena descritto si distingue tradizionalmente da 
quello previsto in generale dallo stesso art. 10 a tutela delle cose di "interesse artistico, 
storico, archeologico o etnoantropologico." Si afferma infatti, in sintesi estrema, che la cosa 
di interesse per riferimento con la storia di per sé non rivestirebbe alcun interesse 
culturale, ma lo assume nel caso concreto, perché collegata ad un qualche evento passato 
di rilievo: si fa l'esempio di un oggetto di fattura comune e di nessun pregio artistico, che 
però fosse caro al personaggio celebre che ne era proprietario.”) 
415 Mario Serio, La legge sulla tutela delle cose di interesse artistico e storico in ISTITUZIONI E 
POLITICHE CULTURALI supra note 402 at 335 (“Questo aspetto del contemperamento degli 
interessi pubblici e privati indusse a definire la legge, fin dalla sua emanazione, come 
tipicamente corporativa. Prima- affermo il Ministro al Senato- si consultavano soltanto i 
tecnici, ora si tiene conto anche degli interessi. È appunto perché la legge di ispirazione e 
portata corporativa ‘solo oggi’, aggiunse Bottai ‘si è potuto redigerla in quanto solo oggi 
gli organismi corporativi e sindacali hanno raggiunto la loro completa efficienza.’”) 
Cassese also notes the importance of Bottai’s and Romani’s influence in the law, especially 
given its short intro to the Camera. Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 125. In 
his study of pre-unification preservation laws, Emiliani aslo emphasizes this, noting how 
the 1939 law is in part rooted in the 1909 law’s choices to reinforce the collective, 
community value of art and its importance for Italy’s identity; a choice which, therefore, 
predates Bottai’s law and its equations with the government in power at that time. 
EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 19- 20 (1996).     
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1953. In it Cantucci examined the unique characteristics of interest 
under administrative law as applied to objects of artistic and 
historic interest contemplated in the 1939 law. Defining interest as 
made up of both subjective and objective aspects, Cantucci defined 
interest as  
 
essenzialmente un fatto soggettivo, in quanto non costituisce un valore 
assoluto, ma bensì un valore relativo, che è quello che risulta appunto dal 
giudizio dei soggetti traducendosi, attraverso questa valutazione, in 
interesse inteso in senso oggettivo.416 
 
A thing is understood as being of interest when one or multiple 
subjects converge their spontaneous attention on it as a result of an 
economic or spiritual judgment.417 This convergence makes the 
object objectively interesting, but people can also have in interest in 
something at the same time because they themselves feel a specific 
feeling or state because of it.418 The subjective part of interest is what 
can make an interest public: the expansion of this interest across 
social networks and relationships makes it collective and, therefore, 
the purpose of satisfying it, public.419  
 
Cantucci does describe artistic and historic interest as in fact one 
kind of public interest: both artistic and historic qualifiers fulfill 
specific aims or satisfy certain collective objectives, such as  
 
la conservazione dei valori artistici e storici considerati come mezzo per 
la elevazione della cultura, per l’affinamento dell’attività dello 
spirito…perché l’individuo possa sviluppare la sua personalità.420 
 
Like other public interests in health or public order, Cantucci says, 
this public interest can be relevant under the law. Public interest is 
relevant under the law inasmuch as it actuates the protection of 
physical things that are of certain types of artistic or historic 
interest.  
 
                                               
416 CANTUCCI, supra note 148 at 100. See also Id. at 103 (describing this as applied to a thing, 
through which an interest of the collective is satisfied).  
417 Id.  
418 Id. at 101. See also Lorenzo Casini, “Italian Hours” supra note 105 at 369 (2011) ( 
“[Cultural objects] transmit something that cannot be touched, such as the terrific emotion 
that visitors may feel once they enter the Colosseum in Rome: ‘relics excite a special 
emotion, even though they have no religious significance.’” (citing to Merryman, Public 
Interest, supra note 375).   
419 CANTUCCI, supra note 148 at 101.  
420 Id. at 102.  
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This artistic and/or historic interest, which we will generally term 
cultural interest, is certainly however not confined, according to 
Cantucci, solely to the protection of certain things or properties.421 
Indeed, art or historic interest is really defined by its connection to 
the collective and not necessarily to a physical property. When the 
public cultural interest is applied to things, then its legal 
significance is as a quality of that specific thing, or property.422 This 
public historic or artistic quality a property of legal significance is 
also, however, connected to the greater public historic or artistic 
interest inasmuch as this quality identifies an intrinsic content 
through which the public cultural interest of the collective is 
satisfied. Given this quality’s connection to the collective, Cantucci 
characterizes administrative law’s role as stepping in to effectuate 
the public interest; a property is classified as a cultural property 
depending upon whether or not it fulfills the unique public cultural 
interest.423 Cantucci emphasizes that this administrative decision-
making process is, therefore, also context specific 
 
Infatti sul piano di questa disciplina non esiste un interesse artistico o 
storico se non in quanto la cosa stessa risponda, per le sue qualità, 
all’interesse pubblico che è oggetto della tutela legislativa e questa 
rispondenza varia in ordine a diversi fattori come il tempo, la critica 
artistica, la valutazione storico-politica, il che importa sempre un 
giudizio tecnico che deve essere effettuato dall’Amministrazione sulla 
base di quello che è l’orientamento medio della collettività titolare dei 
rispettivi interessi.424 
 
These administrative decisions, for Cantucci, also highlight the 
importance of not equating any artistic or historic interest with the 
specific public artistic or historic interest at issue; and the 
importance of not equating any artistic or historic interest with the 
tangible property to which it seems to attach. While we may equate 
artistic or historic interest with a specific quality or aspect of a 
painting which we can see or easily identify (Monet’s brushstrokes 
or Mona Lisa’s smile), in reality this only becomes the public artistic 
or historic interest under the law when it is understood in relation 
to the aims and interests of the collective, which are mediated 
through administrative decision-making.425 In this sense, two 
identical objects may not be of the same public cultural interest 
                                               
421 Id. at 102.  
422 Id. at 102.  
423 Id. at 103- 104.  
424 Id. at 105.  
425 Id. at 105.  
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necessary to designate them as cultural property. 
 
This narrowing of the public cultural interest is actually heartening 
for an extension of cultural property to modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects. Any artistic and/or historical interest 
will not do. Moreover, the presence of identical objects will not 
result in exponential designations of cultural property. In this sense, 
not all Italian fashion design objects need to be classified or even 
understood as cultural property. Artistic or historic significance in 
the context of a brand may not be enough, and creativity alone may 
not be enough, even in comparison to what came before. Rather, a 
classification of a modern or contemporary Italian fashion object as 
cultural property should be based on the collective’s recognition of 
a broad artistic and/or historical interest in that object. We might, 
for example, see such an interest in Ferragamo’s wedge heels. 
Created within the historical narrative of the deprivations of World 
War II, a pair of Ferragamo’s wedge soles might fulfill the various 
parts of collective judgment that Cantucci mentions: time, artistic 
(or fashion) critique, and a historical-political evaluation.  
 
The technical judgment of the administration which Cantucci 
mentions also leads to concerns of a battle of the experts. That is, 
while the administration is actuating a collective public interest, its 
determinations are naturally made by those with specific 
knowledge and experience outside the regular collective’s. This may 
lead to results that seem to pull justifications for a property’s 
classification as cultural property out of thin air. At the same time, 
recent cases seem to have established some limits- experts or 
employees of the Ministry cannot be too vague or too general in 
their reasons. In a recent case in which the home and studio of the 
singer Lucio Dalla was determined to be of particularly important 
cultural interest, the court reprimanded the Ministry for its generic 
determination which sought to protect the whole of the building 
without specification for the owners.426 The required “elementi di 
identificazione e di valutazione della cosa"427 were not satisfied by a 
simple sentimental judgment.428 Moreover, declarations of a whole 
also seem suspect when more specific and individual objects are 
entertained as being of a public cultural interest.429 In this sense, 
                                               
426 Cons. St. sez. VI, 19/10/2018, (ud. 11/10/2018, dep. 19/10/2018), n. 5986 in DEJURE.  
427 Id. (citing to Art. 14, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004).  
428 Id.  
429 Id. (referring to the Soprintendenza’s classification of the whole casa-studio and all its 
furniture and movables when it had imagined that specific items would be of particular 
cultural interest).   
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emotional or sentimental judgments about Italian fashion design 
objects may not be enough to allow them to enter the cultural 
property “box” under Italian cultural property law.  
 
Cantucci is certainly not the only Italian legal scholar to have 
contemplated the nature of the public interest and the legal weight, 
quality and importance it has in Italian cultural property law. 
Grisolia, after commenting on the purposes of the 1939 law after its 
passage in the early 1940s430, also discusses interest, albeit from 
another angle, in his book Tutela delle cose d’arte, published 
practically contemporaneously to Cantucci’s work. Grisolia begins 
his own investigation of public interest by noting the different 
categories of things of artistic interest outside of public, or 
administrative, law, within the Italian Civil Code.431  
 
Using the notion of demanialità432, Grisolia explores how it seems, 
when equated with the publicness of all things of artistic interest, 
fundamentally unable to explain why the protection of certain 
things of artistic interest in private hands are also protected 
alongside other objects which are displayed or used by the public.433 
Seeking to craft a unitary theoretical framework434 to define the 
nature of things of artistic interest across public and private law435, 
Grisolia explores specific articles of the Civil Code and the 1939 law, 
comparing and contrasting them, to argue that a public interest 
pervades all objects of artistic interest, whether they are in private 
or public hands, and, if the latter, then classified as part of the 
                                               
430 See various articles by Grisolia in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI supra note 402.  
431 MARIO GRISOLIA, LA TUTELA DELLE COSE D’ARTE 159- 167 (1952). 
432 Demanialità in English translates to State owned, although it might be debated whether 
it could also be considered part of the concept of public domain or the commons. Grisolia 
refers to property thusly whether it is so because of its function, use, or general social 
utility. See Id. at 161- 165. Grisolia also notes how the use of demanialità continued in the 
1942 Codice Civile. See Id. at 168.  
433 Id. at 166- 167. 
434 Id. at 167 (“Si può a noi sembra, affermare che è mancata finora la visione unitaria del 
problema; il quale è stato infatti, principalmente sulla base del codice civile, spezzettato in 
vari settori dalle divergenti tesi della demanialità e della patrimonialità indisponibile delle 
cose d’arte dello Stato e degli altri enti pubblici, mentre sono stati considerati sempre a 
parte i beni artistici (mobili e immobili; singoli o complessi) dei privati, per i quali si è di 
solito parlato di limiti nell’interesse pubblico e talvolta anche di servitù pubblica.”).  
435 Grisolia refers to the 1865 Codice Civile and to the new legge specialistico, the 1939 law. 
Id. at 162. He also refers to the Codice Civile of 1942 then in effect at the time of his 
writing. Id. at 167. Grisolia also compares and contrasts the 1939 law with rules in the 
Code, which seem to be at odds. For example, analyzing the protection for series or 
collections of objects he notes the absurdity of protecting all raccolte in public hands in the 
Code while only certain series or collections of particularly exceptional interest, no matter 
who they belong to, are protected in the 1939 law. Id. at 172.  
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demanio or as generally indisponibili.436 Rather than concentrate on a 
definition of public interest that focuses on inalienability or the 
public domain, Grisolia emphasizes that a public interest applies to 
all things of artistic interest, no matter to whom they belong, and 
that this interest might be recognized under the law on the basis of 
a thing’s function or based on who controls or owns it in its 
materiality.437 This function, control, or ownership, is, however, 
simply a means of actuating the protection of things of artistic 
interest; these criteria are not the reason for the protection of a thing 
of artistic interest. The reason for such protection is found, again, in 
the collective interest which the State represents.438 It is the ability 
that objects have to fulfill this collective interest that makes objects 
of artistic interest subject to public law.439 The stratified nature of the 
collective interests described in the 1939 law is, for Grisolia, just a 
necessary way of legally addressing the existence of this 
predominant collective, and therefore public, artistic interest in 
certain things alongside other private interests in the same thing.440  
 
Grisolia’s exploration of why objects are of artistic interest is telling. 
Rather than justifying the protection of works of art based on their 
specific cultural functions or the roles they play for culture, he too 
deems them generally goods of public interest because they are 
related to the collective, to a spirit of the Nation.441 A public social 
aim or a public social purpose is what is fundamentally at the heart 
of the public interest.442 In this sense, specific cultural values- 
whether historic or artistic- are not the barometer, but a greater, 
common public cultural interest is. In other words, collective 
interests in objects are not fitted to society, but society itself decides 
what their collective public interest is in objects, and protects them 
accordingly. For Italian fashion design objects this is distinctly 
important because it negates the dictates of fashion as the reason for 
an Italian fashion design objects’ eventual classification as cultural 
property. That is, Italian fashion companies should not be the ones 
                                               
436 Id. at 183- 185.  
437 Id. at 193, 199, 202 (“Nel campo nostro, è fin troppo chiaro (e ciò costituisce il primo 
argomento contro l’assegnazione delle cose d’arte non demaniali alla categoria, di per se 
stessa tanto incerto ed anomala, dei beni indisponibili) che il profilo della trasmissione del 
diritto dominicale è solo uno degli aspetti del regime al quale sono oggi sottoposti i beni 
artistici, la cui destinazione pubblica è invece protetta dalla legge speciale attraverso un 
complesso congegno, che innanzitutto li investe direttamente nella loro esistenza 
materiale e nella loro utilizzazione.”).  
438 Id. at 207.  
439 Id. at 211.  
440 Id. at 239- 240.  
441 See Id. generally.  
442 Id. at 214.  
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dictating what is or is not of the public’s cultural interest in their 
design objects as a first matter. While Italian fashion companies 
might propose reasons and then later help to valorize their design 
objects that are cultural property, it is the collective, the public, and 
the administration which in Italian cultural property law represents 
them, that is responsible for determining the objects’ cultural 
interest, over and above what may be fashionable at a given 
moment.  
 
Discussions of the public interest in objects of artistic or historic 
interest represented by Grisolia and Cantucci’s work are not 
confined to Italian scholarship in public law. Indeed, Salvatore 
Pugliatti’s work La Proprietà nel Nuovo Diritto, published almost 
contemporaneously to Cantucci and Grisolia’s work443, applies the 
notion of a public interest to property as a category, whether 
classified as public or private under the law. Indeed, Pugliatti 
defines property law with reference to the balancing of an 
inseparable binary of public and private interest.444 Existing as 
complements, in harmony, public and private interests, which are 
often not the same or even representative of constant values, need 
to be balanced through property law, which will also in turn vary 
its rules based on the objects it is regulating.445 For Pugliatti, ex post 
categorizations of any property as public or private are not the 
point: rather, public and private interests (which Pugliatti also 
refers to as public, given that it is in the public interest to guarantee 
private interests in property446), are applied through a vertical and 
horizontal analysis, and define the way in which property law treats 
specific objects in its purview.447 The horizontal analysis of public 
and private interests in property occurs by comparing different 
objects; the vertical analysis asks what public or private interests are 
within the same object.448  
 
Giving the excavation of archeological objects as an example, 
                                               
443 Although in parts written and published before the war. Strumenti Tecnico-Giuridici per 
la tutela dell’interesse pubblico nella proprietà in SALVATORE PUGLIATTI, LA PROPRIETÀ NEL 
NUOVO DIRITTO 107 (Milano, Giuffrè, 1954) [hereinafter PUGLIATTI, LA PROPRIETÀ] (noting 
the chapter was previously published in 1939). Pugliatti’s work has also provided the 
foundation for today’s works on property in Italian legal scholarship, which examine how 
the new properties of our age, like the internet, fit into the legal notion of property. See 
Concetto unitario e molteplicità degli statuti proprietari: tra storia e sistema in RODOTÀ, supra 
note 372 at 53 (exploring beni comuni in the same work at 459- 498).    
444 PUGLIATTI, LA PROPRIETÀ supra note 443 at 4-5.   
445 Id.  
446 Id. at 3.  
447 Id. at 8.  
448 Id.  
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Pugliatti notes that a horizontal division of public and private 
interests occurs on the various strata of land itself: in some pieces of 
land, the private interest is determinative, but in others, where 
archeological objects are found, the public interest is more 
determinative and leads to prohibitions on ownership of found 
objects.449 The top level of soil is assigned to the private owner 
thanks to his private interest in it, while the subsoil is assigned to 
the State, due to the public interest in objects that are found there.450 
At the same time, when the archeological object itself is found in a 
specific area of land, that land (and the archeological object itself), 
are of both public and private interests, and property law must 
determine how to balance them. This is the vertical dimension. In 
Italy, for example, the State still owns all archeological objects 
excavated from the land, while the owner, in the past, was only 
entitled to recoup any expenses or damages due to a State-run 
excavation.451 Pugliatti furthermore casts private and public interests 
as the activators of certain legal boundaries; these boundaries can be 
drawn on any property, including intangible ones like intellectual 
property.452  
 
Far from conceptualizing rigid categories, Pugliatti’s work 
emphasizes the flexibility of property law.453 In some cases, subject-
specific laws might best protect public interests in property, while 
in other circumstances, and even for other objects454, the public 
interest might best be protected by giving way to a private interest 
or by not regulating the property at all.455  In this sense, not only 
does Pugliatti’s work, like Cantucci and Grisolia’s, indicate that a 
broad public interest, intimately related to society as a collective, is 
the foundation of property law, but it also, through its vertical 
analysis, foreshadows a discussion of tangible and intangible 
rights.456 Indeed, this idea that a cultural property does not have to 
be a physical thing opens a discussion of how Italian fashion 
                                               
449 Id.  
450 Id. at 9-10.  
451 Id. at 9-10. Art. 91, L. 42/2004.  
452 Id. at 5-6.  
453 Id. at 109.  
454 Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 140. See further discussion of objects and 
physical things infra in Section 2.3.  
455 In this sense, not all cose are beni. See PUGLIATTI, LA PROPRIETÀ supra note 443 at 5. See 
also SALVATORE PUGLIATTI, BENI E COSE IN SENSO GIURIDICO (1962) [hereinafter PUGLIATTI, 
BENI E COSE] (discussing the difference between beni and cose under the law as the bene 
being the synthesis of a public cultural interest and a specific situation to be protected 
under the law, but also exploring the concept of bene in terms of intangible rights and 
tangible things). See also Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 139- 140.  
456 Beni in PUGLIATTI, BENI E COSE , supra note 455 at 14- 58. 
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designs themselves might, at times, synthesize a specific public 
cultural interest and the purposes of cultural property protection on 
its own.  
 
Grisolia’s discussion of the public interest in La Tutela delle Cose 
d’Arte, and how it can apply to objects no matter their control or 
ownership, also foreshadows a discussion of intangible and tangible 
rights. As Grisolia notes, the notion of a public interest gives the 
State rights over an object which are not tangible, notwithstanding 
the fact that these rights allow the State to dictate what may happen 
to the thing of artistic interest in its materiality.457 The private right 
to protect works of artistic interest, which might later be cultural 
property- copyright- is in fact an intangible right justified by a 
public interest. Almost like the right to prohibit the display, copies, 
public performance and the creation of derivative works, cultural 
property law essentially sets limits in similar ways. 
 
The implication that cultural property law and intellectual property 
law are similar because they both conceive of property as 
fundamentally about intangible rights and not physical things itself, 
as really “a bundle of relationships”458, does not mean, however, that 
these legal frameworks can act for each other. This inequality 
between cultural property law and intellectual property law is most 
evident in American legal scholarship in discussions of how 
indigenous cultural property should be regulated, if at all, by law. 
Michael Brown’s exploration of the rights of indigenous people to 
their heritage, for example, doubts very much, in contrast to Scafidi, 
that intellectual property protections as they stand or as they may 
be revised to comprise multiple new regulations, would positively 
actuate indigenous peoples’ rights in their culture.459 Brown 
mentions identification of the collective group, the expiration of 
rights’ terms, and the very nature of the proverbial traveling of 
cultural heritage as reasons to doubt that intellectual property 
protections are appropriate.460 The same criticisms of intellectual 
property rights as types of cultural property rights might apply for 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects. It may, 
after all, be difficult to define the community of Italians to whom 
Italian fashion design objects are relevant and the community may 
                                               
457 GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 229- 230 (citing to Cammeo and Calamandrei).  
458 Brown, Heritage as Property supra note 1 at 58. For the beginnings of a discussion of the 
economic conception of property as a bundle of rights and how it operates within the 
greater scheme of Italian property law see RODOTÀ, supra note 372 at 61. 
459 Brown, Heritage as Property supra note 1 at 56- 60.  
460 Id. at 54, 55, 59.  
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not even consist of Italians at all. The theory of Italian cultural 
property law does not present us with a new type of intellectual 
property law, but its emphasis on the public cultural interest, and 
not a source community, does give us another way to think about 
why and how cultural property might match certain intellectual 
property regimes like copyright that also seem, like cultural 
property law, to apply to widely intangible cultural expressions and 
their control in relation to material iterations. In this sense, 
analyzing the design objects of Italian fashion companies through 
the public cultural interest of Italian cultural property law may clue 
us in to how copyright law, for the specific subject matter of Italian 
fashion design objects, may function as a sort of ex ante cultural 
property regime for actors other than indigenous peoples.461 
 
Massimo Severo Giannini reviewed Grisolia’s Tutela delle Cose d’Arte 
and, as part of his observations, noted how Grisolia referred to all 
objects of artistic interest as objects of public interest, 462 long before 
the term cultural property was incorporated into the law. Giannini’s 
emphasis on Grisolia’s discussion of beni d’interesse pubblico as of 
“appartenenza dominicale”, physically or legally belonging to the 
public or to a private person and “appartenenza funzionale”, destined 
for a public use463, foreshadows Giannini’s own discussion of the 
fundamental publicness of cultural property in Italian law. Indeed, 
Giannini notes his agreement with Grisolia’s presentation inasmuch 
as it supports an idea of duplice dominio- or, we might say, double 
possession- of property.464 In other words, whether certain objects 
are deemed of public or private property, both private and public 
rights exist in the object because of a public interest.465 For cultural 
property, this public interest is embodied in an artistic or historic 
interest in the object, no matter to whom it belongs.466 
                                               
461 The idea that intellectual property law as a whole acts as another type of legal system, 
sumptuary law, has already been proposed in Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 25 
(identifying a “sumptuary intellectual property law” that seems not to in practice function 
well because it does not prevent new forms of distinction, although examining how 
copyright can effectively prevent dilution of expressions and seeing these expressions as 
unrelated to materiality).   
462 Massimo Severo Giannini, Recensione di Mario Grisolia, La tutela delle cose d’arte, estratto da 
Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, III, 1953, n. 1, p. 171-172 [hereinafter Recensione] in 
SCRITTI, Volume 3, 841 (1949- 1954).  
463 Id. at 841. Grisolia mentions beni d’interesse pubblico in GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 223- 
226.  
464 Giannini, Recensione, supra note 462 at 841- 842. 
465 For an exploration of this with reference to Art. 42 of the Italian Constitution see 
Massimo Severo Giannini, Basi Costituzionali della Proprietà Privata in SCRITTI, Vol 6 187- 
245 (2005). 
466 Massimo Severo Giannini, I Beni Culturali [Cultural Properties] 31 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE 
DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO [Trimester Review of Public Law] (1976) [hereinafter Beni Culturali]. 
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The public cultural interest that is common across these legal and 
physical boundaries might at first be thought to be economic. As te 
Italian legal scholar Piva emphasizes, however, in his 1962 
encyclopedic entry on Cose d’arte, we do not value works under 
cultural property law for valore – their value on the market.467 
Rather, it is impossible to only talk about a work of art as it is 
protected under Italian cultural property law in terms of its 
economic value: the work must be discussed first in terms of the 
public’s collective interest in it.468 In this sense, economic value is not 
a bar to cultural property protection nor is it informative. Rather, 
economic value and public cultural interest, in the Italian cultural 
property legal tradition, exist side by side in the same object while 
not being the same thing. Here again, we find a foundation for 
comparisons with other legal frameworks, like U.S. copyright, that 
American legal scholars also identify as involving aesthetic 
decisions alongside U.S. copyright’s arguably economic purpose.469 
Economic concerns and cultural interest may indeed exist side by 
side in certain legal regimes, while not, however, being the same. 
 
For modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects the 
identification of a public cultural interest beyond economic value or 
economic incentives that defines cultural property is important. It 
helps to divorce these design objects’ public cultural interest from 
their use or value as fashion objects per se, at least in theory. Such a 
definition of public cultural interest would, when modern and 
                                               
While as a second order the law might decide that properties owned by private entities 
should be of a greater level of artistic or historic interest, as a first matter, the public 
interest in these objects justifies crafting a framework for their protection. See also Casini, 
Italian hours, supra note 105 at 375.  Lorenzo Casini, I Beni Culturali da Spadolini agli anni 
duemila [hereinafter da Spadolini agli anni duemila] in LE AMMINISTRAZIONI PUBBLICHE TRA 
CONSERVAZIONE E RIFORME 423- 447, 425, n. 8 (2009) (“Proprio negli anni Settanta, sono 
pubblicati alcuni tra i più importanti saggi scritti sul tema. Sono così individuati i 
capisaldi e fondate le basi teoriche del diritto dei beni culturali [“Si tratta del celebre 
saggio di M.S. Giannini, I beni culturali in Riv. Trim. dir. pubbli., 1976, P. 3 ss, in particolare 
31, il quale individua i requisiti comuni a tutti i beni culturali nell’immaterialità, legata al 
valore culturale espressa dal bene, e nella pubblicità, intesa sotto l’aspetto non del regime 
proprietario, ma della destinazione alla fruizione pubblica)”]). At the time of his review of 
Grisolia’s work, Giannini notes that neither the positive law in force at the time, nor legal 
scholarship could fully justify this theory of double possession. Giannini, Recensione, supra 
note 462 at 841. By the 1970s, however, when Giannini elaborated on the quality of 
publicness in cultural property in his article I Beni Culturali, the institution of the Ministry 
of Cultural Heritage and other legal developments had, at least, opened the door for 
deeper considerations of the issue. 
467 G. Piva, Cose d’Arte in ENCICLOPEDIA D’ARTE 93- 94 (Giuffrè, Milano, 1962).   
468 Id.  
469 Glen Cheng, The Aesthetics of Copyright Adjudication, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV 113 (2012); 
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998).   
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contemporary Italian fashion design objects are evaluated as 
cultural property, encourage evaluations of design objects that are 
not wedded to their function, use or market value but would allow 
evaluations that contemplate, perhaps, the historical impact of the 
design objects and, therefore, protect them accordingly under the 
law. In addition, thinking about how economics is not the driver of 
a definition of cultural property in the theory of Italian cultural 
property law helps us to begin to re-conceptualize cultural property 
from a presentation of it as just another reified commodity.   
 
Public cultural interest arguably became even more broad after the 
work of the Commissione Franceschini, which contemplated that 
numerous objects, from musical instruments to furniture, could be 
classified as cultural property. The Commission recommended that 
the term cultural property be used in Italian law instead of things of 
artistic or historic interest and that cultural property be defined as a 
material testament having the value of civilization.470 Writing after 
his contributions to the work of the Commission, Giannini identifies 
pubblicità, or publicness, as one of the defining characteristics of this 
new category of cultural property.471 Giannini elaborates on the 
belonging (appartenenza) and the function (funzione) of cultural 
property in terms of cultural property’s existence as part of a 
national cultural heritage.472 He explores how exactly the public 
interest manifests itself with reference to this new cultural property 
category: the State represents the public cultural interest in the 
physical integrity of the property, and this interest takes priority 
over a private owner’s rights to exercise their economic rights in 
that property if it is in the private owner’s control.473 The publicness 
that characterizes cultural property is, for Giannini, slightly 
different than what might be called collective property or property 
administered in the collective interest.474 Giannini’s point is to 
divorce the notion of publicness in cultural property from economic 
or other rights in the object that are not related to a purpose of 
manifesting the expressions of civilization.475 Cultural property, no 
matter in whose hands it is, needs to be able to meet the needs of 
the universal, not just one collective group, 476 as other properties of 
                                               
470 Giannini, Beni Culturali, supra note 466 at 31.  
471 Id.  
472 Id.  
473 Id. at 32.  
474 Id.  
475 Id. at 31.  
476 Id.  
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the commons might.477 In this sense, the theory of Italian cultural 
property tells us that cultural property, ideally, is not supposed to 
be used as an instrument for its source community but is instead 
meant to be held in what would, in American legal terms, be 
deemed a trust or a public dedication.478 
 
In his own historic assessment of the law a few years after 
Giannini’s writing, Sabino Cassese emphasizes the balancing of 
public and private interests at the heart of the 1939 law. He also 
seemingly expands the idea of publicness to an even broader 
conception of cultural heritage.479 Cassese defines the collective or 
general interests in cultural property in terms not only of use by the 
community but also as research and valorization.480 The public 
interest at the heart of Italian cultural property is, as Cassese 
mentions, dynamic.481 
 
The architectural framework of cultural property law in Italy today, 
now embodied by the 2004 Code of Cultural Property and 
Landscape, with its successive modifications, still tracks the 
division between public and private ownership embodied in the 
1939 law.482 At the same time the Code’s additions and modifications 
continue to embrace the dynamic notion of publicness and public 
interest discussed by past legal scholars. Alongside the continued 
need to preserve cultural property is the need to valorize it, or 
enhance it.483 The function identified by Grisolia in his work as at the 
basis of the specific laws for cultural property and its preservation 
has, we might say, morphed over time into a defined administrative 
function.484 While the Code may decide to divide this function based 
on public and private actors the action or control by public or 
                                               
477 For this observation see also Lorenzo Casini, “Todo es Peregrino e Raro”, 3 RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 987, 994 (2015). 
478 For a discussion of how a common law public dedication could be used in the United 
States as cultural property protections for individual objects, when a public interest in art, 
for example, is identified see Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J., 121, 
126 (1981).  
479 Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 127.  
480 Id.  
481 Id (At the time of his writing, however, Cassese notes that there were relatively few 
legal fulfillments of such a cultural function required under the law.)  
482 Art. 10, D.L. n. 42/2004.  
483 Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Culture of G7 on the Occasion of the Meeting “Culture as 
an Instrument for Dialogue among People”, 
http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/multimedia/MiBAC/documents/1490881204940_D
ECLARATION-Dichiarazione.pdf.  
484 Lorenzo Casini, Pubblico e Privato nella Valorizzazione dei Beni Culturali [Public and 
Private in the Valorization of Cultural Properties], 7 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO 
AMMINISTRATIVO [Journal of Administrative Law] 785, 786 (2005).  
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private actors does not define cultural property under Italian law. 
Instead, the fundamentally public cultural interest, manifested in a 
cultural property’s publicness and in various public administrative 
functions485 characterizes cultural property in Italian cultural 
property law.  
 
Italian cultural property law, as it has evolved throughout history, 
tells us that cultural property is defined by its relationship to the 
collective. A public interest is manifested through artistic or historic 
interests in specific qualities of things and in a things’ ability to 
testify to something that is of public cultural interest to the 
collective. This public cultural interest is not confined by objective 
qualities of things. The public cultural interest at the heart of 
cultural property under Italian law is fundamentally related to how 
those qualities are understood, perceived and relevant to the public. 
This interest is boundless- it crosses lines between tangible and 
intangible property, tangible and intangible rights, types of 
property, and what is public and what is private. The role of Italian 
cultural property law, as part of administrative law more generally, 
is to represent the public’s cultural interest across these boundaries, 
while equitably balancing this interest with others.  
 
There seems to as yet be no legal case or administrative decision 
classifying an individual Italian fashion design object as cultural 
property. There is evidence, however, that Italian fashion is of a 
sufficient public interest to justify the expropriation of property and 
its use. This is evident in a case in which the Region of Lombardy 
expropriated a building for fashion: the Region planned, as part of a 
plan to revitalize an area of Milan, to use the building as a “Museo 
di Moda e Scuola di Moda” and such a use was deemed part of 
proper “attrezzature culturali” under the law regulating such 
expropriation.486 The Court referred to fashion as an integral part of 
the city’s economy and cultural events and not just as a symbol of 
the city of Milan.487 Here, at least, fashion with reference to a city 
                                               
485 Id. at 787. These public functions may also be, as a second matter, assigned to private 
actors. 
486 Cons. Stato Sez. IV, Sent., 18/11/2013, n. 5460 (with the private company who owned 
the building appealing from a decision by the T.A.R. that held in part “le strutture 
destinate ad attività espositiva, ad eventi legati alla moda e al design, a sfilate e ad attività 
scolastica, sempre nell'ambito della moda . . . possono essere considerate come opere di 
interesse generale, in una città quale Milano, in cui la moda è non solo una realtà 
industriale e commerciale, ma un simbolo della stessa città." Ne consegue che l'inclusione 
di 20.000 mq destinati a manifestazioni espositive, sfilate ed eventi collettivi legati alla 
moda, ben possono essere inclusi tra le aree per funzioni pubbliche…”) 
487 Id. (“il Collegio ritiene che la destinazione Museo della moda e Scuola della moda 
rientra non irragionevolmente tra le "attrezzature culturali", che l' art. 16, co. 8, D.P.R. n. 
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may provide a foundation for decisions in the public interest.  
 
Far from simply decreeing that a property is of cultural interest 
because it belongs to a certain decade, historical event, or artistic 
style, Italian cultural property law decides on a case by case basis 
why an object is of cultural interest for the public. The public 
cultural interest is understood within a theory of property which 
grapples with the expansive nature of property in the face of its 
original binaries and even its current aspects as non-property.488 
Italian cultural property law fulfills its function by taking actions in 
the wider public cultural interest, which exists across boundaries. 
The reasons for this are based in the public nature of cultural 
property: “public because it must be accessible to the public and 
must be known; cultural objects are instruments of culture, 
civilization, and education.”489  
 
2.2 The mechanisms of time  
 
A second dilemma that characterizes cultural property is the 
presumption that cultural property needs to be old or, at the very 
least, that it needs to apply to objects after they have lived a life and, 
therefore, been worthy of an application of the public cultural 
interest we identified in the previous section. In reality, however, 
the conception and ascertainment in Italian cultural property law of 
what is colloquially called age belies the notion that one time 
threshold, across all subject matter, may apply to cultural property. 
Time thresholds often work alongside other characteristics of 
cultural property in Italian cultural property law, like the public 
cultural interest. Time thresholds can also change.  
                                               
380 del 2001 comprende tra le opere di urbanizzazione secondaria. E ciò a maggior 
ragione in una città come Milano, che presenta - come richiamato dal I giudice - una 
particolare vocazione nel settore… Ciò non significa, quindi - come sostenuto 
dall'appellante - che la qualificazione di infrastruttura di interesse 
pubblico derivi da un "simbolo" o da una tradizione locale, ma che il concetto di 
"attrezzature culturali", noto al legislatore, si caratterizza anche per la particolare 
vocazione di un centro urbano e giustifica non tanto l'attribuzione di fenomeno culturale 
alla moda (pur sostenibile), quanto la necessità della scelta di una 
particolare opera di urbanizzazione secondaria, effettuata in sede di pianificazione. 
Quanto alle aree destinate a "funzioni espositive", non appare irragionevole che esse 
possano rientrare tra le funzioni di interesse generale, posta la vocazione produttiva della 
città di Milano, che associa non solo la sua immagine, ma parte importante del suo tessuto 
economico al settore della moda, nell'ambito della quale le manifestazioni rappresentano 
sia un richiamo commerciale, sia un evento culturale.”) 
488 As when scholars explore the internet, water and the environment in the context of 
current climate change, and other hallmarks of our current digital age. RODOTÀ, supra note 
372 at 459- 498.  
489 Casini, Italian hours, supra note 105 at 375.  
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A short history of Italian cultural property law is again informative 
here. The first law passed in 1902 post Italy’s unification applied to 
movable objects that were of merit because of their antiquity or 
artistic nature but excluded objects of artistic merit that were by 
living authors or less than fifty years old.490 As early as 1902 then, 
notwithstanding the protracted nature of the bill’s passage491, 
antiquity and time were connected on the face of the law: movable 
artistic objects were equated with objects of antiquity through a 
specific time threshold and even through an unicum with the death 
of an author.492 
 
A time threshold has been consistently included in Italian cultural 
property laws. The 1909 law which followed placed even more 
emphasis on the age requirement than the 1902 law, given its 
striking of an exemplary catalog for objects of artistic merit or 
objects from antiquity.493 While both these laws used 50 years as a 
marker the reasoning for fifty years is, in fact, not as clear as one 
would presume, nor as consistent.  
 
Throughout the history of Italian cultural property law, the age 
requirement has both remained somewhat constant, changed, and 
also worked in tandem with other requirements under the law. 
Indeed, the impetus behind modifications and retention of clauses 
in the 1939 cultural property law had much to do, as we have seen 
above, with the need to balance private and public interests relative 
to Italy’s extensive cultural heritage and the market for antiquities 
and art objects. Age was no exception to this balancing act.494 The 
                                               
490 Art 1, Law n. 185 of 12 June 1902 in G.U. n. 149, Venerdì 17 Giugno 1902 (“Le 
disposizioni della presente legge si applicano ai monumenti, agl'immobili ed agli oggetti 
mobili che abbiano pregio di antichità o d'arte. Ne sono esclusi gli edifici e gli oggetti 
d'arte di autori viventi, o la cui esecuzione non risalga ad oltre cinquant'anni.”)   
491 ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 6-7 (describing how the law, first proposed in 
1872). 
492 The use of the phrase “death of an author” does not mean to enter into discussions of 
authorship under Italian cultural property law. For a philosophical discussion of authors 
as no longer as important as readers see Roland Barthes, THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR 
(1967). 
493 Art 4, Law n. 185/1902 noted that “Gli oggetti d' arte e di antichità non compresi fra 
quelli di sommo pregio nei cataloghi di cui all'articolo 23; ne facenti parte di collezioni, 
quando appartengono agli Enti di cui all'articolo 2, non potranno alienarsi senza 
l'autorizzazione del Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione.” For a description of the 1909 
law’s striking of the catalog requirement for most objects see ALIBRANDI AND FERRI, supra 
note 378 at 7; EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 211.  
494 Mario Serio, La legge sulla tutela delle cose di interesse artistico e storico in ISTITUZIONI E 
POLITICHE CULTURALI supra note 402 at 334 (noting “La relazione di Santi Romano a Bottai 
contiene una lucida esposizione dei principi ispiratori della nuova disciplina e richiama le 
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choice of specific time thresholds in 1939 was still directly related to 
categories of objects and to the private and public interest in the 
very circulation of those objects.495 The time threshold of fifty years 
married with a requirement that movable art objects be by non-
living authors; this threshold did not, however, apply to other 
categories of objects.496 The purpose of the threshold was to avoid 
any hindrance of the market for these objects and to facilitate a 
reliable, unrushed judgment of the public’s cultural interest.497 Such 
a threshold would, according to Bottai, leave room for the unique 
effect which time has on the evolution of works of art into objects of 
cultural interest.498 Bottai specified that while some had lobbied for a 
free circulation of art objects with the exception of masterpieces, 
such a freedom had seemed counter to national public interests.499  
 
What is revelatory about this short legislative history is how things 
classified as objects of cultural interest under the law, and therefore 
protected as such, do not, in the Italian legal tradition, necessarily 
have to age into the cultural property “box” on their fiftieth 
birthday. The dilemma of time as applied to cultural property exists 
in a complex web of public and private interests, and the public 
cultural interest. Time thresholds are, or at least should be, the 
product of organic and natural cultural consensus and discussion. 
                                               
direttive tracciate dallo stesso Bottai nella seduta di insediamento della Commissione. 
Queste si riassumono ‘nella necessità di apprestare un adeguato sistema protettivo del 
grandioso patrimonio artistico e storico della nostra Nazione, tenendo conto, 
compatibilmente con questa esigenza, degli altri interessi, pubblici e privati relativi al 
detto patrimonio, e cercando di agevolare altresì, per quanto possibile, il commercio 
antiquario nazionale.’ (footnotes omitted)). 
495 Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni, Riunione del 15 Aprile 1939, Disegno di legge: “Tutela 
delle cose d’interesse artistico e storico” (n. 154), La normative, La legge sulla tutela delle cose di 
interesse artistico e storico in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI, supra note 402 at 408-409.  
496 As for immovables of historic interest for their reference to political, military and 
cultural history. Id (although the wording of Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article 2 of the 
law makes it seem as though the unicum of non-living author and fifty years old applies to 
immovables that reference particular moments in history, Bottai’s presentation of the law 
belies that interpretation).  
497 Serio in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI supra note 402 at 335 (“Tranne che per 
questi immobili [il cui interesse deriva dal loro riferimento alla storia politica, militare e 
culturale], viene mantenuto fermo il principio di non estendere la speciale tutela alle opera 
di autori viventi o la cui esecuzione non risalga ad oltre cinquant’anni. Una tale estensione 
– spiega la relazione- non solo avrebbe intralciato il commercio degli oggetti d’arte, ma 
avrebbe presentato il pericolo di affrettati giudizi sul valore di artisti viventi o di opere di 
molto recente esecuzione.”)  
498 Disegno di legge: “Tutela delle cose d’interesse artistico e storico” (n. 154), in 
ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI, supra note 402 at 408-409 (“Una tale estensione, non 
solo avrebbe intralciato il commercio degli oggetti, ma avrebbe presentato il pericolo di 
affrettati giudizi sul valore di artisti viventi o di opere di molto recente esecuzione, che il 
tempo potrebbe molto spesso modificare.”)  
499 Id.  
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The thresholds are also distinctly practical; a time threshold should 
take traditional public interests in protecting certain objects as much 
into account as both public and private interests in the marketability 
of these objects.  
 
These early conception of time thresholds as related to specific 
categories of objects and as embedded in a greater web of the 
interests are indicative for how modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion design objects may be cultural property today. Italian 
fashion design objects may not need to be fifty years of age in order 
to be recognized as of a public cultural interest. While we noted 
above that a public cultural interest in a particular Italian fashion 
design object would not be the same as identifying fashion trends, 
that does not mean that an Italian fashion design object could not, 
like a building where an important treaty was signed or a pen that 
was used to sign that treaty500, be deemed of cultural interest soon 
after its creation. Here, we might think of Gianni Versace’s design 
objects and the presentation of his designs, soon after his death, as 
landmarks by Richard Martin. The public cultural interest in 
Versace’s design objects may be considered so evident that we do 
not need to wait fifty years. Taking this a step further, the non-
living author requirement may not even need to apply, as it does 
not currently for certain objects of public cultural interest for their 
reference to specific historical moments. Here, we might think of 
certain design objects by Armani- the suit designed for Richard 
Gere in American Gigolo for example, on view at Armani/Silos. We 
might consider such a design object sufficiently indicative of a 
cultural moment in film to classify it as a cultural property.  
 
Time thresholds for cultural property continued to be discussed in 
Italy throughout the 20th century. Indeed, some legal scholars and 
cases seemed to suggest that no object of any historic interest 
should be subject to a time threshold in order to enter the cultural 
property “box.”501 Indeed, some doctrine did not even accept that 
non-living authors and a specific time threshold should be an 
unicum in Italian cultural property law. Grisolia, for example, again 
in his book La Tutela delle Cose d’Arte, notes that the requirement of 
non-living authors and specific time thresholds might plausibly 
                                               
500 Some cases suggest the object’s relationship with a historical event, the use of the object 
in a historical event, or the holding of a historical event within an immovable object to be 
enough. See Const. St., VI, 28 Febbraio 1990 n. 321.  
501 See ALIBRANDI AND FERRI, supra n. 378 at 208- 209 (citing to Cons. di Stato, Sez. VI, 30 
Dicembre 1960, n. 1017 in Cons. Stato, I, 2185 holding the temporal limit applies to works 
of artistic interest, but not works of historic interest). 
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have to depend on the practicalities and unique requirements of the 
subject matter which, at times, might require them in order to 
protect living authors.502 Grisolia argued that the requirement of a 
non-living author and a specific time threshold should be able to be 
overcome, especially for recent works by long-living authors. He 
grounded such an argument in the very purpose of the protection of 
movable objects of cultural interest under the law and the strong 
public interest in protection and preservation.503  
 
Grisolia imagines that time thresholds and non-living author 
requirements, analyzing Italian cultural property law and not copyright, 
would frustrate a protection of the popular arts (or what would be 
termed traditional, indigenous or community works in English). For 
objects of these popular arts, Grisolia explains, the requirements of 
age and non-living authors is particularly limiting: not only are the 
popular arts, a strong part of Italy’s cultural heritage, created by 
groups of people and not one author504, but they also cannot, 
therefore, be easily characterized as of a certain age.505 Here, Grisolia 
foreshadows a classic critique of U.S. copyright law as applied to 
the cultural expressions of indigenous peoples. Preservation, the 
purpose of Italian cultural property law, finds some common 
ground with arguments contesting the efficacy of the current 
copyright framework for certain subject matters.  
 
Here, in applying this Italian doctrine to modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects, we find ourselves here at a sort of 
crossroads. As Italian fashion history has shown us, regional 
costumes and traditions were central to early ideas of what Italian 
fashion actually was. Italian fashion today, however, is not 
immediately identified with regional communities. It is instead 
associated with individual designers who fulfill romantic 
definitions of an author or who satisfy the notion of one author 
because these design objects are assigned to a corporation. In this 
sense, modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects 
have potentially succeeded in overcoming the critiques of romantic 
                                               
502 GRISOLIA, supra n. 431 at 269- 270. 
503 GRISOLIA, supra n. 431 at 271, footnote 2 (noting the changing temporal requirements of 
other laws in the pre-unification Italian states, based on importance of the object) . 
504 Mario Grisolia, La tutela delle arti e delle tradizioni popolari [hereinafter Grisolia, La tutela], 
reprinted in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI supra n. 402 at 385 (“…per le arte e 
tradizioni popolari, … l’artista non è un individuo, ma è un intero gruppo etnico.”) 
Grisolia also notes that protection for traditional and popular arts could be indirect or not 
connected to an object, which we will return to infra.   
505 Although note that this is not an inference that Grisolia explicitly draws in his short 
article, but it is rather implied. 
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authorship, which Grisolia levied at Italian cultural property law in 
his discussion of the time unicum and which authors like Michael 
Brown506 also critically explore. Effectively embracing and yet 
denying the complexity of the authorship of their creative process, 
Italian fashion companies could cheat the system, if you will, and 
successfully fulfill both the idea of authorship in Italian cultural 
property law and copyright, which even the traditional 
seamstresses of regional Italy could not do. Dolce & Gabbana, for 
example, which takes its inspiration from Sicily and Naples, could 
effectively stand in as a representative for this regional fashion 
design cultural heritage in Italy.  
 
While complementary time thresholds might divide cultural 
property law and copyright law, they also might not provide any 
barrier if the administration so chooses. Depending into what 
category one classifies Italian fashion design objects, they could be 
protected as cultural property as an individual design object at the 
same time as their dissemination and copying is controlled through 
copyright, depending of course on what is classified as 
copyrightable subject matter. In some ways, this is already what is 
happening in the shadow of the law in the U.S. when Italian fashion 
companies orchestrate a donation to a fashion museum, allowing 
the museum to stand in for the administration’s role in Italian 
cultural property law, and then proceed to control the 
photographing of the dress in the galleries and dissemination of 
images of the article in promotional materials, notwithstanding an 
argument that an entire fashion design is not copyrightable. 
Whether the unicum is satisfied or not, museums (especially private 
ones owned by Italian fashion companies) and Italian fashion 
companies working together can effectively create a dual cultural 
property/copyright regime for certain Italian fashion design objects. 
It seems highly doubtful that such unmitigated control of fashion 
design objects and aspects of fashion design is how our public 
cultural interest in fashion should be actuated. Italian fashion 
design objects may need time thresholds and even other temporal 
boundaries more than any other subject matter of cultural property.  
 
A time threshold is not, however, constitutionally mandated under 
Italian law. Ratified in 1948, the Italian Constitution included 
various articles which both specifically and generally applied to the 
protection of objects of artistic or historic interest. None of the 
articles, on their face, mention a temporal requirement. The 
                                               
506 See Brown, Heritage as Property supra n. 1 at 55; Brown, Can Culture supra note 54 at 197.  
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exhortation to safeguard Italy’s “natural landscape and the 
historical and artistic heritage” and the duty to “promote the 
development of culture” in Article 9 do not indicate for how long or 
even when.507 This is, of course, unlike the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the United States’ Constitution, which mandates exclusive 
rights “for limited times.”508   
 
The time thresholds applicable to movable objects of artistic or 
historic interest in the 1939 law continued to apply until the creation 
of the 1999 Testo Unico, a unification of the many diverse 
regulations and laws which had worked to protect these objects. 
During these sixty years, case law and legal doctrine continued to 
make judgments with reference to the temporal requirements 
embodied in the 1939 law and some dispel even further the need for 
specific time thresholds or the unicum.509  
 
In 1966 the Commissione Franceschini, focusing on a redefinition of 
the very cultural essence of cultural property following the term’s 
use at the international level510, also explored time thresholds. The 
Commissione closely related them to the type of objects to be 
protected and also valorized. Emphasizing objects’ historical 
interest over their artistic interest, the Commissione noted that the 
principal of differentiation upon which they based their 
presentation of what should constitute cultural property under 
Italian law meant that “ogni categoria di bene culturale porta 
l’indicazione dei particolari caratteri la cui riconosciuta consistenza 
consente di emettere la dichiarazione.”511 Certain or fixed time 
                                               
507Art. 9, Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (for the English translation see 
https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/file/repository/relazioni
/libreria/novita/XVII/COST_INGLESE.pdf.) 
508 United States Constitution, Article I, §8, cl. 8. 
509 For a discussion of these past cases see ALIBRANDI AND FERRI supra note 378 at 209- 210.  
510 CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO supra note 63 at 48, n. 4 (citing to GRISOLIA, supra n. 431 at 
145 (1952). 
511 PER LA SALVEZZA DEI BENI CULTURALI IN ITALIA: ATTI E DOCUMENTI DELLA 
COMMISSIONE D’INDAGINE PER LA TUTELA E LA VALORIZZAZIONE DEL PATRIMONIO STORICO, 
ARCHEOLOGICO, ARTISTICO E DEL PAESAGGIO Vol. 1, 10-11 (Casa Editrice Colombo, Roma, 
1967) [hereinafter PER LA SALVEZZA]. While the term dichiarazione is used today to refer to 
declarations that certain private property is cultural property under Italian law, the 
Commissione Franceschini used the term to refer to all determinations that a property was 
a cultural property, whether in public or private hands: “Per l’esercizio di tutti gli altri 
poteri e per l’assoggettamento agli obblighi specifici ulteriormente previsti, è necessario 
per contro un apposite ‘atto di riconoscimento’ di tale qualità (Dichiarazione di Bene 
culturale), che serve si può dire ad innescare le varie situazioni soggettive. Innovando 
profondamente si è inoltre ritenuto che ad un tale procedimento non vi debbano essere 
eccezioni: l’atto di riconoscimento, o dichiarazione, è quindi sempre necessario anche nei 
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thresholds here do not exist for some objects, such as archeological 
ones; they are superfluous.512 For newly created objects, however, 
the Commissione Franceschini still recommended a fifty year time 
threshold.513 Still other objects required time thresholds not for 
protection, but for their use: documents of public entities were 
recommended to be opened to the public within forty years, while 
private documents were to be open to the public only after seventy 
years.514 Here we see a similarity to how the Library of Congress or 
the National Archives treat presidential papers and other sensitive 
correspondence, even without an American cultural property law 
for movable objects.515 We also see an implicit exchange between 
copyright and cultural property law through the imposition of 
specific time thresholds at either end of the life of an object. 
 
As part of their expansion of the historical criteria under which 
property could be classified as cultural property under the law, the 
Commissione Franceschini also addressed the circumstances under 
which contemporary art and decorative and applied arts could be of 
particular significance  
 
Di massima le cose d’arte contemporanea non sono assoggettabili a 
tutela prima di 50 anni dalla loro produzione tuttavia, quando siano 
particolarmente significative per valori rappresentativi o intrinseci, 
cose d’arte, anche decorativa o applicativa, possono essere assoggettate 
a dichiarazione ancor prima di tale termine.516      
 
The 1999 Testo Unico incorporated many of the Commissione 
Franceschini’s recommendations. For movable objects of artistic and 
historic interest it kept the requirement of more than fifty years old 
and a non-living author.517 At the same time, it incorporated other 
time thresholds based on the category of subject matter: codifying 
                                               
confronti degli altri organi dello Stato: e ciò per esigenze di chiarezza e soprattutto di 
ordine (Dichiarazione IV).” Id.  
512 Id. at 11-12.  
513 Id.  
514 Id.  
515 SAX, supra note 78 at 84 - 116. The Library of Congress’ actuation of its mission “to 
support the Congress in fulfilling its constitutional duties and to further the progress of 
knowledge and creativity for the benefit of the American people” includes “preserving, 
and providing access to a universal collection of knowledge and the record of America’s 
creativity.” Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 9. 
516 Id. at 64- 65 (Dichiarazione XXXIII).  
517 Art. 2, comma 6, Decreto Legislativo 29 ottobre 1999, n. 490, G.U. 27 Dec. 1999 n. 302 
(It.), available at http://www.liguria.beniculturali.it/PDFs/normativa/DLGS.490-99.pdf.  
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other laws and regulations, including those from 1939, the Testo 
Unico allowed photographs and other material examples of film or 
music to be classified as cultural property if they were at least 
twenty-five years of age.518 Time thresholds also played a role in 
deciding when copies of works of art sold on the market were 
subject to specific record-keeping and procedures.519 On the other 
hand, time thresholds did and still do not play a role for the forgery 
of works, or the ascertainment of their provenance, which is 
regulated no matter how old the work of art is.520 This imposition 
and lack of a time threshold also indicates the purpose of Italian 
cultural property – preserving the public cultural interest not just in 
specific properties, but in the relationship between specific tangible 
properties and the intangible cultural interests that are connected to 
them. As foreshadowed with the mention of property as a “bundle 
of relationships” above, Italian cultural property law seems 
concerned with regulating the relationship between the public and 
an object through the relationship between intangible cultural 
interests and tangible objects. This is, perhaps, similar to how 
copyright is concerned with regulating the relationship between 
authors and the public through the relationship between cultural 
expressions and their fixations in various material.  
 
The Code of Cultural Property and Landscape came into effect in 
Italy in 2004. Codifying the Testo Unico and operating within the 
long history of the regulation of cultural property in Italy, one of the 
things the Code did over time was create two different time 
thresholds for movable and immovable objects. At the time of its 
passage the Code applied the time threshold of fifty years and of a 
non-living author to all individual works of artistic or historic 
interest, whether immovable or movable.521 In 2011, however, a 
decree-law related to public contracts522 raised the temporal limit: 
immovable objects in public property needed to be seventy years of 
                                               
518 Art. 3, comma 1(d), D.L. 490/1999.   
519 The buying and selling of copies of original works of sculpture which were over fifty 
years old and made in the same way as their original had to be, for example, made note of 
in registries sent to the field offices of the Ministry of Culture. Art 62, D.L. 490/1999.  See 
also Allegato A, D.L. 490/1999.   
520 DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE supra note 378 at 42-43. See also Art. 64 and 65 in 
today’s CODICE DEI BENI CULTURALI E DEL PAESAGGIO, D.L. n. 42/2004, available at 
http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2014/09/15/codice-dei-beni-culturali-e-dell-
ambiente-parte-ii-beni-culturali#titolo2. The T.U. contained this rule in Art. 178. See 
DIRITTO E GESTIONE DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE 31 (Barbati et al, eds., 2011).  
521 See Art. 10(5) of the CODICE DEI BENI CULTURALI E DEL PAESAGGIO, D.L. 42/2004, prior 
to changes, available at http://www.bncrm.beniculturali.it/getFile.php?id=466.  
522 Decreto-legge 13 maggio 2011, n. 70, G.U. 13 May 2011, n. 110.    
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age in order to be classified as cultural property.523 The goal of this 
change was to reduce the time of public works’ construction and to 
generally simplify the process.524 Individual movable objects, 
however, as well as immovable objects in private property excluded 
from the scope of public works projects, kept the temporal 
requirement of fifty years.525  
 
Here, the practical needs to properly execute and regulate public 
contracts affect the imposition of a time threshold. The efficacy of 
contract takes a backseat to preservation. Time does not operate in a 
vacuum, but is malleable. Time is also related to specific categories 
of objects and to the types of people or institutions who own the 
objects. Once again, there is a distinct concern with the relationship 
between age and public and private interests in our contemporary 
times which echoes the description by Bottai in his presentation of 
the 1939 law to the government. These interests profoundly shape 
time thresholds under Italian cultural property law. 
 
In 2018 the temporal requirements for cultural property were 
changed once again. After increasing comments by members of the 
antiquities markets and the awareness that many works of 
contemporary artists from the post-war era were set to potentially 
age in to the cultural property “box” as individual works, the time 
threshold in Italian cultural property law for individual movable 
things of cultural interest, whether in public or private hands, was 
raised to seventy years, matching the previous increase for 
immovable things of public property.526 This change was also related 
                                               
523 See art. 4(1)(r) and art. 4(16)(a), D.L. n. 70/2011. See also the Opinion rendered by the 
Ministry of Cultural Heritage: Parere del 3 agosto 2016, MIBACT-UDCM LEGISLATIVO 
0023305-03/08/2016 Al Segretariato Generale CI. 02.0100/64.5. See also Immobili pubblici 
vincolati, 50 o 70 anni la soglia per considerarli vincolati?, BIBLUS-NET, 6 Ottobre 2016, 
http://biblus.acca.it/immobili-pubblici-vincolati-50-o-70-anni-la-soglia-per-considerarli-
vincolati/.  
524 Art. 4(1)(r), D.L. n. 70/2011 (“Per ridurre i tempi di costruzione delle opere pubbliche, 
soprattutto se di interesse strategico, per semplificare le procedure di affidamento dei 
relativi contratti pubblici, per garantire un più efficace sistema di controllo e infine per 
ridurre il contenzioso, sono apportate alla disciplina vigente, in particolare, le 
modificazioni che seguono…”).  
525 Art. 4(16)(a), D.L. n. 70/2011 (“Salvo quanto disposto dagli articoli 64 e 178, non sono 
soggette alla disciplina del presente Titolo le cose indicate al comma 1 che siano opera di 
autore vivente o la cui esecuzione non risalga ad oltre cinquanta anni, se mobili, o ad oltre 
settanta anni, se immobili, nonchè le cose indicate al comma 3, lettere a) ed e), che siano 
opera di autore vivente o la cui esecuzione non risalga ad oltre cinquanta anni”).  
526 For an open letter from some prominent art historians protesting such a change, with 
arguments that it would lead to a loss of the works of many post-war artists from the 
Italian territory see L’Appello a Mattarella- “I beni culturali non sono commerciali: presidente 
non firmi il Dl Concorrenza”, IL FATTO QUOTIDIANO (4 Agosto 2017), 
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to, and made at the same time as, changes to the exportation of 
artworks under Italian cultural property law.527 Time thresholds for 
individual works and monetary limits were instituted with an 
awareness of how they would interact and comply with European 
Union regulations.528 At the same time as this time threshold was 
made for movable objects, another potential category of things that 
could qualify as cultural property was codified. Things that are of 
an exceptional artistic, historical, archeological or 
ethnoanthropological interest for the integrity and completeness of 
Italy’s cultural heritage need to be by a non-living author and more 
than fifty, not seventy, years old.529 Once again, time in Italian 
cultural property law is not a bright line rule, but is rather deeply 
connected to types of things, the public cultural interest in them, 
and even market forces and practicalities. 
 
Italian cultural property law shows us that time and its inclusion as 
an unicum with a non-living author requirement is but one way to 
solve the dilemma of when certain objects are cultural property. 
Time as applied to cultural property is highly context dependent 
and specific to the intangible public cultural interests that surround 
tangible objects. It is striking how much this legacy of time opens 
the door for modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
objects. An argument that Italian fashion design is of the moment or 
changing need not bar the classification of Italian fashion design 
objects as cultural property altogether. While we may wish to take 
market practicalities and requirements into account, time alone is 
not a determinative factor and is a resolvable dilemma.   
 
2.3 The tyranny of “things”   
 
Perhaps the biggest dilemma in Italian cultural property law is the 
                                               
https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/08/04/lappello-a-mattarella-i-beni-culturali-non-
sono-commerciali-presidente-non-firmi-il-dl-concorrenza/3774966/ (“Ne consegue la 
perdita immediata e diretta di tutti i beni culturali realizzati fra il 1947 e il 1967, di 
proprietà pubblica o di persone giuridiche private senza fine di lucro, che il Codice dei 
beni culturali e del paesaggio ha finora tutelato in virtù del combinato disposto degli artt. 
10 comma 1 e 12 comma 1, nonché l’impossibilità di proteggere in futuro tutti i beni 
realizzati nello stesso torno di anni.”) See Art. 175, L. 124 del 4 Agosto 2017 in G.U. 14-08-
2017 n. 189 (updating Art. 10, D.L. 22 Gennaio 2004 n. 42). For a detailed explanation of 
these changes within the legislature see Legislatura 17ª - Dossier n. 494 2, 
https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DOSSIER/0/1029805/index.html?part=d
ossier_dossier1-sezione_sezione13-h2_h266 or Schede di lettura luglio 2017 Legge annuale 
per il mercato e la concorrenza, A.S. n. 2085-B (Luglio 2017) at 237 – 248.  
527 Legislatura 17ª - Dossier n. 494 2, supra n. 527.  
528 Id.  
529 Art. 10(3)(d-bis), D.L. 42/2004.  
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dichotomy between the tangible and the intangible. At the 
international level cultural heritage law distinguishes between 
intangible cultural heritage and tangible cultural heritage, or 
cultural property.530 There are some things, the narrative goes, that 
are so intangible, that are so susceptible to cultural exchange, that 
they are not tied to one material and therefore cannot really be 
possessed or controlled; rather their safeguarding needs to be 
actuated through other ways, such as through lists or incentives or 
other supportive mechanisms.531 While we can of course identify 
properties which are more tangible than others, the dichotomy 
between tangible and intangible property when property is 
conceived of as a “bundle of relationships” or “rights”, frustrates a 
clear distinction between the two different types of cultural 
heritage.532 Such a theory of property also frustrates a clear 
distinction between cultural property law and other legal regimes, 
like copyright, that apply to the same types of subject matter as 
cultural property (works of art, literary works, etc).  
 
Understanding the legal notion of cultural property is further 
frustrated by much of the literature focusing on intangible cultural 
heritage: this literature turns to copyright to resolve the inefficacy of 
safeguarding mechanisms and other forms of self-help or explores 
                                               
530 Cultural property as a term is used in the 1954 HAGUE Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in Armed Conflict (defining cultural property in terms of its relevance 
to all mankind) and in the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transport of Ownership of Cultural Property (allowing 
individual nations to define cultural property). Intangible cultural heritage is defined in 
the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. Other relevant 
conventions at the international level also include the 1972 World Heritage Convention, 
which takes the different criteria of outstanding universal value to examine natural and 
cultural heritage. For an overview of this with regards to nationalism see Lorenzo Casini, 
International regulation of historic buildings and nationalism: the role of UNESCO 24(1) 
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12377.  
531 See generally, 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. 
This is also the same type of argument that is made for cultural activities under Italian 
law. See DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE supra note 378 at 36 (“Per altre entità in 
campo culturale si configura una disciplina pubblicistica distinta da quella relativa ai beni 
culturali in senso proprio. È il caso delle attività culturali, che ‘riguardano tutte le attività 
riconducibili alla elaborazione e diffusione della cultura’ (citing to Corte cost., sent. 19 
Luglio 2005, n. 285, and 21 Luglio 2004, n. 255). Menzionate separatamente dall’art. 117, 
comma 3, Cost. non sono soggette al regime giuridico dei beni culturali perché non 
riconducibili ai tipi di cui agli art. 10 e 11 Cod. La loro proiezione verso il futuro (la 
formazione e la diffusione della cultura e dell’arte) le differenzierebbe, sul piano 
sostanziale, dai beni culturali, materiali e immateriali (aventi oggetto attività), da 
intendersi come ‘memorie ereditate dal passato’.”) 
532 Italian cultural property law has also been characterized in the past as apposite of the 
traditional evolution of property and property law towards individual property rights, 
making an ascertainment of its legal nature even more complex. Camera dei Deputati, 
Seduta del 15 Maggio 1909 in EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 201-202.  
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whether copyright can be a solution for intangible cultural heritage 
protection due to the nature of cultural exchange.533 Studies of 
copyright or intellectual property itself that properly imagine the 
cultural control and dialectical conversation the law allows or 
frustrates534, can also muddy the cultural property waters.   
 
Italian cultural property law gives us ways to think through the 
comparisons between the tangible and the intangible. It also 
provides tools with which to consider the dilemma of how to 
regulate (or not) certain seemingly unregulable aspects of our 
culture. Italian cultural property law shows us that cultural 
property is in fact not just about tangible objects. Preservation of 
tangible objects may be the result of the application of cultural 
property law, but the preservation of a thing is not what defines 
cultural property under Italian cultural property law in the first 
place. In this way, Italian cultural property law is not, in fact, so 
separate from other legal regimes, like copyright, that seek to 
protect cultural expressions that are fixed somewhere. In addition, 
the way in which Italian cultural property law sometimes acts, 
forbidding the reproduction of certain cultural properties, is like a 
copyright regime. The division that is made at the international 
level between intangible and tangible cultural heritage is at times 
hard to draw in Italian cultural property law. At other times, 
however, the division between the tangible and intangible, or what 
is in or out of the cultural property “box”, seems clear. Indeed, 
notwithstanding an, at times adamant, statement that it only 
protects tangible property, Italian cultural property law seems to 
embrace a shifting boundary between the tangible and intangible in 
its conception of property on a case by case basis.   
 
Historically, while imposing duties of conservation and exportation 
prohibitions that may be characterized as exercises of intangible 
rights, Italian cultural property law was characterized by tangibility 
in the law itself through the use of the term cosa or “thing.”535 The 
use of “thing”, notwithstanding the intangible rights and duties 
mandated by Italian cultural property law which applied to the 
object and affected the scope of cultural property, has created a 
lasting legacy of tangibility.536 What is now understood as protected 
                                               
533 See Brown, Can Culture, supra note 54, as one example with responses by Rosemary J. 
Coombe, among others.  
534 See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW (1998).   
535 See supra L. n. 185/1902 and L. n. 364/1909. 
536 CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO, supra note 63 at 48- 49. 
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and valorized under Italian cultural property law as a cultural 
property is still understood as what is tangible property alone. As 
evidenced by case-law on the subject537, the subject matter of Italian 
cultural property law is circumscribed by tangibility, and even 
specific tangibility at that. Cultural activities, for example, or 
activities of artisanship can be protected at the regional level and 
only at the State level through fiscal incentives and programs, but 
not as cultural properties under Italian cultural property law.538  
 
At the same time, however, Italian cultural property law identifies a 
                                               
537 Cort. Cost. N. 118/1990, cortecostituzionale.it (“Allorché l'importanza storico-culturale di 
un bene dipenda dalla sua utilizzazione pregressa, quest'ultima non assume rilievo autonomo, 
separato e distinto, ma si compenetra nelle cose che ne costituiscono il supporto materiale e, quindi, 
non può essere protetta separatamente dal bene.). But see Cort. Cost. n. 94/2003 (holding the 
Lazio region’s protection of historic places not to be contrary to the State’s exclusive 
power to identify and protect cultural property in Italy because “[l]a legge regionale del 
Lazio n. 31 del 2001 non pretende… di determinare una nuova categoria di beni culturali ai sensi 
del d.lgs. n. 490 del 1999, ma prevede semplicemente una disciplina per la salvaguardia degli 
‘esercizi commerciali ed artigianali del Lazio aperti al pubblico che hanno valore storico, artistico, 
ambientale o la cui attività costituisce testimonianza storica, culturale, tradizionale, anche con 
riferimento agli antichi mestieri.’... [la] qualificazione [come locale storico] rende semplicemente ad 
essi applicabile la speciale disciplina della legge regionale in tema di finanziamenti per la loro 
valorizzazione e per il sostegno delle spese connesse all’aumento dei canoni di locazione, senza 
produrre alcuno dei vincoli tipici della speciale tutela dei beni culturali…”). On the subject of the 
scope of cultural property protection as it is defined in Italian law between the State and 
the regions see L. Casini, Le parole e le cose: la nozione giuridica di bene culturale nella 
legislazione regionale in 3 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO (2014). 
538 An example of a regional law which valorizes artisanship is Legge regionale n. 76 del 11 
Novembre 2016 (in which the region of Tuscany “dispone interventi a sostegno del tessuto 
culturale dell’identita ̀ toscana,  nonche ́ di attivita ̀ che si svolgano in contesti caratterizzati da 
un’identita ̀ socio-commerciale e storico-culturale stratificata nel tempo.”). While this split 
between protection by the State and valorization by both the State and the regions is 
found in Art. 117 of the Italian Constitution, Art. 45 of the Italian Constitution also 
provides that “La legge provvede alla tutela e allo sviluppo dell'artigianato.” In 1985 the 
State passed a law which provided a framework for the region’s valorization of 
craftsmanship. See Legge n. 443/1985, Legge-quadro per l’artigianato, G.U. n. 199 of 24 
Agosto 1985. See also Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica n. 288/2001 in G.U. n. 164 
of 17 Luglio 2001 (defining artistic craftsmanship and clothing made to measure for the 
purposes of Law n. 443/1985). Some valorization activity at the State level has been 
contested by the regions. See Cort. Cost. n. 285/2005 (holding that valorization of 
cinematic and theatrical activities was properly legislated at both the State and regional 
level). See also DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE supra n. 378 at 36 (citing to the case to 
define attività culturali as those which “riguardano tutte le attività riconducibili alla 
elaborazione e diffusione della cultura”). Giannini also explains the division between 
protection at the State level and concurrent valorization between the State and regional 
levels as one which is grounded in preventing the polarization of cultural property: “in 
Toscana si dichiarerebbe beni culturali tutti i vasi, in Sicilia si dichiarerebbe tutti i carretti, 
e questo non si potrebbe ammettere, perché l’individuazione del bene culturale non può 
rispondere che a criteri unitari e, quindi occorrono uffici unitari in grado di dire quando è 
che un bene ha natura culturale.” Massimo Severo Giannini, I beni culturali tra principi e 
società; Beni culturali e interessi religiosi. Atti del Convengo di studi Napoli, 1981, (1983) in 
SCRITTI, Vol 7, 899 (2005).   
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relationship as at the core of its definition of cultural property. This 
relationship is one between the public cultural interest, which is 
intangible, and a tangible object. Italian cultural property law, while 
emphasizing tangibility, recognizes that it is a unique combination 
of the intangible, public cultural interest with tangible things that 
makes certain property cultural property.  
 
Some chipping away at the emphasis on cultural property as a 
physical thing was evident in the early 20th century. Early Italian 
cultural property laws contain references to collections and groups 
of things as early as 1902.539 Including groups of things, to a certain 
extent, denies that things alone are important to the definition of 
cultural property. Indeed, it implies that a relationship between 
different things in reference to something is what counts. Recent 
administrative decisions deciding when series or collections of 
objects are cultural property highlight this.540 While the 1909 law 
refers only to things, in the 1920s complementary laws slowly but 
surely enlarged the category to include ancient manuscripts, rare 
prints and engravings, and even villas, parks and gardens of artistic 
or historic interest.541 Here, rarity is the evaluative criteria for objects 
that exist in multiples, and parks, which are by nature changeable, 
are also deemed sufficiently tangible. The laws passed in 1939, 
while splitting the regulations between movable objects of historic 
interest in law n. 1089 and landscape and immovable objects in law 
n. 1497542, added series of things and collections of things of 
exceptional interest belonging to anyone.543 A slow but sure 
evolution of subject matter, before the inclusion of the term cultural 
property in the law, begs the question of what these different things 
had in common such that they could all be regulated as of artistic or 
historic, or still other, public interest. Certainly it is not simple 
materiality or tangibility alone.    
 
This is not to say that, as the scope of objects of artistic or historic 
                                               
539 Art 2, L. n. 185/1902. 
540 See T.A.R. Sez. II, 8 Ottobre 2008, n. 8824 (deciding that a private collection of paintings 
created a collection worthy of a declaration as cultural property because of a common 
characteristic, the fact that they had been mentioned in a 1790 catalog).  
541 See L. n. 364/1909, Testo Coordinato (included modifications from L. 23 giugno 1912, n. 
688 (G.U. 8 luglio 1912, n. 160), R.D.L. 24 novembre 1927, n. 2461 (G.U. 7 gennaio 1928, n. 
5), convertito, nella L. 31 maggio 1928, n. 1240 (G.U. 18 giugno 1928, n. 141). 
542 For a description of this separation and the aestheticized judgment influenced by 
Benedetto Croce see T. Alibrandi, L'evoluzione del concetto di bene culturale [hereinafter 
Alibrandi, L’evoluzione], relazione al Convegno di Gubbio 26-27 novembre 1999 su Il Testo 
unico in materia di beni culturali e ambientali, FA, 1999 at 2703.  
543 See discussion by Bottai in Disegno di legge: “Tutela delle cose d’interesse artistico e 
storico” (n. 154), in ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI supra note 402.  
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interest was expanding, cultural property law conceived of itself as 
protecting rights that would not follow objects. In his book Tutela 
delle cose d’arte, Grisolia, as part of his broader analysis of real 
property rights and public domain rights within administrative 
law544, emphasizes that laws protecting works of art for the distinct 
public function dictated by the collective interest in the object need 
that tangible object.545 Italian cultural property law, in this sense, is 
distinctly about rights to a tangible, about real property rights, and 
cannot be characterized, for example, as personality rights, which 
would not follow an object, but, rather a specific person.546 In this 
sense, tangibility is a limit to an expanding notion of cultural 
property in Italian cultural property law. It is not, however, 
tangibility alone that defines the legal notion of cultural property. 
 
As the category of cultural property expanded in Italy, the limit of 
tangibility proved important. Grisolia, for example, considered 
whether traditional and popular arts should be included in the legal 
category with reference to tangibility. The inclusion of an 
ethnographic interest in article 1 of l. n. 1089 of 1939, alongside the 
artistic and historic interest, opened the door for the protection of 
such traditional arts and crafts.547 Foreshadowing discussions about 
indigenous cultural heritage today, Grisolia noted that before 
protecting these “manifestazioni artistiche, letterarie e religiose…le 
espressioni più caratteristiche della loro attività marinara, agricola, 
industriale, commerciale e, in genere, professionale, in quanto, s’intende, 
abbiano carattere paesano”548 under a special law, drafters and 
legislators should think about whether these traditional arts and 
crafts were already protected through indirect means in the past or 
even through other means of and tools developed in the ways of life 
which had produced these traditional arts and crafts in the first 
place.549 For Grisolia, when “per l’arte e tradizioni popolari, la sfera di 
tutela non può restringersi alle cose, come invece accade per l’arte antica, i 
monumenti e le bellezze naturali”550 other forms of non-cultural 
property protection were needed.  
 
                                               
544 Grisolia’s observation about how important the bene is to the Public Administration’s 
rights to a work of artistic interest is made in the context of his examination of the 
differences between la natura del diritto reale, which has internal and external components, 
and la natura del diritto demaniale. See GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 216- 218.   
545 Id. at 219.  
546 Id. at 219, footnote 1.  
547 See the article in Grisolia, La tutela, supra note 504 at 384.  
548 Id. at 386.  
549 Id. at 386.  
550 Id. at 385.  
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The reasons for which “la sfera di tutela” could not comprise things 
that were not cose under Italian cultural property law 
fundamentally had to do with the nature of preservation. Far from a 
“freezing” of objects across the board, the point of preservation in 
Italian cultural property law, gleaned from these sources, is to, 
protect the cultural relationship which the public has with an object. 
If that relationship, the fixing of the public’s interest, is not tied to 
the object but to an intangible property, an activity, a sharing, if the 
object is not needed, then that relationship may be protected in 
ways separate from Italian cultural property law.  
 
Giannini’s work best exemplifies the shift from cultural property as 
a tangible thing to cultural property as a relationship based on an 
assignment of an intangible public cultural interest to a tangible 
thing. Prior to Giannini’s work on the topic the Commissione 
Franceschini had expanded the definition of what constituted 
cultural property by defining it as a material testament having the 
value of civilization.551 It had also examined categories of objects, 
beyond contemporary art552, and their particular qualities. Although 
the Commission did not address fashion specifically, it did mention 
works which exhibit similar overlaps of form and function, 
contemporary use, historic or artistic importance, and testamentary 
value. Two of these categories were musical instruments and 
furniture.553 The descriptions of a public cultural interest in these 
objects, while not couched in intangible and tangible terms, were 
based, for musical instruments, on musical and artistic importance 
and their ability to testify to the artistic development of 
civilization.554 For furniture, historical interest, in part because of 
these objects’ use and role in households and other human habitats, 
was important.555   
 
In his article I Beni Culturali, Giannini sets up a comparison between 
different objects that are all cultural property.  
 
…com’è che sono beni culturali Palazzo Pitti, che è bene demaniale dello 
Stato, il Palazzo della Signora, bene patrimoniale indisponibile del 
Comune di Firenze, ed il palazzo di proprietà privata che si trovi nella 
medesima città, e come mai le alture del Golfo della Spezia, dichiarate 
                                               
551 PER LA SALVEZZA, supra note 511 at 6, 22.   
552 Id. at 64- 65.  
553 Id. at 372- 375 (discussing musical instruments); 376- 379 (discussing furniture).   
554 Id. at 372 (“Il valore di essi è duplice, in quanto va considerato nei suoi due aspetti: 
artistico e musicale. Fin dalle più lontana antichità gli strumenti musicali hanno seguito 
molto da vicino lo sviluppo artistico delle varie civiltà e delle varie epoche…”)  
555 Id. at 376.  
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bellezza paesistica, comprendano insieme beni del demanio militare, beni 
statali e comunali del patrimonio indisponibile e beni privati? Qual è 
l’elemento comune fra tutte queste cose, per cui esse sono beni 
culturali?556 
 
Elsewhere in the same article, Giannini also envisions a similar 
comparison between tangibles and intangibles in light of the 
inclusion of testaments having the value of civilization alongside 
more classic objects of historic or artistic interest:  
 
Approfondendo e spiegando: le “Rime” di Petrarca appartengono al 
patrimonio culturale letterario del mondo; le tante edizioni di libri che di 
esse sono state fatte le riproducono e ne permettono la conoscenza 
diffusa, ossia sono moltiplicatori di circolazione materiale. A meno che 
non presentino particolare caratteri, quando al soggetto o all’oggetto, per 
cui possano divenire beni librari, i libri delle “Rime” sono cose 
costituenti supporto di beni patrimoniali, le “Rime” bene immateriale 
letterario: tra essi non vi è relazione diretta, ma solo la relazione 
indiretta che sorge allorché si ha una vicenda qualsiasi di riproduzione 
documentale. I manoscritti delle “Rime” sono invece una cosa 
contenente gli enunciati immediati della creazione letteraria, e per essere 
testimonianza materiale avente valore di civiltà, sono bene culturale 
(non importa come classificato o classificabile), ma in quanto cosa sono 
altresì supporto di un bene patrimoniale, oltretutto di presumibile 
elevatissimo valore. Se non esistessero, il patrimonio culturale sarebbe 
privo del manoscritto di un’opera letteraria eccelsa; ciò sarebbe un 
impoverimento ma non una mancanza irreparabile, poiché di tante 
grandi creazioni letterarie mancano i manoscritti. Peraltro, esistendo, 
sono un bene immateriale a sé e in più; bene che- si rilevi- è distinto dal 
bene immateriale letterario “Rime.”557   
 
For Giannini, then, what defines a cultural property under Italian 
law is the intangible public cultural interest we may identify in 
these properties. The way in which that intangible public cultural 
interest is negotiated with reference to the tangible object is what 
allows it to enter the cultural property “box” under Italian cultural 
property law. All the tangible buildings Giannini mentions above 
are seen as actuating, in their materiality, the public’s cultural 
interest, whereas texts, like Petrarca’s “Rime” are seen as actuating 
the public cultural interest at all times, no matter where they are 
placed. Some properties, like manuscripts, may be prized because, 
in their tangibility, apart from being the physical support of an 
                                               
556 Giannini, Beni Culturali, supra note 466 at 21- 22.  
557 Id. at 33.  
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intangible cultural property like text, they also actuate a public 
cultural interest because of their ability to testify to something- the 
physical touch of an author, or a community, a spark of creativity. 
These manuscripts are, for Giannini, still fundamentally intangible 
because the public cultural interest is still not completely tied to the 
book in its tangibility, but rather to its ability to reference something 
else- a creative process. Objects that are of artistic and historic 
interest, on the other hand, are understood as displaying a 
relationship between intangible public cultural interest and tangible 
object that is inseparable and therefore this allows them to be in the 
legal cultural property “box”, at the same time as they might still be 
the subject of economic rights or value.558  
 
Apart from breaking down the tyranny of things, Giannini’s words 
also give us a way to connect cultural property and copyrightable 
subject matter that other authors have only explored from other 
angles.  
 
Cultural property is defined by an intangible cultural interest or 
value exhibited by and for the public. Italian cultural property law 
decides to act to preserve that intangible cultural value which is of 
the public’s interest when that cultural value is tied to a specific 
property. There are ways in which items of cultural property can be 
classified as such while not completely exhibiting such an unicum 
between intangible cultural interest and tangible property, but these 
examples are limited to properties which we might note as 
testaments having the value of civilization like manuscripts, 
musical instruments, pieces of furniture, and even, at times, 
audiovisual material.559 Here, it is not a specific link that actuates the 
                                               
558 Id. at 22, 27 (“Nei beni artistici e storici l’entità immateriale valore culturale inerisce 
anche alla cosa bene patrimoniale, ma di solito non è da questa separabile….Il pregio 
artistico o storico infatti è, in natura e prescindendo dalle qualificazioni giuridiche, 
inerente alla cosa: un quadro di grande autore, un mobile firmato, un palazzo 
abitabile…”)   
559 Id. at 29 (“Infine i beni librari sono…cose non classificabili né come bene archivistici né 
come beni storico-artistici, ma cose per le quali essere beni culturali è legato all’essere 
strumenti di diffusione della cultura, in quanto documenti di manifestazioni del pensiero 
e dell’arte. Tali sono, infatti, i libri, gli stampati, i manifesti, le incisioni, conservati in 
biblioteche, emeroteche, gabinetti delle stampe, e così via. Se poi si estende l’attenzione ai 
mezzi audiovisivi, parimenti è evidente il loro essere strumenti di diffusione della 
cultura…non è che, come tali, questi documenti incorporino espressione d’arte o ne 
permettano la riproduzione; la parte maggiore delle espressioni conservate in questi 
documenti, fruibili o riproducibili, non hanno valore artistico o pregio di altra sorta; sono 
però pure sempre documenti di manifestazioni che aspirano a raggiungere valori 
culturali, e che per ciò solo si reputa vadano conservati dai pubblici poteri alla valutazione 
che ne potranno fare generazioni future.”) Giannini’s characterization of audiovisual 
materials in 1970s Italy finds a supportive partner in 2014 Congressional testimony 
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public’s cultural interest, but a referral to something else. This is 
similar to the way a belvedere allows the actuation of a public’s 
cultural interest in a vista.560 Because intangible public cultural 
interests might be actuated by properties no matter where they are 
placed, like with texts, then not only are they not protected but their 
physical supports are not either. These physical supports are not of 
public cultural interest- the text is, no matter where it is placed. In 
Giannini’s presentation, these properties, in which an intangible 
public cultural interest attaches solely to an intangible, should not 
be in public law’s purview, but in private law’s:  
 
…gli ordinamenti positivi si occupino solo di alcune, di quelle cioè per le 
quali si pongono ragioni pratiche di tutela pubblica…Per i beni delle 
altre specie può non porsi alcun problema di tutela (non è necessario, p. 
es. tutelare l’Illiade o le Partite di J.S. Bach), oppure possono porsi 
problemi di tutela privata o interprivata (ed è in questo il caput delle 
normazioni sulla proprietà letteraria, artistica, scientifica). È chiaro che 
il giorno in cui si ponessero, per volgersi di eventi della nostra società, 
problemi di tutela pubblica di altre specie di beni culturali oltre quelle 
per le quali già vi è una normazioni apposita, occorrerebbe provvedere.561  
 
For Giannini, for items like text there is no need for cultural 
property law to apply because the public cultural interest is 
protected without protecting the text itself as a cultural property. 
Copyright law, on the other hand, applies to these texts as a way to 
negotiate private relationships in these intangible objects of public 
cultural interest. The texts are not cultural property because there 
is, as yet, no need to protect them as such. This does not of course 
mean that they may not be regulated in the future, should the need 
arise. 
 
Added to this placement of intangible text, or the relationship 
between intangible public cultural interest and intangible object, 
outside of the cultural property “box” in nations which do have 
                                               
shedding light on the quantity of heritage that is lost when audiovisual materials cannot 
be preserved. Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 12- 14. There are also 
some U.S. cases that indicate an equation of a tangible property with an intangible 
intellectual property. See, for example, Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, 39 N.E. 2d 
249, Jan. 15, 1942) (holding, when applying a common law copyright, that copyright in a 
painting passed with the sale of a tangible painting, “an artist must, if he wishes to retain 
or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation of that right when he sells the 
painting.”.).  
560 Id. at 30.  
561 Id. at 34.  
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cultural property laws is Giannini’s note that nations which do not 
have a cultural property legal regime at all, whether for tangible or 
intangible objects, allow objects to be goods held in common, or, 
we might say, goods in the public domain.562 So what does this 
mean for intangible texts outside the cultural property “box” 
which find themselves in jurisdictions without cultural property 
law? We might think of these intangible properties like text, that 
are the same no matter where they are placed, as public domain 
items after copyright because they actuate a public cultural interest, 
after copyright’s term limits have expired.  
 
This proposal, that certain intangible properties age out of 
copyright and into a public domain because they are recognized as 
of public cultural interest, may, however, not be limited to 
copyright’s expiration. A public cultural interest in certain 
copyrighted works may be evident and even actionable before the 
copyright term expires. Fair use provisions are a good example of 
how copyright law recognizes this and allows for the commenting 
and even celebration of works in an educational environment or 
not.563 Preservation in Section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act is 
another example: cultural institutions may copy and make 
available to the public works they deem to “be of great historical, 
cultural and research importance.”564 Like a time threshold is not 
necessarily a bright line rule for cultural consensus in cultural 
property law, so term limits are neither bright line rules for 
cultural interest.  
 
Notwithstanding an expansion of the definition of cultural 
property in Italian law in the 1999 Testo Unico which seemed to 
include intangible text565, Italian cultural property law has not yet 
                                               
562 Id. at 27 (“…[U]n quadro di grande autore, un mobile firmato, un palazzo abitabile che 
siano beni culturali, come cose hanno valori commerciali talora altissimi, ovunque si 
trovino, ossia, per quanto qui interessa, tanto in un ordinamento la cui legislazione 
conosce la figura giuridica dei beni culturali, quanto in un ordinamento la cui legislazione 
ignora tale figura. Dal punto di vista giuridico, nel primo paese essi sono beni culturali, 
nel secondo sono beni, mobili o immobili, comuni.”) 
563 See for example, in a music case, the seminal Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569 (1994). 
564 Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 17 (proposing that such an exception begin 
twenty years before the expiration of the copyright term).  
565 Alibrandi, L'evoluzione, supra note 542 at 2708- 2709 (the T.U. defined beni culturali as 
“‘quelli che compongono il patrimonio storico, artistico, monumentale, demoetnoantropologico, 
archeologico, archivistico e librario e gli altri che costituiscono testimonianza avente valore di 
civiltà così individuate in base alla legge’”, seemingly , according to Alibrandi, opening the 
door for the protection of intangible cultural heritage like Dante’s text of the Divina 
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found the need to, as Giannini says, regulate intangible properties 
of intangible public cultural interest. The inclusion of Art. 7-bis in 
the 2004 Code ,which protects examples of intangible cultural 
heritage only insofar as they exhibit all the characteristics of 
cultural properties, in which the intangible public cultural interest 
is actuated by a tangible object, affirms that tangibility, 
notwithstanding the importance of a public’s intangible cultural 
interest, is still a limit to the notion of cultural property under 
Italian cultural property law.  
 
Some cases add nuance to this. A business activity, for example, 
might be de facto protected , but not required to be exercised, 
through the protection of a historic building566. This is much as 
protecting manuscripts, to some extent, controls the protection of 
the text that is in them. Italian cultural property law has not yet, 
however, seen fit to definitively expand its purview to marriages 
of intangible public cultural interest and intangible objects like text 
in today’s Code.  
 
To sum up, in Italian cultural property law the tangible object is 
overwhelmingly protected because there is a unique relationship 
between a tangible object and our intangible public cultural 
interest. Other properties may be protected in their tangibility 
because they lead to something else: a beautiful vista, listening to a 
song, or learning about a movement. At the same time, however, 
there are certain properties which cannot be, even with the most 
tenuous links, related in their tangibility to the intangible cultural 
interest. Here the intangible public cultural interest attaches only 
                                               
Commedia. In this sense, Alibrandi notes “Si finisce così per invadere l’ambito di settori 
giuridici tradizionalmente diversificati dalla materia dei beni culturali (as esempio il diritto 
d’autore).”)  
566 Cort. Cost. n. 118/1990 (“Il valore culturale dei beni di cui all'art. 2 su richiamato, al cui 
genere appartengono quelli di cui trattasi, è dato dal collegamento del loro uso e della loro 
utilizzazione pregressi con accadimenti della storia, della civiltà o del costume anche 
locale. In altri termini, essi possono essere stati o sono luoghi di incontri e di convegni di 
artisti, letterati, poeti, musicisti ecc.; sedi di dibattiti e discussioni sui più vari temi di 
cultura, comunque di interesse storico-culturale, rilevante ed importante, da accertarsi 
dalla pubblica amministrazione competente. La detta utilizzazione non assume rilievo 
autonomo, separato e distinto dal bene ma si compenetra nelle cose che ne costituiscono il 
supporto materiale e, quindi, non può essere protetta separatamente dal bene, come si 
pretenderebbe. L'esigenza di protezione culturale dei beni, determinata dalla loro 
utilizzazione e dal loro uso pregressi, si estrinseca in un vincolo di destinazione che agisce 
sulla proprietà del bene e può trovare giustificazione, per i profili costituzionali, nella 
funzione sociale che la proprietà privata deve svolgere (art. 42 della Costituzione). 
Il vincolo non può assolutamente riguardare l'attività culturale in sè e per sè, cioè, 
considerata separatamente dal bene, la quale attività, invece, deve essere libera secondo i 
precetti costituzionali (artt. 2, 9 e 33).”)  
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to the intangible object. For these things, like text, but also cultural 
activities, activities of artisanship, or even some traditional arts 
and crafts, our intangible public cultural interest is, in Giannini’s 
interpretation and in other contemporary Italian legal doctrine, 
always attached to an intangible property. It is this relationship 
that is determinative for Italian cultural property law, and not 
necessarily things alone. Deciding whether there is a unity 
between the intangible public cultural interest and a tangible, or 
the intangible public cultural interest and an intangibles, is what is 
fundamental to cultural property under Italian cultural property 
law. We must negotiate the two and decide which applies for each 
object, including a fashion design object, in order to call it cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law.      
 
 
3. The Dilemma of Copyright within the Italian Cultural Property 
Law Context 
 
Public cultural interest, time, and things, while being dilemmas of 
cultural property under Italian law, also give us, as we have seen, 
tools with which to identify when a property is cultural property. The 
inverse question, however, is also important- when and why does 
Italian law choose to not protect certain properties as cultural 
property? As we have seen, the most bright-line rule that prohibits 
properties from the cultural property “box” is when a public cultural 
interest attaches to an intangible property that is the same no matter 
where it is places. Petrarca’s Rime are Giannini’s example. Copyright, 
in Giannini’s opinion, is best suited to regulate these types of 
properties. From doctrine and legislative history it should be the case 
then that Italian cultural property law does not care about the 
relationship between intangible public cultural interest and these 
intangible properties at all. This is, however, not the case. There is an 
overlap between copyright and cultural property law in Italy 
when cultural property law does regulate the relationship between an 
intangible public cultural interest and tangible objects through cultural 
property protection. 
 
If we follow Giannini’s view, copyright is only a private law regime 
that regulates the relationship between private individuals for objects 
that are not cultural property. Since its inception, however, Italian 
cultural property law has controlled the commercial reproduction of 
properties it deems cultural property at least for cultural properties in 
public collections. This control of reproduction, essentially the 
relationship between public cultural interest and any material is 
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frustrating, as many scholars who find themselves tracking down 
permissions to reproduce works in Italian collections know. This is 
especially so for American scholars, who operate in a market nation 
without a traditional cultural property law regime. This is in part 
because the regulation of the image or reproduction of a tangible 
object for economic purposes567 (what happens in Italy) is understood 
(especially in the United States) as a masquerade for the regulation of 
the copying of an intangible property – some intangible work that is 
only fixed in a tangible medium of expression- that usually happens 
through copyright law.568 So, why does Italian cultural property law 
care about reproductions, about the public cultural interest attached 
to an intangible or, in other words, to any tangible? Is there in reality 
some common ground between copyright and cultural property law, 
depite Giannini’s separation of them into private and public law, 
respectively? 
 
Copyright law, in Italy and in the United States, is understood as 
related to originality and, in Italian law especially, to creativity.569 
Many of the works which we think of as being cultural property 
seventy years after their creation begin as copyrightable works. As an 
antecedent to works of historic or artistic interest think of the 
figurative arts in Italian copyright, or pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works in U.S. copyright law.570 W.W. Kowalski has already suggested 
that we might see copyright law as  
 
                                               
567 Here we set aside, for now, a discussion of moral rights, which are more obviously 
incorporated into Italian copyright law, while being regulated by a separate statute, the 
Visual Artists’ Rights Act, which has its own limitations, in the United States. See also 
ANDREA SIROTTI GAUDENZI, IL NUOVO DIRITTO D’AUTORE 47 (2016). The Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A. For a more detailed discussion of 
moral rights and the intricacies of it at the State level see Moral Rights in RALPH E. LERNER 
AND JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1071- 1123 (4th ed., 2012). It is important to note that even 
the authors that imagine an overlap between moral rights and cultural heritage protection 
specifically reject the suggestion that the public interest in preserving the cultural 
significance of an object be completely substituted by copyright law. See Kowalski, supra 
note 79 at 1168 - 1169 (stressing that a right of integrity can protect the work of an artist in 
the public interest as part of a common cultural heritage but insisting that “copyright law 
should not strive to replace or even compete with cultural heritage law”); Gerstenblith, 
Architect as Artist supra note 78 at 463 (“while the application of moral rights to public art 
and architecture coincidentally helps to further the goals of protection and preservation, 
artists’ rights are not intended primarily for that purpose.”).  
568 17 USC §102.  
569 Id. (noting “original works of authorship”). For an exemplary case noting a low bar for 
originality in U.S. copyright law, but holding that it is not evident in facts alone see Feist 
Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, (1991). See also GAUDENZI, 
supra note 567 at 46- 47.  
570 Art. 1 Law n. 633 of 22 Aprile 1941; 17 USC §102. 
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responsible for the protection of valuable works of art in the interim period- 
before the work of art is considered cultural heritage but when its 
protection is in the public interest.571    
 
Seeing copyright as an ex ante cultural property regime for certain 
categories of subject matter might work for jurisdictions like the 
United States where movable objects of historic or artistic interest, or 
even objects that are testaments having the value of civilization, are 
generally not protected as individual objects, but rather through a 
collection of some sort. In this way copyright specifically might be 
seen as “[undergirded by the] recognition that our accumulated 
knowledge and insight should be viewed as elements of a common 
heritage.”572 In this sense, U.S. copyright, although purporting to be 
about intangible works and the regulation of copies of those works, 
might effectively equate to “a right to decide the fate of an object”.573 
In U.S. copyright law, works are defined across an intangible and 
tangible divide as  
 
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device…includes the material object, other than a 
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.574 
 
In certain circumstances, even though copyright protection is 
understood as separate from the ownership of the object itself, this 
legal regime controls the fate of tangible objects. Copyright holders, 
while having a right to an intangible limited by someone else’s 
ownership of the tangible object, still act with reference to the 
“fixation” of their intangible in a tangible object.575   
 
The proposal that copyright, by regulating the relationships between 
private persons and certain intangible works fixed in tangible 
properties, can act as an ex ante cultural property law needs further 
exploration in Italian cultural property law terms. This is needed 
since Italian cultural property law purports to, at times, act like a 
                                               
571 Kowalski, supra note 79.  
572 SAX, supra note 78 at 3 (although referring to this as the undergirding of intellectual 
property rules generally).  
573 SAX, supra note 78 at 9.  
574 17 USC §101.  
575 Paintings are a good example of this- a contemporary artist may own the copyright in 
the visual representation, the pictorial, graphic and sculptural work which he places on a 
canvas, but the canvas itself, with the visual representation fixed in or on it, may be 
owned by a collector.  
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copyright legal regime, Italian or otherwise.576 The actions taken by 
Italian cultural property law to regulate reproduction are usually 
justified as regulations of a cultural property’s decoro, that 
intangibility quality that is measured in terms of how appropriate 
actions towards and within cultural properties are.577 The substance of 
this decoro is, at the very least, as Giannini mentioned years ago, 
vague.578 In addition, exercises of decoro can produce serious content-
based restrictions.579  
 
More than anything, however, Italian cultural property law’s 
regulation of reproductions, which have been in place since the early 
20th century580, and the squishy content of the term decoro581 belie the 
importance of tangibility alone in Italian cultural property law, at 
least for the cultural property in the State’s possession which is defined by a 
relationship between the intangible public cultural interest and tangible 
property. The regulation of reproductions might be justified by a need 
to preserve the physical integrity of the object. Indeed, the regulation 
of reproductions grew out of provisions in the 1902 and 1909 law 
which sought to maintain objects’ physical integrity.582 Today, 
however, reproductions can easily be made without even touching 
the object. When Italian cultural property law limits its regulation of 
reproduction to the commercial reproduction of objects in the State’s 
possession it seems to, improperly, take on the clothing of copyright 
law. In doing so, it seeks to regulate what the notion of cultural 
                                               
576 This is a reference to the harmonization which has taken place thanks to the Berne 
Convention, see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/.    
577 Art. 53, L. 42/2004. See also DIRITTO DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE supra note 378 at 193 
(discussing tutela del decoro ). 
578 See Massimo Severo Giannini, Review of Mario Grisolia’s La tutela delle cose d’arte, estratto 
da Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, III, 1953, n. 1, p. 171-172 in SCRITTI, Vol 3, 842 (2003) 
(“Il massimo di potere dispositivo che la legge riconosce allo Stato è il divieto, che può 
imporsi, di utilizzare il bene in modi incompatibili con ‘il carattere’ storico o artistico: 
divieto, peraltro, di rilievo marginale, e di contenuto piuttosto confuso e incerto.”)  
579 The recent debate surrounding Steve Bannon’s purchase and use of a protected 
monastery and convent in Italy is evidence of this. Cristina Ruiz, Battle over Bannon’s 
nationalist bootcamp in Italian monastery, THE ART NEWSPAPER, April 24, 2019, 
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/battle-over-bannon-s-nationalist-bootcamp-
in-italian-monastery. 
580 Lorenzo Casini, Riprodurre il patrimonio culturale? I "pieni" e i "vuoti" normativi 
[Reproducing cultural heritage? The legal filling and empty spots] 3 AEDON [ARTE E 
DIRITTO ONLINE] [ART AND LAW ONLINE] (2018) [hereinafter Riprodurre il patrimonio 
culturale?], http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2018/3/casini.htm. 
581 For a discussion of some cases involving the determination of decoro see Lorenzo Casini, 
Jeux avec les frontiers: le role de la jurisprudence administrative dans la construction du droit 
italien du patrimoine culturel in DROIT PUBLIC ET PATRIMOINE LE RÔLE DU CONSEIL D’ÉTAT 
199- 212, 205 (2019). 
582 Casini, Riprodurre il patrimonio culturale?, supra n. 580.  
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property law under Italian cultural property law says it does not 
mean to: the relationship between a public cultural interest and an 
intangible property. In other words, by regulating decoro and the 
commercial reproduction of cultural properties in its possession, the 
State, while perhaps seeking to maintain the public’s cultural interest 
in a specific tangible property, also seeks to control the public cultural 
interest itself, as it exists apart from the tangible object. This is 
evident in critiques of the improper use of images of Italian cultural 
property in certain commercial advertisements. The uproar over the 
use of the image of the David by an Illinois rifle company in 2014583 
seems to be as much about controlling how the public might fix its 
cultural interest on the David, how it might understand and find it 
culturally relevant, as about preserving and protecting the public’s 
previously ascertained cultural interest in it. Indeed, the 
asymmetrical enforcement of this reproduction by the Ministry might 
support this hypothesis further. Why is the same action to regulate 
reproduction not taken for the sale of David underwear and David 
aprons in the many souvenir kiosks in Florence? 
 
If Italian cultural property law seeks to control the reproduction of 
cultural property, then it seeks to control both the relationship 
between intangible cultural interest and tangible properties and the 
relationship between intangible cultural interest and intangible 
cultural properties. This is, however, contrary to the notion of 
cultural property as it stands under cultural property law. In this 
sense, valorization, in which regulations of decoro and reproduction 
are usually classified584, affects the scope of tutela and the notion of 
cultural property.  
 
The notion of cultural property under Italian cultural property law 
                                               
583 Mentioned in Casini, “Noli me tangere” I beni culturali tra materialità e immaterialità [“No 
one touch me” Cultural properties between tangibility and intangibility], 1 AEDON [ARTE E 
DIRITTO ONLINE] [ART AND LAW ONLINE] (2014), 
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2014/1/editoriale.htm. See also Gaia Rau, Il 
David Testimonial di un Fucile, il fotomontaggio scatena la polemica, FIRENZE LA REPUBBLICA, 7 
Marzo 2014, 
http://firenze.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/03/07/news/il_david_testimonial_di_un_fuci
le_fotomontaggio_scatena_la_polemica-80475411/. 
584 Although decoro is technically considered to be part of the valorization of cultural 
property, and not its strict protection, the valorization of cultural property is allowed or 
not based on whether a fundamental part of it remains intact or not. This part is deemed 
its decoro. As a result, just as we might understand what is copyrightable subject matter 
through issues of infringement, so we might understand what is cultural property by 
looking not only at what is identified as such at the front end of cultural property 
protection, at the time of its identification and declaration or verification, but also by 
looking at what is not deemed in conflict with the use of the property, which must not 
compromise its protection.   
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seems to at times aspire to be the same as copyrightable subject 
matter, just at a different time after the expiration of the copyright 
term. In the United States, this might be concerning because 
copyright is understood at expiring at a given moment. On the other 
hand, an overlap between the notion of cultural property and 
copyrightable subject matter would perhaps help us to see how the 
public cultural interest in certain objects may be actuated through 
copyright in legal jurisdictions like the United States which do not 
have a cultural property legal regime for movable objects like Italy. 
Such a comparison might also help us to understand what is going on 
when certain authors, like fashion designers, insist on copyright 
protection. Fashion designers might be fighting for a future 
assignment of public cultural interest to their tangible work through a 
recognition that their intangible property might be of some intangible 
public cultural interest. This hypothesis is further explored in 
Chapter 4.    
 
Let’s return to Italy, however, and to Giannini’s hypothesis that the 
moment might appear when it is necessary to protect certain new 
categories of objects as cultural property through Italian cultural 
property law. Giannini’s presentation of cultural property as 
fundamentally about the relationship between an intangible public 
cultural interest and tangible property supposes that text, the 
intangible property of intangible public cultural interest that is 
always outside the cultural property “box”, is always the same no 
matter upon what material it is placed. There are, however, texts where 
this is not the case- some texts are only of public cultural interest because 
they are on certain materials. Expanding Giannini’s presentation of the 
notion of cultural property to the case where text is materially 
dependent might help us to imagine how modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects are cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law. While Italian fashion design is usually understood as too 
intangible to be protected as cultural property, because in fact its 
public cultural interest is based on its ability to travel and to be 
culturally exchanged, in certain cases we might be able to identify Italian 
fashion design as tangible and therefore as susceptible to an attachment of 
public cultural interest that would make it eligible for inclusion in the 
cultural property “box.”  
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CHAPTER 3 
FASHION DESIGN OBJECTS AS CULTURAL 
PROPERTY UNDER ITALIAN LAW? 
 
This chapter explores how certain texts, despite usually being identified 
as intangible and invisible, may be tangible and, therefore, tangible 
properties eligible for inclusion as cultural property under cultural 
property law. Comparing these new tangible texts to images and 
designs, it proposes a legal standard for when certain fashion designs 
may be tangible enough to satisfy the requirement that properties have 
a public cultural interest attached to their tangible qualities, allowing for 
their entrance into the proverbial cultural property “box.”   
 
1. Fashion Design Objects and other Cultural Properties as 
Tangible and Intangible 
 
As explained in the last chapter, public cultural interests attached to 
intangible properties are generally considered outside the definition of 
cultural property under Italian cultural property law. This having been 
said, it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to draw a bright line rule 
for what is in or out of the cultural property “box.” Time mechanisms, 
cultural interest, collective consensus, and practical concerns all work 
together to solve the question of how something is cultural property. 
Notwithstanding this complex web of requirements, however, the 
limit of tangibility as applied to property is, for now, what might be 
termed the gatekeeper to entrance into the proverbial cultural 
property “box.” 
 
While the limit of tangibility of property may at first seem 
straightforward, it is, in a sense, deceptive and counterintuitive. A 
problematic separation between tangible and intangible with respect 
to the public’s cultural interest is especially evident in this digital age. 
Our intangible public cultural interest, in fact, may converge on an 
aspect of a tangible property that is also susceptible to intangibility. 
Fashion design objects are an excellent example of this, because design 
elements that are at once fundamental parts of a tangible object might 
be easily reproduced in other materials. There are also other examples. 
Imagine a painting- our intangible public cultural interest converges, 
as Cantucci would say, on the object. There are a number of reasons to 
find the tangible painting of cultural interest, including its author, its 
historical context, its provenance, what it depicts, etc. This public 
cultural interest, however, can focus on a part of the painting which 
can be intangible, reproduced in other materials, and yet still be 
fundamentally tied to the tangible canvas. Indeed, the composition of a 
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painting to which we might attach our cultural interest is both tangible 
and intangible. It might be easy to think that such an intangible feature 
of a tangible property might be protected apart from the tangible 
object in which it originated but, at times, it cannot be. 
 
The exploration of how intangible features of tangible property are in 
some ways still tangible is important in our contemporary times. 
Today, certain laws that protect creativity and its contemporary 
iterations have progressively embraced intangible aspects and reasons 
for these creative works over their tangible, mechanical processes. One 
of the hallmarks of the progressive inclusion of “new arts” (like 
photography) into legal regimes protecting forms of creativity is an 
emphasis on intangibility in order to negate utilitarian, mechanical or 
functional natures and aspects.585 As certain subject matters of culture 
have been embraced as deserving of legal protection, certain fictions 
have been created to emphasize their figurative nature over their 
complex process of creation. Tangibility is a stake in the wheel of this 
cultural evolution and an almost necessary line in the sand between 
different legal regimes to delimit their different jurisdictions.  
                                               
585 A comparison between two cases deciding how photographs are copyrightable in the 
19th century points to a winning emphasis on the hand of the author and the positioning of 
figures over the actual capturing of an image by machinery. One is Mayer v. Pierson 
decided in 1862 by the French Court of Cassation. For a copy of the opinion 
see Court of Cassation on Photography (1862), PRIMARY SOURCES ON 
COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.), www.copyrighthistory.org, 
available at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_f_18
62 (images of a reproduction of the opinion). See also Anne McCauley, Merely Mechanical: 
On the Origins of Photographic Copyright in France and Great Britain 31(1) ART HISTORY 57, 
72 (2008) (pointing to one aspect of the discourse surrounding photography, “the 
identification of the machine with programmatic repetition and standardization” as the 
one definitive reason for the legal recognition of certain photographic positives as artistic 
property). The other American case deciding the copyrightability of a photo of Oscar 
Wilde displays similar argumentation. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53 (1884). Today copyright arguments still tend to justify copyrightability by 
emphasizing the intangible aspects of works over the tangible, mechanical functional 
aspects of their creation, although this is progressively becoming a fine line with 
photographs, where the transformative part of the fair use test and the nature of the 
sharing of digital images make an author’s contribution often indiscernable. See Graham 
v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding on a motion to dismiss that Prince’s 
screenshot of an Instagram post displayed in an art gallery for sale was not fair use); 
Xclusive-Lee, Inc., v. Jelena Noura “Gigi” Hadid, 1:19-cv-00520 (E.D.N.Y., 2019) (reported 
on by The Fashion Law, describing the model Gigi Hadid’s argument that fair use applies 
to her sharing of a paparazzi photograph of herself on Instagram in part because she is a 
co-creator of the work since she created the “’ “[the subject’s] pose, expression, or 
clothing’”). See also Supermodel Gigi Hadid Calls Instagram Photo at Center of Paparazzi 
Lawsuit "Fair Use", THE FASHION LAW, June 7, 2019, 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/supermodel-gigi-hadid-calls-instagram-photo-at-
center-of-paparazzi-lawsuit-fair-use.  
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Two recent examples illustrate the conundrum of prioritizing an 
intangible visual over a tangible object and the mechanical, functional 
processes surrounding it. In a recent article in The Art Newspaper 
Martin Bailey spotlighted the restoration of Vermeer’s work Girl 
Reading a Letter at an Open Window by the Dresden gallery which holds 
it. The restoration revealed a hidden cupid in the upper part of the 
canvas. This cupid, as Bailey recounts, makes an 
“astonishing…difference” to Vermeer’s composition.586 The letter the 
woman is reading may be from a love letter, or Cupid’s presence may 
be interpreted as a type of message about love for the woman or as 
Vermeer’s general love advice for the viewer.587 What is striking here is 
that a simple image of the painting would not have revealed the 
change of message. Indeed, even an X-ray image of the painting which 
revealed the Cupid prior to its restoration needed the material of the 
tangible canvas or painting to alter the composition. Here, this is not 
simply a question of valorizing Vermeer’s painting by taking a picture 
of it and distributing it; this is an example of how one part of a 
painting which we might be able to think of as intangible and divorced 
from its material object, the image, still needs and is dependent on its 
tangible material- the painting. A separate recent article in The New 
York Times spotlighted the restoration of a number of paintings of 
sunflowers by Van Gogh in various iterations.588 The museums which 
held these Sunflowers were curious to understand if they were simple 
copies of each other, or if they were intended by Van Gogh to be 
independent artworks. Van Gogh, as the article recounts “referred to 
[one] work as a ‘repetition’ of the [other] painting.”589 Setting aside for now 
Van Gogh’s intent and the process he used, restorers at the National 
Gallery in London and the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam 
analyzed the paintings in their materiality to understand “how different 
[one] ‘repetition’ is from the first. Should it be considered a copy, an 
independent artwork or something in between?”590 Their answer, that these 
paintings were so different in their paint colors, texturing and 
brushstrokes as to be different from one another, came from an analysis 
of the tangible painting and affects our perception of its intangible image. 
Indeed, the knowledge of the image is incomplete without the physical 
                                               
586 Martin Bailey, Comment | Cupid ‘outing’ in Vermeer painting is the right move, THE ART 
NEWSPAPER, May 28, 2019, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/vermeer-
cupid-outing-is-the-right-move.  
587 Id.  
588 Nina Siegal, Van Gogh Painted Many ‘Sunflowers.’ But How Different Are They?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/arts/van-gogh-sunflowers-
gauguin.html.  
589 Id.  
590 Id.  
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canvas of the tangible Sunflower paintings. These are examples of an at 
first intangible image which is, however, still dictated by the tangible 
property of which it is a part.  
 
By protecting tangible properties when they are of cultural interest, 
Italian cultural property includes protection of both the tangible 
property and its intangible image by controlling the physical object of 
which they are both a part. This is something, however, which Italian 
cultural property law, doctrine and case law do not aspire to do. 
Indeed, with the exceptions of decoro and commercial reproductions of 
cultural property in State property mentioned above, Italian cultural 
property law seeks to leave the protection of intangible properties of 
cultural interest to other legal regimes.591 At the same time, however, 
examples like Sunflowers and Girl Reading a Letter at an Open Window 
beg the question: can Italian cultural property law really opt out of the 
preservation of intangible property? Italian cultural property law 
might be better off embracing a shifting definition of the tangible and 
intangible properties in its purview.  
 
Embracing a spectrum of intangibility and tangibility under cultural 
property law as opposed to a strict division between tangible and 
intangible has much to do with how to assign artistic and historic 
interest, or testamentary value, to objects under the law. Returning to 
the examples above, the historic value of the Vermeer painting 
(composition and canvas) seems greater than the image of the Vermeer 
because it can give us more information than the image itself. At the 
same time, however, there are cases in Italian law which seem to 
describe the cultural interest in paintings as based solely or at least in 
part on their intangible composition. In one case, the private owner of 
an “Allegory” painting by the 15th century Flemish artist Frans Floris 
appealed the Ministry’s judgment that the painting was a cultural 
property of particularly important artistic-historical interest after his 
request to export it.592 One of the first observations about the painting’s 
cultural interest was that it depicted an allegory of Genova in the 
composition. The Ministry was apparently ready to declare it a 
                                               
591 For the entertainment of the justifications for the regulation of the circulation of the 
image, or the intangible parts of a cultural property, and for a discussion of why cultural 
properties should be reproducible see Amedeo Tumicelli, L’immagine del bene culturale 
[The Image of the Cultural Property] 1 AEDON (2014), 
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2014/1/tumicelli.htm. For further discussions of 
the links between intangibility and cultural properties under Italian law see the other 
articles published in Issue 1 of 2014 of AEDON.  
592 The following facts are taken from various stages of the case in the opinions T.A.R. Milano, 
(Lombardia) sez. II, 08/11/2007, (ud. 24/07/2007, dep. 08/11/2007), n.6205 and Consiglio di Stato 
sez. VI, 10/12/2014, (ud. 28/10/2014, dep. 10/12/2014), n.6046, DEJURE.  
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cultural property based on these criteria but then, given the owner’s 
protests that it did not so depict Genova and members’ of the Field 
Offices’ agreement on the point that such a link could not be 
confirmed, the Ministry rejected this as a reason for the painting’s 
classification as a cultural property.593 The Ministry did decide, 
however, to classify the painting as a cultural property for other 
reasons. It decided the representation was particularly significant 
because it represented “l’unico dipinto attualmente noto dell'autore 
raffigurante un'allegoria di soggetto profano a carattere encomiastico."594 The 
private owner protested this basis for classification given that 
historical documentation existed of other allegories of virtue by the 
painter. The Court, applying and reviewing various rules to which the 
behavior of the Ministry had to comply, noted that the Ministry’s 
evolving reasons for classifying the cultural property as such seemed 
to be preconceived and not based in fact. The Ministry had given 
different weight to different historical-artistic facts at various stages of 
the process and even vacillated between understanding the painting as 
a cultural property because of its ability to testify to the painter’s links 
to Genova and other, arguably more evident, parts of the composition. 
This revolving door of public cultural interest assignment was too 
much for the court, and it annulled the painting’s classification as 
cultural property.595 
 
Setting aside the bad faith behavior of the administration in this case, 
the vacillation of the assignment of public cultural interest to the 
tangible painting, to intangible parts embedded in the painting, then to 
the tangible painting inasmuch as it testifies to a historical connection, 
is a cautionary tale. In other circumstances, had the facts backed their 
judgment up, the Ministry certainly could have classified the painting 
for its composition’s depiction of Genova, or its tangible property’s 
ability to testify to a specific historical moment. Such reasoning 
implicates the embrace of a spectrum of the intangible and tangible 
divide in Italian cultural property law. At the same time as Italian 
cultural property law protects the tangible object, its manner of 
assigning the public cultural interest belies an interest in tangible 
things alone. Classifying series or collections of objects as cultural 
property only highlights this issue, as in one case where a private 
collection of paintings was declared cultural property because of a 
common characteristic that was not even evident in them alone but 
                                               
593 T.A.R. Milano, (Lombardia) sez. II, 08/11/2007, (ud. 24/07/2007, dep. 08/11/2007), n.6205. 
DEJURE.  
594 Consiglio di Stato sez. VI, 10/12/2014, (ud. 28/10/2014, dep. 10/12/2014), n.6046, 
DEJURE.  
595 Id.  
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was, rather, due to the fact that they had all been mentioned in a 1790 
catalog.596 
 
For modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects, the 
ascertainment of this public cultural interest and the decision of where 
to assign it is crucially important. In a world where multiple examples 
and variations of Italian fashion design objects exist, historical, artistic 
or testamentary judgments at the basis of the public cultural interest 
are often finely drawn and the classification, therefore, of fashion 
design objects as cultural property is by nature susceptible to these 
fine lines. Let us take, for example, a Giorgio Armani dress from 1990, 
most recently included in the exhibition Italiana: L’Italia vista dalla 
moda.597 [Figure 21] The dress consists of what we might call harem 
pants underneath a wide short skirt that arrives almost to the wearer’s 
knees and a close-fitting top with netting over it. Of a dark green and 
blue color, the fabric of each of these pieces is different: while the pants 
have a paisley design, the skirt has a delicate yet confident flower 
embroidery with a ribbon-esque waist, and the top is made of a sheer 
fabric. Even without an explanatory label, the visual links to the work 
of the celebrated early 20th century French designer Paul Poiret are 
evident to an eye familiar with fashion history.  
 
In the early 20th century Poiret designed a number of cutting edge 
gowns made of a pants and skirt combination inspired by the Middle 
East.598 One of these dresses is in the collection of the Costume Institute 
at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, while the Museum at The 
Fashion Institute of Technology has another. Titled “Fancy Dress 
Costume” and dated to 1911, the Poiret gown in the collection of the 
Costume Institute is noted as being created for and worn at Poiret’s 
famous promotional 1002nd night party.599 [Figure 21] An elaborate 
                                               
596 See T.A.R. Sez. II, 8 Ottobre 2008, n. 8824.  
597 Italiana. L’Italia vista dalla moda 1971-2001. Curated by Maria Luisa Frisa and Stefano 
Tonchi. February 22 to May 6, 2019 at the Palazzo Reale in Milan. The dress by Armani 
dates to his Giorgio Armani Spring/Summer 1990 collection. See e-mail from Cecilia 
Dessalles d’Epinoix, Responsabile Iniziative Corporate Giorgio Armani S.p.A., to author, 
April 15, 2019, 4:53 pm (on file with author).  
598 As fashion history recounts it, Poiret’s early 20th century embrace of orientalism was in 
part precipitated by the arrival of the Ballets Russes in Paris. See Paul Poiret, THE MUSEUM 
AT FIT, 
http://fashionmuseum.fitnyc.edu/view/people/asitem/items$0040:2935/0?t:state:flow=
c746f588-1c39-4743-8495-a43d0c6e64fd (last visited April 9, 2019) (“[Poiret] remains best 
known for his ravishing orientalist evening dresses and fancy ball costumes. These 
designs echoed the look of contemporaneous Ballet Russes productions, such as Cleopatre 
and Scherezade, and Poiret’s lampshade tunics and harem pants were among the most 
celebrated designs of the era.”).  
599 Fancy Dress costume, 1911, Paul Poiret, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/81781?&searchField=All&sortBy=
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concoction of bejeweled seafoam green fabric with numerous gems 
described as of metal, silk and cotton, the dress consists of a pair of 
harem pants tied at the ankles, a longer overlaid skirt which goes to 
the wearer’s knees, and a v-neck sleeveless bejeweled top. By contrast, 
the “Evening Dress” in the collection of the Museum at The Fashion 
Institute of Technology, dated to 1913, is described as related to 
Poiret’s classic Sorbet Gown, which is in turn characterized by fashion 
historians as being inspired by a “lampshade tunic over harem 
trousers” originally worn by Poiret’s wife at the 1002nd night party.600 
[Figure 21] Displaying a very different color scheme compared to the 
gown in the collection of the Metropolitan, the 1913 evening dress is in 
shades of purple, cream and rose, and is described as of “mauve and 
ivory silk satin and seed beeds.”601 While the Museum at FIT’s evening 
dress still has identifiable pants with a skirt over it, both the shape of 
the pants and the skirt, which is more like a tunic or wrap dress, are 
noticeably different than Poiret’s fancy dress in The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art and Armani’s 1994 dress inspired by Poiret. The 
different color schemes and differences in design seem to clearly 
differentiate one evening dress from the other.  
 
In cultural property terms we can see that deciding where to locate the 
intangible cultural interest in this dress, where to identify its historical 
or artistic value, benefits from a discussion of tangibility and 
intangibility. This discussion is not one of function and art, but one 
which asks when a tangible property is important over and above an 
intangible one alone. A tangible property can still be functional and 
yet of public cultural interest. A tangible property can be art and yet 
not of public cultural interest. Returning to our Poiret, we can discuss 
tangibility and intangibility over and above function and art in the 
following ways. Does the historic or artistic value of Poiret’s early 20th 
century design lie in its unique combination of a skirt and pants in an 
orientalist style? Or, is the historic value in Poiret’s unique 
combination of all these elements in various specific iterations? If we 
decide that Poiret’s pants and skirt combination is of historic 
                                               
Relevance&ft=paul+poiret&offset=0&rpp=80&amp;pos=1 (last visited April 9, 2019). 
(“This fancy-dress ensemble was made for and worn to Poiret's 1002nd Night party in 
1911, which was designed and organized to promote his new creations in the full splendor 
and glamour of the orientalist trend.”)  
600 Evening Dress, THE MUSEUM AT FIT, http://fashionmuseum.fitnyc.edu (last visited April 
9, 2019) (“[Mme Poiret’s] costume inspired the famous Sorbet gown of 1913 – with its 
lampshade tunic decorated with pearl embroidery in sherbet colors of pistachio, pink, and 
mauve.”) A version of a Poiret dress titled Sorbet is also visible in the collection of the 
Victoria & Albert Museum in London and describes this same design inspiration. See 
Sorbet, VICTORIA & ALBERT MUSEUM, http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O15549/sorbet-
evening-dress-paul-poiret/ (last visited April 9, 2019).  
601 Evening Dress, supra note 600.  
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significance, then we might not see this contribution as inherent to one 
specific tangible dress. We might see an intangible Poiret style as 
historically significant. As a result, Armani’s Italian fashion design 
object inspired by Poiret in 1994 might be less historically significant, 
not historically significant at all, or perhaps of a different historical 
significance altogether. On the other hand, if we identify the historical 
significance of Poiret’s fashion objects in their unique combination of 
specific colors, fabrics and material alongside the addition of a pants 
and skirt, then we might limit their historical significance to specific 
iterations of tangible dresses. In this sense, Armani’s 1994 creation 
might be considerably historically significant for its unique riff on one 
or more of Poiret’s specific ensembles.  
 
Determining whether the public cultural interest attaches to a style, 
design or material becomes even more difficult when we encounter 
multiple versions and even copies of Poiret’s dresses by others. Such is 
the case with the artist Isabelle de Borchgrave’s rendering of a Poiret 
Evening Suit from 1912.602 [Figure 21] When we look at Borchgrave’s 
close copy, small differences do become apparent between it and the 
Museum at FIT’s evening dress, which it most resembles. These 
differences include Borchgrave’s decision to include what seems to be 
a skirt instead of the classic Poiret harem pants, differences in the 
placement of the flower motifs on the tunic’s skirt and sleeves, and 
slight differentiations in color. Looking beyond these differences, 
however, perhaps by observing how the light may catch Borchgrave’s 
rendering in person or by touching it, it becomes apparent, almost by 
complete surprise, that Borchgrave’s dress is of paper and not of 
fabric. While Borchgrave’s intention is to create art, the functionality of 
this design object as fashion by Borchgrave is by no means negated: 
“paper clothes” (made in the 1960s of “a nonwoven mixture of 
cellulose and cotton or rayon”) have been made, sold and worn 
throughout fashion history.603 If we assign a public cultural interest in 
Poiret’s design or style, as it exists in any or all tangible materials, 
Poiret’s design would be out of the cultural property “box” and any 
commercial reproduction of it would be free. On the other hand, a 
public cultural interest might lie in a tangible dress of Poiret’s that 
reflected this specific design, in one design object. In this case, some 
sort of recognition to the relationship between the public cultural 
interest and an intangible property through the classification of a 
                                               
602 MODA DI CARTA: ISABELLE DE BORCHGRAVE A VILLA NECCHI CAMPIGLIO 77 (Skira, 2016).   
603 See Valerie Steele discusses MFIT paper dresses, THE MUSEUM AT THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/news/archive/2011/valerie-steele-
paper-dresses.php (last visited April 9, 2019) (also noting that “some paper dresses were 
meant to be hand painted”, a method almost identical to Borchgrave’s work). 
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tangible property as cultural property might be extended. This seems 
contrary to Giannini’s conceptions but is like the above example of the 
allegorical painting. 
 
The notions of archetype, stereotype and prototype provide another 
way to think about how an extended limit of tangibility might include 
some relationships between intangible public cultural interest and 
intangible properties. These notions as applied to fashion design 
objects, within the context of fashion’s “partak[ing] in all the 
existential dilemmas of design”604, come from Paola Antonelli’s recent 
MOMA exhibition Items: Is Fashion Modern?605 Without emphatically 
attributing certain fashion objects to brands or designers606, the 
exhibition tried to first focus visitors on a fashion object’s stereotype, 
or “the incarnation that made it significant in the last one hundred (or 
so) years…[drawing] on the collective consciousness: when you close 
your eyes and think of a sari, or a pair of chinos, or a pearl necklace, 
what do you see? That is the item’s stereotype.”607 Archetypes, on the 
other hand, were deemed historical.608 Practically, this meant that in the 
same exhibition some tangible, individual fashion objects were 
presented as representative of the stereotype: for example, a Patagonia 
fleece for a fleece or a Hermès Birkin for a Birkin bag. Other 
stereotypes had multiple tangible iterations in different fashion 
objects, as for the Little Black Dress or the Platform Shoe.609  
 
While stereotypes that cannot be easily divorced from their fashion 
brand or designer origin, like the Birkin bag, may be thought of in 
terms of authorial significance in cultural property law or even 
through trade dress or trademark protection in trademark law, the 
definition of stereotype in Items: Is Fashion Modern? urges a move 
beyond source recognition alone because it incorporates history into 
its definition (“…the incarnation that made it significant in the last one 
                                               
604 Paola Antonelli, Who’s Afraid of Fashion? in ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN? 15 (2017). The 
problematics between fashion and design are also sometimes characterized as ones 
between art and design. See Colman, History and Principles, supra n. 6 at 229.   
605 For a full description of the exhibition see the catalog. ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN? supra 
n. 604.   
606 The exhibition did label certain objects with the name of their designer (as for example 
with Chanel No. 5). For others, it left out the brand name, as with Levi’s 501s, described 
only as 501s. Of course, the labels in the exhibition belied this emphasis on design only, as 
did the inclusion of objects with numbers on them, such as jerseys, whose symbolic 
meanings could not be easily erased.  
607 Id. at 20. 
608 Id.  
609 For images of the exhibition see Installation Images, Items: Is Fashion Modern?, MUSEUM OF 
MODERN ART, https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/1638 (last visited April 10, 
2019).  
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hundred (or so) years…”610). Presented with stereotypes, what we 
imagine the definitive iteration of a specific fashion object to be, we are 
automatically influenced by history and historical perspective. The 
stereotype of Capri pants, for example, included in the exhibition, 
might normally be thought of by an Italian audience as incarnated by 
Emilio Pucci’s 1950s iteration, but the exhibition included still earlier 
iterations designed by Sonja de Lennart in Germany in the 1940s.611  
Where is the historical significance implied by the term stereotype in 
these material fashion objects? Is it in an intangible design that can be 
reiterated in any material, or in one specific material object? If the 
public cultural interest can only be assigned to an intangible design, 
and not even to a tangible design object which by definition has that 
intangible design, is an idea effectively of public cultural interest to us?  
 
Fashion objects created by the American designer Mary Ping installed 
in the MOMA exhibition close to the Hermès Birkin bring these 
questions even further home. Created for Mary Ping’s fashion label, 
Slow and Steady wins the Race, individual bags of leather reproduce the 
forms of It Bags, including the Gucci Bamboo Bag.612 In the exhibition, 
Ping’s bags are described as “a series of purses that divorce 
craftsmanship from luxury branding.”613 Here, it is almost as if Ping 
has attempted to assign a public cultural interest to craftsmanship 
alone, as other Italian scholars like Grisolia have hinted at when 
discussing protecting the popular and traditional arts. At the same 
time, however, Ping’s exercise does not succeed. These bags are still 
recognized as reproducing certain fashion designs, no matter that they 
are all in caramel leather and outside their usual luxury material and 
accoutrements. Here, the public cultural interest seems caught up not 
only with the intangible design, but also as inseparable from the idea 
of a Gucci Bamboo Bag or a Chanel bag. To protect an idea as a 
cultural property would be a slippery slope indeed. Ideas are not 
protectable in copyright for similar reasons.614 The law should not 
                                               
610 Paola Antonelli, Who’s Afraid of Fashion? in ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN?, supra note 604 
at 20.  
611 Capri Pants in ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN? supra note 604 at 85.  
612 For an image see Birkin Bag in ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN? supra note 604 at 62- 63. It is 
interesting to contemplate whether Ping reached an agreement with the houses for use of 
their trade dress. For a discussion of the reciprocal use of trademarks by designers and 
artists see Gianfranco Negri-Clementi and Silvia Stabile, L’arte e il diritto d’autore in IL 
DIRITTO DELL’ARTE: L’ARTE, IL DIRITTO E IL MERCATO, Vol 1, 113 (2012). 
613 Id. at 62.  
614 For some discussions in case law of the idea/expression dichotomy, to which the 
merger doctrine and the doctrine of independent creation in copyright are connected, with 
reference to designs of useful articles see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-218 (1954) 
(“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is 
given only to the expression of the idea -- not the idea itself. Thus, in Baker v. Selden, 101 
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extend a cultural monopoly or an economic monopoly to an idea. If 
the idea of a Birkin Bag is of such public cultural interest to the public, 
perhaps it needs to be outside of both the cultural property and 
copyright legal regimes. 
 
In contrast to ideas, text and images are generally seen as intangible  
properties that are outside the purview of cultural property law but  
not outside the purview of copyright law. At the same time, however,  
there is a relationship between images and tangible properties that  
allows them into the cultural property “box” through a backdoor while 
text is said to remain outside. This difference is grounded in what 
Carlo Ginzburg has termed visible images and invisible texts.  
 
2. Redrawing the Tangible and Intangible Boundaries through Text 
and Images  
 
 Visible images, as Carlo Ginzburg has critically elaborated, are part of 
an assumption that “there is a difference between a canvas by Raphael (or by 
Veronese) and a copy (be it a painting, an engraving or, today, a photograph) 
                                               
U.S. 99, the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was 
not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan which achieved similar results where 
the alleged infringer made a different arrangement of the columns and used different 
headings. The distinction is illustrated in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151, 
when the court speaks of two men, each a perfectionist, independently making maps of 
the same territory. Though the maps are identical, each may obtain the exclusive right to 
make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the other's copyright. 
Likewise a copyrighted directory is not infringed by a similar directory which is the 
product of independent work.” (footnotes omitted)); Oldcaste Precast v. Granite Precasting 
& Concrete, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20977 at *14- *22 (holding technical drawings of concrete 
precast vaults copyrightable because each drawing contained different, particular 
expressions and did not equal the idea of a concrete vault and distinguishing these 
technical drawings from useful articles, noting that “a technical drawing…is created precisely 
to ‘convey information,’ hence it is not a useful article. §101 of the Act defines technical drawings 
as being a "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work”…”); But see Enterprises International, Inc. et 
al v. International Knife & Saw, Inc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48493 at *16- *18 (holding 
technical drawings of knife blades uncopyrightable because the drawings merged or were 
inseparable from the knife blade itself and equating technical drawings of the knife blades 
with designs for useful articles which do not convey information or portray appearance).    
See also Notes and Questions to Baker v. Selden in COHEN ET AL, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL 
INFORMATION ECONOMY 3 – 16; 19- 21; 21- 29 (3rd ed. 2010) (noting “some courts see merger 
doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement liability, rather than as a bar to copyright 
at the outset or other courts just say the scope of the copyright is thin – so thin that 
infringement only occurs if an identical copy is made.”); Idea and Expression in Chapter 11, 
Copyrights in LERNER AND BRESLER, supra note 567 at 912- 915; see also 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 2A.06 (2019) (noting in a discussion of the idea/expression doctrine in the 
context of Baker how the refusal to protect ideas in the visual arts is more complex and 
usually replaced by determination of “scene-a-faire”).  
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and [that] it cannot be eliminated.”615 Images, in other words, are 
supposedly always copies that refer back to an object and are, at the 
same time, not the same as the object to which they refer. Images in 
this framework of original and copy are always (counterintuitively) 
material: images are never the same, images are never the tangible 
object, but images are always an intangible copy that refer back to a 
tangible object. No matter where we see an intangible image we still 
identify it with another tangible object. We see images as a placeholder 
for the real thing. When Manet’s Luncheon on the Grass for example, is 
projected on a slide it is not understood as the Luncheon on the Grass. 
Even if the image of Luncheon on the Grass may enter into spaces which 
Manet’s original work never could have before digitization, even if the 
image may hang on a wall as a poster for a million years, the image of 
Luncheon on the Grass is never understood as the original Luncheon on 
the Grass. Italian cultural property law preserves these visible images, 
these tangible or material images, but not necessarily these images as 
they exist as intangible copies. 
 
 Invisible text, on the other hand, as Ginzburg has also described, is 
part of a separate assumption that there is “…an essential incompatibility 
between the idea of an abstract, invisible text and the idea of a book as a 
palpable and visible object…”616 Text, in other words, is not materially 
dependent and has no original, or better still, texts are always an 
intangible original. This is the assumption at the heart of the 
distinction Giannini makes between books, manuscripts and texts. 
Texts are the same no matter where they are printed- on a book or on a 
manuscript. Books are the physical support of texts which are not 
cultural property, while manuscripts which still reproduce the text are 
cultural property because they testify to the creativity of the text’s 
author. Cultural property law, the argument goes, never preserves 
intangible text.  
 
 Design, of which fashion design is a part617, is not easily assigned to the 
categories of invisible texts or visible images. Defined as a descriptor of 
“the aesthetic and functional characteristics of an object”, design 
                                               
615 Carlo Ginzburg, Invisible Texts, Visible Images in COPING WITH THE PAST: CREATING 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION (Pasquale Gagliardi, et al, eds.) 134 
(Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2010). 
616 Id. at 136. 
617 Paola Antonelli, Who’s Afraid of Fashion?, supra n. 604 at 17 (“…most forms of design, but 
especially fashion design, are too often considered ‘lesser’ disciplines in the art world 
(much the way film is), because no matter how extensive the scholarly literature they 
engender, they still manage to immediately connect and inspire- and usually delight- at 
levels that are accessible by the many as well as by the few.”) 
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frustrates the tangible and intangible divide. 618 Design is a unity of 
form and function, of aesthetic and function. Design is both intangible 
and tangible. Design is by nature meant to be reproducible and copied. 
The level of reproducibility may vary depending on the designed 
object (think, for example, of the practical difficulties of reproducing an 
entire building or the restraints on reproducibility allowed by contract 
or other law), but designs are meant to both create the sameness of 
intangible text and, at the same time, to communicate some semblance 
of an original quality that is related to Ginzburg’s visible images.  
 
To elucidate these differences further, take the example of an American 
design object, the Eames chair. We identify the design of an Eames 
chair as representative or indicative of the material, physical Eames 
chair somewhere, but we also recognize the design of an Eames chair 
as the design no matter whether the Eames chair is made of wood, 
plastic, or another material. The fact that design straddles both 
assumption one (images are visible and tangible) and assumption two 
(text is invisible and intangible) has been unknowingly expressed 
recently by a conversation on Twitter between two professors at the 
University of Notre Dame. In response to Professor Jeffrey 
Pojanowski’s indecisiveness as to whether to purchase a real Eames 
chair notwithstanding its expense or to feel discomfort at the prospect 
of buying a “fake”619, Professor Mark McKenna replied “Much depends 
here, of course, on what ‘fake’ means in this context. The fact that those 
chairs have the same design as the original might just be called 
competition to provide designs people want.”620  
 
Locating the importance of the Eames chair in the design, McKenna’s 
words, while framing the chair’s reproduction as good competition, 
seems to support premise two: it’s not necessarily a “fake” when we 
recognize the value of or exhibit an interest in a design across media 
and materials. While Pojanowski’s response echoed some agreement 
with premise two, it also envisioned a role for premise one through an 
                                               
618 Penny Sparke, Design, supra note 102. As Sparke notes, “By the 1980s…such phenomena 
as ‘designer’ jeans, ‘designer’ vacuum cleaners, and even ‘designer’ lemon squeezers (e.g. 
squeezer for Alessi designed by Philippe Starck, 1988) acknowledged that the most potent 
meaning of the word [design] was that of ‘added value’ in the form of style—an 
indefinable quality that made things not only useful but also more desirable, albeit in a 
somewhat intangible way.” For a discussion of design, artisanship and art in the Italian 
perspective see Gianfranco Negri-Clementi and Silvia Stabile, L’arte e il diritto d’autore in IL 
DIRITTO DELL’ARTE, supra note 612 at 123- 124.  
619 In Professor Pojanowski’s words: “Wanted to buy an Eames reading chair for my office 
and then saw how expensive they were”; “I saw [that there are imitations too] and am 
thinking about it. But I kind of feel like I’d rather wear no watch or a Seiko rather than a 
fake Rolex.” @Pojanowski, TWITTER, April 9, 2019 tweet (on file with author) 
620 @markpmckenna, TWITTER, April 9, 2019 tweet (on file with author) 
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appreciation of materials related to the intangible design, “True. If the 
construction (materials and composition) and functionality are 
comparable, the only thing one would be paying a premium for is an 
effable sense of snobbery and that’s not good.”621 In other words, 
material may still matter for the recognition of an Eames design as 
such. Design is fundamentally caught up in both assumptions across 
pre-conceived boundaries between images and text.  
 
Fashion design, perhaps even more than industrial design, brings the 
tension between intangibility and tangibility, visible images and 
invisible texts, to the fore. While we may use a juicer, sit on a couch or 
live in an architectural space, fashion design is uniquely connected to 
materiality because we wear it on our bodies.622 Fashion design 
physically changes the ways in which we stand, sit and even 
communicate with the rest of the world. Fashion design is both 
intangible like a text (a fashion design may be repeated in many outfits 
or in many iterations across different media and materials) and 
tangible like an image (design may be uniquely manifested in specific 
material forms).  
 
At the same time as the dichotomy between invisible text and visible 
images exists, there are some examples of text which are materially 
dependent, where text is tangible and not intangible. As Maria Luisa 
Catoni has already written  
 
We might [despite the implication from Ginzburg’s notion of an invisible 
text that texts and images entertain a profoundly different relationship not 
only with a specific place (whether or not it is their specific place of origin) 
but also with the physical support upon which they are articulated] 
nonetheless ask whether such a sharp distinction between text and 
images…is applicable to all images and all written texts, even within 
cultural traditions considered as belonging to Western culture.623 
 
                                               
621 @Pojanowski, TWITTER, April 9, 2019 tweet (on file with author)  
622 This also brings up important discussions of gender and fashion, and of identity more 
broadly, and the sanitization of bodies through a fetishization of fashion objects when we 
divorce them from the body and view them only as objects. For a discussion of class and 
gender from a fashion studies point of view see DIANA CRANE, FASHION AND ITS SOCIAL 
AGENDAS: CLASS, GENDER, AND IDENTITY IN CLOTHING (University of Chicago Press, 
2000). See also presentations given at the colloquium Memory, Wear, and Imperfection in 
Dress, THE MUSEUM AT FIT, September 29, 2018, 
http://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/events/special-projects/fashion-unraveled-
colloquium.php.  
623 Maria Luisa Catoni, Symbolic Articulation in Ancient Greece: Word, Schema and Image in 
SYMBOLIC ARTICULATION: IMAGE, WORD, AND BODY BETWEEN ACTION AND SCHEMA 146 
(Sabine Marienberg, ed.) (De Gruyter, 2017). 
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Looking at these examples, and some of the history behind the 
evolution of invisible, intangible text helps to envision how some  
texts might enter the cultural property “box” under Italian cultural 
property law and, therefore, how modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion designs might also by comparison. Far from existing in distinct 
“boxes”, examples show us that intangibility and tangibility exists on a 
fluid spectrum. 
 
The dichotomy between images and text which Ginsburg seeks to trace 
is usually identified in the shift from oral to written poetry in Ancient 
Greece. A bit counterintuitively, the argument goes, the fixation of oral 
poems, such as Homer’s Illiad and Odyssey, into one version through 
writing allowed text to become an abstract entity. The fixation of text 
allowed it to travel, divorcing it from changes which might be made in 
an oral performance or for a particular audience.624 Tangibility allowed 
text to become intangible, the same wherever it appears. It is this 
intangibility and immediate understanding that is exemplified in silent 
reading. Bernard Knox gives some early examples: the riddle in 
Antiphanes’ Sappho ("What is it that is female in nature and has 
children under the folds of its garments, and these children, though 
voiceless, set up a ringing shout ... to those mortals they wish to, but 
others, even when present, are not permitted to hear?...a letter")625; 
Theseus’ silent reading of a letter tied to his dead wife’s hand in 
Euripedes’ play Hippolytus; Demosthenes’ silent reading of an oracle in 
Aristophanes’ play Knights.626     
 
The narrative arc of intangible text, however, is nuanced by two facts. 
First, notwithstanding text’s increasing intangibility, its presentation as 
figuratively tangible like other technai was a crucial part of its ability to 
exist as an intangible. In this sense, text was like other crafts and 
cultural practices that produced and continue to produce tangible 
images. Second, an intangibility of text did and still does not negate the 
continuing existence of other types of texts, namely those that are not 
abstract or those that still need tools other than silent reading to be 
understood. 
 
Even the etymology of the word text itself belies the modern 
association of text with an intangible, invisible entity. Indeed, “text 
                                               
624 See The aoidos in context in BARRY B. POWELL, WRITING AND THE ORIGINS OF GREEK 
LITERATURE (Cambridge Press, 2002). 
625 Bernard M.W. Knox, Silent Reading in Antiquity, 9 GREEK, ROMAN AND BYZANTINE 
STUDIES 421, 432 (1968). Knox’s work and examples are also cited in Ginzburg, supra n. 614 
and in JESPER SVENBRO, PHRASIKLEIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY ON READING IN ANCIENT 
GREECE 163- 165 (Janet Lloyd, trans., Cornell, 1993).  
626 Knox, Silent Reading in Antiquity, supra n. 624 at 433- 434.  
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comes from [the] Latin textus, which means fabric/weaving and the 
product of weaving and from the verb texere to weave.”627 In ancient 
times, “putting words together [was] primarily visualized by thinking 
of weaving.”628 In Greek the word humnos, hymn, is linked to the word 
for weave, huphainô, which is in turn derived from the Greek word for 
fabric-working.629 Etymologically linked to textile and fabric, the raw 
material of clothing and fashion, the evolution of the word text itself 
implies the artificial construction of the assumption underlying the 
intangibility of text which has been constructed since the transcription 
of Homeric poems and the appearance of silent reading in the 5th and 4th 
centuries B.C.E.630 Gregory Nagy has pointed to the Greek word humnos 
to show the metaphoric quality of what we might commonly think of 
as “a song sung in praise of gods or heroes- but also a song that 
functions as a connector, a continuator.”631 Nagy’s overarching “point 
is, metaphors referring to the craft of fabric-workers pervade the usage 
of humnos in archaic Greek poetics.”632  
                                               
627 Text/Textile, Center for Hellenic Studies, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlCTxDy_yv0 (with Gregory Nagy) (video). See 
also Text in MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/text. See Scafidi, F.I.T., supra n. 37 at 76 (although using ancient 
Greek examples to support the idea that textiles conveyed information like a text).  
628 Text/Textile, supra n. 626. This link between word and weaving in ancient times has 
been taken up in fashion law literature. Susan Scafidi notes that “[f]or the ancient Greeks, 
the fiber arts were an extension of symbolic thought, as vital to a meaningful existence as 
speech.” Scafidi, F.I.T., supra n. 3 at 76.  
629 GREGORY NAGY, PLATO’S RHAPSODY AND HOMER’S MUSIC: THE POETICS OF THE 
PANATHENAIC FESTIVAL IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 70- 71 (Center for Hellenic Studies, 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
630 Ginzburg, Invisible Texts supra n. 616 at 136 (highlighting “the momentous event that 
took place in Athens in the 6th century B.C.E: the transcription of Homeric poems, which 
had until then circulated only in oral form, sung by professionals known as rhapsodes”).  
631 NAGY, supra n. 628 at 70. 
632 Id. at 71. Other research on the relationships between fabric, textile and other ancient 
Greek technai are currently being pursued as part of The Penelope Project, hosted at the 
Research Institute for the History of Technology and Science in the Deutsches Museum, 
Munich. The project, whose “aim is to integrate ancient weaving into the history of science 
and technology, especially digital technology”, has also resulted in work on the 
relationships between textile and rhythm notation in poetry and music (See GFanfani, 
Rhythmical interweaving: epiplokē in ancient Greek metrical theory, Ancient Greek Metre and 
Rhythm/Weaving Imagery in Greek Poetry, February 5, 2018 THE PENELOPE PROJECT, 
http://penelope.hypotheses.org/614). Giovanni Fanfani, one of the researchers associated 
with the project, has written articles on the use of textile as a metaphor in Greek poetry. 
Giovanni Fanfani, Weaving a Song: Convergences in Greek Poetic Imagery between Textile and 
Musical Terminology. An Overview on Archaic and Classical Literature in TEXTILE 
TERMINOLOGIES FROM THE ORIENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPE, 1000 BC to 1000 
AD 421- 436 (Salvatore Gaspa et al, eds., Zea Books, 2017) and Ellen Harlizius-Klück and 
Giovanni Fanfani, (B)orders in ancient weaving and archaic Greek poetry in SPINNING FATES 
AND THE SONG OF THE LOOM. THE USE OF TEXTILES, CLOTH AND CLOTH PRODUCTION AS 
METAPHOR, SYMBOL AND NARRATIVE DEVICE IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 61-99 
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Some examples show how text, recited by rhapsodes from a set text, 
was like tangibles images. In these rhapsodes’ texts we find metaphors 
in which the rhapsodes compare the lasting quality of their recitation to 
stitched products and to sculptures. As Svenbro recounts, Pindare in 
Néméene commands his lyre to weave his song (“ ‘O douce lyre, tisse 
(exúphaine) sans plus tarder, sur le mode lydien, ce chant (mélos) 
aimé…’”633) and says he himself weaves a decorated tiara (“ ‘Je tisse 
(huphaínō) pour les Amythaonides un diadème ornementé (poikílon 
húmnon)’”634). Of interest for the relevance of these nuances for fashion 
are Svenbro’s comments that go so far as to say that these comparisons 
are not only about tissage and tressage, but also about couture.635 
Elsewhere Svenbro points out how Simonides uses marble as 
metaphor for what his own poetry must do (“ ‘Il est difficile de devenir 
un homme exemplaire dans le Mémoire des hommes, carré pour ses bras, pour 
ses jambes et pour sa pensée…’”636), explaining the use of the term carré by 
a rhapsode as a way to equate a rhapsode’s own poetry with the famed 
kouroi to suggest the permanence of his work.637 According to Svenbro 
one of the chief reasons for the emphasis and the equation of recitation 
of poetry with other technai was the rhapsodes’ desire to be paid by the 
heterogeneous audience members they now served.638 In effect, 
rhapsodes sought a legal equality between themselves and the authors 
of other monumental works.639   
 
The work of rhapsodes in Ancient Greece reveals a continuing affinity 
between newly intangible text and other categories of tangible works 
                                               
(Oxbow Books, forthcoming) (available at 
https://zenodo.org/record/840005#.WpLhSGaZO8U).  
633 JESPER SVENBRO, LA PAROLE ET LE MARBRE: AUX ORIGINES DE LA POÉTIQUE GRECQUE 192 
(1976) [hereinafter SVENBRO, LA PAROLE].  
634 Id.  
635 Id. at 191-192.  
636 Id. at 220. (“En autre mots, Simonide emploie une métaphore empruntée à la sculpture 
pour suggérer l’intemporalité à laquelle l’anēr agathós atteint dans la poésie…C’est à 
travers une réflexion sur la peinture et la sculpture qu’il arrive à une compréhension de sa 
propre activité : « La parole est l’image des actions… » Simonide considère donc la poésie 
non seulement comme analogue à la peinture, mais encore à la sculpture. ») Id. at 156. 
Svenbro also cites to Pindar for the same idea that poetry is superior to marble. See Id. at 
157 (« Comme Pindare, Simonide considère que la parole poétique est supérieure au 
marbre. ») 
637 Id. at 156- 157. See also the Italian version: JESPER SVENBRO, LA PAROLA E IL MARMO: 
ALLE ORIGINI DELLA POETICA GRECA 14 (Boringhieri, 1984). 
638 SVENBRO, LA PAROLE supra n. 632 at 180.  
639 Id. (« …si les poètes ont insisté sur l’analogie entre monument et poème, leur insistance 
relève donc vraisemblablement d’une volonté de faire reconnaître la « monumentalité » de 
la poésie commémorative et, du même coup, l’équivalence ‘juridique’ entre sculpteur e 
poète. » )  
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of art, like sculpture and painting and textiles. We might say, like the 
diverse categories of things protected under Italian cultural property 
law and U.S. copyright law, that newly intangible text in Ancient 
Greece included itself alongside other objects to emphasize its value no 
matter the emerging qualities of tangibility and intangibility which we 
may identify in hindsight.  
 
Other types of texts alongside what we might frame as increasingly 
intangible textual recitations of rhapsodes in the 5th century B.C.E. 
further narrow the gap between intangible text and tangible images 
and, therefore, between cultural property and non-cultural property. 
Mnesitheos’ inscription dating to the early 5th century B.C.E. is a text 
which, written on a stone, is implicitly connected to and made 
meaningful by the addition of a reader’s voice to it.640 As Svenbro 
analyzes the text, the phrase “someone will tell the passerby”, spoken 
aloud by the reader/speaker of the inscription, allows the fame of the 
person who is dead to be distributed.641 In this case the text on the stele 
requires a voice to be truly permanent. Not only is the text not the 
same no matter where or how it is reproduced, but a material 
monument is crucial to the communication of the text’s meaning. This 
funerary monument and inscription work together to shape the way in 
which the message is expressed. The text on the stele requires a voice 
and its place on a funerary monument to be truly permanent. In 
addition, neither the sculpture nor the text is the same no matter where 
or how they are reproduced: both need a voice and each other to 
communicate their message. Here, this text may be protected and 
preserved as a cultural property. Our public cultural interest in the 
text’s message is tied to the text as it exists on the tangible monument; 
we cannot understand one without the other. This text seems tangible.  
 
In our contemporary times we have texts which today are similar to 
Mnesitheos’ inscription. Svenbro himself gives a modern example in 
French, “doukipudonktan”, from Raymond Queneau’s novel Zazie 
dans le Métro. The text must be read aloud in order to be fully 
understood as “From where [is it] that they stink so much then?”642 
Duchamp’s phrase and work of the same name L.H.O.O.Q. [Figure 23] 
and the Britney Spears’ song “If You Seek Amy” are other examples. In 
these examples, text is not intangible, it is not the same wherever it is 
printed. Rather, text is tangible because it is dependent on its 
placement on a specific type of material or because it exists between 
tangibility and intangibility thanks to a necessary oral and aural 
                                               
640 For this example see SVENBRO, PHRASIKLEIA, supra note 624 at 48.  
641 Id. 51- 55.  
642 Id. at 166.  
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dimension.643 
 
These examples show how an obvious meaning of the text can 
necessitate negotiations between text and tangible materials that then 
indicate text’s tangibility. Context, however, can also inform the 
tangible text inquiry. The example of Nestor’s Cup brings home the 
modern conundrums of conceiving text as historically tangible, then as 
intangible, only to return to text as tangible in certain cases. As Catoni 
details, Nestor’s Cup dating to the 8th century B.C.E. displays an 
inscription, “I [am] Nestor’s cup, good to drink from. But he who drinks from 
this cup, him straightaway the desire of beautiful-crowned Aphrodite will 
seize.”644 The placement of this text on a cup and the self-referencing of 
its placement conveys the importance of the cup’s materiality for the 
text’s meaning. The text is a tangible text. At the same time, however, 
the context of the symposium is also crucial to the tangible text’s 
meaning and existence as such. Catoni describes the inscription as a 
“literal meaning of ownership [which] is partially corrected and linked 
in a substantial way to its support as well as its context of use.”645 In 
certain circumstances, context may need to be incorporated into a 
negotiation of the relationship between public cultural interest and 
property to determine what might be sufficiently tangible to satisfy the 
cultural property legal standard.  
 
For modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects context is 
an important consideration. Most fashion designs are not as 
immediately clear in their cultural message, and therefore not as clear 
in their public cultural interest, as tangible text. At the same time, 
however, context considerations might also need a limit. Italian fashion 
designs exist in many different spaces at many different times; fashion 
design objects are not confined to one place, as the text on Nestor’s 
Cup is confined to the symposium. Fashion designs instead exist in 
many different places, from the design studio, to the closet, to the 
street, to the cultural institution.     
 
                                               
643 Which might also be compared to the trademark legal regime and its rules preventing 
“sound alike” marks. See Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 149 (2nd Cir, 2003) 
(discussing the Polaroid factors of trademark infringement and noting, as part of its 
analysis of whether two marks both of the word “virgin” were similar that “the reputation 
of a mark also spreads by word of mouth among consumers. One consumer who hears 
from others about their experience with Virgin stores and then encounters defendants' 
Virgin store will have no way knowing of [sic] the differences in typeface.”) See also 
Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. (while first passed in 1947, trademarks were also 
included as part of the 1870 Patent Act; see Patent Act of 1870, 41 H.R. 1714).  
644 Catoni, Symbolic Articulation, supra note 623 at 149.  
645 Id. at 150. 
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3. Fashion Design Objects on a Tangible/Intangible Spectrum 
 
The possibility that some text, like the Ancient Greek examples of 
Mnesitheos’ inscription or the one on Nestor’s Cup, might be 
considered tangible text eligible for inclusion in the cultural property 
“box” opens a door for the consideration of fashion design objects as 
cultural property. Certain fashion designs include text. Examples of 
fashion designs’ embrace of text can serve as a starting point for how 
the public cultural interest in certain Italian fashion designs may be 
tied to the materiality of a fashion design object. When so tied to a 
dress, accessory or other tangible object itself, a fashion design may be 
considered a cultural property and protected as such; an entire Italian 
fashion design object may then be classified as cultural property.  
 
A first example of such a fashion design object is a full length 
sleeveless evening gown made of gold sequins from Moschino’s Pre-
Fall 2015 collection designed by Jeremy Scott. On the front of the dress, 
from the bust to below the knees, is written in large block letters “I 
HAD NOTHING TO WEAR SO I PUT ON THIS EXPENSIVE 
MOSCHINO EVENING DRESS.”646 Read out loud by the viewer, the 
dress’ wearer or owner is given a voice and deliberately interacts with 
the viewer like the funerary monument’s inscription mentioned above. 
On another material the meaning of the message would not be the 
same, the dress’ wearer or owner would be making a different type of 
statement, one that was perhaps mocking instead of tongue in cheek. 
This text, at first glance and first reading, seems tangible enough for 
this Italian fashion design object to enter the cultural property “box” in 
circa sixty-six years and after Jeremy Scott’s death.647 By extension, the 
fashion design itself would be cultural property.  
 
Another contemporary Italian example is a 2016 GucciGhost bag 
designed by Alessandro Michele, the current Creative Director of 
Gucci, in conjunction with the artist Trouble Andrew.648 17.5 inches 
high and 17 inches wide, this black bag is 6 inches deep and its handle 
is a round hole in the leather at approximately 1.5 inches from the top 
                                               
646 Look 25, Pre-Fall 2015 Moschino, VOGUE, https://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/pre-
fall-2015/moschino/slideshow/collection#25.  
647 The time and non-living author unicum mentioned above. See Art. 10(5), CODICE, D.L. n. 
42/2004.  
648 See Behind the Collection, Gucci Ghost, GUCCI, 
https://www.gucci.com/us/en/st/capsule/women-gucci-ghost-collection (“ ‘Artist 
Trouble Andrew is as much as Gucci as the brand is, the way he uses the logo of the 
company is by taking it to the streets, it is interesting how our language, started by a 
family in Florence nearly 100 years ago can be something very contemporary.’ Alessandro 
Michele, Gucci Creative Director) .  
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of the bag.649 The bag displays the graffitied word “REAL” in the 
middle on the front of the square bag where the word “GUCCI” is also 
embossed at the bottom of it. The back of the bag has the Gucci 
trademark GG displayed in the same graffitied type as “REAL” on the 
front. Made in a variety of colors, including red with blue writing and 
black with pink writing, this bag is black with yellow writing. Like the 
Moschino example above and the funerary monument inscription, the 
commentary of the design on the front of the bag, which refers to the 
bag’s realness seems easily understandable at first reading but only 
inasmuch as it is on a “real” Gucci bag, on Gucci material. Placed on any 
other material, a non-Gucci bag, the message of the text would not be 
the same. Here we seem to have an example of tangible text that is part 
of an Italian fashion design and, therefore, an Italian fashion design 
object which might be such an unicum of intangible public cultural 
interest in an intangible element and tangible material that the bag can 
enter the cultural property “box” after Alessandro Michele and 
Trouble Andrew’s death and in circa sixty-eight years.  
 
At the same time, however, both these examples are also related to 
context. The way in which both texts on the dress and the bag, and 
therefore the way in which both Italian fashion designs, convey their 
messages is inextricably caught up, like in the example of Nestor’s 
Cup, with both the material and the context. Separated from the 
discussion of counterfeits and fakes, the message of authenticity and 
tongue-in-cheek quality of these Italian fashion designs may have less 
cultural relevance and be of less public cultural interest by extension. 
In this sense, the test of whether certain modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion designs are sufficiently Italian fashion design objects 
that enter the cultural property “box” is dependent on their specific 
place, support and messages. Context here could be an added 
consideration in a legal standard applied under Italian cultural 
property law. A consideration of context for the Moschino dress and 
the Gucci bag above might only further support a preservation of these 
Italian fashion design objects. The fashion design alone, separate from 
the dress or bag, is not enough to convey the full message here. In the 
face of other objects which might undermine or blur this fashion 
design’s message because the text and design are on other materials, 
preservation of the entire Gucci bag or Moschino dress, even if it exists 
                                               
649 These measurements are courtesy of The Real Real website, on which the bag is for sale. 
See GUCCI 2016 GUCCIGHOST LARGE TOTE, THE REALREAL, 
https://www.therealreal.com/products/men/bags/totes/gucci-2016-guccighost-large-
tote?sid=pxogmz&utm_source=Google&utm_medium=shopping&cvosrc=cse.google.goo
gle&cvo_crid=151251594673&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7_6WvLPm3AIVigOGCh212w5jEAQ
YBCABEgIVv_D_BwE.  
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in multiple versions, seems necessary.  
 
Another example not related to a context of authenticity or 
counterfeiting is a 2015 dress designed by Valentino embroidered with 
a line of text from Dante’s Inferno.650 The text, from Canto V and likely 
citing Dante’s references to Paolo and Francesca651, is placed in a 
concentric circular form on the skirt of the dress at the apex of the 
wearer’s legs. Such a placement is likely tied to the meaning of the text, 
which takes place in the circle of Hell where sinners are punished for 
subjecting their reason to their sensual or corporeal desires.652 Here, the 
text’s concentric circle form makes clear that there is a connection 
between the text from Inferno and the Italian design, but its tangibility 
might only be ascertained through a contextual analysis. Placed on this 
specific part of the skirt, the text conveys a specific message which 
might be of public cultural interest to us. Placed on a bag or shoe or 
even other object, even if in this concentric circle form, the message 
might not be the same and, therefore, no longer of public cultural 
interest to us. In this sense, this Valentino fashion design object might 
be sufficiently tangible to be classified as a cultural property under 
Italian law.  
 
A standard for when objects such as these Italian fashion design 
objects may be cultural property might, therefore be the following. 
First, look to the relationship between the Italian fashion design and 
the material. If the message of the Italian fashion design is sufficiently 
materially dependent at this stage, then there may be no need to 
consider the context in which the object exists. If there is a question as 
to whether the message of the Italian fashion design is sufficiently 
materially dependent, context may be taken into account as part of a 
second step.  
 
In short, Italian fashion design objects that include text might be 
evaluated according to their particular circumstance, in light of their 
specific place, support, message, and at times context, to determine 
whether the public cultural interest is sufficiently tied to a design that 
is materially dependent. If it is determined that a design is sufficiently 
                                               
650 Look 41/48, Spring 2015 Couture Valentino VOGUE, available at 
https://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/spring-2015-couture/valentino.  
651 See e-mail to author from Blair Trader, Head of PR for Valentino, June 7, 2019 (on file 
with author). The attribution of the text to that describing Paolo and Francesca has been 
made at the suggestion of Guido Guerra, M.A. Italian Studies, University of Notre Dame, 
who identified the word “non m’abbandona” in line 105 of Canto V as part of the 
Valentino design.  
652 Such a description observed by Guido Guerra, M.A. Italian Studies, University of Notre 
Dame (on file with author).  
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materially dependent and that the public cultural interest attaches to 
that design, then an Italian fashion design object may be classified as 
cultural property. In this sense, fashion design objects offer nuance to 
Giannini’s differentiation between intangible text that is not cultural 
property and the objects of aesthetic, historic interest or testamentary 
value that can be classified as cultural property. Some previously 
conceived intangible text is not only of public cultural interest but also 
sufficiently materially dependent to be classified as a tangible cultural 
property. In this sense, there are some tangible texts which do not need 
to be indirectly protected through the preservation of manuscripts as 
testaments having the value of civilization.    
 
This proposed legal standard may also help to weed out Italian fashion 
designs which are not sufficiently materially dependent. This material 
dependency does not, however, necessarily mean that these Italian 
fashion designs, and the objects to which they apply, are not cultural 
property. Some Italian fashion design objects may also, apart from this 
legal standard, be considered testaments having the value of 
civilization. Other Italian fashions may be like a separate category of 
cultural property: the visible images associated with paintings. 
 
To explore how some Italian fashions may be like visible images, take 
two non-Italian fashion designs by the Japanese fashion designer 
Matsuda653 in his collections from 1988 and 1989.654 In the 1980s, after 
officially entering the U.S. market and creating labels underneath his 
Nicole Ltd. brand655, Matsuda designed a number of objects with text on 
them that are still part of The Museum at the Fashion Institute of 
Technology’s collection. One, a necktie dated to 1991,656 measures 51.5 
inches long to the tip of the tie’s corner and varies in width from 1.15 
inches at the skinniest point of the tie to 3.25 inches at its widest. In 
flock printed text, in which fibers are placed on the shirt’s fabric to 
form the letters through adhesive or electrostatic657, letters that spell out 
                                               
653 For a short biography of Matsuda see Elizabeth Glendinning, Mitsuhiro 
Matsuda, Fashion Photography Archive. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.  Bloomsbury Fashion 
Central. Web. 16 Apr. 2019. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474260428-FPA086>. 
654 Richard Martin, Wordrobe: The Messages of Word and Image in Textile and Apparel Design of 
the 1980s in TEXTILE AND TEXT (formerly THE TEXTILE BOOKLIST) (Fashion Institute of 
Technology, 1989) at 11. Fashion Institute of Technology Special Collections.  
655 Elizabeth Glendinning, Mitsuhiro Matsuda, supra n. 652.  
656 This date is available in The Museum at The Fashion Institute of Technology’s TMS 
database. The full entry and description read “91.240.11, Matsuda, man's necktie, 1991, 
Japan, Gift of Richard Martin, Clothing and Accessories, Yellow-green cross rib silk man's 
tie with flock printed design of words.” The objects were viewed on August 16, 2019 at 
The Museum at The Fashion Institute of Technology.  
657 What is flock printed, definition and explanation, 
http://www.textileglossary.com/terms/flock-printed.html.  
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“Monsieur Nicole Matsuda” are spaced close together in a line which 
curls and winds itself into knots on the front of the tie [Figure 26]. At 
the tie’s corner, individual letters separate from the word “Matsuda” 
and fall, one by one, into a pile at the corners. Another Matsuda shirt 
dated to the same year displays similar text with similar placement at 
strategic points on it. Looping text, the same phrase “Monsieur Nicole 
Matsuda”, curls around the collar, down the front of the shirt, and 
finally falls, letter by letter, into the front shirt pocket. Like on the tie, 
individual letters spelling out “Monsieur Nicole Matsuda” fall into the 
corners of the sleeve cuffs.  
 
For the shirt, with button holes made over the flock-printed letters, the 
text is indelibly tied to the material. The tie seems the same, with its 
flock-printed letters floating into a V-like shaped container made by 
the corner of the tie. A visual impression of objects falling into a pocket 
or another receptacle is depicted here. This text, if placed on any other 
object or material, while it would convey the same name and therefore 
implying a source identification, would not convey the same visual 
message which the placement and the progressive separation of its 
letters convey on the shirt or tie now as they interact with the specific 
shape and materiality of this shirt and this tie. Divorce this text from 
the material of the fashion object, place the text on a shirt without a 
pocket, and the visual message of the image which the text makes is no 
longer properly understood.  
 
Here, more than simply indicating the source of this shirt, i.e. naming 
Matsuda as the designer, the text which is part of a fashion design 
plays with material and becomes a type of visualized quotation, an 
image.658 In this sense, the fashion design is much like Ancient Greek 
examples of images which include text on pottery. One example is an 
amphora dating to the 5th century B.C.E.659 (Figure 27) showing text 
coming out of the mouth of a rhapsode. Greek letters standing for the 
beginning of a poem, “As once in Tiryns…”660, are placed in a 
downward arc which melds with the stance of the poet to convey a 
leaning forward motion, as if the text depicted on the vase is literally 
falling out of the rhapsode’s mouth towards an imaginary audience. On 
the one hand this text seems distinctly tangible – placed any other way 
in the image it would not convey the same meaning, the same message. 
                                               
658 Catoni, Symbolic Articulation supra n. 623 at 132.   
659 Neck-amphora, THE BRITISH MUSEUM, 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.as
px?assetId=221978001&objectId=399287&partId=1 (last visited July 17, 2019) (describing 
as “Amphora Made in Attica, Attributed to the Kleophadres Painter, 490- 480 BC, 
Collection of the British Museum, Roman and Greek Antiquities” ). 
660 For this information see the catalogue entry from the British Museum. Id.  
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Straight text or vertical text placed beside the rhapsode would not help 
to convey the rhapsode’s self-representation in the concrete sense. At the 
same time as a part of an image, as a visualized quotation, the text 
functions as a crucial part of a representation. Connected to the 
material and yet also able to be divorced from it, while informed by its 
particularities of design, this image of the rhapsode and the cultural 
message it conveys might be protected through classifying one entire 
vase with the image as cultural property, certain iterations where the 
vase has added historic significance as cultural property, or every vase 
having this image as a piece of cultural property.  In this sense, we 
might also consider protecting the first iteration of Matsuda’s shirt, 
other exemplary versions of Matsuda’s shirt or tie in their materiality, 
or all their material iterations, as cultural property. This is much the 
same decision as that which Italian cultural property law would take to 
protect the multiple versions of Van Gogh’s Sunflowers on the Italian 
territory. 
 
A standard for when objects such as the Matsuda fashion design 
objects may be cultural property might, therefore be the following. 
Again, first, look to the relationship between the Italian fashion design 
and the material. If the message of the Italian fashion design is 
sufficiently materially dependent at this first stage, but can also be 
repeated in other materials without, however, maintaining the original 
relationship between the fashion design and the object, then the 
fashion design may be sufficiently like a visible image, like the 
composition of a painting, that the fashion design object in its first 
tangible iteration(s), at the very least, may be cultural property.  
 
Some Italian fashion designs might fulfill this test that we have thus far 
applied to the Matsuda examples. Take, for example, a dress by Cesare 
Fabbri for the “Zuccoli” Spring/Summer 1990 Collection currently in 
the collection of Palazzo Pitti’s Museo della Moda e del Costume. On the 
dress, a beaded representation of the triangular topped façade of the 
Santa Maria Novella church in Florence, Italy is matched by a 
triangular piece of material which makes up the halter of the dress’ 
bodice. The material support and this decorative element are closely 
related. Depending on how we understand the relationship between 
the design, a reproduction of the Santa Maria Novella façade, and the 
importance of the halter top of the dress, which imitates the top of the 
Santa Maria Novella façade on the church, we may decide that this 
Italian fashion design is like a visible image which is always informed, 
despite its ability to be reproduced, by the material upon which it is 
first placed. Would this triangular fashion design convey the same 
cultural message if it were placed on a turtleneck, and not a halter 
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dress? At the same time, the issue of what is of public cultural interest 
muddies the analysis. Do we see this Italian fashion design as of public 
interest because it is a uniquely tangible fashion design object or 
because it is a reproduction of another tangible object that is cultural 
property, the Santa Maria Novella façade? Depending on how we 
characterize the cultural significance of the fashion design, we might 
be more prone to envision the fashion design as an invisible image 
unable to be tangible enough as related to any material, which only 
refers back to the Santa Maria Novella façade itself.     
 
Of course, a fashion design could also be understood as a text as 
image; an image which is not tied to a specific material at all but is only 
meant to convey a proper schema661, in Ancient Greek terms, the abstract 
reality of how a rhapsode should perform. We might identify this 
abstract reality as the same no matter where it is placed, as in Ancient 
Greece where certain gestures and postures, in sculpture, dance and 
across other technai, communicated the same messages.662 In this sense, 
fashion designs would not be tangible text or visible images but 
intangible images- always copies that were originals no matter where they 
were placed. Italian fashion design as text here essentially becomes an 
icon.663 Some modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects 
like logos or silhouettes of dresses raise this issue for us. In such 
examples, taking the context of the text into account, an Italian fashion 
design could also be characterized as an intangible text, reproducible 
across material design objects to convey similar or even nuanced 
messages which are not related necessarily to the material support 
upon which they are placed. The concentric Dante text example in the 
Valentino dress noted above, despite its ability to be tangible based on 
its placement on the dress, might also be interpreted thusly. Here, an 
Italian fashion design object would not be eligible for protection as 
                                               
661 For a discussion of schema as “aiming at the continuous reproducibility of the same 
figures in different media”, see Catoni, Symbolic Articulation supra note 623 at 147. Schema 
may also be defined as “figure, general outline, silhouette, posture, or gesture.” See Id. at 
141. Schema here refers to figures communicated in the compositions of artworks, or 
invisible abstract realities, as Maria Luisa Catoni has indicated. See generally MARIA LUISA 
CATONI, LA COMUNICAZIONE NON VERBALE NELLA GRECIA ANTICA (2008). See also Catoni, 
Symbolic Articulation in Ancient Greece: Word, Schema and Image, supra n. 623 at 139- 140 
(referring to a discussion in Plato’s Cratylus, “…just as painting imitates through schema 
and chroma (meaning drawing and color) the schema and the chroma (meaning the figure 
and the color) of the imitated object…”). “Pictograms” are not the same as schema. For 
support of this point see Writing: semasiography and logosyllabography in POWELL, supra n. 
624 at 62- 71. 
662 See generally CATONI, supra note 661.  
663 As Catoni observes as applied to Alcimadas’ equation of written text with other 
imitative technai like sculpture “a text…is an eikon (image).” Catoni, Symbolic Articulation, 
supra note 623 at 132.   
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cultural property under Italian cultural property law because, like 
Giannini’s example of Petrarca’s text, it would be understood as an 
original, no matter where it is placed.    
 
A Jeremy Scott designed pair of shoes from Moschino’s Fall 2014 
Ready to Wear line may be one example of a fashion design that exists 
as an intangible text. Such a fashion design cannot be classified as 
cultural property because its cultural message is not materially 
dependent enough to necessitate the preservation of the entire fashion 
object of which it is a part. In the collection of the Museum at the 
Fashion Institute of Technology and measuring 3.5 inches high, 9 
inches long and 3.25 inches wide at its widest point, the Moschino 
shoes in question are white, yellow and red. Slingbacks, the yellow is 
on the majority of the outside part of the shoe, while the tip is red with 
a yellow curved M on it over black curved lines which seem to form a 
shadow under the yellow M. The inside of the shoe is covered by 
yellow and white stripes, and has a label “Moschino Milano” at its 
heel. Underneath, the shoe is scuffed. Carved or stamped into the sole 
is written “VERO CUOIO” “37” and there is also a label glued on to 
the sole noting “2014.46.1C/D MOSCHINO ITALY Fall 2014 Gift of 
Moschino MFIT.” Focusing on the M and looking only at the shoe, 
there is a correlation between the name “MOSCHINO MILANO” and 
the M as the first initial of that name. Moreover, “VERO CUOIO” tells 
us about the material of the shoe, although, without a knowledge of 
Italian shoe sizes, the information the “37” might convey may not be 
identified. The choices of the colors are equally unclear looking only at 
the shoe itself, including its material. Looking at other objects from the 
same collection, such as a sweater from the Moschino Fall 2015 Ready 
to Wear Collection, the choice of colors (red, yellow, black and white) 
may perhaps be identified as the common schema of the fashion object. 
Here, the common design element of color seems intangible and 
reproduced across individual fashion objects in one collection.  
 
In addition, looking more closely at the “M” and applying the standard 
above, discerning if there is a connection between this “M” and the 
material of the shoe, and applying a contextual analysis, looking at 
other objects in the cultural vicinity of the shoes, the white and yellow 
stripes, red and yellow, and the curved “M” are all the same colors and 
practically in the same positions as a McDonald’s French Fry container. 
Here the white and yellow lines are applied to the inside of the shoe 
and might also be placed on another material, but within the greater 
context of the yellow M on the red surface and the outside knowledge 
that there exists a similar looking object in a fast food restaurant, the 
message of the “M” becomes clear and, as applied on multiple Moschino 
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objects and other tangible objects does not seem sufficiently tangible to be 
classified as cultural property. The public cultural interest converges on 
the schema of the M as it is applied and understood on multiple 
materials in multiple places. The “M” and colors, while on Moschino 
materials, could also potentially communicate the ironic commentary 
on McDonald’s logo if they were placed on other materials of different 
provenance or of different raw material.  
 
Of course, the main issue and challenge with identifying the public 
cultural interest in fashion designs divorced from materiality is that a 
purely symbolic cultural message of the design might be the definitive 
factor for our cultural interest. Cultural interest may not relate at all to 
the connection between the design and its material. Such symbolic 
meaning alone, apart from an object, seems definitively outside the 
cultural property “box” under Italian law. Indeed, even when Italian 
cultural property law presumes to protect tangible objects like 
manuscripts, it grounds this preservation not in a manuscripts’ 
symbolic function but, as Giannini says, in the manuscript’s physical 
connection to the author and his creativity, or, in the case of 
audiovisual materials, to an ability to incorporate cultural expressions 
and diffuse them. Designs which are symbolic alone do not seem to do 
this. Rather, they are about standing in for a certain message, not 
communicating one or diffusing cultural expression in an absolute 
sense. Such symbolism seems better suited to the realm of trademark 
law, and not to that of cultural property law. The “as applied to”664 
requirement is not only different from “fixed”665 in copyright, but it is 
                                               
664 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2nd. Cir. 1976) (noting in 
its application of the categories of generic, descriptive, suggestive and fanciful in 
trademark law that the type of product to which the mark is applied and its use are used 
to determine the category); see also Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 
(2000) (discussing Abercrombie to note when a mark is considered distinctive in terms of 
the mark’s “primary significance…to identify the source of the product rather than the 
product itself.”) 
665 17 U.S.C. §102. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (“the fixation requirement is met whenever the work is “sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be…reproduced or otherwise communicated “for more than a 
transitory period”); Kelley v. Chicago Park District, 635 F.3d 290, 304-305 (7th Circ. 2011) 
(although applying the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, the Court explored if the work qualified 
for “basic copyright” noting “Wildflower Works is neither "authored" nor "fixed" in the 
senses required for copyright… If a garden can qualify as a "work of authorship" 
sufficiently "embodied in a copy," at what point has fixation occurred? When the garden is 
newly planted? When its first blossoms appear? When it is in full bloom? How—and at 
what point in time—is a court to determine whether infringing copying has occurred? In 
contrast, when a landscape designer conceives of a plan for a garden and puts it in 
writing—records it in text, diagrams, or drawings on paper or on a digital-storage 
device—we can say that his intangible intellectual property has been embodied in a fixed 
and tangible ‘copy.’”); see also Megan Carpenter and Steven Hechter, Function over Form: 
Bringing the Fixation Requirement into the Modern Era, 82(5) FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2014), 
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also different from “caught up” or “related to”666 in cultural property 
law.  
 
It is here that the limits of a proposed legal standard to decide how 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion designs, and therefore 
design objects, are cultural property under Italian cultural property 
law may be found. Designs which are so unmoored, so unfixed or 
unrelated to material supports may not be understood as cultural 
property. Such designs are best conceived of in terms of style and 
schema. When style and schema are so indicative of an Italian fashion 
design, not only does cultural property law seem unable to apply, but 
the legal standard becomes marred by questions of authenticity better 
suited to trademark law, as Giannini would say, a private law regime.  
 
4. The Possible Legal Limits Imposed by Intangible Schema and Style 
for Tangibility 
 
Style, the conceptual partner of schema identified above, seems to hang 
like a grey haze over a proposed legal standard for how modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design objects may be sufficiently 
tangible to be classified as cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law. Not only, as we have seen above, do certain designs 
seem best characterized as intangible texts or even intangible images, 
as schema or abstract entities that are the same no matter where they are 
placed, but they seem to communicate symbolic messages that Italian 
cultural property law is hard pressed to see as within its purview. In 
addition to these legal concerns, references to an “Italian style” in 
Italian fashion history highlight the importance of deciding what 
weight to assign to such a term in an analysis of how Italian fashion is 
part of cultural heritage and how, more specifically, Italian fashion 
design objects are cultural property.  
 
The identification of style has been extensively discussed by material 
culture scholars and art historians and its understanding in those 
quarters is indicative of something that is common across material 
iterations of objects and yet also culled from certain objects. Cultural 
property is, after all, a liminal notion667: other disciplines inform it, the 
                                               
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4984&context=flr. See also 
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 743- 744 (9th Cir., 2015) (holding an actress’ 
performance in a film uncopyrightable because the director and crew fixed her 
performance and noting the nature of film or audiovisual works, which privilege joint 
authorship and not collective authorship). 
666 See Giannini, supra note 465.  
667 CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO, supra note 63 at 47- 50 (discussing the expansion of 
cultural property into the myth of benculturalismo); Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 
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legal weight of the term is not given by the law itself. As a result, the 
way material culture scholars and fashion studies scholars see style 
might provide a clue as to whether some fashion designs are like 
intangible text, reproducible across media; like tangible text, related to 
certain materials; or even like visible images. Such analyses potentially 
help to identify what parts of Italian fashion designs might not be 
considered sufficiently related to their material support, and therefore 
not eligible to be cultural property.  
 
The use of the term style both in Italian cultural property law and in 
U.S. copyright law is at time ambiguous. In U.S. copyright law, style 
can both identify a specific expression which is copyrightable and a 
potential indicator of a commonality which cannot be copyrightable 
subject matter. In this sense, style as a term with legal weight in U.S. 
copyright law reveals itself as on the intangible and tangible spectrum 
identified above, but also as a tool for determining what is an 
unprotectable idea or protectable expression and for the application of 
the merger doctrine.668 In Italian cultural property law style, as in the 
                                               
330 at 136; TARASCO, supra note 91 at 46 (“Il bene culturale è categoria paerta all’evoluzione 
socio-culturale, di cui deve farsi espressione.”).  
667 Cassese, da Bottai a Spadolini, supra note 330 at 135- 136 (noting the difficulty of 
understanding cultural property as including all material culture under the law, although 
from both a liminal and intangible perspective).  
668 In Franklin Mint Corp v. National Wildlike Art Exchange, Inc. for example, the Third 
Circuit identified a style particular to an artist as part of a copyrightable expression and 
not as an uncopyrightable or freely able to be copied style of a period. LERNER AND 
BRESLER supra note 567 at 915 (citing and summarizing Franklin Mint Corp v. National 
Wildlike Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir., 1978)). The court noted how hard it is to 
draw a common boundary between idea/expression across the different categories of 
copyrightable subject matter: “Precision in marking the boundary between the unprotected idea 
and the protected expression, however, is rarely possible, see Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin 
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 
121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902, 75 L. Ed. 795, 51 S. Ct. 216 (1931), and the line 
between copying and appropriation is often blurred. Troublesome, too, is the fact that the same 
general principles are applied in claims involving plays, novels, sculpture, maps, directories of 
information, musical compositions, as well as artistic paintings. Isolating the idea from the 
expression and determining the extent of copying required for unlawful appropriation necessarily 
depend to some degree on whether the subject matter is words or symbols written on paper, or paint 
brushed onto canvas.” Franklin Mint Corp v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 
62, 65 (3rd Cir., 1978). In a later case, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, in which the creator of a 
cover for the New Yorker sued the movie studio for copying his cover as part of a movie 
poster, the Southern District of New York noted the “whimsical, sketchy style” as part of 
Steinberg’s copyrightable, and here inappropriately copied, expression, notwithstanding 
what we might term the common unprotectable style or idea of a “New Yorker's myopic 
view of the centrality of his city to the world” common to both the cover and the poster. 
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 706, 710 – 712 (S.D.N.Y., 1987). See also Ward v. 
Andrews McMeel Publ’g, LLC, 963 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232-233 (S.D.N.Y., 2013) (describing 
how typography, scratch off letters, colors and shapes are not copyrightable in a hangman 
book.) There are also other cases dealing with other subject matter that reveal the 
contradictory role style can play in copyright suits. See Dr. Seuss Enters, L.P. v. Penguin 
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case of the Allegory painting above, might be just as much a 
justification for considering a work to be a cultural property as not.   
 
Jules Prown defines style as “a distinctive manner or mode which, whether 
consciously intended or not, bears a relationship with other objects marked in 
their form by similar qualities…”669 He continues, “[t]he way in which 
something is done, produced, or expressed is its style. Style is manifested in 
the form of things rather than in content.”670 
 
According to Prown style is “inescapably culturally expressive…[and] 
the formal data embodied in objects are therefore of value as cultural 
evidence…[making] the analysis of style…useful for [studies] other 
than purely art historical studies.”671 In elaborating on how style is 
manifested in form, Prown takes account both of style’s relationship to 
function and its relationship to content through form:   
 
[s]tyle is manifested in the form of things rather than in content…[t]o say 
that form and content are discrete is not to say that they are unrelated. 
They affect and modify each other.672 
 
Function is the constant against which stylistic variables play… 
Functional intention obscures style. The configuration of a functional 
object, such as a tool or machine, is almost completely determined by its 
                                               
Books, U.S.A., Inc. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir., 1997) (noting a parody has to target the original, 
including the style of it that affects its substance, and not just general style), T-Peg Inc. v. 
Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97 (1st Cir., 2006) (allowing analysis of style by jurors to 
determine infringement); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t , Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir., 2010) 
(while the District court noted the “particularized, synergistic compilation and expression 
of the human form and anatomy that expresses a unique style and conveys a distinct look 
or attitude” as allowing designs features of the doll to be copyrightable, the 9th Circuit 
characterized style as part of the uncopyrightable nature of the dolls, “Mattel can’t claim a 
monopoly over fashion dolls with a bratty look or attitude, or dolls sporting trendy 
clothing- these are all unprotectable ideas”); Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir., 2017) 
(observing, although holding that Robin Thicke did infringe Marvin Gaye’s copyright in 
his song that “our decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style or 
“groove””). It must be noted that this identification of style, much like the utility or 
function of a design in the separability test, is usually made at the infringement stage of a 
copyright infringement suit, but also affects the scope of the copyright seeking to be 
protected. When a plaintiff brings an infringement suit, they need to prove ownership of a 
valid copyright before proving that the infringer copied and that the infringing work is 
substantially similar to the copyrighted one. As a result, courts often address questions of 
validity within the context of an infringement suit. See TRADE DRESS, supra note 16 at 465 
(Aspen Publishers 2010). See also Kieselstein- Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 
(1980).    
669 Jules David Prown, Style as Evidence, 15(3) WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 197, 197 (1980). 
670 Id. at 198. 
671 Id.  
672 Id.  
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purpose, and style is a peripheral consideration. Form in such a case 
clearly follows function. The configuration of an object or activity 
purposefully concerned with a message, such as a story or play, is strongly 
conditioned by that message. 673 
    
Here, we see initial similarities with the schema we spoke of above. 
Silhouettes, figures, gestures, or general outlines relate to the form of a 
thing, the figure of the object that is being imitated. As we have seen, a 
certain communicative function is also related to schema: schema is 
meant to communicate specific values, at times it must function in a 
certain way. At the same time, the values schema communicates are 
also their content. To see the relationship between schema, form, 
function and content we can return to the example of our rhapsode on 
the ancient Greek vase, which we identified as like a visible image, but 
which we might also think of as an intangible image, a visualized 
quotation which is the same no matter where it is produced. The form 
here, of a rhapsode standing upright with a stick, with text spilling out 
of his mouth, informs the schema, the figure of the rhapsode which is the 
abstract invisible reality which we identify as of a rhapsode. This 
abstract invisible reality, however, is also informed by the content of 
the message – if we are to communicate the proper way that a rhapsode 
should stand and deliver his song, how can we but portray him 
standing like this, with his stick and the text flowing? In this sense, the 
function of this visual quotation of a rhapsode is highly determinative of 
both its form and, therefore, its schema and style. If we look at other 
instances of representation similar to the rhapsode across difference 
media in Ancient Greece we see that similarities in form exist, and 
therefore that similarities in content and function of the image, exist.674 
Studies such as Aby Warburg’s which trace gestures across examples 
of the visual arts also testify to common schema throughout different 
media.675 
 
For the purposes of classifying fashion design objects as cultural 
property this overlap between style, schema and visible images or 
intangible images, like intangible text, complicates how we identify 
what is of sufficient public cultural interest to us in an object to qualify 
it as cultural property. The union of content and form, form and 
function, and then form, function, content and style with reference to 
                                               
673 Id.  
674 Maria Luisa Catoni has done this for other representations. See generally CATONI, supra 
note 661.  
675 A. Warburg, Einleitung. Bilderatlas Mnemosyne 1929, in A. Warburg, MNEMOSYNE. 
L'ATLANTE DELLE IMMAGINI (M. Ghelardi and Nino Aragno, eds. 2002) 
http://www.engramma.it/eOS/index.php?id_articolo=2991.  
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culture make it hard to justify a protection of a style or schema that is 
not specific to a particular object because that style or schema needs to 
proverbially and practically travel in order to be of cultural significance to us. 
While preserving certain relationships between the public cultural interest 
and tangible properties would support and help our understanding of cultural 
messages and therefore actuate our public cultural interest in them, 
preserving certain relationships between the public cultural interest and 
intangible properties would frustrate our understanding of cultural messages 
and therefore deny our public cultural interest in them. As a result, if we 
follow Prown’s analysis matched with Catoni’s, what we would 
identify as the style of an Italian fashion design object, a design aspect 
that is reproducible across materials that communicates the same 
message, should be outside the cultural property “box” under Italian 
cultural property law.  
 
This of course does not mean that material supports are not important 
to an analysis and identification of style. Prown, for example, goes 
about showing what style is through an analysis of multiple types of 
the same object. Looking at chairs and teapots over different periods of 
time, Prown identifies different ways in which these objects are done, 
produced, or expressed676 to identify a difference, across two groups of 
objects, between a style that is curving, twisted and inspired by organic 
forms and a style that is clean cut, geometric and abstract (in other 
words rococo and neoclassical).677  Throughout his analysis Prown 
engages with the distinct expression in individual objects in order to 
arrive at extracting a general style which applies to groups of objects. 
Materiality of the objects plays a part in Prown’s identification of the 
general style. Prown contrasts “carved mahogany”678 with “sliced 
veneers”679 noting how each material affects the different and distinct 
ways in which certain tables express their specific style (the way in 
which they are tables) and, therefore, the cultural traditions, beliefs 
and expressions of the society which created them. While one has 
“twisted ropes, leaf forms, and claw and ball feet…replicating organic 
natural objects”680, the other is “simpler and more direct…precise and 
clean cut.”681 While the function of a table may be to allow things to be 
placed on top of it, leading to the necessity of a flat surface, and a table 
may need to stand at a certain height, and therefore have legs, here 
Prown identifies variations against these functions which are not 
                                               
676 Prown, Style as Evidence, supra note 669 at 201- 205.  
677 Id. at 202. 
678 Id.  
679 Id.  
680 Id.  
681 Id.  
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dictated by it and which are instead manifested in the object’s form, 
which he defines as “the configuration of a single object including [its] 
shape (in particular) [which] can also include material, color, size, 
texture, weight.”682 The “general or widespread use of [such] a 
particular form” is then understood as a style.  
 
Prown’s identification of style seems to begin with the identification of 
certain forms, which includes taking the material into account. From 
this identification of form and its relationship with function, Prown 
arrives at style and then general cultural expressions. In order to arrive 
at identifying that style and general expression, however, Prown must 
begin with one individual object and that individual object’s 
contribution to a more general style. Each individual object seems to 
contribute, through its form, to an understanding of what general style 
is and therefore what the cultural expressions of its society are. Each 
object, through its own particular form, even seems to contribute to the 
reflection, formation and later understanding of the cultural 
expressions, beliefs and traditions of a society. In certain circumstances 
individual cultural expressions identified in this test might be tangible 
enough, so related to one particular material, to protect as cultural 
property. Given, however, that style is understood, by definition, as a 
cultural expression across forms, it does not seem to fit into the 
definition of cultural property under Italian cultural property law.  
 
The difference between certain forms that are protectable as cultural 
property and generally unprotectable and intangible styles, or schema, 
does become complicated when we apply this division to fashion 
design objects.  
 
Valerie Steele has applied Prown’s analysis to fashion objects. In her 
article A Museum of Fashion is more than a Clothes Bag, Steele applies 
Prown’s stylistic analysis to a yellow-silk late 19th- early 20th century 
dress in the collection of the Wadsworth Athenaeum in Connecticut.683 
Noting the role of function in her stylistic analysis in comparison to 
Prown’s, Steele observes that “…clothing is not simply (or even primarily) 
‘functional’, at least not in the concrete sense of the word. Clothing may, of 
course, function by telling us something about the wearer.”684 Here, the 
function of an individual fashion design object can be communicative, 
which follows from our analysis of how certain Italian fashion designs 
                                               
682 This definition was given in an e-mail from Jules Prown to the author, dated August 13, 
2018, 5:06 pm (on file with author).  
683 Valerie Steele, A Museum of Fashion is more than a Clothes-Bag 2(4) FASHION THEORY 327, 
330 (1998).  
684 Id. at 332.  
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are like tangible text, above. This communication may be understood 
from an internal analysis which Steele terms stylistic analysis, 
“concerned mainly with internal evidence…”685 This internal evidence 
and the stylistic analysis it engenders is much like the legal standard 
proposed above- it looks to place, support, messages and perhaps 
context to identify whether an Italian fashion design is tangible 
enough, so indicative of a communicative message, to be protected 
under Italian cultural property law. Here, style seems to be another 
word for the expression of a particular object. In Steele’s test, 
description, deduction, and speculation686, are all steps which are closely 
tied to the materiality of a dress and the individual message it can 
convey, notwithstanding her referral to it as stylistic. Here, the stylistic 
analysis of a dress seems about identifying how the dress, in its 
materiality, can tell us something about the wearer, specific to that 
dress. In some cases then, stylistic analysis as applied to fashion design 
objects may not necessarily frustrate an understanding of how 
individual fashion design objects might be cultural property. Indeed, 
such a stylistic analysis might help us to understand how certain 
fashion design objects are testaments having the value of civilization.  
 
A semiotic analysis, on the other hand, of certain aspects of Italian 
fashion design objects, one in which, as Steele says,  
 
we must go out of the object to understand what each sign means.  The 
sign (icon) may resemble the object it represents, as an artificial flower 
sewn on a dress stands for a real flower. The sign (symbol) is assigned an 
arbitrary meaning. The object that an icon represents may itself be a 
symbol for something else; a flower, for example, may symbolize spring 
and, by extension, youth687   
 
might identify parts of fashion design objects which are not necessarily 
tied to the tangible object, like the “M” and colors on the Moschino 
shoe example above. Here, the symbolic quality of these individual 
fashion design objects kicks them out of the proverbial cultural 
property “box.” Recalling Catoni’s mention of text as an eikon above, 
certain parts of a fashion object may act, as Steele notes, as an icon, an 
image. These same icons might so intangible, like some text, that they 
cannot enter the cultural property “box” under Italian cultural 
property law.  
 
Such a symbolic exercise as applied to fashion design objects which 
                                               
685 Id.  
686 Id. at 329. 
687 Id.  
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incorporate text seems best exemplified in Richard Martin’s 
examination in his essay Wordrobe: Messages of Word and Image in Textile 
and Apparel Design of the 1980s.688 Characterizing his examples of text on 
clothing as “phenomena of pronounced speech”689, Martin also wades 
into the fashion as art debate, showing how other examples of visual 
art also meld word and image in the same way that these items of 
fashion do.690 “Reading” is, for Martin in his essay, an exercise that 
flows from both art and fashion alongside an “iconography.”691 Using 
the tools of context and even metaphor Martin sees text in fashion as 
symbolic; he deploys semiotics, in the tradition of Roland Barthes692, to 
translate and understand the meaning of fashion that has text both on 
it and as part of its design.693 While Martin addresses 1980s Moschino 
fashion objects with text on them, he places these fashion objects 
alongside others which reproduce text outside of their intelligibility in 
a section of his essay titled Globalism and Glosolalia.694 Melding Barthes 
and Walter Benjamin, Martin notes that language used outside of its 
realm of intelligibility is a new sign or system but also “an aura, an 
inarticulate sympathy”695, which in turn makes these clothes a “true 
universal language.”696 For Martin, while it matters that text is printed 
on clothing, it only matters as much as that text conveys something no 
matter the fact that it is on a particular type of fashion or fabric, like 
other categories of works (conceptual art, books) that incorporate text. 
Indeed, when classifying other incorporations of text in fashion as 
simply decorative, such as those by Matsuda with their “floating 
letters”697, Martin compares these to “supposedly free forms of proto-
concrete poetry, Mallarme, and the collaboration of Blaise Cendrars 
and Sonia Delauney in their 1913 synaesthesia of word and image.”698 
                                               
688 Richard Martin, Wordrobe: The Messages of Word and Image in Textile and Apparel Design of 
the 1980s in TEXTILE AND TEXT, supra 654. The title of the essay, Wordrobe, published in 
1989, would also be the name of an exhibit Martin later created and curated at the 
Costume Institute of The Metropolitan Museum of Art from September 9, 1997-November 
23, 1997. For these dates see the notes surrounding the archival inventory of the 
documents of the exhibition. Subseries III.OOOO. Wordrobe (September 9, 1997-November 23, 
1997), Costume Institute Records, 1937-2008, 206- 207. 
689 Id.  
690 Id. at 4-5.  
691 Id. at 5.  
692 To whom Martin cites towards the end of his essay. See Id. at 13.  
693 Id. at 7 (discussing Stephen Sprouse as “anticipat[ing] in the artistic thrust of our time 
top [sic] examine sign, symbol, and language as both metaphor and expression of 
ourselves” in pieces in his 1980s collections which Martin presents as part of the punk 
movement).  
694 Id. at 8-9.  
695 Id. at 9.  
696 Id. at 9.  
697 Id. at 11.  
698 Id.  
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In other words, Martin sees these fashion designs as intangible images 
or intangible text. Such communicative meanings divorced from 
materiality are beyond the scope of cultural property under Italian 
cultural property law. When the public cultural interest is assigned to 
schema and, at times style, it should be a signal of the exclusion of 
Italian fashion design objects from the cultural property “box” under 
Italian cultural property law. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TOWARDS A CULTURAL PROPERTY THEORY OF 
COPYRIGHT? 
 
Having proposed a legal standard for when the public cultural interest 
in Italian fashion designs might be so connected to a tangible iteration 
as to qualify certain Italian fashion design objects as cultural property 
under Italian cultural property law, this chapter asks how protecting 
this narrow new category of Italian fashion design objects as cultural 
property is related to copyright law, both in the U.S. and in Italy. It 
identifies commonalities and differences between the two regimes by 
spotlighting their relationships to one specific category, Italian fashion 
design objects. 
 
1. Fashion Design Objects between Copies and Originals    
 
A standard for when certain Italian fashion design objects are cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law might look something 
like the following. First look to the relationship between the Italian 
fashion design and the material of which it is made or upon which it is 
placed. If the cultural message of the Italian fashion design is 
sufficiently materially dependent at this first stage, and of sufficient 
public cultural interest, then we should classify the Italian fashion 
design object as cultural property under Italian cultural property law. 
In addition, if the message of the Italian fashion design is sufficiently 
materially dependent at this first stage, but can also be repeated in 
other materials without, however, recreating the same original 
message conveyed when the fashion design was on its first material 
support, then the fashion design may be sufficiently like a visible 
image, like the composition of a painting, that the first iteration of it as 
a fashion design object may be cultural property. In some cases, there 
may be no need to consider the context in which the Italian fashion 
design exists as a second part of the test. On the other hand, context 
might also be taken into account to decide whether a tangible Italian 
fashion design object is needed in order to preserve our public interest 
in the Italian fashion design as it exists in a material iteration.   
 
Italian fashion design objects that include text are the design objects 
that seem to most easily fulfill this standard. Italian fashion design 
objects that include text, like the REAL GUCCI bag, the Moschino 
dress or even perhaps the Valentino dress, might be evaluated 
according to their particular circumstance, in light of their specific 
place, support, message, and at times context, to determine whether 
our public cultural interest is sufficiently tied to a design in them that 
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is materially dependent. At the same time, this proposed standard also 
seems to indicate when Italian fashion designs are like visible images, 
like the composition of a painting, such that they too should be 
cultural property. Some fashion designs and therefore fashion design 
objects still fall outside this test; they are those that are like intangible 
text or intangible images, which are so intangible and unconnected to 
material objects as to never be cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law. Italian fashion design objects could also, of course, be 
testaments having the value of civilization. Notwithstanding their 
incorporation of an intangible Italian fashion design, and that 
intangible Italian fashion design’s existence across multiple fashion 
design objects, certain individual objects might testify to a designer’s 
creativity or be so indicative of a certain historical moment that the 
public cultural interest in them could be actuated by protecting these 
design objects as cultural property.  
 
These different applications of the standard exist on a spectrum of 
intangibility and tangibility and can, moreover, work with other 
characteristics of Italian cultural property, like time thresholds and 
even different levels of public cultural interest (which include simple, 
particularly important, or exceptional699) to decide when Italian fashion 
design objects are cultural property. For purposes of clarity, 
summarizing these different categories which exist on a spectrum is 
useful to understand how they uniquely manage the relationship 
between the public cultural interest and tangible properties, or the 
public cultural interest and intangible properties. In addition, 
summarizing these different categories also reveals how they exist not 
only on a spectrum of tangibility and intangibility, but also on a 
spectrum of originals and copies.  
 
Tangible Text represents a union of the public cultural interest in 
certain intangible texts whose meanings are, however, tied to the 
material upon which they are placed. These tangible texts are cultural 
                                               
699 Art 10, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004 (mandating that properties display different levels of 
cultural interest depending on whose property they are in; State properties are presumed 
to be of a simple cultural interest, while those in private hands need to be of particularly 
important cultural interest to be declared as such and series and collections of objects, 
among others, need to be of exceptional cultural interest). While these levels of interest are 
seen as procedural mechanisms, they are not understood as definitive of the public 
cultural interest in a property. The historical definition of cultural interest testifies to this. 
Rosadi, for example, in explaining the 1909 law which did away with the catalog 
requirement, noted that the procedures of notice presumed that properties in private 
properties would be of a greater cultural interest. EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 213. A 
particularly important cultural interest is not definitive of a cultural property in private 
hands, rather it is a quality which justifies actions on a private property in order for it to 
be administratively declared cultural property.   
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property. The original, so to speak, is the text and the object. In a sense, 
tangible texts cannot be copied because their meaning is so materially 
dependent. The placement of the same text on a different object no 
longer means the same thing and is not of the same public cultural 
interest. Some fashion designs that incorporate text can be identified as like 
tangible text and therefore their fashion design objects are cultural property. 
 
Visible Images represent a union of the public cultural interest in 
tangible properties which have, however, conceptually separable 
intangible elements. Paintings and compositions are, here, the main 
example. These visible images are cultural property. The unicum of the 
tangible property with its intangible elements, such as a painting with 
its composition, is considered the original, while the composition 
alone is considered a copy. Some fashion designs that incorporate text or 
images might be identified as like visible images and therefore their fashion 
design objects as cultural property. 
  
Intangible Text or Intangible Images, which we may in some 
circumstances term schema or style, represent a union of the public 
cultural interest with intangible properties. These intangible texts or 
intangible images are not cultural property. The text or the image is 
understood as always an original and never a copy, or as always a 
copy which means the same thing no matter where it appears. Most 
fashion designs are like intangible text or intangible images and are therefore 
not cultural property; neither, then, are the fashion design objects of which 
they are a part.  
 
Testaments Having the Value of Civilization may be tangible 
iterations of intangible text or intangible images. These testaments 
having the value of civilization are cultural property, but they do not 
preserve the intangible text or intangible image directly. Some, and 
perhaps many, fashion design objects might be testaments having the value of 
civilization and, therefore, cultural property.  
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, this proposed spectrum of cultural 
property subject matter tweaks Giannini’s presentation of intangible 
text as beyond the scope of Italian cultural property law. In that 
presentation, Giannini notes that, where Italian cultural property law 
does not protect intangible text, other legal regimes, like copyright, 
protect intangible text by regulating private actors’ interaction with it.700 
In addition, Giannini notes that in jurisdictions where there is no 
cultural property law, cultural properties are part of a public domain. 
                                               
700 Giannini, supra note 465.  
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Two main questions arise from Giannini’s presentation. These 
questions are of particular interest to a U.S. jurisdiction in which the 
fashion industry is desirous of copyright protection and where a legal 
framework that treats movable, non-indigenous objects of cultural 
interest outside of museum collections as cultural property is not 
particularly evident. First, can copyright law at times function as a 
cultural property law for certain subject matter that is not protected 
under cultural property law? In other words, is there a commonality 
between copyrightable subject matter and cultural property under 
their respective laws? Second, and relatedly, in jurisdictions that do 
not have cultural property law for certain objects, like the United 
States, are items which might be protected as cultural property, in 
other jurisdictions, part of a public domain?  
 
Fashion designs and, especially, modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion designs objects, seem to provide an appropriate case study 
through which to explore the interactions between cultural property 
law and copyright law. This is especially the case when we think of the 
relationships between copyright law and cultural property law in 
terms of originals and copies. There are some categories that 
theoretically should be or even that might already be in U.S. copyright’s 
purview. As Amy Adler’s work explores, U.S. copyright seems best 
suited to protecting works that are always the same- that are perfect 
substitutes for one another. Fashion design is theoretically one such 
category and copyright should theoretically apply to it. Cultural 
property law may provide the answer to why U.S. copyright does not 
adequately protect fashion design as a whole in the way that it 
supposedly must by promoting progress. Cultural property law might 
explain why only certain categories of fashion design are deemed 
copyrightable subject matter in the U.S. Cultural property law might 
provide a different justification than other theories, such as Sprigman’s 
and Raustala’s. Such a justification for U.S. copyright’s treatment of 
fashion design based on Italian cultural property law, however, might 
be narrow in scope. That is, in other jurisdictions with cultural 
property laws like Italy, copyright law may be related to cultural 
property law while perhaps not fully acting as a cultural property 
legal regime. Italian copyright law, for example, explicitly recognizes 
as copyrightable subject matter fashion designs exhibiting creative 
character or artistic value by using historic, cultural metrics.701  
                                               
701 Art 2(1), L. n. 633/1941. Another difference in protection between the U.S. and Italy is 
the difference in design right protection, which has been shaped extensively in Italy by 
supranational law. For an overview of the European law of unregistered and registered 
design rights at the European Union level see TRADE DRESS, supra note 16 at 527- 560 
(Aspen Publishers 2010) (explaining “Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and 
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Examining U.S. copyright law from an original and copy perspective, 
Amy Adler has noted that certain examples of art, especially modern 
conceptual ones, do not need copyright because the norm of 
authenticity, understood here as the source or origin of a work of art, 
eliminates the need to prevent copying.702 Using the production of 
contemporary art work as her main example, Adler points to works by 
Richard Prince, which essentially copy Instagram posts, and other 
modern conceptual artworks like Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans.703 
One of the things that becomes apparent from Adler’s argument is 
that, for the norm of authenticity to replace or negate the need of 
copyright for certain works of contemporary art, the objects of 
contemporary art at issue must be conceptualized as originals with 
copies, i.e. as visible images in our spectrum. Adler seems to admit as 
much when she says that, for visual art,  
 
…the art market prizes scarcity rather than volume, and originals rather 
than copies. Although individual songs or books or movies are perfect 
substitutes for one another [with the exception of rare books and vintage 
photographs, mentioned in a footnote], the distinction between originals 
and copies forms the very foundation of the art market.704 
 
                                               
of the Council of 13 October 1998 on The Legal Protection of Design, O.J. L 289 (Oct. 28, 
1998)” and “Council Regulation 6/2002/EC of 12 December 1001, O.J. L. 3 (Jan. 5, 2002).”). 
The cultural property standard proposed in this dissertation does not foreclose that, in the 
United States, the way in which to identify whether a design has sufficient ornamental 
aspects in design patent law may also exhibit some similarities to cultural property law’s 
identification of the cultural interest in objects, even with patent’s standard of novelty. 
Such an exploration is, however, for future work and is beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation. See TRADE DRESS, supra note 14 at 297 – 373 (Aspen Publishers 2010) for an 
overview of the scope of design patent and relevant cases. It is important to note that there 
are more overlaps between this standard for cultural property protection and other legal 
regimes, even outside of fashion design. Such an overlap is already contemplated by 
works such as The Statue of Liberty, which was both given a design patent in the 19th 
century, registered at the U.S. Copyright Office, and later registered as historic property at 
the federal and state levels. See Id. at 310 (reproducing design patent image); “Statue of 
Liberty is Registered”, August 31, 1876, Timeline, The 19th Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_19th_century.html; New York: Statue of 
Liberty National Monument, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
https://www.nps.gov/articles/liberty.htm; Governor Cuomo Announces Columbus 
Monument Listed on State Register of Historic Places and Recommended to National Register, 
PRESS RELEASE, NEW YORK STATE, October 8, 2018, 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-columbus-
monument-listed-state-register-historic-places-and (noting “Other statues and buildings 
on the State Register of Historic Places include the Statue of Liberty…”).   
702 Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 313, 349 (2018). 
703 Id. at 349.  
704 Adler, supra note 702 at 331.  
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In Adler’s interpretation, it seems U.S. copyright only really works for 
intangible texts or intangible images- things which are perfect 
substitutes for each other. Indeed, Adler’s article contemplates how  
copyright, whether in its economic justifications or for other reasons 
proposed by other scholars705, may appropriately serve other categories 
of authors whose objects are valued for their copies. These objects 
include illustrations, graphic designs, and other commercial art  
 
whose markets may depend on multiple copies rather than sales of 
authentic originals, or whose markets lack the protection the art market 
provides by valuing authenticity.706  
 
Adler identifies rare books and vintage photographs as other 
categories which do not require copyright protection because “we put 
great value on the first edition.”707 Here Adler’s works seems to 
identify another category of works on our spectrum which do not need 
or should be out of copyright- testaments having the value of civilization.  
 
Adler’s article offers a first glance at the doubt that U.S. copyright is 
properly able to protect two categories of work which are firmly inside 
the cultural property “box”- visible images and testaments having the 
value of civilization. Can U.S. copyright be understood as continuing to 
protect these works, visible images and testaments having the value of 
civilization, notwithstanding its proposed inefficacy? 
 
There is also doubt that copyright is meant to apply to all the 
intangible texts and intangible images that it should protect. Certain 
authors like Sprigman and Raustala correctly note that copyright, for 
some subject matter, chooses not to apply. Indeed, Sprigman and 
Raustala, relying on the principle of innovation as the driving force of 
copyright, note, perhaps rightly so, that  
 
copying fails to deter innovation in the fashion industry because, counter-
intuitively, copying is not very harmful to originators. Indeed, copying 
may actually promote innovation and benefit originators. We call this the 
‘piracy paradox.’708     
                                               
705 See Adler’s section Attacks on the Utilitarian Model in Id. at 327- 328.  
706 Id. at 370 (Adler describes these categories of objects in terms of their author or creator: 
“One major problem with my theory is that it applies only to "visual art," and so requires 
us to separate out "artists" from other visual creators, such as illustrators, graphic 
designers, or "commercial" artists…”).  
707 Id. at 331, n. 77.  
708 Sprigman and Raustala, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 9 at 1691 (2006). See also 
LOSCHEK, supra note 103 at 135 (noting similarly that “Fashion does not create mimicry; it is 
through mimicry that clothes become fashion.”) 
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Here fashion designs seem to be like intangible text for Sprigman and 
Raustala. Identifying obsolescence and anchor trends709 as the main 
drivers of the fashion industry along with the production of new 
fashion designs, fashion, the story line goes, is about accepting specific 
trends for a short period of time and operating within a common 
framework. Copying is paradoxically good because being fashionable 
means looking like others for a specific period of time. For Sprigman 
and Raustala, the work or property at issue for copyright protection in 
fashion is line-by-line copies, or exact copies of fashion designs. These 
fashion designs are as appropriate to copy or create as derivative 
fashion designs, which are fashion designs inspired more loosely by 
another.710 Fashion design for Sprigman and Raustala seems to be the 
essence of a trend, whether that trend is defined as a dress in all its 
details or as simple as the color red. Copying this trend essence, in any 
shape or form, is appropriate and allowed under copyright because, 
for Sprigman and Raustala, the copying serves copyright law’s 
purpose: it promotes the progress of the arts and sciences. In other 
words, fashion designs are like intangible text or intangible images, 
like most conceptions of style or schema: they are originals no matter 
where they are reproduced and never, essentially, really have a copy.  
 
Adler’s article, however, and, for that matter Giannini’s, both imply 
that such intangible texts, fashion designs characterized thusly, are 
appropriately copyrightable and indeed most likely should be. In 
contrast, the argument by Sprigman and Raustala seems to suggest, 
again, that copyright law does not protect fashion because protecting 
fashion is at cross purposes with the subject matter copyright law is 
meant to protect, notwithstanding the fact that copyright works best when it 
protects things that are perfect substitutes for one another, like intangible 
text. Why? Is there a way to reconcile these two seemingly conflicting 
statements? How can fashion design be like an intangible text, 
identifiable no matter in what material or by whom it is created, 
identified as itself in its very copies, and yet be too inappropriate of a 
category of work to be protected under copyright law? Why are Italian 
cultural property law and U.S. copyright law here both inapplicable?   
 
Here we propose that the reason both legal regimes are inapplicable 
might be because U.S. copyright law seeks to act like the Italian 
cultural property regime for the category of pictorial, graphic and 
                                               
709 Sprigman and Raustiala, Paradox Revisited, supra note 11 at 1203.  
710 Id. at 1210 (2009) (“Whereas Hemphill and Suk wish to ban line-by-line copies, we find 
no reason to treat them differently from the copying done to create derivative fashion 
designs.”) 
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sculptural works. Like Italian cultural property law which, now, 
protects visible images and testaments having the value of civilization, 
U.S. copyright law, when protecting pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works, seeks to identify if a public cultural interest may exist in a 
tangible property, which may also have intangible elements. In this 
sense, for the category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, U.S. 
copyright law seeks to at the very least identify future visible images 
and testaments having the value of civilization in the interests of the 
American public.711  
 
U.S. copyright law’s concern with the existence of a possible public 
cultural interest in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work is most 
evident when U.S. copyright law decides how a category of works 
normally excluded from the pictorial, graphic and sculptural category, 
designs of useful articles, may enter the pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
category and therefore be copyrightable subject matter. When considering 
whether designs of useful articles are pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works in U.S. copyright law at the infringement stage, judicial 
decisions seems to seek to identify the intangible part of the tangible property 
to which the public cultural interest may attach. It is this intangible part of 
possible future public cultural interest in a useful article that is 
deemed copyrightable subject matter.  
 
Now, there are certain boundaries to this theory. First, U.S. copyright 
law acts at an earlier stage than Italian cultural property law. As 
detailed in Chapter 2, Italian cultural property law usually applies to 
individual objects that are classified as of historic or artistic interest 
after their author is no longer living and seventy years after their 
creation. U.S. copyright law, on the other hand, applies to pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works from the moment of their creation and 
then for seventy years after the author’s death.712 In this sense, there is 
already some overlap between U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural 
property law. An author may be no longer living and his copyright 
                                               
711 One wrinkle in this theory may be derivative works, defined as “work[s] based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. 
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” 17 
U.S.C. §101. If U.S. Copyright law seeks to identify, as part of the category of pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, future visible images and testaments having the value of 
civilization administratively decreed to be cultural property, what does that mean for 
future iterations of the copyrightable subject matter in other copyrightable subject matter? 
Is that too presumed to have the same future public cultural interest?   
712 In some cases the term may be longer (as in work for hire) or shorter. See 17 U.S.C. 
§302- 305.  
  195 
still valid when Italian cultural property law chooses to verify or 
declare that that object is of a simple or particular important cultural 
interest. Ferragamo’s Rainbow Sandals made in 1938 are a perfect 
hypothetical here. U.S. copyright law, however, even if it may have, 
for pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, elements similar to the 
Italian cultural property law regime, acts unlike cultural property law 
because U.S. copyright law operates before the complete cultural 
consensus needed under Italian cultural property law for the ascertainment of 
the public cultural interest exists. In this sense, U.S. copyright law may 
identify an ex ante public cultural interest, a possible public cultural 
interest, without, therefore, engaging in the value judgments of Italian 
cultural property law or, for that matter, Italian copyright law. Such a 
content-neutral decision on copyrightability makes sense- it is only for 
the public, after a certain period of time, to decide whether a work is of 
public cultural interest. 
 
Now, some may counter that searching for a possible future cultural 
interest in the designs of useful articles to include them in the category 
of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works is the rendering of an 
aesthetic judgment.713 The inability of judges to render aesthetic 
judgments in copyright is most often cited as a strong precedential 
rule.714 However, identifying a possibile future public cultural interest 
is not the same as rendering an aesthetic judgment. Taking a cue from 
the explanation of what the boundless cultural interest means from 
Chapter 2 above, it is easy to see how an evaluation of public cultural 
interest does not necessitate aesthetic judgment. Historical interest, 
ethnoanthropological interest and others do not always require 
aesthetic judgment. As a result, implicitly identifying a possible public 
cultural interest may not be as contrary to the principles of Bleistein, 
nor as content-based, as we might at first think. Identifying a possible 
public cultural interest with reference to Italian cultural property law 
may also address the issue of panaestheticism which Barton Beebe sees 
as the main problem in a post-Star Athletica world. In Italian cultural 
                                               
713 There is literature exploring how judges already render aesthetic judgments beyond 
copyright law and how aesthetic reasoning is in many ways part and parcel of certain U.S. 
legal regimes. See, for example, Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 
381 (2017) (identifying appropriate places for aesthetic judgment in law and proposing a 
standard for when it should be limited based on the First Amendment).  
714 Cases and secondary literature usually cite to for this precedent. See Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (while holding a circus poster worthy of 
copyright protection noting “[i]t [is] a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations…it 
would be bold to say that [pictures with a commercial value] have not an aesthetic 
value.”). Some authors suggest that the majority opinion of the Court here looked to te 
market to substitute for aesthetic judgment. See Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the 
Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV. 275, 286 (2019).  
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property law not everything is cultural property and thus not 
everything or anything “can serve as an object of aesthetic 
experience.”715  
 
The second boundary to the theory that U.S. copyright law is 
concerned with the existence of a possible public cultural interest 
when considering whether designs of useful articles are pictorial, 
graphic or sculptural works is that U.S. copyright is understood and 
explained as economically driven.716 At the same time, however, there 
are scholars who already consider the aesthetic implications of some 
copyright decisions717, and who explicitly situate copyright within the 
social and communicative nexus of cultural progress and cultural 
dialogue.718 And, even in its economic justifications, U.S. copyright law, 
                                               
715 Beebe, supra note 714 at 278.  
716 This is a generally accepted principle. Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, No. 15-866, 580 
U.S. ___ (dissenting opinion) at 7. For one premiere example of a book that treats the 
subject thusly see WILLIAM B. LANDES AND ERIC POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2009). See also Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of 
Copyright as Cultural Property in Japan and the United States, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
283, 358 (2006) (“While attempts have been made to characterize that which is protected 
by copyright as cultural treasures and so distinguish these products from advances in 
science that might be protected by the patent laws, this position has not been generally 
accepted in the United States." [citing to petitioner’s arguments in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201 (1954)] Rather, two assumptions are deemed to be at the foundation of the Copyright 
Act: 1) that it is to the advantage of an enlightened society to encourage creative additions 
to the resource of the public domain, and 2) that unrestrained and unimpeded replication 
of intangible intellectual and creative products is not in the best interests of the 
community.”) Scott’s article is a comparison of copyright in Japan, which is classified as 
part of the Japanese cultural property regime, and copyright in the United States, which is 
not part of any cultural property regime and indeed deemed separated from any cultural 
property-like concerns. The organization of Scott’s article highlights the arguments in the 
petitioner’s brief in Mazer v. Stein and partially inspires the idea that the copyright legal 
regime in the United States and the cultural property regime in Italy could be compared to 
each other, notwithstanding the fact that they are the products of two very different 
historical contexts.  
717 Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, supra note 469 (noting how certain 
decisions in different spheres of copyright doctrine reflect certain aesthetic doctrines). See 
also Beebe, Bleistein, The Power of Aesthetic Progress, supra note 27. See also Glen Cheng, The 
Aesthetics of Copyright Adjudication, supra note 469.  
718 See Adler, supra note 702 at 327- 328 (2018) (citing in part to Rebecca Tushnet, Economies 
of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Julie E. 
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007)). See 
also Beebe, Bleistein, The Power of Aesthetic Progress, supra note 27 at 346 (Beebe points to 
pragmatist aesthetics as the aesthetic progress metric by which to measure progress in 
copyright and defines aesthetic progress as measuring “the quality of ephemeral aesthetic 
experience in the present”); DRASSINOWER, supra note 52 (although not concentrating 
solely on U.S. copyright law, arguing that promoting incentives for creativity is 
insufficient as the purpose of copyright law and that copyright law is instead meant to 
protect acts of speech between persons); and CRAIG, supra note 52 at 2 (noting “The 
copyright system should be regarded as one element of a larger cultural and social policy 
aimed at encouraging the process of cultural exchange that new technologies facilitate. 
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is seen as justified by some public interest or public purpose719 and has 
a hybrid private-administrative law nature. The economic justification 
for copyright sees itself in public terms and not necessarily in private 
ones: progress is good for society as a whole and not just for 
individual authors.720 Somewhat similarly, in Italian cultural property 
law the differences between economic justifications and safeguarding 
or preservation are not so black and white. In Italian doctrine and 
jurisprudence we find discussions of economics in relation to both the 
safeguarding of heritage and the promotion of the development of 
culture. Certain Italian art historians have cited to older Italian cases 
and doctrine to argue that economic development should have a 
cultural value according to Article 9 of the Italian Constitution and 
that cultural and aesthetic values should profoundly influence the 
Italian economic order.721 Other Italian cultural property norms more 
                                               
The economic and other incentives that copyright offers to creators of original expression 
are meant to encourage a participatory and interactive society, and to further the social 
goods that flow through public dialogue.”). See also Julie Cohen, Copyright, Creativity and 
Cultural Progress in JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012), available 
at http://www.juliecohen.com/page5.php. The question of how we justify U.S. copyright 
law a part from authorial incentives also seems to be a hot topic in current intellectual 
property scholarship, as evidenced by Eva Subotnik’s paper The Fine Art of Rummaging at 
the 2019 Intellectural Property Scholars Conference at DePaul in Chicago in August of 
2019 (asking in part “What is the purpose of copyright if we substract authorial 
incentive”” and “What is copyright meant to protect post-mortum?” through the case 
study of Vivan Maier and her copyright successors.)  
719 See for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 123, 157 (2002) (noting as part of a discussion of the 
Copyright Term Extension Act: “But if an easement over land is gone once it is dedicated 
to the public, then why not a future interest in a copyright? It is dedicated to the public at 
the time of its creation.”). See also observations from the history of the Copyright Act in 
the United States infra and Hearings on the Preservation of certain Copyrighted Works 
infra. Early debates in Congress note alternatively “the belief of the framers that great 
public benefit would accrue from the partial recognition of these two kinds of property 
[referring to copyright and patent]” (Report No. 1188, Senate, May 21, 1886, to accompany 
Bill S. 2496 at 1).  
720 For this argument and an exploration of it at the “edge” of intellectual property in an 
edited volume see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF 
IP (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg, eds.) (2014) (especially Carol M. Rose, 
Introduction mentioning the traditional rationales at 2).  
721 SALVATORE SETTIS, ITALIA, S.p.A. 126 - 127 (2002) (“Abbiamo ricordato che uno dei 
principi fondamentali della nostra Costituzione (art. 9) stabilisce che ‘la Repubblica tutela 
il paesaggio e il patrimonio storico e artistico della Nazione.’ Nel più autorevole 
commentario [citing to G. Branca (a cura di), Commentario della Costituzione, Bologna 1975], 
Fabio Merusi ha mostrato che tale norma non è solo ‘sublimazione’ della legislazione 
preesistente alla Costituzione (leggi 1089 e 1497 del 1939), ma anzi vale soprattutto come 
progetto dei Costituenti per il futuro; e che essa è intesa ‘ad imporre una valenza culturale 
all’intero sviluppo economico-sociale’, tanto che lo sviluppo economico ‘dovrebbe 
manifestarsi attraverso opere ispirate non soltanto a criteri economicistici, ma anche a 
valori culturali.’ Questa lettura è stata precisata e consacrata al massimo livello da 
un’importante sentenza della Corte Costituzionale (151/1986), secondo cui l’art. 9 della 
Costituzione sancisce ‘la primarietà del valore estetico-culturale’, che non può essere 
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readily indicate the close connection between economics and 
safeguarding. The decision of Italian cultural property law to limit the 
circulation both of cultural property belonging to the State and of 
certain private property declared of particular importance722 
necessarily limits the economic value which the State and a private 
owner may potentially gain from their item of cultural property. We 
need only cite to the many examples of private owners contesting the 
designation of their property as cultural property723, or public protests 
by antiquarians about the red tape surrounding export license 
applications for items not necessarily designated as cultural property724, 
to drive home the point that a great quantity of economic resources are 
tied up in the Italian cultural property regime. In an inverse way, this 
is similar to decisions under U.S. copyright law to limit the exercise of 
a copyright holder’s right to enforce their copyright in the face of fair 
use defenses. Just as the Italian state says a private owner may not 
export a tangible cultural property because it needs to stay in Italy to 
be available to a wider public, so U.S. copyright law says that a 
copyright holder may not prevent specific viewings or even uses of 
their intangible property when it serves specific public purposes. We 
can cite to numerous examples of copyright holders’ attempts to 
                                               
‘subordinato ad altri valori, ivi compresi quelli economici’, e pertanto dev’essere esso 
stesso ‘capace di influire profondamente sull’ordine economico-sociale.’”)  For a more 
recent discussion than 151/1986 of the competences of regions and the State for the 
preservation and valorization of cultural property see, Const. Ct., n. 9/2004 available at 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do# (holding it is the exclusive 
competence of the State to regulate the education and formation of cultural property 
restorers given that restorers’ work is closely related to the object itself; therefore such 
regulation falls under the exclusive right of the State to maintain and restore cultural 
property).  
722 “Definitive exportation” is generally prohibited for objects that are considered cultural 
property in Italy, whether private or public. In some cases, the Ministry of Cultural 
Heritage may also prohibit non-definitive circulation (loans, etc) of certain private 
property of particularly important interest, post their declaration as cultural property, for 
a definitive period of time, when certain concerns are evident. See Dario Jucker, La 
circolazione dei beni culturali tra Italia e Svizzera: Le azioni di restituzione in in IL DIRITTO 
DELL’ARTE, supra note 612 in VOL 3 at 203-204. Moreover, it is important to note that even 
objects that are considered to be freely definitively exportable from the Italian territory 
must, if displaying certain characteristics, still be presented to the Italian Exportation 
Office and receive authorization to be exported. Id. Recent reforms have incorporated a 
monetary limit. See Art. 65, CODICE DEI BENI CULTURALI E DEL PAESAGGIO, D. L. n. 
42/2004, https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2014/09/15/codice-dei-beni-
culturali-e-dell-ambiente-parte-ii-beni-culturali#titolo2.  
723 See, again, T.A.R. Milano sez. II n. 6205/2007.  
724 Such protests were made by the antique dealer and Segretario Generale della Biennale 
Internazionale dell’Antiquariato di Firenze, Fabrizio Moretti, at the symposium 
Esportazione dei Beni Culturali: Italia, Regno Unito, Stati Uniti, Olanda, Germania a Confronto 
on March 28, 2017 in the Salone dei Cinquecento in Palazzo Vecchio organized by Moretti 
to coincide with and as part of activities surrounding the first G7 Meeting on Culture, but 
prior to the reform.  
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influence the free and legal use of their works725 as a complement to 
antiquarians’ call for freer exportation. Both can be characterized as 
economic restraints on specific properties justified by a wider public, 
and perhaps even cultural, interest. Some have even seemed to 
characterize fair uses in the United States under U.S. copyright law as 
“cultural heritage type uses” to which some rightsholders would be 
amenable.726 While not characterizing fair use as a preservation regime, 
congressional hearings in 2014, while exploring the efficacy of Section 
108 of the Copyright Act extending exceptions to copyright 
infringement to libraries and archives engaged in preservation efforts 
under certain circumstances, did note that “preservation activities 
could be covered by the fair use provisions of Section 107.”727 In such 
fair use cases it almost seems as though copyright law splits control of 
the development and very existence of public cultural interest between 
owners, cultural institutions and the public, leading possibly to a 
potential public cultural interest vacuum for a period of time. 
 
In addition, scholars such as Jerome Reichman have explained the 
circular and cyclical nature of copyright protection for certain types of 
design in Italy and the United States as driven by a dueling tension 
between vascillating feelings towards industrial design as fulfilling a 
historical definition of art and being more freely producible in the 
competitive market for industrial property.728 Such a presentation of 
copyright for design as related to both historical interest and economic 
concerns across jurisdictions supports a comparison of the notions of 
cultural property and copyright and their legal regimes as applied to 
fashion design and fashion design objects in Italy and the United 
States today. 
 
Just as decisions related to cultural property do not negate economic 
choices in Italy, neither might decisions related to even an 
economically-driven copyright negate some consideration in the 
                                               
725 Correspondence between copyright holders and permission seekers reveal nuanced 
negotiations for rights, often dependent on the cultivation of personal relationships 
between authors, curators and rights holders.  
726 Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 116 (testimony of Sedlik). 
727 Id. at 6.  
728 J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law--A 
Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 388-389 (1993) [hereinafter 
Reichman, Past and Current] (citing in part to  
J. H. Reichman, Design Protection after the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the 
Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 267 (1984) [hereinafter Reichman, 
Design Protection]). 
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United States of that which is broadly considered to be of cultural 
interest. In other words, much like cultural property law, U.S. 
copyright law may be just as concerned with certain property’s 
cultural use as with its economic one. This seems evident when U.S. 
courts are called upon to determine whether certain features of 
designs of useful articles are copyrightable subject matter as pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.  
 
2. Conceptual Separability and Cultural Interest: Fashion Designs as 
Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works under U.S. Copyright Law? 
 
Grounded in Article 1, Section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the 
U.S. government’s ability to legislate for copyright is rooted in the 
founding fathers’ exhortation that Congress “promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right for their respective Writings and Discoveries.”729 
This is unlike Article 9 of the Italian Constitution, written centuries 
later, which provides, “The Republic promotes the development of culture 
and of scientific and technical research. It safeguards natural landscape and 
the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation.”730 While the debate 
recorded surrounding the passage of the Constitutional clause in the 
Constitutional Convention has been characterized as short (and a full 
analysis of it is beyond the scope of this dissertation)731, suffice it to say 
that there seems to thus far be no evidence that the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution considered the Intellectual Property Clause to be a clause 
enabling cultural property-like protection. The idea might be 
                                               
729 U. S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
730 Art. 9, Constituzione [Const.] (It.) available at 
https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (in 
English). It is important to note that members of the Italian Constitutional Assembly noted 
the support the United States gave to the progress of the Arts and Sciences when debating 
the addition of the clause “La Repubblica promuove la ricerca scientifica e la 
sperimentazione tecnica e ne incoraggio lo sviluppo.” See Assemblea Costituente, Seduta di 
Mercoledì 30 Aprile 1947 at 3425, available at 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/Costituente/Lavori/Assemblea/sed106/sed106.pdf. The 
safeguarding clause, on the other hand, was deliberately inspired by the German Weimar 
Constitution and the Spanish Constitution. See Salvatore Settis, Italy’s cultural heritage: 
definition, protection, political issues, February 20, 2017, Lecture, Università Commerciale 
Luigi Bocconi, Milano. See also Andrea Ragusa, Costituzione e cultura: Il dibattito in tema di 
Beni Culturali nei lavori dell’Assemblea constitutuente, STORIA E FUTURO, available at 
http://storiaefuturo.eu/costituzione-cultura-dibattito-in-tema-beni-culturali-lavori-
dellassemblea-costituente/ (describing debate in the Constitutional Assembly and 
separate publications of studies of the United States Constitution and others prior to the 
debate over constitutional inclusion of cultural heritage).    
731 For analysis of Madison’s diaries which he kept of debate in the Constitutional 
Convention and other background on the Clause see Dotan Oliar, The Origins and Meaning 
of the Intellectual Property Clause, Working Draft September 15, 2004, available at 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/ip/oliar_ipclause.pdf. 
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entertained, however, that at least supporting the arts and sciences of 
potential public cultural interest in some way was part of the idea 
behind the clause.732 
 
Copyright in the United States is extended to   
 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.733     
 
A non-exhaustive survey reveals that, over time, much like Italian 
cultural property law, the subject matter and the term limits of 
copyright have expanded, although, as other authors have noted, 
copyright protection has never been extended to fashion designs.734 
Patents and copyrights were separated into different bills as early as 
1790, although with some overlaps throughout legislative history735, 
which also presents historical arguments about what belonged in the 
patent regime and what belongs in copyright, still a live conversation to 
this day among practitioners and legal scholars.  
 
The subject matter of the first 1790 Copyright Act included “any map, 
chart, book, or other writing…”736 Extending the subject matter of 
copyright has allowed copyright protection for items as diverse as 
books and maps, then works of art, photographs, sound recordings, and 
now even software. The advent of new forms of arts (and sciences) led 
to legislative proposals, debates and litigation over time. An 1890 bill in 
                                               
732 Oliar has observed four peculiarities to the U.S. Intellectual Property Clause, its use of 
the word “progress”, its institution of an examination system for patents and a non-
territorial definition of the word novelty, and its influence by Jefferson’s support of the 
free exchange of ideas. Id. at 52- 53. This free exchange of ideas and Jefferson’s metaphor 
of the light is used by Sprigman and Raustala in their discussion of why certain subject 
matter, like fashion designs, is unprotectable under intellectual property law. See THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, supra note 12 at 6.   
733 17 U.S.C. §102. 
734 THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, supra note 12 at 30; Hemphill and Suk, supra note 69 at 159- 
160; Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, supra note 6 at 118-119. Of 
course, the subject matter of design patent has also expanded over time, also without 
protecting fashion designs per se but potentially protecting new, original and ornamental 
designs for articles of manufacture. See Jason J. DuMont and Mark Janis, The Origins of 
American Design Patent Protection 88 INDIANA L. J. 837 (2013). Some authors characterize 
the recent emphasis on design patent protection as a change after decades of design patent 
irrelevance. See Colman, History and Principles, supra note 6 at 229- 230 (citing to Burstein).  
735 See the 1870 Patent Act which included revisions for Copyrights. Chapter V, Patent Act 
of 1870, 41 H.R. 1714.  
736 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning (1790), 
https://www.copyright.gov/about/1790-copyright-act.html.  
  202 
the House of Representatives, for example, proposed to harmonize 
copyrightable subject matter to include “any book, map, chart, dramatic or 
musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof 
or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs 
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts…”737 This harmonization 
extended protection to works of visual art738 but also cemented previous 
inclusions of historical prints and photographs.739 All this diverse subject 
matter was deemed properly derived from the U.S. Constitution’s 
reference to “writings.”740 In the midst of these changes the U.S. 
Congress also allowed for international copyrights and extended rights 
to non-U.S. citizens in the shadow of the Berne Convention.741 Of course, 
differences in terminology are also historical.742 A great extension of 
subject matter occurred in 1909 when musical compositions were 
included alongside, of most interest for our purposes, “works of art 
models or designs for works of art, reproductions of a work of art, drawings or 
plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs, and prints and 
pictorial illustrations” were included.743 This extension actually went 
beyond international law at the time by not derogating as much as it 
could from the Berne Convention. Under the Berne Convention nations 
could, at the time, provide greater exceptions to the “granting to 
authors of musical works…the exclusive right to control the 
reproductions of their compositions by mechanical means.”744 Instead of 
reading this exception broadly, the United States chose to extend a right 
to compensation to authors of musical works even when their musical 
compositions were allowed to be copied under the law.745 Celluloid 
motion pictures were later included in extensions of copyrightable 
                                               
737 H.R. 10881, 51st Congress, 1st Session (1890).  
738 For a timeline of such changes from the point of the view of the Copyright Office see 
The 19th Century, COPYRIGHT.GOV, 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_19th_century.html.   
739 Id. See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). See also 
Copyright in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 19TH CENTURY PHOTOGRAPHY (John Hannavy, ed., 2008).  
740 Colman, History and Principles, supra note 6 at 225, 236, n 31 (citing to 1907 Senate 
Report). 
741 For one example of the discussions in the Senate see Report No. 1188, Senate, May 21, 
1886, to accompany Bill S. 2496 at 3 (noting intent to extend international comity but 
concerned with protecting “American publishers and the American artisans who make 
the books in this country”). See also February 1909 Currier Report, House of 
Representatives at 6.  
742 Colman, History and Principles, supra note 6 at 236 (noting different definitions of science 
in colonial times as “an organized system of knowledge that was the product of 
authorship and was to be protected by copyright laws” (citing to Ng)).    
743 H.R. 28192, Copyright Act of 1909, Public Law 60-349, 60th Congress (1909).  
744 February 1909 Currier Report, House of Representatives at 6. The Report also cites the 
copyright laws of Italy in effect at the time. Id. at 7-8.  
745 Here the report refers to what we would today categorize as mechanical licenses. See 
Id. at 6.  
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subject matter included in 1912.746 
 
As the subject matter of copyright expanded, U.S. courts found 
themselves adjudicating cases of copyright infringement and deciding 
the scope of the copyrightable subject matter enumerated in the statute. 
Such was the case in the 1954 case Mazer v. Stein. In the case the 
copyright holder of a statuette as a work of art, and a partner in a 
manufacturing firm who sold the copyrighted works both as 
independent statues and as part of lamps as lamp bases, sued another 
manufacturer who copied these statuettes works and also incorporated 
them into lamp bases and sold them.747 The case reached the Supreme 
Court where, in their briefs, the parties argued over the copyrightability 
of the statuettes at issue. The issue was of fundamental importance 
because the Copyright Act in force at the time arguably did not extend 
copyright to objects that were not considered as belonging to the arts. 
The parties in the case used the Cellini salt cellar in their briefs as an 
example of their arguments. Both parties characterized the salt cellar as 
copyrightable for different reasons – the party accused of copying its 
competitor’s lamp bases argued that the Cellini salt cellar was 
copyrightable because the piece only had a “theoretical utility” and 
because it could not be reproduced.748 The statuettes as lamp bases, in 
contrast, had a practical utility and could not be copyrighted. The party 
who owned the copyright, on the other hand, argued against a narrow 
theoretical utility which would deny copyrightability, and argued that a 
salt cellar such as Cellini’s was like other “[a]rtistic incense burners, 
mugs, cups, plates, candle holders, and the like”749 which should be 
copyrighted because “[a]rt objects having direct usefulness form a great 
class of artistic expression.”750 The statuettes here would be 
copyrightable whether they were useful or not because they were, in 
any event, artistic. The Court in Mazer held that the statuettes were 
copyrightable. 
 
In today’s discussions surrounding what is copyrightable about designs 
of useful articles, the Mazer case is usually discussed as one bend in the 
longer road of factoring out functionality. Functionality is a bar to 
copyrightability under U.S. copyright law and most discussions of 
whether features of a design of a useful article are or are not 
copyrightable as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work have centered 
on whether a feature is functional or not. It is usually deemed important 
                                               
746 Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing, supra note 835 at 12.  
747 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954). 
748 Brief for Petitioners at 16, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
749 Brief for Respondents at 14, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
750 Id.  
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that the Court in Mazer found the statuettes copyrightable by applying 
the U.S. Copyright Office’s regulations which defined copyrightable 
works of art as  
 
[including] works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not 
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic 
jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works belonging 
to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture.751  
  
The line in these regulations is understood as distinguishing between 
useful articles, which are firmly outside of U.S. copyright law, and how 
to conceptualize the broad understanding of what is the “art”, or what 
are the non-functional elements of useful articles or the form, which is 
indeed copyrightable. How to determine what is functional and what is 
not about the design of a useful article, an almost impossible task given 
the union of form and function in design752, is understood as the sine qua 
non of determining copyrightable subject matter. In certain amici briefs to 
the latest separability case at the U.S. Supreme Court this task has 
evolved to include discussions of the differences between applied art 
and industrial design with reference to U.S. copyright’s legislative 
history.753 It has also led to proposed differences between original 
expressive content or aesthetic/informational utility and “’useful 
processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of 
matter’.”754 
 
In light of our discussion of Italian cultural property law, however, the 
importance of the Mazer opinion seems to lie in the separation the Court 
seemed to be making, not between functional and non-functional, but 
between visible images, intangible text/intangible images and tangible 
text. That is, Mazer suggests that the bright line rule for copyrightability 
is between properties culturally valued for their ability to be caught up 
in tangible property and yet also reproduced in others and properties 
which are culturally valued only for a unique relationship between that 
value and a tangible property. The former is copyrightable subject 
matter, the latter are not. This is what function may really be about: the 
cultural value of a tangible property lies in its specific use; its cultural 
value does not lie in its intangible elements or in its existence across 
specific tangible properties. It is for this reason that it is not 
                                               
751 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 212 - 213.  
752 See supra.  
753 Brief amicus curiae on behalf of Intellectual Property Professors in support of Petitioner 
at 5-6, Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al, Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ 
(2017). 
754 Brief of Fashion Law Institute et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24- 27, 
Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).   
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copyrightable subject matter. Giannini’s discussion of the identification 
of the cultural value of, and our cultural interest in, certain cultural 
properties is relevant here. Giannini essentially said that there is an 
ambiguous correspondence between cultural value and commercial 
value of a thing.755 Cellini’s salt cellar discussed in the Mazer case is a 
great example of this. Cultural interest can exist alongside of, and in the 
same object as, useful objects which might also have value on the 
market as such. This is another way of characterizing the functionality 
versus non-functionality debate: useful objects (functional, economic) 
can have cultural (non-functional, non-economic) parts. Indeed, there 
are even more boundaries that can be crossed here- cultural can be 
functional and even economic if functionality is defined as conveying 
information or portraying appearance.756 Intrinsic functionality may 
even be considered cultural for some objects.757 We can think of useful 
objects as non-economic if they are placed in a cultural context. It is easy 
to see how debating functionality in terms of use and economic value 
leads us to a never-ending circle. Rather than debating functionality or 
non-functionality, economic or not economic, let us consider the 
differences between tangibility and intangibility in Giannini’s terms as 
applied to U.S. copyright. Let us imagine what parts of any article, useful 
or not, can be pictorial, graphic and sculptural works because these 
parts are of some potential cultural interest. If the part is of possible 
cultural interest because it is tangible- its cultural meaning is tied to the 
tangible object, it will not be a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. If the part 
is of possible cultural interest because of its intangibility- its ability to exist 
in multiple tangible iterations (whether or not it refers back to its first tangible 
iteration) and still be of cultural interest- then it will be a pictorial, graphic or 
sculptural work.  
 
To emphasize that a reading of cultural property into this precedent is 
not too unexpected, let us note how the Mazer Court made a passing 
observation in its opinion about cultural treasures. The Court noted 
how the party accused of copying the statuettes in the case had 
suggested that  
                                               
755 Giannini, Beni Culturali, supra note 466 at 26 [translation own].  
756 A definition of function which was in fact proposed in one of the Amici Curiae briefs in 
the Star Athletica v. Varsity case, when Chris Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer proposed 
that lines as part of dress designs that make the wearer thinner should be functional, 
despite the fact that these lines could also be characterized as portraying appearance. Brief 
of Professors Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 29, 
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. et al, No. 15-866 Star, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).  
757 Which seems to be implied in a recent article in which Robert Denicola has argued for 
emphasis on an intrinsic utilitarian functionality of separated pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural features to understand the Court’s test in Star Athletica. Robert C. Denicola, 
Imagining Things: Copyright for Useful Articles after Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 79 UNIV. 
OF PITTSBURGH L. REV. 635 (2018).  
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‘Fundamentally and historically, the Copyright Office is the 
repository of what each claimant considers to be a cultural 
treasure, whereas the Patent Office is the repository of what 
each applicant considers to be evidence of the advance in 
industrial and technological fields.’758        
 
Declining to pass judgment on the accuracy of that statement, but 
characterizing it as desiring a ruling that what is patentable is not 
copyrightable, the Court held only that patentability does not exclude 
copyrightability and vice versa.759 In other words, there is something 
common and yet also uncommon to the patent and copyright regimes.  
 
While the Court here refers to the commonality that exists across 
intellectual property law regimes, its mention of cultural treasures 
suggests that what may also be common across copyright law and 
cultural property law is the intangible public cultural interest that 
attaches either to intangible objects, tangible objects with intangible 
elements, or tangible objects. In this dissertation’s view, U.S. copyright 
law essentially extends protection to a potential (because of its term 
limits) public cultural interest in intangible elements of tangible 
property, like the compositions of a painting, and to most intangible 
text or intangible images which are the same no matter where they are 
placed. It should not, however, in the specific category of pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, allow copyright to exist when a potential 
public cultural interest attaches to a tangible, useful object alone. At the 
very least, the scope of that copyright should be infinitesimally small.      
 
Imagining how cultural interest attaches to tangible and intangible 
elements of property is what the separability test in the United States, 
even prior to the Star Athletica case, seemed to be about. After the 
Mazer decision, the U.S. Copyright Office instituted a new standard by 
which to determine the scope of copyrightability for such objects, in 
light of the Courts’ note in Mazer that certain objects could be both 
patented and copyrighted. The standard read  
 
‘If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that it is 
unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a [copyrightable] work 
of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, 
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can 
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work 
                                               
758 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 215.  
759 Id. at 217.  
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of art, such features will be eligible for [copyright].’760          
 
This standard was then incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act as 
part of the re-definition of ‘works of art’ in the 1909 Act as pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works.761  
 
The definition applied today reads 
 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied 
art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. 
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their 
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the 
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, 
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.762 
 
A useful (non-copyrightable) article, outside the pictorial, graphic and 
sculpture works category is defined as an  
 
…article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article 
that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article’.763 
 
This “be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently 
of” evolved over time into the separability test, which was 
characterized as being of two types - physical or conceptual. In the 
physical separability test, courts, often deciding at the infringement 
stage764, would ask if the decorative parts of an object could be actually, 
physically separated from the useful object: as one court put it, using 
Nimmer’s example, the jaguar on top of the aptly-named Jaguar car is 
still a decorative jaguar sculpture whether it is on the car or not.765 The 
                                               
760 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) as cited to in Brief amicus curiae on behalf of Intellectual 
property professors in support of petitioner at 5, Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, 
Inc., et al, Docket No. 15-866 (2018). 
761 Id.  
762 17 USC §101.  
763 17 U.S.C. §101.   
764 This is because ownership of a valid copyright need to be proved before proving that 
the infringer copied and that the infringing work is substantially similar to the 
copyrighted one. TRADE DRESS, supra note 16 at 465. See infra.   
765 “What must be carefully considered is the meaning and application of the principle of 
‘conceptual separability.’ Initially, it may be helpful to make the obvious point that this 
principle must mean something other than ‘physical separability.’ That latter principle is 
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conceptual separability test was not as straight forward. It had 
numerous different iterations in different jurisdictions. Some of these 
different conceptual separability tests were applied to fashion design 
objects, others were applied to mannequins, fish models, and bicycle 
racks.   
 
Here are some examples. The U.S. Copyright Office usually asked if 
“the artistic feature and the useful article could both exist side by side 
and be perceived as fully realized, separate works”766. The Second 
Circuit crafted various tests. In Kieselstein-Cord, it held belt buckles 
copyrightable by reasoning that the buckles’ “primary ornamental 
aspect” was “conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian 
function.”767 The court also mentioned the buckle’s inclusion in the 
collection of The Metropolitan Museum of Art, the designer’s 
inspiration from art nouveau, and the fact that some consumers wore 
the buckle as jewelry.768 In Carol Barnhart, the Second Circuit 
emphasized necessity, holding mannequins with hollowed out rears 
made to display clothes were not copyrightable because such a shape 
was necessary for the performance of their utilitarian function, unlike 
the belt buckles in Kieselstein whose “unique artistic design” was 
unnecessary for performance of the utilitarian function of a belt 
buckle.769 In the same case, Judge Newman’s dissent argued for an 
application of a test that would ask whether “[the useful] 
article…stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is 
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function”; that is, a 
design of a useful article would be conceptually separable and 
therefore copyrightable subject matter “whenever the design creates in 
the mind of the ordinary observer two different concepts that are not 
inevitably entertained simultaneously.”770 To concretize his test Judge 
Newman gave the example of an “artistically designed chair displayed 
in a museum.”771 In a third case, Brandir, where the design of a RIBBON 
Rack bicycle was found uncopyrightable since its designer, although 
adapting the rack from a minimalist sculpture, had adapted “the 
                                               
illustrated by the numerous familiar examples of useful objects ornamented by a drawing, 
a carving, a sculpted figure, or any other decorative embellishment that could physically 
appear apart from the useful article. Professor Nimmer offers the example of the 
sculptured jaguar that adorns the hood of and provides the name for the well-known 
British automobile…With all of the utilitarian elements of the automobile physically 
removed, the concept, indeed the embodiment, of the artistic creation of the jaguar would 
remain.” Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1985).   
766 Cited in Varsity, slip op., at 17-19.   
767 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d at 994.   
768 Id. at 990.  
769 Carol Barnhart, 773 F. 2d at 419.   
770 Carol Barnhart, 773 F. 2d at 422-423.   
771 Id.  
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original aesthetic elements to further a utilitarian purpose”772, the 
Second Circuit embraced Professor Denicola’s test requiring an 
examination of the process of the designer. This same test was also 
embraced by a majority of the Seventh Circuit in the Pivot case when it 
found a mannequin head that displayed a “hungry look” 
copyrightable since the mannequin “was the product of a creative 
process unfettered by functional concerns.”773 In the same Pivot case, 
however, Judge Kanne in his dissent called for the same mannequin to 
not be considered copyrightable because its aesthetic functions could 
not be separated from its utilitarian function as a teaching aid to 
beauty students, characterizing the “hungry look” not as a separable 
feature, but as an aspect of the mannequin’s utility.774 The Fifth Circuit 
in Galiano, a case also involving uniforms, using a likelihood-of-
marketability test, held designs of casino uniforms were not 
copyrightable because they could not be marketed only for their 
aesthetic qualities, but were, rather, only marketable because of their 
function as casino uniforms.775 The court seemed to suggest that certain 
designs in costume museums might potentially meet their test and be 
copyrightable.776 The Patry test would have found pictorial, graphic 
and sculptural features of a useful article copyrightable if these 
features were separable from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article 
and if “aesthetics dictates the way that the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features appear”, not form or function.777 Another approach 
considered both the extent to which a designer’s process was dictated 
by aesthetics and the extent to which the design of the item itself was 
dictated by function.778  
 
                                               
772 Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987).   
773 Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 932 (7th Cir. 2004).   
774 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d 913 at 934. (“To be copyrightable, the statute requires that the 
useful article's functionality remain intact once the copyrightable material is separated. In 
other words, Pivot Point needs to show that Mara's face is not a utilitarian “aspect” of the 
product “Mara,” but rather a separate non-utilitarian “feature.” The majority, by looking 
only to whether the features could also “be conceptualized as existing independently of 
their utilitarian function ” and ignoring the more important question of whether the 
features themselves are utilitarian aspects of the useful article, mistakenly presupposes 
that utilitarian aspects of a useful article can be copyrighted. If we took away Mara's facial 
features, her functionality would be greatly diminished or eliminated, thus proving that 
her features cannot be copyrighted.”) 
775 Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Company, 416 F.3d 411, 421- 422 (5th Cir., 2005). 
776 Galiano, 416 F.3d at 422. (“Gianna correctly notes that there are costume museums and 
that they are replete with extravagant designs that might also have utilitarian qualities, 
but Gianna does not demonstrate that its designs describe such material. We therefore 
affirm the denial of summary judgment.”) 
777 Varsity Brands et al v. Star Athletica, No. 14-527, slip. op at 19 (6th Cir., August 19, 
2015). 
778 Id.  
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In these examples, it seems as though courts, when looking at designs 
of many different types of useful objects, were already trying to 
understand where the cultural interest might lie in these designs. 
Sometimes the cultural interest seems to be wedded to properties’ 
tangibility and, in some cases to the useful elements of that very 
tangibility: as in the hollowed out rears of mannequins. At other times 
the cultural interest seems to exist in properties’ intangible elements 
that are just embedded in a tangible object- a “hungry look” embedded 
in a mannequin, like the image of a Van Gogh sunflower is embedded 
in the Sunflower canvas; the design elements of a chair that can be 
characterized as artistic no matter what chair they are in, or the artistic 
design of belt buckles that can exist across belt buckles. Without 
crafting their reasoning in these intangible/tangible terms, the courts’ 
different opinions and different tests seemed to result in counter-
intuitive results. 
 
2.1 Fashion Designs as Copyrightable Subject Matter when like 
Visible Images 
 
Thanks to the counter-intuitive results of the previous separability 
tests, the United States Supreme Court accepted certoriari in the case 
Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc in 2016. In the case Varsity 
Brands, Inc. (Varsity), a corporation which “designs, manufactures, 
and sells apparel and accessories for use in cheerleading”779 registered a 
number of its cheerleading designs with the U.S. Copyright Office in 
2007 and 2008.780 [Figure 30] The designs, consisting of chevrons, zig-
zags and color blocks on the uniforms, were alternatively classified as 
“two-dimensional artwork” and as “fabric design (artwork).”781 The 
                                               
779 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422 at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2014).   
780 For a full list of the designs registered by Varsity see Copyright Office Search Results, 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://cocatalog.loc.gov (Search “Varsity”). For images of the specific 
designs at issue in the case see Varsity, slip op., at 4-5. On a substantive note, copyright 
exists in works as soon as the work is created but registration gives a copyright owner 
certain rights, including the right to sue. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled that 
final registration by, and not only application to, the Copyright Office is dispositive for a 
copyright owner’s enforcement of his copyright. See Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. 
Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al., No. 17–571, 586 U.S. ___ (2019).  
781 Compare Varsity, 2014 WL 819422, at *2 (“Varsity registered five cheerleading uniform 
designs with the Copyright Office for the following Varsity design numbers: 074, 078, 
0815, 299A, and 299B. (Pg. ID # 2230–31.) For three of these designs (074, 078, and 0815), 
Varsity submitted a sketch of the uniform as deposit material and the nature of the work 
and authorship is listed as “2–dimensional artwork.” For the remaining two uniforms 
(299A and 299B), Varsity submitted a photograph of a completed uniform incorporating 
the design as deposit material, the nature of the work is listed as “fabric design (artwork)” 
and the nature of authorship is listed as “2–dimensional artwork.” (Pg. ID # 2231–36.)”) 
with Varsity, slip op., at 3 (“Varsity sought and received copyright registration for “two-
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copyrightable nature of these uniform designs is directly relevant for a 
consideration of how certain modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
designs may be copyrightable subject matter under U.S. law. The 
artistic features of the designs of cheerleading uniforms at issue in the 
case display many similarities to Italian fashion design objects which 
have also used the uniform as an inspiration for the designs of their 
fashionable clothing. We need only think of Giorgio Armani’s 
uniforms for the Italian Olympic team, Alberta Ferretti’s recent 
uniforms for Alitalia stewardesses, or Gucci’s hot pink ski jackets.782 In 
2010 Star Athletica, another company that “markets and sells uniforms 
and accessories for football, baseball, basketball, lacrosse, and 
cheerleading”783, presented cheerleading uniforms for sale in its catalog 
which Varsity thought were substantially similar to Varsity’s 
copyrighted designs, and therefore infringing.784 Varsity sued Star 
Athletica for copyright infringement. 
 
Concentrating on separating the stripes, chevrons and zig-zags from 
the cheerleading uniform, the useful article, while keeping the 
cheerleading uniform or useful article intact, the District Court asked 
“Can a cheerleading uniform be conceived without any ornamentation or 
design, yet retain its utilitarian function as a cheerleading uniform?”785 No, it 
answered, it cannot: “a cheerleading uniform loses its utilitarian function as 
a cheerleading uniform when it lacks all design and is merely a blank 
canvas.”786 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit the decision was reversed: the 
chevrons, stripes and color blocks were held to be copyrightable. 
Defining the function of a cheerleading uniform more narrowly, and 
asking then whether the stripes, chevrons and color blocks were 
copyrightable pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, the Sixth Circuit 
noted that defining a useful article based on its decorative ability 
would rule out the copyrightable nature of nearly all artwork and still 
other subject matter protected as pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works under U.S. copyright law.787 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 
                                               
dimensional artwork” for many of its designs, including the following designs, which are 
the subject of this lawsuit.”). 
782 The latter, described as “Gucci (Tom Ford) Jacket (right) Pink polyester, nylon, spandex 
blend, circa 1995, Italy, 2008.25.4, gift of Dorothy Schefer Faux” was on display in the 
Museum at the Fashion Institute of Technology’s 2016 exhibition, Uniformity. See 
http://exhibitions.fitnyc.edu/uniformity/?url=athletics/uniformity-athletics-spyder-
gucci-1.  
783 Varsity, slip op., at 5. The District Court opinion described Star as “a marketer and 
designer of various sports apparel.” Varsity, 2014 WL 819422, at *1.   
784 For a description of a suit of infringement see Varsity, 2014 WL 819422, at *1.   
785 Id. at *8.  
786 Id. at *8.  
787 Varsity, slip op., at 26 (“To the extent that Star contends that pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian aspects of a 
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chevrons, stripes and color blocks were indeed transferable, and that 
they were interchangeable between uniforms themselves, and 
therefore not tied to the uniform’s function of covering the body.788 The 
Sixth Circuit expressly compared the chevrons, stripes and color blocks 
to art, noting that “‘nothing (save perhaps good taste) prevents’ 
Varsity from printing or painting its [graphic] designs, framing them, 
and hanging the resulting prints on the wall as art.”789 The only thing 
the Sixth Circuit explicitly left out of its decision was what it 
characterized as dress design: “[that] which ‘graphically sets forth the 
shape, style, cut, and dimensions for converting fabric into a finished 
dress or other clothing garment…’”790  
 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where the Court affirmed the decision, holding the chevrons, stripes 
and color blocks copyrightable subject matter. Prior to the Court’s 
decision, at oral argument, some comments made by the Justices 
revealed an awareness and concern for a cultural interest in fashion 
design objects. As part of a discussion about the potential ramifications 
of infringement, Justice Breyer, who later dissented in the case791, asked  
“What about the woman or the man who wishes – and indeed, this is a normal 
reason for wearing clothes – they are making a statement about themselves? 
They’re saying who they are? The clothes on the hangar do nothing, the 
clothes on the woman do everything. And that is, I think, what fashion is 
about.”792  Justice Breyer also pondered “Why do we [referring to the 
Justices] wear robes?”793  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision abolished the distinction between 
physical and conceptual separability. Interpreting the separability 
phrase in the definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works 
                                               
cheerleading uniform because they serve a decorative function, see Appellee Br. at 51–52, 
we reject that argument. Such a holding would render nearly all artwork unprotectable. 
Under this theory of functionality, Mondrian’s painting would be unprotectable because 
the painting decorates the room in which it hangs. But paintings are copyrightable. It 
would also render the designs on laminate flooring unprotectable because the flooring 
would be otherwise unattractive. But the Copyright Act protects flooring designs that 
“hid[e] wear or other imperfections in the product.” [inner citations omitted]). 
788 Id. at 29.  
789 Id. at 28 (citing to Home Legend, 784 F.3d at 1413).   
790 Id. at 28- 30. Emphasis my own.  
791 See generally Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___(dissenting opinion).  
792 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Star Athletica LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al, 
Docket No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).  Justice Breyer’s comments have been noted as 
glossing over the importance of physical bodies in fashion and fashion design. See Ann 
Bartow, Barbie in Bondage: What Orly Lobel's Book You Don't Owe Me: How Mattel v. 
MGA Entertainment Exposed Barbie's Dark Side Tells Us about the Commoditization of 
the Female Body, 29 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 435, 469 (2019). 
793 Id.  
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mentioned above, the Court created the following standard:  
 
a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for 
copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or 
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) 
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—
either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if 
it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 
incorporated.794 
 
Much of the Court’s decision-making process occurred in the second 
part of the test. For the Court, the simple identification and perception 
of features of a useful article that have pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
elements and may be considered a work of art is “not onerous.”795 The 
second part of the standard, however, involves separating out those 
features and making sure they themselves are not useful articles. It is 
in this part of the test that similarities to Italian cultural property law’s 
protection of the relationship between the public cultural interest and 
tangible properties which display intangible elements, in other words 
visible images, appear. In its reasoning, the Court seems to be 
attempting to conceptually identify whether there is a part of the 
design of the cheerleading uniform that, like a composition in a 
painting, can be of cultural interest and, therefore, copyrightable.  
 
The Court noted  
 
respondents have applied the designs in this case to other media of 
expression—different types of clothing—without replicating the 
uniform… The decorations are therefore separable from the uniforms and 
eligible for copyright protection [although not necessarily copyrightable].796 
 
This identification of the intangibility of some features of the design 
was central for the Court because it indicated a difference between 
“correspond to the shape of” and “replicate”797. Replication would 
imply that these elements were necessarily always the same as the 
useful article of a uniform. If the designs replicated the useful article, 
the intangible elements of the designs would always need the tangible 
property, more so that pictorial, graphic and sculptural works’ 
                                               
794 Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (majority opinion) at 1.  
795 Id. at 7 (“The first requirement—separate identification—is not onerous. The 
decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or three-
dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”)  
796 Id. at 11.  
797 Id. at 11.  
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characterization as being “fixed” in a material form.798 Indeed, the U.S. 
copyright statute specifically indicates that copyright is only an 
intangible right that is separate from the tangible object in which it is 
“fixed.”799  If the chevrons, stripes, and color blocks replicated the 
useful article- if, in our interpretation, they always needed the material 
support of a specific dress to convey the cultural message of a 
cheerleading uniform- then they would essentially replicate not only 
the useful article but the tangible useful article at that. This is not fixation, 
but impermissible replication.   
 
Corresponding to the shape of, in contrast, would imply that, at times, 
these stripes, color blocks and chevrons, even if they did happen to 
correspond to the outline of a uniform800 in their configuration, or even 
if they corresponded to the uniform’s style or to its schema, could still 
communicate a message that had absolutely nothing to do with any 
useful function associated with the tangible uniform (wicking moisture 
away, but which also, according to the Court, included identifying a 
cheerleader as such, etc.). This corresponding to the shape of is like the 
intangible composition of a tangible painting. U.S. copyright, at least 
when deciding how designs of useful articles are pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works, does not seek to protect the tangible painting with the 
visible image, but the visible image itself. Identifying designs of useful 
articles that qualify as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works is about 
identifying features of the design which embody the possible 
relationship between the public’s cultural interest and an intangible 
aspect of the design which is only related to a tangible property and 
does not replicate it.  
 
The Court gave two examples of a guitar and a fresco as instances 
where pictorial, graphic and sculptural works might correspond to the 
shape of, but not necessarily replicate a useful article, like the designs 
at issue. These examples allow us to bring the argument that 
separability is about identifying a public cultural interest in intangible 
elements of tangible objects home. When discussing a fresco, the Court 
                                               
798 Fixed is defined as “when [a work of authorship is] embodi[ed] in a’ ‘material objec[t] . . 
. from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.’” Star, 
No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (majority opinion) at 3 (citing to 17 USC §101).   
799 17 USC §202. (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a 
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is 
embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy . . . in which 
the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work 
embodied in the object…”) 
800 Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (majority opinion) at 11 (“Petitioner similarly argues that 
the decorations cannot be copyrighted because, even when extracted from the useful 
article, they retain the outline of a cheerleading uniform… This is not a bar to copyright.”)  
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noted that a fresco’s “track[ing of] the dimensions of the surface on which it 
was painted”801 did not mean it could lose protection as a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work.  
 
Just as two-dimensional fine art corresponds to the shape of the canvas on 
which it is painted, two-dimensional applied art correlates to the contours 
of the article on which it is applied. A fresco painted on a wall, ceiling 
panel, or dome would not lose copyright protection, for example, simply 
because it was designed to track the dimensions of the surface on which it 
was painted.802 
 
Likewise, just because a drawing on a guitar follows the shape of a 
guitar, does not mean that it always performs the function of a guitar 
no matter where that drawing is placed. The drawing on a guitar may 
correspond to the shape of the useful object, but it does not replicate the 
tangible object and its uses when it is placed on another tangible object. The 
design of a guitar does not always allow you to play the guitar. A 
cultural interest may exist in the design of the guitar apart from 
whether the guitar can be played or not: 
 
consider, for example, a design etched or painted on the surface of a guitar. 
If that entire design is imaginatively removed from the guitar’s surface and 
placed on an album cover, it would still resemble the shape of a guitar. But 
the image on the cover does not “replicate” the guitar as a useful article. 
Rather, the design is a two-dimensional work of art that corresponds to the 
shape of the useful article to which it was applied.803  
 
Here, for these specific chevrons, stripes and color blocks, the Court 
seems concerned with identifying visible images, and not intangible text 
or intangible images, as part of the pictorial, graphic and sculptural work 
category of U.S. copyright. For both frescos and designs of useful articles 
like guitars or cheerleading uniforms, the issue is whether the Court 
can identify an intangible part of a tangible property that is susceptible 
of being reproduced elsewhere but still might refer to its original place 
of fixation, while not replicating the entire object in which this intangible 
element is fixed. Eventually, this is the type of intangible element to 
which the public may attach their cultural interest in the future.  
 
As part of its reasoning the majority of the Court also noted   
 
To be clear, the only feature of the cheerleading uniform eligible for a 
                                               
801 Id.  
802 Id.  
803 Id.  
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copyright in this case is the two-dimensional work of art fixed in the 
tangible medium of the uniform fabric. Even if respondents ultimately 
succeed in establishing a valid copyright in the surface decorations at issue 
here, respondents have no right to prohibit any person from manufacturing 
a cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and dimensions to the ones 
on which the decorations in this case appear. They may prohibit only the 
reproduction of the surface designs in any tangible medium of 
expression—a uniform or otherwise.804 
 
This seems to touch on the, albeit fine, difference between the 
cheerleading uniform as uncopyrightable because it is a tangible union 
of intangible design and tangible property and the features of the 
design as copyrightable because these features only refer back to the 
tangible object while being present on other materials, like a visible 
image of a Van Gogh or Gustav Klimt painting.805 The designs here are 
eligible for a thin copyright. They are like a visible image and not like an 
intangible text or even an intangible image. A potential copyright only 
extends to the potential relationship between the public’s cultural 
interest and the visible image, the features of the designs; the 
copyrightable subject matter is only defined by a cultural interest in an 
intangible feature of the tangible, and not by a public cultural interest 
in the entire tangible property itself. In this case, the Court decides 
whether this fine line exists by examining the relationship between the 
intangible elements and the tangible object. At a later date, it might 
also reference the design of the useful object in question’s function, 
content and even material. 
 
The dissent in Star Athletica criticized the majority opinion because it 
said that the holding effectively allowed for pictures of cheerleading 
uniforms, what we might deem intangible images, to be copyrightable. 
As pictures, intangible images, the photographs of the cheerleading 
uniforms were always the cheerleading uniform, always the same no matter 
what material they were placed upon and therefore the Court, in the dissent’s 
opinion, was effectively giving a monopoly to the designer of these chevrons, 
stripes and color blocks. In response, the majority seems to have 
emphasized their characterization of the features of the designs of 
cheerleading uniforms as visible images and not as intangible text or these 
intangible images, which are the same no matter where they are placed. For 
the majority even if we wanted to call these chevrons, zig zags and 
color blocks pictures of cheerleading uniforms when imaginatively 
                                               
804 Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___at 12.  
805 Mentioned in the Government’s amicus curiae brief, Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae supporting respondents at 18- 21, Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, 
Inc., et al, Docket No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).  
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separated from the cheerleading uniform, these pictures are still not 
intangible images or the same as the useful article, as the dissent would 
have us believe. The chevrons, stripes and color blocks are rather, 
visible images which might be informed by their tangible property, but 
to which a separate cultural interest might attach, apart from that 
tangibility. This separate cultural interest attached to intangible parts 
of a tangible property that do not replicate the tangible property is 
what is determinative for the separability test. Moreover, in the court’s 
opinion, such visible images might even exist in a conceptual work of 
art, like Marcel Duchamp’s shovel, that consists almost completely of a 
useful article. The Court was adamant that, notwithstanding the fact 
that “a shovel as a shovel cannot” be copyrighted806 even if displayed 
in an art gallery807,   
 
…if the shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as art 
apart from the shovel, and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works on their own or in another medium, they too 
could be copyrighted.808 
 
If we read this application of the separability test to Marcel Duchamp’s 
In Advance of a Broken Arm in light of Giannini’s scholarship, the 
requirement of tangibility in Italian cultural property law, and 
copyright’s similar subject matter, it seems as though the Court is 
applying a sort of inverse tangibility test for the designs of useful 
articles. Broadening its test from two-dimensional works to three, the 
Court points to what really matters for separability: a public perception 
and cultural existence apart from the uses associated with the useful 
article itself. The limit the Court sets in its opinion for the scope of such 
potential copyright also seems to support this interpretation. Again 
 
the only feature of the cheerleading uniform eligible for a copyright in this 
case is the two-dimensional work of art fixed in the tangible medium of the 
uniform fabric… They may prohibit only the reproduction of the surface 
designs in any tangible medium of expression—a uniform or otherwise.809 
 
If the copyright holders can prohibit the reproduction of the surface 
designs in a cheerleading uniform, but not the whole union of uniform 
                                               
806 , Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al, Docket No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___ 
(2017) at 12.  
807 Id. at 12, footnote 2 (“…a shovel, like a cheerleading uniform, even if displayed in an art 
gallery is ‘an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray 
the appearance of the article or to convey information.’ It therefore cannot be 
copyrighted.”) 
808 Id. 
809 Star, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. ___at 12.  
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and surface designs, then what is copyrightable subject matter in the 
Court’s eyes? It must only be the relationship between the public 
perception and the surface designs, no matter where they are fixed. 
Like a visible image, like the composition of a painting, the surface 
designs, no matter where they are fixed, are copyrightable in so far as 
they refer back to or correspond to the shape of the uniform, but not in so far 
as they replicate the uniform or, in other words, are the tangible union 
of uniform and surface designs. Here, even if there is a cultural interest 
in that tangible union of uniform and surface designs, the Court seems 
to hold that cultural interest is not determinative of copyrightability 
under the separability test. 
 
Recently lower courts have grappled with how to apply this new 
separability test from Star Athletica. To be fair, their opinions are 
divergent and do not explicitly couch the separability test in terms of 
cultural interest. They do, however, indicate that some awareness and 
consideration of cultural interest is part of the test for the design of a 
useful article’s separability. They also might be better understood if 
presented in public cultural interest terms. 
 
The case which most acknowledges public cultural interest in 
intangible parts of features of the designs of tangible, useful articles is 
Inhale v. Starbuzz in which a District Court in California held that 
features of the design of a hookah bottle were not copyrightable subject 
matter under the separability test.810 The court explained   
 
there is nothing distinctive or artistic about the individual features--
despite Inhale's flowery language describing the features, they are 
essentially geometric shapes of the most common type. Inhale itself 
recognizes that ‘each individual geometric figure is not likely 
protectable.’…Combining two or three of these common geometric shapes 
together does little to improve the situation--the components of the water 
container at issue are simply not works of art in even the broadest, most 
liberal sense. See Compendium of Copyright Office Practices II § 503.02(b) 
( "[t]he [minimal] creative expression . . . [necessary for sculptural works] 
must consist of something more than the mere bringing together of two or 
three standard forms or shapes with minor or spatial variations.") This is 
not to say that there are not some, if not many, useful articles composed of 
unique geometric shapes variations or unique combinations of geometric 
shapes that might pass muster under the Star Athletica test. It is only to 
say that the water container at issue here is no Noguchi Table. [“The 
Noguchi Table was designed by Isamo Noguchi in 1939 for the then 
                                               
810 Inhale v. Starbuzz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201498 (C.D. CAL. , May 8, 2017) at *8 - *9. 
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president of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, the original 
remains in the museum's permanent collection.”]811 
 
Here, this lower court considers the cultural interest in the Noguchi 
Table as something that would qualify its unique combinations of 
geometrical shapes as copyrightable subject matter. At least at the first 
stage of the separability test, the “spotting” part, the court imagines 
that they are looking for features that may be of cultural relevance.  
 
In Diamond Collection v. Underwraps Costume Corporation, a District 
Court in New York was tasked with deciding whether designs of 
Halloween costumes for the Day of the Dead exhibited features that 
were copyrightable subject matter. Looking at the designs, the court 
recognized as separable the “ruffles and bowties on the Dia de los 
Muertos costumes”, the “graphic skeleton patterns on the 
lace poncho”, “a pattern of nefarious looking jesters interposed with 
diamonds” on the Evil Harlequin costume, and “the graphic of a 
skeleton rising out of burning flames”.812 The court did not elaborate on 
exactly why these features of the designs were separable, except to say 
that “all of these features could be removed from the costumes. Their 
‘primary purpose . . . is artistic; once [the features] are removed, the 
remainder is a functioning but unadorned [article of clothing]’.”813 Are 
these features not, however, like the intangible compositions of a 
painting to which we might assign our public cultural interest? How is 
a pattern of nefarious looking jesters on this costume different from a 
pattern of nefarious looking jesters on another object dating to 
medieval times? Are both not by nature worthy of our cultural 
interest? It is this that seems to be of importance for separability- 
deciding whether these features of the designs of useful articles exist in 
the wide sea of the intangible parts of other objects which may be of 
cultural interest to us.  
 
The most extensive treatment of the separability test has recently been 
given by the 3rd Circuit as part of its decision that features of the design 
of a banana costume are copyrightable subject matter. The 3rd Circuit 
characterized Star Athletica’s separability test as “effectively turn[ing] 
on whether the separately imagined features are still intrinsically 
                                               
811 Id. at *8 - *9.  
812 Diamond Collection, LLC v. Underwraps Costume Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11737 at 
*11-*12.  
813 Id. at *12 (citing to Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-CV-9597, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
138041, 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (holding features of the designs of 
decorative light strings to be copyrightable subject matter)).  
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useful.”814 While this seems to needlessly add the word “intrinsically” 
to the test, the 3rd Circuit went on to explain how Star Athletica’s 
standard for two-dimensional objects could apply to three-dimensional 
objects, effectively broadening the test’s applicability from pictorial 
works to sculptural works. Observing that it was the arrangement and 
combination of features which mattered, the 3rd Circuit repeated the 
majority’s dicta about Marcel Duchamp’s shovel and linked it to its 
own precedent. 
 
We too have observed that ‘just because a sculpture is incorporated into an 
article that functions as other than a pure sculpture does not mean that the 
sculptural part of the article is not copyrightable.815  
 
In other words, with reference to the Mazer opinion and the Cellini salt 
cellar example, what matters for copyrightability is a function other 
than a physical or economic function. A cultural function, if you will, is 
what matters, and that cultural function may be found to exist in any 
useful object through features of its design, if those features do not 
replicate the tangible object itself.  
 
Looking at the banana costume, the 3rd Circuit found “the banana’s 
combination of colors, lines, shape and length” to be copyrightable.816 
The key for these features of the design of the banana costume were 
their ability to exist as copyrightable subject matter for the 3rd Circuit 
because they could be, as a whole, a sculpture in another material. The 
3rd Circuit also found that these features were sufficiently original, 
noting the originality of renderings of natural objects like bananas was 
decided on a case-by-case basis based on relative powers of 
perception.817 For the 3rd Circuit, merger did not foreclose the 
                                               
814 Silvertop Associates, Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc., No. 18-2266 (3rd. Cir., 2019) at 
7.  
815 Id. at 9.  
816 Id. at 9- 10, n. 5 (this overruled parts of the previous District Court opinion, which had 
held “’the location of the head and arm cutouts which dictate how the costume drapes on 
and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to the mere existence of the cutout holes)’ 
among the copyrightable features…We disagree with that portion of the District Court’s 
analysis because we must imagine the banana apart from the useful article…. The cutout 
holes’ dimensions and locations on the costume are intrinsically useful (perhaps even 
necessary) to make the costume wearable like the “shape, cut, and dimensions” of the 
cheerleader uniforms in Star Athletica, so they cannot be copyrighted.” In our 
interpretation, this is a correct application because, even if there were some unique public 
cultural interest in this draping and protrusion, head and arm cutouts, as features of the 
design of a useful article, they are like intangible text, or style or schema, which are the same 
no matter where they are placed or, at least, are meant to be the same no matter where or 
in which material they are placed and, therefore, should be freely used by everyone, like 
the design of a Birkin Bag, because they are indeed of such public cultural interest.) 
817 Id. at 10-11. Relative because the 3rd circuit noted it could not make aesthetic judgments.  
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copyrightability of these features of the design. In other words, these 
features of the banana costume were not like our example of the Birkin 
Bag, or the Gucci Bamboo Handle for that matter. In the words of the 
court,  
 
…there are many other ways to make a costume resemble a banana…. one 
can easily distinguish those examples from Rasta’s costume based on the 
shape, curvature, tips, tips’ color, overall color, length, width, lining, 
texture, and material.818  
 
Now, on the spectrum of tangibility and intangibility, it seems that the 
3rd Circuit is insisting here that a banana costume is not an intangible 
text or an intangible image. At the same time, the example of the 
features of the design of a banana costume are not completely 
analogous to the chevrons, stripes and zigzags of the cheerleading 
uniform in Star Athletica and visible images. But the sculptures do 
exhibit similar tangible and intangible relationships: they can be 
reproduced in marble, bronze, wood and still other materials, just as 
the composition on a canvas can be placed on paper, a wood panel or 
even on a wall. Here, U.S. copyright law might be identifying features 
of possible cultural interest in an inverse or even complementary way 
to Italian cultural property law. While in Italian cultural property law 
the requirement that the intangible public cultural interest be caught 
up in one tangible material is what matters, the same sculptures in 
different materials can also exhibit inherent artistic or historic interest. 
As we saw when discussing the tyranny of “things”, there are multiple 
ways to deem similar three-dimensional objects of cultural interest in 
their tangibility. Likewise, the existence of three-dimensional features 
of designs of useful articles across materials may be deemed 
sufficiently indicative of separability, and potential public cultural 
interest, to be copyrightable subject matter. There is of course a limit: 
copyrightable subject matter is not cultural property. Pictorial, graphic 
and sculptural works are not tangible objects, they are not the 
underlying thing. Copyrighting features of the designs of useful 
articles does not give you a right to the useful article itself. Rather, the 
commonality between the two is the intangible public cultural interest. 
In U.S. copyright law, the features of the banana costume design are 
copyrightable because of their ability to travel and be of different 
                                               
818 Id. at 13 (also noting, while rejecting the application of the scenes à faire doctrine, that 
“Although a banana costume is likely to be yellow, it could be any shade of yellow—or 
green or brown for that matter. Although a banana costume is likely to be curved, it need 
not be—let alone in any particular manner. And although a banana costume is likely to 
have ends that resemble a natural banana’s, those tips need not look like Rasta’s black tips 
(in color, shape, or size).” Id. at 14.)   
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cultural interests, like a visible image or sculptural form. In Italian 
cultural property law, the banana costume design as an object may be 
cultural property because, after traveling for some time, the public 
cultural interest has become indelibly caught up with a specific feature 
of the design in that particular costume.  
 
There are other cases that do not so clearly involve cultural interest, 
but do lend themselves to the entertainment of cultural interest by 
comparison. In Day to Day Imps. v. F.H. Group Int’l a manufacturer of 
car seat covers, described as two-dimensional art designs, sued another 
company who sold car seat covers that were allegedly too similar.819 In 
holding the car seat covers as copyrightable, the District Court of New 
Jersey, after emphasizing the Star Athletica Court’s example of frescos, 
reasoned that  
 
If the arrangement of colored geometrical shapes on the surface of the car 
seat were separated from the car seat medium and placed on a canvas, they 
would qualify as two-dimensional works of art. It does not matter that 
such images on the canvas may resemble a car seat or a picture of a car 
seat- the image still would not replicate a car seat as a useful article. The 
usefulness of the car seat is the contour of the fabric so that it fits snug over 
the seat, this is separable from the colored graphical shapes placed on this 
fabric for decoration. These designs add nothing to the utilitarian function 
of the car seat cover.820 
 
Here, the court identifies what is copyrightable in the colored graphical 
shapes inasmuch as they are not connected to the tangibility of the 
material as a seat cover. Might we not distinguish here between the 
cultural interest the public may have in how the fabric covers the seat 
and the cultural interest the public may have in the colored graphical 
shapes alone, even if they may still correspond to the shape of a car 
seat? Although not fashion design per se, we might analogize this 
example to other tangible objects with intangible facets. 
 
Similarly, in Jetmax v. Big Lots, a District court in New York held the 
wire frames over the “molded, decorative, tear shaped cover[s]” of 
lights to be eligible for copyright as pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works.821 Although perhaps impermissibly focusing on what was left 
behind by noting that “the primary purpose of the cover is artistic, 
once the covers are removed the remainder is a functioning light 
                                               
819 Day to Day Imps. v. F.H. Group Int’l, 2019 U.S. Distr. LEXIS 110081 at *1-*2.  
820 Id. at *16. 
821 Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-CV-9597, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138041, 2017 WL 
3726756, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017).  
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string”822, the court’s decision might also be analogized to the 
composition of a painting or the features of a sculpture, as in Diamond 
Collection v. Underwraps Costume Corporation.823  
 
2.2 Some anomalies for Copyrightability when Fashion Designs are 
like Tangible Text or like Intangible Texts 
 
The proffered interpretation is that U.S. copyright law, at least as 
applied to how fashion designs are pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, 
acts like an ex ante Italian cultural property legal regime by protecting 
visible images, the part of tangible properties which Italian cultural 
property law protects through a tangible property because it is the part 
to which a public cultural interest may attach. For fashion designs, 
U.S. copyright law does not protect an entire tangible object, nor does 
it protect fashion designs that are like intangible text, of the same 
possible cultural interest no matter on what material they are placed. 
Rather, U.S. copyright only recognizes as its subject matter fashion 
designs that are like visible images, connected in some way to the 
material upon which they are placed but possibly reproducible 
elsewhere as well, without necessarily needing their original material 
support to convey their message but always referring back to it. 
 
There are anomalies, however, and some questions that arise from the 
hypothesis that the separability test is essentially about identifying 
whether a possible public interest exists in intangible parts of tangible 
objects. First, this hypothesis does not explain why U.S. copyright law 
does not protect the things that it should in certain circumstances. 
While the separability test might recognize that fashion designs 
corresponding to the shape of a dress are copyrightable subject matter, 
the test also limits this copyrightability to these fashion designs as they 
exist across different media, as they exhibit cultural interest on 
different materials, like visible images, and not as they are the same no 
matter where they are placed. In Giannini’s terms, the separability test 
only deems fashion design that is not like Petrarch’s Rime to be 
copyrightable. A style of a dress, a trend, the notion of a black dress, or 
even a white uniform, are not copyrightable subject matter. Why does 
the separability test not recognize as copyrightable subject matter what 
                                               
822 Id. at 16.  
823 Another cases that has applied the separability test since Star Athletica is Design Ideas 
Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94489 (holding a bird silhouette on a clothespin 
separable buy noting it could have been originally fixed in some other tangible medium 
other than the clothespin, although discussing arguments that the use of a sculpture does 
not make is a useful article more than other nuances of the Court’s majority opinion in 
Star Athletica).   
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U.S. copyright law deems copyrightable in its other categories?824    
Why does U.S. copyright protect intangible texts and intangible 
images through the category of literary works and photographs in the 
category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, but not fashion 
designs that are like these intangible texts or intangible images when 
deploying separability?  
 
Second, the U.S. Copyright Office does register as pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works fashion designs which do have a different meaning 
depending on the material upon which they are placed. That is, the 
U.S. Copyright Office registers and recognizes as copyrightable subject 
matter designs that can be like tangible texts. The Office has, for 
example, registered “REAL GG” for Gucci as a two-dimensional 
artwork.825 Depending upon what material the “REAL GG” is placed, 
however, its separability- its ability to be perceived by the public as of 
cultural interest apart from the material in which it is first fixed- may 
vary. How do we reconcile this anomaly? How should the U.S. 
Copyright Office understand this “REAL GG”, registered in 2016, as 
copyrightable subject matter in light of the 2017 Star Athletica opinion? 
Rather than answer this anomaly at the separability stage, the 
existence of fashion designs that can be like tangible texts might be better 
addressed at the infringement stage.826 Of course, to reach this 
infringement stage, fashion designs that are features of the designs of 
useful articles that do pass the separability test need to be sufficiently 
original.827 Given, however, that the U.S. Copyright has already 
registered fashion designs that incorporate text and the low bar for 
                                               
824 This also sets up a conflict with other categories of copyrightable works and subject 
matter, like music, and therefore, a conflict between what U.S. copyright law should 
protect, according to Giannini, and what it actually protects when considering fashion 
design. For categories other than fashion, the extension of U.S. copyright to other 
categories of works in which the relationship between tangibility and intangibility is 
described seems to completely mirror Giannini’s assignment of intangible texts to 
copyright. Take music, for example: “The distinction between the intangible intellectual 
property (the work of authorship) and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression (the 
copy) is an old and fundamental and important one. The distinction may be understood 
by examples of multiple fixations of the same work: A musical composition may be 
embodied in sheet music, on an audiotape, on a compact disc, on a computer hard drive 
or server, or as part of a motion picture soundtrack. In each of the fixations, the intangible 
property remains a musical composition.” 2 Patry § 3:22 as cited in Kelley v. Chicago Park 
District, 635 F.3d at 304. Here music, like Petrarch’s Rime, is the same intangible property 
no matter where it is fixed or to what material it is inherent, like an intangible text, and is 
protected as copyrightable subject matter and as a copyrightable work. 
825 Registration Number VA 2-002-720, February 24, 2016, U.S. Copyright Office.   
826 Which will be addressed infra in the Conclusion, Section 2.   
827 Which the Court declined to do in Star Athletica. See Star Athletica, No. 15-866, 580 U.S. 
__ at 11, n. 1.  
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originality in U.S. copyright law828, this may be an easily satisfied 
requirement.  
 
The answer to the first anomaly may have to do with the 
idea/expression doctrine in U.S. copyright law. Despite the fact that 
U.S. copyright is, ideally, the proper place to regulate our public 
cultural interest in intangible fashion designs whose cultural message 
we understand no matter upon what material they are placed, that 
relationship between our public cultural interest and the intangible 
fashion design may be the idea of that fashion design which we need to 
communicate to each other. Such a cultural communication does not need 
a tangible property like a dress, nor does it only refer back or 
correspond to a tangible object like a visible image does. Such a cultural 
communication, such a potential cultural interest, only needs the 
intangible fashion design, like the drawing of an accounting frame 
may convey the accounting process.829 Whereas with intangible text 
and intangible images we can make narrow decisions about thin 
copyrightability, with most fashion designs we cannot because the 
cultural communication is always the same. Think of the example of 
Mary Ping’s art installation. To communicate our cultural interest in a 
Bamboo Bag, Mary Ping only needs the intangible design of the 
Bamboo Bag, not the tangible bamboo or even wood, and there need 
be no relationship between the two. The immateriality of the material 
to the Bamboo Bag may also go beyond Mary Ping’s art installation. 
Gucci itself, in numerous design patents filed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
received legal protection for the look of handles which seemed to be of 
bamboo, but which were not.830 This is important factual information 
                                               
828 The case usually cited to support the low standard of originality is Feist Publications, 
Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).   
829 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (usually cited as an example of the merger 
doctrine). For a similar reason, facts are also uncopyrightable. See Feist Publications, Inc., 
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).   
830 See, for example, Brevetto n. 73795, Modello Industriale Ornamentale (1958), Archivio 
Centrale dello Stato, Rome (describing handle with bamboo-like knots in accompanying 
photograph as “Il manico rigido a forma circolare è realizzato in legno nella parte inferiore (8), 
che é infissa sul modello a mezzo di basette anch’esse in legno (9) con perno per dare movimento a 
snodo al manico stesso…”); Brevetto n. 73796, Modello Industriale Ornamentale (1958), 
Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (describing perhaps what looks like most like a 
Bamboo Handle in today’s Gucci Bamboo bags as “Il manico (8), é semicircolare rigido 
realizzato in legno, parzialmente ricoperto di cuoio nella parte superiore (9) montato su supporti in 
metallo (10) a duplice forchetta con perno laterale per consentire lo snodo.”); Brevetto n. 85481, 
Modello Industriale Ornamentale (1960), Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (showing 
bamboo-like knots in the handle but describing the handle as “Il manico è realizzato in legno 
pregiato o metallo in forma rigida, liscio nella parte superiore (8) e a nodi nella parte terminale che 
va ad inserirsi sul modello mediante due basi snodate (10).”); Brevetto n. 92627, Modello 
Industriale Ornamentale (1961), Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (describing “Borsetta di 
  226 
today as we consider whether our public cultural interest is actuated 
by the tangible Bamboo Handle or by features of the design of the 
Bamboo Handle, no matter of which material they are made. If the 
later, the features of the design of the Bamboo Handle would be 
copyrightable, like features of Duchamp’s In Advance of a Broken Arm. 
To communicate our public cultural interest in a Birkin Bag is the 
same- our public cultural interest is so tied to the fashion design of a 
Birkin Bag, it is such a stereotype, let alone archetype, that we do not 
need the fashion design object at all. Hence, there is also no need to 
refer back to a tangible object, as fashion design that is copyrightable 
because it is separable would require. Here, the idea makes any 
reference to a tangible object unnecessary; every object is the Birkin 
and the Birkin is the same no matter the object. This justification for 
why “knock-offs” exist is similar in result but fundamentally different 
in methodology from Sprigman and Raustala’s, which supposes that 
U.S. copyright law does not protect fashion designs because their 
copying drives the innovation that copyright seeks to promote. 
Instead, a justification based on public cultural interest imagines that 
some fashion designs are so intrinsically wedded to the idea of what 
they seek to communicate that they cannot be protected under U.S. 
copyright law because everyone should be able to have access to them, 
wear them, and do anything else with them because of their great 
public cultural (and not necessarily innovative or creative) interest.   
 
In this sense, the preservation and historical and cultural importance 
of certain fashion designs goes even further than the fair use argument 
that is usually levied for certain uses of copyrighted works, like sound-
recordings, audiovisual material, film or even text.831 Certain fashion 
designs are so inherently equal to an idea of them that they cannot be 
copyrightable subject matter at all or even subject to fair use or other 
exceptions because they are so culturally important.  
 
3. Fashion as a Design of an Industrial Article of Creative Character 
and Artistic Value under Italian Copyright Law 
 
One of the ways to further explore the idea that U.S. copyright law is a 
type of ex ante cultural property regime in the United States that is 
concerned with protecting designs of useful articles inasmuch as they 
are like visible images is to see if, in Italy, Italian copyright law tries to 
                                               
signora con manico formato da tasselli di legno o bambù snodati tra loro ed intercalate da elementi 
di metallo.”).  
831 See comments as part of Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014. 
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act in the same way when it is applied to Italian fashion designs. Does 
Italian copyright law also apply to some modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion designs in a way that is similar to how U.S. copyright 
law applies to features of fashion designs? Does Italian copyright law 
overlap in some way with Italian cultural property law?  
 
The constitutional underpinnings for Italian copyright law are found 
primarily in Article 9 of the Italian Constitution and in Article 33 
which protects freedom of expression.832 Italian copyright law is 
defined as protecting works of ingenuity that have creative character.833 
Like U.S. copyright law, Italian copyright law does not protect ideas- 
as doctrine notes the originator must transform himself into an author 
through the externalization or by concretizing of his idea.834 This 
minimum creativity is comparable to the originality requirement in 
U.S. copyright.835 Perhaps one of the biggest differences between Italian 
copyright law, or diritto d’autore as it is called, and U.S. copyright law is 
the recognition diritto d’autore affords to collective works. This 
recognition affects term limits- films, operas and other collective 
creative works are recognized as of multiple authorship and the use of 
them requires approval of all the authors; the terms of copyright 
usually expire seventy years after the death of the last author in the 
group.836 Article 2, clause 4 notes that “le opera della scultura, della 
pittura, dell’arte del disegno, della incisione e delle arti figurative similari, 
compresi la scenografia”837 are copyrightable subject matter. Designs, or 
modelli, of industrial articles fall in to a separate category and require 
more than a minimum of creativity; rather, they require a “carattere 
creativo e valore artistico”, a response to the concerns of the overlap 
between patent and copyright protection.838 This new category was 
only added to Italian copyright law in 2001.839 Like U.S. copyright law, 
Italian copyright law distinguishes between an intangible form of a 
                                               
832 Gianfranco Negri-Clementi and Silvia Stabile, L’arte e il diritto d’autore in IL DIRITTO 
DELL’ARTE, supra note 612 in Vol 1 at 64-65. The authors also mention the importance of 
Article 42, which provides for the inalienability of property, including intellectual 
property.  
833 Art 1, L n. 633/1941 (cited to in GAUDENZI, supra note 567 at 75- 76 also citing to Art. 
2575 Codice Civile).    
834 GAUDENZI, supra note 567 at 76. 
835 Id. at 78.  
836 Id. at 89- 90. Which does not even begin to get in to the weeds of the applicability and 
exercise of moral rights to and by authors of collective works. 
837 Id. at 81 (citing to L. 633/1941 and noting this is not intended as a closed list at 80, n. 24).  
838 Id. at 81-83.  
839 Id. at 83 and Francesca Morri, Le Opere dell’ Industrial Design tra Diritto d’Autore e Tutela 
come Modelli Industriali: Deve Cambiare Tutto Perché (quasi) nulla cambi?, 1 RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE [The Review of Industrial Law] 177 (2013). 
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work which is protected and its material support.840 Describing the 
difference between what is protected and what is not as the difference 
between “corpus mysticum” and “corpus mechanicum”, or its intangible 
and tangible elements, Italian copyright law protects the mysticum in as 
much as it is caught up with or fixed in the tangible element in what is 
called a first copy841, much like U.S. copyright law doctrine. The overlap 
between these two different categories of copyrightable subject matter 
(pictorial or sculptural works on the one hand and works of industrial 
design of creative character and artistic value on the other) sometimes 
make for nuanced legal considerations of their common and different 
scope842 and also impact collaborations between artists and designers, 
who might wish to delineate who owns or has rights in the work of art 
and design as authors, respectively.843  
 
Two recent cases dealing with how designs of industrial articles are 
copyrightable under Italian law immediately, without the need for 
comparison with the category of pictorial or sculptural works844, seem to 
suggest that Italian copyright law, for the specific categories of designs 
of useful articles, protects, at an earlier stage than Italian cultural 
property law, design features that are historical or artistically 
significant. In this sense, the specific category of designs of useful 
articles reveals connections between cultural property law and 
copyright law that already exist for other objects firmly in the cultural 
property “box”, like paintings or other traditional works of fine art. It 
also indicates that copyright law, across the different legal jurisdictions 
of Italy and the United States, might be concerned with identifying the 
intangible parts of designs of useful articles that are of cultural interest.  
 
In a recent 2016 case the court of Milan decided that the Moon Boots, 
created by the designer Giancarlo Zanatta and his Italian company 
Tecnica in 1970845 were models of industrial design of creative character 
and artistic value under Article 2, clause 10 of the Italian diritto d’autore 
                                               
840 Gianfranco Negri-Clementi and Silvia Stabile, L’arte e il diritto d’autore in IL DIRITTO 
DELL’ARTE, supra note 612 in Vol 1 at 67. Also making this distinction in terms of 
autographic and non-autographic works.  
841 Id. at 98.  
842 Id. at 124- 125.  
843 For further discussion of this see Id. at 111-112.  
844 It is interesting to note that, while U.S. copyright law speaks of thin and thick 
copyrights with respect to photographs, Italian copyright speaks of simple photographs, 
those that simply reproduce images of other works. See Gianfranco Negri-Clementi and 
Silvia Stabile, L’arte e il diritto d’autore in in IL DIRITTO DELL’ARTE, supra note 612 at Vol 1 in 
106 (citing to Art. 88 of L. n. 633/1941). A photographer may reproduce such simple 
photographs, but they will need to obtain the permission of the author of any work (or 
person) displayed in the photograph. Id.  
845 ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN?, supra note 604 at 181.    
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L n. 633/1941. In its reasoning, the court deliberately noted that it 
could not apply the separability test previously in force in Italy846, 
which was much like the previous dual physical and conceptual 
separability test in force in the United States. The court insisted that it 
conduct its evaluation with reference to the unicum of the Moon Boot.847 
A recognition of creative character and artistic value would have to be 
applied to a union of the corpus mysticum and the corpus mechanicum.848 
Pointing to the design’s impact in design history to justify its 
reasoning849, the court characterized its ascertainment of the historical 
import of the boots’ design alongside artistic elements, which it 
evaluated by looking to evidence of the boot in cultural environments 
to avoid a value judgment. The court sought not an ex post evaluation 
of artistic value850, but an evaluation in the moment with reference to a 
                                               
846 For a description of how Italian copyright cases previously applied a separability test to 
Italian design objects and the shift to non-separability after the relevant EU Directive see 
Francesca Morri, Le Opere dell’ Industrial Design tra Diritto d’Autore e Tutela come Modelli 
Industriali: Deve Cambiare Tutto Perché (quasi) nulla cambi?, 1 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO 
INDUSTRIALE [The Review of Industrial Law] 177 (2013).  
847 Tecnica v. Anniel, Tribunale Sez. Spec. Impresa, Trib. Sez. Speciale Impresa, Milano, 
12/07/2016, DEJURE.   
848 Id. The terms corpus mysticum and corpus mechanicum have also been used to refer to the 
conception of cultural property in the work of Giannini in Giuseppe Morbidelli, Il valore 
immateriale dei beni culturali in 1 AEDON (2014), 
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2014/1/morbidelli.htm.  
849 Id. (“Ora, pare al Tribunale che i Moon Boots ben possano fregiarsi delle caratteristiche 
di opera creativa, dotata di valore artistico al fine dell'accesso alla tutela prevista dall'art. 2 
n. 10 della legge sul diritto d'autore, in considerazione del loro particolare impatto 
estetico, che, alla sua comparsa sul mercato, ha profondamente mutato la stessa 
concezione estetica dello stivale doposci, divenendo vera e propria icona del design 
italiano e della sua capacità di fare evolvere in modo irreversibile il gusto di un'intera 
epoca storica in relazione agli oggetti d'uso quotidiano.”) 
850 Id. (“Al fine di dare per quanto possibile concreto fondamento a tale valutazione — al di 
là dei giudizi comunque sempre personali ed arbitrari in ordine al valore artistico o meno 
di un'opera, destinati spesso nel tempo a mutamenti anche radicali — appare necessario 
rilevare nella maniera più oggettiva possibile la percezione che di una determinata opera 
del design possa essersi consolidata nella collettività ed in particolare negli ambienti 
culturali in senso lato, estranei cioè ai soggetti più immediatamente coinvolti nella 
produzione e commercializzazione per un verso e nell'acquisto di un bene economico 
dall'altro. In tale prospettiva acquista particolare positiva significatività della qualità 
artistica di un'opera del design il diffuso riconoscimento che più istituzioni culturali 
abbiano espresso in favore dell'appartenenza di essa ad un ambito di espressività che trae 
fondamento e che costituisce espressione di tendenze ed influenze di movimenti artistici, 
al di là delle intenzioni e della stessa consapevolezza del suo autore, posto che l'opera a 
contenuto artistico assume valore di per sé e per effetto delle capacità rappresentative e 
comunicative che essa possiede e che ad essa vengono riconosciute da un ambito di 
soggetti più ampio del solo consumatore di quello specifico oggetto. Tale interpretazione 
consente di delimitare sul piano qualitativo l'effettivo ambito di applicabilità della tutela 
del diritto d'autore a quei (pochi) oggetti del design industriale ai quali risulta 
diffusamente conferita una consolidata e permanente capacità rappresentativa ed 
evocativa specifica, prescindendo da indeterminati e soggettivi riferimenti a profili 
comunicativi e suggestivi che determinerebbero la possibilità di un apprezzamento 
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cultural and critical consensus.851 Industrial designs which are not of 
this present historical interest are presumably in a negative space of 
Italian copyright law. 
 
Here we see close links between the reasoning of Italian cultural 
property law and the reasoning of Italian copyright law. Just as Italian 
cultural property law might look to historic evidence seventy years 
after a property’s execution and after its author is no longer living to 
ascertain whether there is a sufficient intangible public cultural interest 
caught up in the tangible property to protect it, so Italian copyright 
law seems to look at similar indicia during the life of the design to 
ascertain whether sufficient creative character and artistic value exists 
in that intangible design, which is inherently part of a tangible object 
and cannot be separated from it, so that it may be protected by the 
author during his lifetime and for a certain period afterwards.  
 
The Moon Boots case is an example of how fashion design is 
copyrightable subject matter in Italian law. It seems to indicate that 
copyright law and cultural property law are part of a larger cultural 
heritage legal framework for fashion design objects. While some might 
see copyright only as an alternative to cultural property protection, 
exploring how copyright law and cultural property law can both apply 
to one subject matter shows that they can in fact work in tandem. This 
larger cultural heritage framework, however, is not confined to the 
subject matter of fashion design. Other tangible objects of our modern 
and contemporary culture can first be copyrightable and later cultural 
property. Recently an Italian court has decided that the design of a 
Ferrari is of sufficient creative character and artistic value to be 
copyrightable under Italian copyright law. In newspaper reports, the 
Court was quoted as reasoning that the Ferrari 250GTO was an icon, 
whose  
 
“valore artistico… ha trovato oggettivo e generalizzato riconoscimento in 
numerosi premi e attestazioni ufficiali», in ‘copiose pubblicazioni’ e nella 
riproduzione ‘artistica’ su monete e sotto forma di ‘sculture’, 
                                               
autonomo dell'oggetto in un ambito strettamente artistico privo di collegamento con le 
funzionalità d'uso ad esso proprie, in tal modo di fatto riproponendosi la tesi della 
scindibilità e negando la stessa possibilità di tutela dell'industrial design sotto il profilo 
del diritto d'autore” (ord. Tribunale Milano 28/11/06; ripresa in ord. Tribunale Milano 
29/12/06, est. Marangoni).”) 
851 Id. (“Naturalmente non si tratta di acquisizione del “valore artistico” ex post, bensì della 
sua valutazione, che in qualche modo richiede un apprezzamento che contestualizzi 
l'opera nel momento storico e culturale in cui è stata creata, di cui assurge in qualche 
modo a valore iconico, che può richiedere (come per tutti i fenomeni artistici) una qualche 
sedimentazione critica e culturale.”) 
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periodicamente esposte nei musei.”852  
  
Here are implicit references to history and explicit references to art  
and museums, other parts of the cultural heritage sphere. There are also 
references to the reproducibility of the design in other materials- on 
coins and in sculptures. Italian copyright, in decisions deciding the 
copyrightability of industrial designs of creative character and artistic 
value after the abolition of its own separability test, seems to attempt to 
identify aspects of the design that later might qualify the tangible 
property for inclusion in the Italian cultural property “box.” This 
relationship provides evidence that copyright seems to be a first way, an 
ex ante way of identifying and legally protecting early iterations of 
cultural property. The Italian examples give us a further clue as to what 
U.S. copyright law seems to be attempting when it recognizes that 
certain parts of fashion designs may be copyrightable subject matter. 
There seems to be a common interest in recognizing the parts of designs 
of useful articles that may be of future public cultural interest.    
 
4. U.S. Copyright Law and Italian Cultural Property Law: Closer Ties?   
 
Examining how Italian fashion design objects might be cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law and copyrightable under 
Italian copyright law leads to consideration of the overlaps between 
cultural property law and copyright law generally. Certain fashion 
designs seem protectable as fashion design objects under Italian 
cultural property law because they are like visible images, like the 
image of a Van Gogh sunflower which is caught up with the tangible 
property of the canvas and yet always refers to it. Such fashion designs 
are, like other paintings, tangible enough. The Star Athletica case and 
its reasoning implies that U.S. copyright law, when deciding how 
designs of useful articles are part of the pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works category through separability, is also concerned with 
identifying the same type of potential relationship between intangible 
features of a tangible property and the public cultural interest that 
exists in Italian cultural property law. Both Italian cultural property 
law, when identifying works of artistic or historic interest, and U.S. 
copyright law, when identifying designs of useful articles as pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, seem mainly to deem designs which can 
exist as visible images to be within their purview. Lest it seem as though 
this comparison between U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural 
property law is too far-fetched, Italian copyright law, or diritto d’autore, 
                                               
852 La Ferrari 250 GTO è un’opera d’arte, lo dice il Tribunale. La prima volta per un’auto, IL SOLE 
24ORE, 20 Giugno 2019, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/la-ferrari-250-gto-e-un-opera-
d-arte-dice-tribunale-ACdBBHT.  
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shows us that copyright law in Italy does blatantly consider cultural 
interest through evidence of historic impact and significance when 
deciding whether designs of industrial articles, of which fashion 
designs are a part, are copyrightable. While existing in different legal 
jurisdictions, the legal frameworks for U.S. copyright law and Italian 
copyright law might not be that different when applied to fashion 
designs.  
 
Certain examples of modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
objects give us more practical examples of these overlaps between 
jurisdictions and between cultural property and copyright. Take the 
Flora design on a Gucci scarf. The Flora design, created in the 1960s by 
Vittorio Accornero at the request of Rodolfo Gucci for Grace Kelly853, 
was also successfully registered at the U.S. Copyright Office as a 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural work.854 How can we understand this 
fashion design as an Italian cultural property and as a pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural work? We know, thanks to the case law and the 
statutes above, that U.S. copyright law does not protect fashion designs 
that would replicate their underlying useful article, in this case, the 
Flora scarf. We also know that Italian cultural property law does not 
protect intangibles like text, that are the same no matter where they are 
located. In addition, we know that U.S. copyright law also does not 
protect fashion designs that are like intangible text, the same no matter 
their material, despite the fact that they would be the ideal candidate 
for copyright protection because their copying, as descriptions of the 
knock off economy attest, effectively produces the same property, 
effectively replacing it, like intangible text which is always the same 
and always communicates the same message no matter where it is 
placed. So, how might we square the fact that the Flora scarf is 
copyrightable subject matter and cultural property?  
 
One way to understand why U.S. copyright law protects the Flora 
design, despite its close relationship to the tangible scarf as a useful 
article, is that U.S. copyright law protects the Flora design inasmuch as 
it is a visible image, an image that refers back to the original scarf, 
reminding us of its existence, while not replicating the scarf itself 
because it can be applied to many other materials. Italian cultural 
property law, on the other hand, a certain number of years after the 
Flora design has been replicated on other materials, when the public’s 
                                               
853 GUCCI: THE MAKING OF, supra note 158 at 86 et seq.  
854 Gucci did so under a FORM GATT, “a copyright claim in a work in which U.S. 
copyright was restored under the 1994 Uraguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).” For 
this description see Form GATT Instructions, THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/forms/formgatti.pdf.  
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cultural interest in that intangible feature of the tangible, useful scarf 
has been ascertained, will likely decide to protect the relationship 
between the Flora design and the public cultural interest. The unicum of 
intangible design feature and tangible scarf in one or multiple 
iterations is the cultural property, while the intangible square floral 
design alone is copyrightable subject matter.  
 
Critics might say that the Flora is, notwithstanding this analysis, can be 
like an intangible text, the same wherever it is printed. This may be so 
but when it functions thusly, as a design that means the same no 
matter what material it is printed on, neither cultural property law nor 
copyright law seems like the best law to apply. Instead trademark 
might be a better choice. When the Flora acts as an intangible text it is 
communicating authenticity and source no matter the public’s cultural 
interest in the historic, artistic value or cultural expression. 
Authenticity and source is the province of trademark, not copyright. 
While there may be similarities between the subject matter and even 
reasoning of copyright and trademark, they fundamentally protect two 
different aspects of the Flora and other design features. The U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office’s recent refusal to register the phrase 
“PRODUCT BAG” as applied to a bag sheds light on these 
differences.855 In response to a request from Off-White, Virgil Abloh’s 
brand based in Milan, the USPTO noted that it could not register  
 
‘PRODUCT BAG’ because ‘the applied-for mark…does not function as a 
trademark’… [it] does ‘not indicate the source of [Off-White’s] goods’ nor 
does it ‘identify and distinguish [Off-White’s goods] from [those of] 
others.’856   
 
In contrast to this trademark reasoning, the U.S. Copyright Office 
would likely register “PRODUCT BAG” as a copyrightable feature of 
the design of the bag, as a two-dimensional artwork, just as it 
registered “REAL GG”. Neither the phrase’s failure to indicate source 
nor its descriptive nature when applied to a bag would deny 
“PRODUCT BAG” copyright protection. As a copyrightable pictorial, 
graphic or sculptural work “PRODUCT BAG”’s ability to be an artistic 
feature and then be repeated on other materials without replicating the 
useful article of the bag itself would matter alone. For trademark, in 
contrast, the material upon which the “PRODUCT BAG” is first placed 
matters not because it is a useful article but because it describes the bag, 
                                               
855 Off-White is Trying to Register One Specific Use of its Famed Quotation Marks, THE FASHION 
LAW, September 19, 2019,  http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/off-white-is-seeking-
to-register-one-specific-use-of-its-famed-quotation-marks.  
856 Id.  
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which is impermissible for a trademark unless secondary meaning, or evidence 
of source identification through the phrase, also exists. Our interest in 
trademarks is not cultural, but commercial; the relationship between 
the mark and object matters inasmuch as it fails to identify source, not 
inasmuch as it indicates a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, 
something that is like a visible image. These are two different types of 
authenticity that are not the same.  
 
The hypothesis that U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural property 
law are close when seen through the lens of certain modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion design and fashion design objects, does 
come with still other nuances and some caveats.  
 
First, this proposed relationship between cultural property law and 
copyright law compromises a view that copyright is only a tool of 
valorization and not meant for preservation. For rare books, for 
example, reproduction regulated through copyright can be a way to 
increase both sales and cultural appreciation.857 Far from just seeing 
copyright law as a way to valorize tangible cultural property that 
occurs in originals and copies or does not depend on norms of 
authenticity, copyright law might also be a way to preserve and 
protect intangible or even tangible works as a first matter. This is of 
course a proposal that needs more nuancing and investigation if it is to 
be applied beyond the narrow scope of designs of useful articles as 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. Indeed, while legislative 
history admits that preservation and copyright law need to strike a 
balance858, such an observation still stops short of admitting that 
preservation, as it is understood in copyright with reference to 
libraries, archives and other cultural institutions in the U.S., is an 
explicit goal of copyright law. Notwithstanding this the relationship 
between copyright and cultural heritage is present in considerations of 
the applicability of copyright law, even in the United States.859   
 
While both copyright and cultural property might be concerned with 
recognizing our public cultural interest in certain properties, they do 
have different scopes and terms, notwithstanding that their individual 
time thresholds might at times overlap. When considering designs of 
                                               
857 Christopher Buccafusco, Discovery, Cannibalization, or Both: How Digitization affects 
Demand for Physical Copies, Intellectual Property JOTWELL, April 16, 2019, 
https://ip.jotwell.com/discovery-cannibalization-or-both-how-digitization-affects-
demand-for-physical-copies/. 
858 Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 2.  
859 Id. at 6. 
  235 
useful objects in the pictorial, graphic and sculptural works category, 
U.S. copyright law seems to primarily protects visible images as 
intangibles fixed in tangible property at the beginning of their creation 
for the life of their author and for seventy years after that. Italian 
cultural property law, on the other hand, seeks to recognize the 
intangible public cultural interest in an unicum of intangible and 
tangible property for the same category. In this sense, Italian copyright 
law for designs of industrial articles seems interested in protecting 
visible images inasmuch as they are connected to physical objects and 
are of cultural interest because it leans on historical evidence and 
cultural impact to do so. While there is not yet a case in which a 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design object has been 
declared cultural property under Italian law, we might imagine that 
the administration might make similar observations about the fashion 
design being, like a painting with its composition, of cultural interest 
for specific aspects of its design. Rosa Genoni’s Primavera dress may be 
of interest for its embroidery, which takes inspiration from Botticelli’s 
Primavera. 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, their different scopes and at times 
overlapping terms, U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural property 
law seem to at times be at odds with the very public cultural interest to 
which they are related and to produce some asymmetrical results. 
Libraries, museums and archives find themselves having to grapple 
with orphan works and permissions, for example. The overlaps 
between economics and culture and commerce, or beni culturali and 
beni patrimoniali, as Giannini would say, might frustrate public cultural 
interest just as much as it might facilitate it. A lack of economic value 
may allow cultural property to be more easily unloaded, sold or 
donated by a private owner for the benefit of the public. Likewise, it 
has been observed that “copyrighted works possessing commercial 
value historically have a better record of being made publicly 
available”860 and are therefore more susceptible to an assignment of 
public cultural interest. In addition, while copyright is characterized as 
protecting the intangible work caught up in a material copy alone, the 
connection between the tangible copy and the intangible work is 
admitted in some circumstances, as when libraries lament the limits 
placed on them to combat tangible deterioration of a work because 
they cannot copy the intangible.861  
                                               
860 Preservation and Re-Use of Copyrighted Works, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representative, 113th Congress, April 2, 2014 at 116 at 10. 
861 Id. (Referring to audiovisual material in the context of Section 108(c): “Time is of the 
essence. Waiting until deterioration is evident, as the law currently requires, not only is 
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The overlaps between copyright law and cultural property law, while 
perhaps facilitating cultural interest and cultural consensus on the one 
hand, can also create asymmetrical interests between copyright and 
cultural property, especially for works which do not have a commercial 
value during the copyright term but are of a potential cultural value. 
While such a lack of market power might support an appreciation of 
the unicum of tangible and intangible work later, it can first frustrate an 
appreciation of cultural value in the intangible aspects of a work at the 
beginning of its life.862 
 
 
    
                                               
counter to best preservation practice, it also significantly and permanently devalues the 
archived preservation file which will in time be the only best surviving copy.”) In 
response to the various testimonies the Copyright Office has issued updated guidelines 
for Section 108. See U.S. Copyright Office,Section 108 of Title 17, A Discussion Document 
of the Register of Copyrights, September 2017    
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section108/discussion-document.pdf. 
862 Id.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
MORE THAN TWO WAYS863 OF THINKING ABOUT 
ITALIAN FASHION DESIGN OBJECTS AS CULTURAL 
PROPERTY? 
 
The previous chapters imagined a new standard that would facilitate 
the inclusion of certain modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
design objects as cultural property under Italian cultural property law. 
They also imagined how modern and contemporary Italian fashion 
designs might be understood as copyrightable subject matter under U.S. 
copyright law and under Italian copyright law with reference to Italian 
cultural property law. In contrast, this Chapter notes that there are legal 
avenues other than copyright in the United States which might best 
recognize and protect a public cultural interest in intangible fashion 
designs that are caught up with tangible objects or a public cultural 
interest in tangible fashion design objects directly. The primary legal 
avenue is historic preservation law. The Chapter examines the limits to 
protecting fashion design objects under historic preservation law and 
how it might be extended, with reference to still other legal definitions, 
to protect modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects as 
cultural property in the United States.  
 
1. Fashion Design Objects as Historic Property or “Art” in the 
United States  
 
The previous chapters have examined how Italian cultural property 
law might identify individual modern and contemporary Italian 
fashion objects, outside a museum collection, as cultural property 
under the law. The standard proposed requires examining how the 
public cultural interest attaches to the tangible parts of certain Italian 
fashion design objects. These tangible parts may in fact contain 
intangible parts, much as other objects of fine arts like painting do, and 
the public cultural interest might attach to these intangible parts that 
are inherently caught up or attached to the tangible property and 
related to them, much as the Van Gogh and Vermeer paintings 
described above present intangible images that are inherently 
connected to and informed by their tangible canvases. In this sense, 
there are two categories that Italian fashion design could be compared 
to in order to be protected as cultural property under Italian law: 
tangible text and visible images. 
 
                                               
863 Again, based on Merryman, Two Ways, supra note 2.    
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At the same time, modern and contemporary Italian design objects 
could also be protected as testaments having the value of civilization, 
like a manuscript containing Petrarca’s Rime or Dante’s poetry or J.D. 
Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. Such a classification as cultural 
property would entail protecting the tangible Italian fashion design 
object because it testifies to the designer’s creativity, to a specific 
moment or even, like audiovisual materials, because it is able to diffuse 
and communicate culture. Rosa Genoni’s Primavera dress and Pisanello 
inspired cape in the collection of the Museo della Moda e del Costume 
for example might be an example of such a testament having the value 
of civilization.  
 
The example of Rosa Genoni’s dresses are important because they 
present us with a challenge under Italian cultural property law: how to 
protect Italian fashion design objects that are like intangible texts. In 
other words, how do we protect the relationship between the public 
cultural interest and intangible objects, objects that are understood as 
complete replacements for each other, that are the same no matter 
upon which material they are placed. Rosa Genoni’s dress with its 
designs might be understood as sufficiently like visible images, or they 
may be understood as like intangible texts: we may not be able to 
identify a public cultural interest in the dress design as it relates to a 
specific material, but we may always see a public cultural interest in the 
unicum of intangible and tangible, effectively making, even the 
physical dress, an intangible text that is the same no matter where it is 
and that, therefore, should not be protected either in its tangibility or in 
its intangibility because such properties are meant to be disseminated 
and copied, made in multiple forms.  
 
Giannini tells us that such types of properties- properties that exist like 
intangible texts- are not protected by Italian cultural property law, but 
that they are protected by copyright law, which regulates private 
actors relationships with them, and then by the public domain. In 
addition, Giannini also tells us that in legal jurisdictions that do not 
have cultural property law, we will generally find cultural property in 
the public domain anyway. As a result, given that the United States is a 
country which does not have a cultural property-like legal regime for 
types of movable objects of historic interest like modern and 
contemporary fashion, U.S. copyright law was examined to see if 
Giannini’s hypothesis might hold. Does U.S. copyright law protect the 
intangible texts Giannini mentions, does it step in, given its term limits, 
as an ex ante cultural property regime?  
 
For certain intangible texts, like literary works, and intangible images, 
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like photographs, U.S. copyright does seem to. It protects these 
intangible things as original works of authorship fixed in a tangible 
form of expression for the life of the author, seemingly allowing the 
author to shape and influence the public’s interest in this intangible 
property before it enters the public domain. For other objects, however, 
which are like intangible texts, as with most modern and 
contemporary Italian fashion designs, U.S. copyright law does not 
protect them. Some fashion designs do seem to enter the pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works category, as we saw through a 
presentation of the old separability test and the Star Athletica case, 
when they can be understood as visible images: intangible features of a 
tangible article in which they are fixed that may refer back to that 
article but which may also have a cultural life of their own, without 
replicating the article itself. In other words, U.S. copyright law, when 
dealing with fashion designs, seems to allow them to be copyrightable 
subject matter only when they can exist like the composition of a fresco 
or the outline of a guitar on another material object. Here, U.S. 
copyright law seems to protect a potential public cultural interest in 
the intangible fashion design at the same time as it insists that it does 
not identify the tangible unicum of the intangible design and the 
tangible object as copyrightable subject matter and that it does not 
identify the fashion design as an intangible text as subject matter.  
 
The reason or the first limiting of the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter is based in the U.S. copyright law doctrine that separates 
ownership of the physical object from ownership of the intangible 
property within it. Selling a work of art, for example, does not mean 
you sell the copyright to the composition of the work of art or the 
copyright to the sculptural design. The second limit is more difficult to 
understand, given that U.S. copyright would be the best legal regime 
to protect fashion designs when they exist as intangible texts because 
U.S. copyright seems meant to protect properties that are perfect 
substitutes for one another. This second limit, however, was justified in 
terms of the idea/expression, or merger, doctrine in copyright. Some 
intangible texts, of which some fashion designs may be a part, are so 
identified with the idea of the fashion design, they are such stereotypes, that 
we cannot protect them as intangible texts in copyright because the 
public needs them in order to participate in cultural communication 
and to forge some sort of eventual cultural consensus. It is for this 
reason that, despite their ideal inclusion in U.S. copyright, some 
images and texts and fashion designs are outside the purview of 
copyrightable subject matter and that their copying cannot and should 
not be regulated at all. Instead of entering the public domain after a 
certain period of time, these fashion designs and texts and images enter 
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the public domain immediately.  
 
U.S. copyright rules however are not, as we saw, the same for all 
copyright jurisdictions. Italian copyright law seems to recognize that 
fashion designs that are both like visible images and potentially like 
intangible text can be copyrightable subject matter under Italian law. 
Here, Italian copyright law seems to deliberately step into the shoes of 
the Italian cultural property legal regime for fashion designs as 
Giannini supposes it does for intangible texts. At the same time, Italian 
cultural property law might be able to protect some of the fashion 
designs inasmuch as they are tangible texts or testaments having the value 
of civilization. In this sense, the notion of cultural property under Italian 
cultural property law may include certain modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects.  
 
In this sense, Giannini’s hypothetical is modified. Copyright law can 
protect intangible texts instead of cultural property law, as Italian 
copyright law seems to do. In jurisdictions where copyright law, 
however, acts as a sort of ex ante cultural property law regime, some 
intangible texts are outside the purview even of U.S. copyright.  
 
There is another avenue of protection for modern and Italian fashion 
design objects in the United States, however. Historic preservation law, 
which already protects immovable objects of historic or artistic interest, 
and even what we might characterize as testaments having the value of 
civilization, both at the federal and state levels, might be extended to 
protect our public interest in the intangible facets of fashion design and 
other forms of design as they are inherent to or related to their tangible 
properties.  
 
1.1 The United States’ Historic Preservation Law: Common 
Dilemmas across the Atlantic 
 
One of Giannini’s suggestions, as we saw above, is that Italian 
cultural property law might one day be revised to include objects 
which are not yet in its purview. Similarly, there have been some 
suggestions that United States historic preservation law, the most 
obviously complementary legal regime in the United States to 
Italian cultural property law, be amended to include certain works 
of art or even certain rights in its purview, or at the very least that it 
be supplemented by some sort of public trust or community right.864 
                                               
864 Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist, supra note 78 at 433; Nicole B. Wilkes, Public 
Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a National Art Preservation 
Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 179 (2001); Maliha Ikram, Long-Term Preservation 
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The notion that U.S. historic preservation law could be expanded to 
include certain movable objects, including Italian fashion design 
objects now mainly preserved in certain museums in the United 
States, or that the United States could offer some other legal 
changes, including easements on works of art that would follow 
these objects no matter whether they were in a museum or not865, is 
not such a far afield idea.  
 
From a comparative perspective, there are some similarities 
between historic preservation law and Italian cultural property law 
in the way in which they affront some of the characteristic 
dilemmas of cultural property. Such similarities can help us to 
problematize, along the same lines as we did above, what a 
protection for Italian fashion design objects in the U.S. might look 
like, in comparison to Italy. From a historical perspective, Grisolia 
and Cantucci in their separate books on the protection of early 
categories of Italian cultural property law in the 1950s devoted 
sections to the laws and rules in place in the United States. In 
addition, at least one architect of an influential historic preservation 
law at the state level prior to the implementation of the 1966 
Historic Preservation Act, Albert S. Bard in New York, was also 
aware of Italian cultural property law generally.   
 
1.1.1 Aesthetics and “Antiquity” at the Beginning of U.S. Historic 
Preservation Law   
 
An awareness of U.S. preservation effects is evident in Italy as early 
as 1909 when Rosadi during his presentation of the law to protect 
object described above notes “Negli Stati Uniti d’America la tutela è 
nella legge: i distretti dove sono le maggior bellezze naturali sono 
dischiarate ‘parchi nazionali’ e le stesse montagne rocciose non possono 
essere trasformate.”866 Later, in Tutela delle Cose d’Arte, written in the 
                                               
of Public Art: From Cultural Heritage to the Confederacy, 14(1) NORTHWESTERN J. L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 38 (2018); Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 759 (2011).  
865 The Ellis rule is one such proposal. The rule suggests that “A museum selling a work 
should ensure that the institution or individual to which or whom the work is sold 
commit in some binding form to equal or higher conservational standards and equal or 
higher public access to the work in question. Subject to that condition being met, the 
museum should be able to exercise appropriate discretion with respect to how it spends or 
invests the proceeds of the sale, and specifically, should not be required to use it solely for 
the acquisition or conservation of art.” Adrian Ellis seems to have proposed the rule as 
early as 2009. For a recent presentation of it see Adrian Ellis, Should a Museum Be Allowed 
to Cash In on Its Art? Yes, But on Two Conditions, ARTNET, January 18, 2018, 
https://news.artnet.com/opinion/deaccessioning-adrian-ellis-ellis-rule-1202147.   
866 EMILIANI, supra note 381 at 207.  
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1950s, Grisolia presents U.S. historic preservation law from an 
Italian perspective. He draws the reader’s attention to the 1906 
Antiquities Act’s mention of “ ‘objects of antiquity’ ” and “ ‘objects 
of historic or scientific interest’ ”867, the 1935 Historic Sites Act’s 
mention of “ ‘historic American sites, buildings, objects, and 
antiquities of national significance’”, and Cantucci to a 1949 
amendment to the U.S. Code regulating “ ‘archeological ruins and 
objects’.”868 He notes the importance of state laws for the protection 
of specific categories of objects on par with Italian cultural property 
at the time, and the role of private preservation initiatives.869 Grisolia 
observes  
 
I presupposti ed i fini della tutela giuridica, nel nostro campo, hanno 
quindi, a quanto sembra, carattere spiccatamente locale, e non 
coinvolgono beni della civiltà di altri paesi, di cui del resto gli Stati Uniti 
non sono molto provvisti. Si spiega così, data questa relativa deficienza, 
perché sia facilitato l’afflusso di cose d’arte, concedendo per esse larga 
libertà nel territorio federale: il liberismo, in questo caso, appare un 
riflesso della relativa scarsezza degli Stati Uniti in fatto di cose d’arte 
antica, in confronto alla sua ricchezza in altri settori.870 
 
 Such an observation about the local peculiarities of the United 
States, which allowed for the preservation of objects indigenous to 
its soil but not works of art as in Italy, have also been spotlighted by 
American legal scholars like Patty Gerstenblith. Gerstenblith casts 
this uniqueness of U.S. historic preservation law and cultural 
property protections, which were relatively late to protect objects 
belonging to indigenous communities, as related to the colonists’  
 
almost exclusive[e focus] on their Mediterranean and European cultural 
                                               
867 GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 72; CANTUCCI, supra note 148 at 86 (including a much more 
detailed investigation of historic preservation in the United States than in Grisolia and 
recounting early preservation efforts in the 19th century after the Civil War).  
868 CANTUCCI, supra note 148. In addition, Cantucci spotlights the 1916 National Park 
Service Act, Executive Orders in the 1930s. Id. at 87. Cantucci also observes the differences 
in duties and obligations when cultural property is classified as such in the United States 
and in Italy. “È da notare come la classificazione come monumento storico non importa 
negli Stati Uniti alcun effetto giuridico e non incide affatto sul diritto che ha il proprietario 
del monumento di usarne a suo piacere.” Id. at 88. At the federal level, with the exception 
of historic property which must be taken into account during federal undertakings, 
Cantucci’s comments are still characteristic. State historic preservation laws, with their 
certificates of appropriateness, do, however, affect a private owner’s use of their historic 
property, although owners generally have a greater say in whether their property can be 
recognized as such in the first place. See NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW supra 
note 362 at 70.  
869 GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 72.  
870 Id. at 75.  
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ancestry and on the question of whether a legitimate North American 
but European-derived culture with its own style of art, architecture and 
literature could develop.871  
 
Indeed, Grisolia does not mention any constitutional protection at 
the federal level for cultural property in the United States because 
there was (and is) none. Historic preservation is, instead, justified 
based on numerous clauses including the Property Clause872, the 
Commerce Clause and General Welfare Clause of the United States 
Constitution873, and the Tenth Amendment, which notes “powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.”874  
 
This lack of an explicit constitutional clause did not prohibit 
Americans, however, from thinking about how to protect their 
public cultural interest in certain properties, much as Italian cultural 
property law preceded the constitutional clause in today’s Italian 
Constitution. Just as early iterations of Italian cultural property law 
took their cue from aesthetics as a first order and antiquity, or 
history, as a second, so U.S. historic preservation law began in two 
strands: preserving aesthetic beauty, or making the city beautiful, 
and the historic.875 The earliest preservation efforts in the United 
States in the late 19th century centered on history and preserving the 
physical spaces inhabited by one great man of American history, 
George Washington. One of Washington’s cabins was purchased by 
the State of New York in the 1850s, while the Mount Vernon Ladies’ 
Association saved George Washington’s plantation in Virginia.876 
These historically minded preservation efforts, were usually either 
privately instigated or special, sui generis actions by government. 
Moreover, despite a lack of explicit constitutional mandate at the 
federal level, state government, much like regions in pre-unified 
Italy, took it upon themselves to enshrine some sort of protection 
for (mainly immovable) things of artistic or historic interest. The 
earliest constitutional articles on the subject date to 1918 in the 
                                               
871 Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the 
United States [hereinafter Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property], 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 
562, 575 (1995).  
872 U. S. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (The Property Clause) (allows Congress to regulate property 
that is owned by the United States.) 
873 U. S. CONST., art. I, § 8, clause 3; U. S. CONST., art. I, § 8, clause 1.   
874 U. S. CONST., amend. X.  
875 See generally WILLIAM J. MURTAGH, KEEPING TIME: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
PRESERVATION IN AMERICA (3rd ed., 2006) and Albert Bard and the City Beautiful in ANTHONY 
WOOD, PRESERVING NEW YORK: WINNING THE RIGHT TO PROTECT A CITY’S LANDMARKS 
(Routledge, 2008).   
876MURTAGH, supra note 875 at 14. 
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Massachusetts Constitution. Its Article 51 stated that  
 
The preservation and maintenance of ancient landmarks and other 
property of historical or antiquarian interest is a public use, and the 
commonwealth and the cities and towns therein may, upon payment of 
just compensation, take such property or any interest therein under such 
regulations as the general court may prescribe.877  
 
This is not, of course, to say that individual states and local 
governments were not attempting to preserve structures for historic 
or even aesthetic reasons prior to 1918. Similar to the case which we 
have seen in New York in the 1850s, Massachusetts also attempted 
to preserve the aesthetic integrity of its urban spaces through 
“efforts to enforce some manner of conformance with her existing 
architectural standards and traits.”878  
 
Early aesthetic concerns became even more pressing for members of 
the American elite with the advent of the so-called City Beautiful 
movement, inspired by the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago.879 In 
emphasizing the complex web of early private preservation efforts, 
state statutes and local ordinances alongside the larger cultural 
movement for beauty taking place in early 20th century America the 
Pennsylvania Station origin myth which commonly begins the 
narrative of historic preservation in America is dispelled, as 
Anthony Wood has already noted.880  
 
While these early historic preservation actions seem confined to the 
urban landscape, individual actors and the U.S. government in the 
early 20th century also attempted to preserve and protect movable 
objects in the United States, but also United States’ natural 
treasures. The history of the bill’s passage in various drafts 
proposed both in the House of Representatives and in Congress is 
enlightening because it reveals some similarities with Italian 
cultural property law, but also specific adaptations for the 
uniqueness of the American territory. Restricted to public lands, 
multiple bills on the same subject were proposed in the House and 
Senate in 1904. One first proposed in March 1904 in the House of 
                                               
877 JACOB MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 58- 59 (1965). Grisolia also mentions 
this article in the Massachusetts’ Constitution. GRISOLIA, supra note 431 at 72- 73.  
878 MORRISON, supra note 877 at at 22 (citing to Public Statute c. 104 and noting an 1887 
judicial decision which struck down a town ordinance prohibiting owners from 
“erect[ing], rebuild[ing] or essentially chang[ing] any building for any purpose that is not 
a dwelling house without first obtaining a written permit from the Board of Alderman.”) 
879 WOOD, supra note 875 at 16- 19. 
880 Id. at 9.  
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Representatives emphasized as its broad purposes “preserving and 
protecting from wanton despoliation”881 and prohibited 
counterfeiting of  
 
any archeological object which derives value from its antiquity, or 
making of any such object, whether copied from an original or 
not, representing the same to be original and genuine…882      
 
Bills proposed in the Senate in February 1904 delegated power to 
the President to  
 
from time to time, set apart and reserve from sale, entry, settlement or 
occupancy so much of any of the public lands on which are located 
aboriginal monuments, ruins, or other antiquities…when in his opinion 
said aboriginal monuments, ruins, and other antiquities are of sufficient 
public interest to make their preservation desirable…883 
 
Bills introduced in the Senate defined the subject matter of the law 
as movable objects that would include  
 
other ancient remains which serve to illustrate the early history of the 
aborigines, including… implements, utensils, and other objects of wood, 
stone, bone, shell, metal, and pottery, or textiles, statutes and statuettes, 
                                               
881 Section 1, H.R. 13349, 58th Congress (March 2, 1904) (Bill introduced by Mr. Rodenberg in 
The House of Representatives). The word “wanton” was later struck out by the Senate. 
See S. 5603, 58th Congress (April 25, 1904).  
882 Section 8, A Bill For the preservation of historic and prehistoric ruins, monuments, 
archeological objects, and other antiquities, and to prevent their counterfeiting, S. 5603, 58th 
Congress (April 25, 1904). Intent was, obviously a necessary prong. The April 25, 1904 
report by Mr. Fulton, with amendments, added the phrase “found on any public lands of 
the United States” after any archeological object. An April 20 version of the bill proposed 
earlier in the Senate had a counterfeiting section. See A Bill For the preservation of historic 
and prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects, and other antiquities, and to 
prevent their counterfeiting, S. 5603, 58th Congress, (April 20, 1904). Eventually the final bill 
evolved to not include “wanton” and was a combination of bills first proposed in the 
House, which would have given control of objects and excavations to the Smithsonian. For 
evidence of these various changes see AN ACT For the preservation of historic and 
prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects, and other antiquities, and to prevent 
their counterfeiting, S. 5603 (58th Congress) (January 19, 1905).  
883 A Bill For the preservation of aboriginal monuments, ruins, and other antiquities, and 
for other purposes, Section 1, S. 4127, 58th Congress, (February 5 1904). Comments during 
the hearings registered comments with the ways in which certain other bills in the House 
were crafted, dividing responsibilities between the Department of the Interior and the 
Smithsonian Institute, criticized because it “would lead to constant friction and to a 
clashing of authority, which would be apt to neutralize the beneficial results of the 
legislation.” S. Doc. No. 814, at 6 (1904).  
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and other artificial objects.884 
 
These bills introduced in 1904 also placed emphasis on the 
education value that artifacts could have and specifically named 
American archeology and ethnology as disciplines which the 
preservation of these objects were meant to aid.885  
 
Committee hearings on these bills reveal that they were meant to 
address the immediate concern of the removal of archeological 
objects from the United States886, much as Italy’s early laws were also 
meant to address the exportation of their works of art. And indeed, 
Italy was on the minds of those testifying at the hearings. 
Referencing the future testimony of Mgr. Dennis J. O’Connell, rector 
of the Catholic University of America887, Doctor Kelsey from the 
University of Michigan and the Archeological Institute of America888 
observed “The United States is at a great advantage in dealing with 
this question [of preservation] when compared with the countries of 
Europe. As Monsignor O’Connell will inform you, from his long 
residence in Rome, [they] have long since attached the question 
with much greater advantage than we….”889  
 
Italy was specifically mentioned by those testifying. Reverend 
Doctor Baum, President of Records of the Past Exploration Society 
offered, “…[T]he great desire to go into a ruin and get the best there has 
led to an utter neglect of the scientific excavation of our ruins, which 
would not be tolerated for one moment, as Professor Kelsey knows, in Italy 
                                               
884 Section 3, Section 1, S. 4127, 58th Congress, (February 5 1904). The bill also placed much 
responsibility for the protected objects in the hands of the Smithsonian Institution instead 
of in the Department of the Interior, which was the choice of the House of 
Representatives’ bill.  
885 Section 12, Section 1, S. 4127, 58th Congress, (February 5 1904).  
886 S. Doc. No. 814, at 4 (1904). (testimony of Doctor Kelly, “As an instance to illustrate the 
importance of immediate legislation, in Denver a short time ago, when I was present at a 
public meeting, a gentleman of the city who presided at the meeting, said that very 
recently two carloads of boxes containing objects of archeological interest from the 
southwest had recently passed through the city….Part of them were to be shipped 
abroad…We are all aware of the facts. Catalogues of collectors suggest the conclusion that 
parties are constantly at work upon the public lands extracting all available objects of 
value; and these objects of value are not merely extracted, but the environment of them is 
so completely disfigured in the process that the remains become valueless for scientific 
purposes, either for exhibition or for any other purpose.”) 
887 S. Doc. No. 814, at 1 (1904). 
888 Id.  
889 S. Doc. No. 814, at 5 (1904). Doctor Kelley also noted that it was easier to regulate the 
densely populated areas of the country, as opposed to the wide open swaths of the 
American frontier where most of these objects were found, which made it much harder to 
regulate than what we might term the looting of antiquities in Europe. 
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or Greece.”890 While Doctor Hilprecht from the University of 
Pennsylvania who had excavated in Nippur wrote of his “great 
satisfaction” for the bill he hoped it would be expanded to all 
American lands given that “[i]n Turkey, Egypt, Greece, and Italy the 
law provides for the Government permit for all excavations having in view 
the examination of ancient sites by pick and shovel in the whole Empire.”891 
 
This testimony and the arguments for the regulation of certain 
objects of antiquity germane to the United States reveals a common 
concern with the public interest in objects of historic, anthropologic, 
and ethnographic interest both in the United States and in Italy, 
around the same time period.892 As was noted during the hearings 
“The general public has awakened to a realization of the importance of 
preserving in America these remains of the past, not simply for present 
interest, but for the future.”893 When the Antiquities Act was finally 
passed as a law “for the preservation of American antiquities”894 its 
subject matter had considerably broadened in scope. For the 
President’s proclamations the focus had shifted from “reserving” 
public lands which contained the relevant subject matter of public 
interest to the power to  
 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and 
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest 
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government 
of the United States to be national monuments…895 
 
                                               
890 S. Doc. No. 814, at 1, 12 (1904). 
891 S. Doc. No. 814, at 13 (1904). 
892 An emphasis here on historic since anthropological and ethnographical were not added 
in to Italian cultural property law until 1939. See infra.  
893 S. Doc. No. 814, at 5 (1904). 
894 H.R. 11016, 59th Congress, (March 12, 1906).  
895 Section 2, H.R. 11016, 59th Congress, (March 12, 1906). This is a distinctly historic 
approach to the Antiquities Act, given the discussion of the President’s powers of it under 
President Trump and other scholars’ notes about its continued viability as applied to 
certain objects. See PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER ON THE REVIEW OF DESIGNATIONS 
UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT [hereinafter EXECUTIVE ORDER], April 26, 2017, OFFICE OF 
THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/04/26/presidential-executive-order-review-designations-under-antiquities-
act. But see ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RES. SERV., R44687, ANTIQUITIES ACT: SCOPE OF 
AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS (2016) (analyzing whether the 
President has authority to modify and revoke national monument designations and 
grounding Congress’ authority to designate national monuments in the Property Clause – 
separate from the Intellectual Property clause) and Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws 
Protecting Our Cultural Heritage 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63 (1993-1994), available via 
HEINONLINE (noting dueling case law U.S. v. Diaz and U.S. v. Smyer, deciding whether or 
not the term ‘object of antiquity’ in the Act was unconstitutionally vague).  
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A year after the Antiquities Act was passed Albert S. Bard, the 
future legal architect of New York State’s preservation law and one 
of the most influential private actors in the preservation movement 
in New York City, traveled to Europe.896 Over the years Bard would 
make more trips to the Continent and his diaries from his 1922 trip 
to Italy in September survive. Among his many stops were Venice, 
Florence, Rome and Naples. In Florence he commented on the 
beauty of the Fra Angelico in San Marco. In Rome he observed of 
San Giovanni in Laterano “[l]ike all the churches hit by the Baroque 
which followed M. Angelo [sic], the church itself is ruined.”897 
Indeed, such observations were very much in Bard’s character. A 
devotee of art and architecture, he had become active in art societies 
in New York while practicing as a lawyer in the city, joining the 
Municipal Art Society in 1901.898 In this year, the Municipal Art 
Society in particular, “focused its energy away from presenting the city 
specific works of art, and instead concentrated more broadly on the cause of 
making New York a more beautiful city.”899 
 
One of the first places the Municipal Art Society began, along with 
other societies like the representative Fine Arts Federation of New 
York900, was with the plight of billboards in New York City. As we 
                                               
896 WOOD, supra note 875 at 24.  
897 See Notes regarding Bard’s trip through Italy in 1922 and carbon copy of his diaries in 
Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. 
Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 146, Folders 10-11. 
898 WOOD, supra note 875 at 24- 25.  
899 Id. Furthermore, lists of so-called landmarks and important works of art drawn up by 
individuals and art societies in New York in the early 20th century pinpointed properties 
which held both “historical and architectural merit.” See ALBERT ULMAN, A LANDMARK 
HISTORY OF NEW YORK: ALSO THE ORIGIN OF STREET NAMES AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(Appleton & Co, 1901); WORKS OF ART BELONGING TO THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1905- 1905. 
A GUIDE TO THE WORKS OF ART OF NEW YORK CITY (Florence Levy, ed., 1916). Later, in the 
1960s, ones of the ways that the Municipal Art Society would encourage grass roots 
support for a Landmarks Law was to publish a book entitled New York Landmarks and 
offer guided tours of parts of Manhattan. See August 1964 Newsletter (mentioning the 
New York Landmarks book). See Meeting Minutes, April 25, 1955, Municipal Art Society 
Archives. It is important to note that the Municipal Art Archives’ are a wealth of 
information but that an exhaustive study of all their material and this history of the 
organization is outside the scope of this dissertation. The same applies to the Bard Papers 
in the New York Library and the Archives of American Art in New York. 
900 Established in 1895 and incorporated in 1897 to “ensure united action by the Art 
Societies of New York in all matters affecting their common interests, and to foster and 
protect the artistic interests of the community.” This purpose is found in the Federation’s 
1897 Certificate of Incorporation, included in Fine Arts Federation of New York, Certificate of 
Incorporation, Constitution, By-Laws, As Amended to October 1949, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 54, Folder 1. Similar information can be found on the Fine Arts 
Federation’s current website: Mission + History, THE FINE ARTS FEDERATION OF NEW YORK, 
http://fineartsfederation.org/mission-and-history/ (“The Fine Arts Federation of New 
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have seen above, at this time, the scope of laws passed to protect 
objects of antiquity and broad swaths of land in the United States 
mainly applied to public property.901 Indeed, the challenge for those 
who wished to make a city beautiful by removing the heinous 
billboards advertising of everyday products from the avenues of 
Manhattan in the early 20th century was to find a way to regulate 
private property, and the aesthetics, the view, of the private 
property at that.902 The concern with billboards was not confined to 
New York City nor to fine arts societies. As early as 1905, as 
Anthony Wood mentions, the American Scenic and Historic 
Preservation Society’s Annual Report had included an article 
entitled “The Poster Nuisance/An Argument Against the Abuses of 
Outdoor Advertising.”903 Bard himself was on the Mayor of New 
York City’s Billboard Advertising Commission in 1913.904 It is in this 
fight that aesthetics played an important role. 
 
One of the earliest legal actions taken by an arts society with which 
Bard was involved was a constitutional proposal for the protection 
                                               
York was established in 1895 as a unique advocate for design excellence in New York City 
and beyond. The Federation is comprised of member organizations of diverse 
constituencies with professional expertise in public art, architecture, landscape 
architecture, planning, urban design, and open space in New York City. Today, the 
organization is the only alliance of its kind acting on behalf of the city’s art and design 
professions in support of a well-designed public realm. The Federation’s founding 
mission is “to ensure united action by the Art Societies of New York in all matters 
affecting their common interests, and to foster and protect the artistic interests of the 
community.”) 
901 See supra note 877 discussion of the Massachussetts’ ordinance in MORRISON.   
902 WOOD, supra note 875 at 26 (“What government lacked was the ability to control private 
property for aesthetic purposes. Time and again, efforts to advocate for the control of 
private property on the grounds of appearance ran up against questions of 
constitutionality.” … “Gilmartin [in SHAPING THE CITY: NEW YORK AND THE MUNICIPAL 
ART SOCIETY (Clarkson Potter, 1995)] ...described one of the Municipal Art Society’s failed 
efforts to place modest limitations on the use of private property, in this case an effort to 
prohibit the placement of billboards on the roof of buildings, as being ‘a bit like trying to 
pass a gun control law in Texas.’”) 
903 WOOD, supra note 875 at 28- 30.  
904 Id. at 27 (“Particularly troubled by the billboard blight was the Fifth Avenue 
Association. In 1912, because of growing complaints ‘in relation to nuisances in 
connection with billboards and signs used for advertising purposes,’ Raymond Fosdick, 
New York City’s commissioner of accounts, issued ‘A Report on an Investigation of 
Billboard Advertising in New York City’. This report led the Avenue Association’s 
president Robert Grier Cooke to write Mayor Gaynor urging the appointment of a 
commission to further study this growing problem. The mayor told Cooke to select a 
committee and he would appoint them. He named Cooke its chair. One of the seven 
members of the commission and its secretary was Albert Bard.”) Such histories of the 
plight of billboards in the United States and later successful historic ordinances brings 
interesting comparisons with Italian cultural property law, such as the garden case 
mentions supra, which do succeed in indirectly protecting vistas around historic property. 
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of beauty. In 1915 members of a Special Committee of the Five905 of 
the Fine Arts Federation, proposed the following amendment to the 
New York State Constitution:  
 
The promotion of beauty shall be deemed a public purpose, and any 
legislative authority having power to promote the public welfare may 
exercise such power to promote beauty in any matter or locality, or part 
thereof, subject to its jurisdiction. Private property exposed to public 
view shall be subject to such power.906  
 
In a letter Bard wrote to the Committee he elaborated on the 
purpose of such language,  
 
A constitutional amendment which shall have the effect of making the 
creation of beauty a public purpose and aesthetic considerations a proper 
basis for legislation; in other words, an amendment which will free the 
legislative power from the hampering effects of reactionary court 
decisions. […] The purpose of the clause submitted is simply to put 
beauty on a parity with health, sanitation and the other recognized 
objects of legislative power, and to do so as briefly as possible while 
safeguarding private property which has no relation to the public.907 
 
Foreshadowing contemporary doubts about the worthiness of 
aesthetics as a deployable standard, and also, from a comparative 
perspective, the eventual rejection of a solely aesthetic approach to 
cultural interest under Italian cultural property law altogether, at 
least one member of the Special Committee was not as keen on 
using beauty alone as a public purpose and as the foundation for 
preservation, notwithstanding the embrace of aesthetics and beauty 
by Bard and others908. “It seems to me that your program is very well 
                                               
905 The Committee was established to “ ‘report to the Federation the means whereby the 
interest of Art Commissions and of City Planning Commissions, throughout the State, 
may be furthered before the coming State Constitutional Convention.’” Letter to the 
Members of the Special Committee of Five of the Fine Arts Federation from Albert S. Bard, 
Chairman, January 21, 1915, Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. 
The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 54, Folder 1 at 
page 1.  
906 Letter to the Members of the Special Committee of Five of the Fine Arts Federation from Albert 
S. Bard, Chairman, supra note 905 at enclosure 2. Wood seems to suggest that the language 
of this proposed amendment came directly from the Mayor’s Billboard advertising 
commission and was then proposed by the Fine Arts Federation. The common member of 
the two groups was, of course, Bard. See WOOD, supra note 875 at 28, 30.  
907 Letter to the Members of the Special Committee of Five of the Fine Arts Federation from Albert 
S. Bard, Chairman, supra note 905 at page 2.  
908 One member George B. Ford wrote to Bard “I think your letter of January 21st to the 
Members of the Committee of Five of the Fine Arts Federation is excellent. The three 
amendments which you suggest are all well worth while [sic] and I will certainly do all 
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arranged, but I should doubt the wisdom of trying to write ‘beauty’ into 
the words of the constitution in the manner proposed.”909 Such an 
observation might also, today, be grounded in hierarchical 
concerns. Especially when thinking of modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects, the criteria of beauty might skew 
judgments in favor of luxury and not to other design objects of 
traditions different than the Western canon.  
 
Articles and notes Bard wrote later in his life clue us in to a 
distinction he may have developed to address the issue raised by 
his colleague. Public Aesthetics and Private Aesthetics, published 
decades later in 1951910, makes an interesting case which recalls the 
discussion of public interest as related to aesthetic interest in Italian 
legal doctrine discussed above. Bard had to draw this distinction in 
order to emphasize how aesthetics could be a valid public purpose 
under the law alongside others, like public safety. Bard defined 
private aesthetics as “the desire of an individual landowner not to have a 
new building on a neighbor’s land interfere with his view.”911 Such 
private aesthetics would not justify the taking or regulation of 
private property, but public aesthetics would:  
 
No court today would support the sumptuary laws of several centuries 
ago which told the private citizen what he might or might not wear, 
upon the basis of its cost. But it is a far cry from these concerns of 
personal taste and choice to a generalization that in the planning of a 
community reasonable regulation of private property may not be based 
upon public appearance, even when the planning for appearance is not so 
inextricably tied in with matters or property values, tax basis, etc., etc., 
[sic] that the aesthetic regulation can be dissected out and placed by 
itself, i.e. is ‘separable’. The concepts and terms ‘private aesthetics’ and 
‘public aesthetics’ should now become accepted forms in legal 
                                               
that I can to held in forwarding them.” Ford’s letter is on stationary of the City of New 
York, Board of Estimate and Apportionment, Committee on the City Plan, Municipal 
Building. Letter from George B. Ford to Albert S. Bard, January 26, 1915, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 54, Folder 1. It is important to note that the Board of Estimate 
also played a role in the advent of New York historic preservation law, given that they 
were charged with approving city expenditures.  
909 Letter from John S. Pine to Albert S. Bard, January 28th 1915, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 54, Folder 1.   
910 Public Aesthetics and Private Aesthetics, July 1951 (for the American City Magazine, Issue 
of August 1951) in Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New 
York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 135, Folder 2. 
911 Id.  
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classification and terminology.912      
 
Thinking about how such public and private aesthetics would have 
applied to a fashion design object were they to be included as 
objects subject to preservation under historic preservation law raises 
the issue of public and private appearance of individuals. One of 
the risks in regulating aesthetics separately, when it is in a public 
space, as fashion design objects already are when displayed in 
museums and divorced from bodies on the street, is of making 
content based judgments on what is worthy of preservation or not. 
As Bard observed, no one would want to return to sumptuary laws 
(as we have seen in the introduction with the case of leggings, 
fashion in the public sphere is already charged enough with only 
social norms at stake). At the same time, by choosing which fashion 
design objects were worthy to be preserved, even by negotiating a 
the relationship between a public cultural interest and their tangible 
material, we might be unnecessarily choosing certain fashion design 
objects over others, and therefore certain viewpoints over others in 
the public space, another dilemma of cultural property.    
 
At the same time, the idea that aesthetics, or other cultural interests, 
can be separated from property values or other economic facets of 
property is one which we have seen in Italian cultural property law. 
Here we see reflections of Pugliatti, Grisolia, Cantucci and even 
Giannini’s explanation of how a cultural property is at once the 
same as and yet separate from a bene patrimoniale. In his work on 
how to preserve and protect private properties through government 
regulation on the basis of aesthetic interest, and later historical 
interest, Bard seems to make arguments for similar processes of 
identification as his Italian counterparts.  
 
While the constitutional beauty amendment was not ratified at the 
New York Constitutional Convention in 1915, the notion of beauty 
and aesthetics as a worthy public purpose that would justify the 
government’s prevention of certain activities and uses of private 
property only grew, despite critiques inside913 and outside the 
hallowed halls of law. Eventually, interest in the aesthetic under 
proposed laws to first protect urban spaces in New York, like 
interest in the aesthetic under cultural property law in Italy, 
                                               
912 Id. at 3.  
913 Wood notes a 1909 decision stating “‘esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and 
indulgence rather than necessity.’” WOOD, supra note 875 at 28 (citing to City of New 
York, Report of the Mayor’s Billboard Advertising Commission of the City of New York, 
August 1, 1913, 28).  
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embraced the complementary criteria of history.  
 
While there is thus far no direct evidence from this time that Bard 
and his fellow activists were aware of the Italian laws of 1902 and 
1909, with its 1927 revisions protecting villas and gardens914, Bard 
was generally aware of the legal differences between the United 
States and Europe which frustrated preservation. He was quoted as 
noting,  
  
‘Americans generally are far behind many other nations in realizing the 
value of beauty as a municipal asset expressible in dollars, to say nothing 
of its daily contribution to the happiness of the citizen.’915    
 
In the late 1930s, on behalf of the fine arts societies, Bard took a 
second try at a constitutional amendment to the New York 
Constitution, this time considerably broadening its language and 
therefore its potential scope,  
 
‘The natural beauty, historic associations, sightlines and physical good 
order of the states and its parts contribute to the general welfare and 
shall be conserved and developed as a part of the patrimony of the people, 
and to that end private property shall be subject to reasonable regulation 
and control.’916 
 
Anthony Wood, in his examination of the evolution of New York 
City’s Landmarks Law, notes that Bard referred to this proposed 
constitutional amendment as ‘the patrimony of the people’ clause.917 
                                               
914 See Art 1, footnote 3, L. n. 364/1909, Testo Coordinato.  
915 WOOD, supra note 875 at 30 (citing to Bard’s testimony on behalf of the Municipal Art 
Society “before the Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions [of The City of New 
York]” in New York (N.Y.) Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions, Final 
Report, June 2, 1916 (City of New York, Board of Estimate and Apportionement, 
Committee on the City Plan, 1916), 82)).   
916 WOOD, supra note 875 at 30-31 (“Introduced into the Constitutional Convention by Hon. 
O. Byron Brewster of Elizabethtown, New York at the request of the City Club of New 
York, the Citizens Union, and the Fine Arts Federation of New York, it read: “The natural 
beauty, historic associations, sightlines and physical good order of the states and its parts 
contribute to the general welfare and shall be conserved and developed as a part of the 
patrimony of the people, and to that end private property shall be subject to reasonable 
regulation and control.’” (citing to Bard papers and to ‘Constitutional Amendment 
Proposed for New York’ New York State Planning News 2, no. 6 (July 20, 1938).) 
917 Id. (“In 1938, at the age of seventy-one, Bard saw yet another opportunity to advance the 
cause of aesthetic regulation. The every-twenty-year question of whether there should be 
a Constitutional Convention in New York has received a positive answer and the big 
event had been scheduled for that summer. Bard went to work writing and promoting a 
proposed new clause for the constitution…The main focus of Bard’s efforts was the 
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Here, for comparative purposes, there is a distinct advancement 
towards later language of Italian cultural property law in 1939 
regulating landscape918, but also the use of the word patrimony, 
which would later be used by the Commissione Franceschini919 and 
then enshrined in the text of Italian cultural property law.920  
 
Bard spent the majority of his activities with the fine arts societies 
participating in committees on legislation and corresponding with 
other like-minded activists in other parts of the United States. His 
correspondence reveals a copious, detailed attention to the 
evolution of case law which addressed the issue of protecting 
aesthetics as a public purpose as it developed across the United 
States.921 Indeed, Bard published commentaries and publicized these 
cases.922 For the comparative purposes of this dissertation, Bard’s 
most interesting correspondence and publications date to the 1950s, 
prior to, during and after the passage of the Bard Act, enabling 
legislation at the state level which allowed New York City to pass 
its Landmarks Law.923  
 
There is one piece of Bard’s correspondence which makes the links 
between Italian cultural property law and the evolution of historic 
                                               
proposed amendment that he called ‘the patrimony of the people’ clause (Intro 508, No. 
535).”) 
918 See Art. 1, L. n. 1497/1939 (noting “Sono soggette alla presente legge a causa del loro 
notevole interesse pubblico: le cose che hanno conspicui caratteri di bellezza naturale…i 
complessi di cose immobili che compongono in caratteristico aspetto avente valore 
estetico e tradizionale…le bellezze panoramiche…”).  
919 PER LA SALVEZZA, supra note 511 at 22 (titling DICHIARAZIONE I as Patrimonio della 
Nazione).  
920 Art 1, Art 2, T.U., D.L. 490/1999 and of course in Art. 2, L. N. 42/2004.  
921 See Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public 
Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Boxes 135 and 136. Note that a full 
investigation of the evolution of the term aesthetics as recorded by Bard in legislation and 
case law is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
922 As one example, Albert S. Bard, The Latest Billboard Decision: Supreme Court of Indiana 
recognizes Evolution in Law Relating to Esthetics- City of Indianapolis in THE AMERICAN 
CITY August, 1930, Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New 
York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 135, Folder 5. There is 
also evidence that Bard kept track of the links between aesthetics and the police power as 
early as 1916, when he saved an article from the New York Law Journal entitled Police 
Power and Public Aesthetics dated Tuesday October 1916. Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 135, Folder 11.  
923 See Albert Bard and the City Beautiful in WOOD, supra note 875. The New York 
Preservation Archive Project has a history of the bill. See Bard Act (1956), THE NEW YORK 
PRESERVATION ARCHIVE PROJECT, http://www.nypap.org/preservation-history/bard-
act/ (“The Bard Act provided localities across New York State the authority they needed 
to pass local laws to protect landmarks, and was the New York State legislation that 
enabled the creation of a New York City Landmarks Law.”)  
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preservation law in New York even more explicit. In August of 1952 
Bard wrote to the Italian Consulate General in New York City as 
part of his activities with the National Roadside Council.924 In his 
letter Bard writes,  
 
Recently a newspaper item stated that the Italian Government had just 
put into effect a new and drastic law which regulated outdoor 
advertising in resort areas for the purposes of preserving scenic beauty. 
This organization would be interested in receiving a copy of the new 
regulation and would be especially grateful to have an English 
translation of it.925  
 
Amid much delay926 and awaiting a reply directly from Rome, Bard 
corresponded with a colleague at Ohio State University who 
observed that he  
 
wish[ed] to send [copies of Bard’s article on a New Jersey decision 
regarding billboards published in a 1951 issue of The American City]..to 
the Touring Club Italiano and other Italian agencies which should be 
interested in this problem in Italy. On a recent trip to Italy I was 
shocked by the amount of advertising which had taken over the highway 
approaches to the largest cities.927 
 
In response Bard wrote,  
 
I am interested to note your comment on the outdoor advertising 
situation in Italy. Last August I wrote to the Consulate General making 
inquiry as to a new and drastic law regulating outdoor advertising in 
Italy, to which some newspaper referred, and asking for a copy of the 
new regulation. The Consul General promised to obtain a copy of the 
‘Italian Official Gazette containing the law in question’…928 
                                               
924 Letter from Albert S. Bard, Vice-Chairman and National Roadside Council to Italian Consulate 
General, August 23, 1952, Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The 
New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4.  
925 Id.  
926 The correspondence between the two indicates that the Italian Consulate’s original 
letter of response had been lost in the mail and that the Consulate was waiting for a 
response from Rome. Letter from Consulate General of Italy in New York to Albert S. Bard, 
September 13, 1952, Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New 
York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4. 
927 Letter from Charles R. Sutton to Albert S. Bard, May 25, 1953, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4. 
928 Letter from Albert S. Bard to Charles R. Sutton, May 27, 1953, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4. 
  256 
 
Following this exchange, in a second letter to the Consulate Bard 
shared “Only recently I have a letter from a correspondent which says, 
‘On a recent trip to Italy I was shocked by the amount of advertising which 
had taken over the highway approaches to the larget cities.’”929 Eventually 
the Italian Consulate General answered Bard’s inquiry by referring 
to law n. 1497 of 1939.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome to which we have referred your 
inquiry of September 13 has furnished us with the following 
information: ‘A law which regulates outdoor advertising in resort areas 
for preserving scenic beauty has been in existence in Italy since June 29, 
1939. According to paragraph 14 of the above mentioned law permission 
to erect posters in determined areas must be obtained from the 
Authorities administering the road (communal, provincial or State).930 
The same regulation applies to posters placed in the civinity [sic] of 
monuments or buildings of historic interest, [sic] However, a new 
comprehensive regulation affecting the whole matter is at present under 
consideration but we are not in a position to state when it will be 
issued.931 
 
No copy of the law seems to have been included with the letter. In 
response Bard not only requested a copy but also commented on the 
abuse of discretion he felt the Italian legislation in effect offered:  
                                               
929 Letter from Albert S. Bard to Consulate General of Italy, May 27, 29153, Albert S. Bard 
papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, 
and Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4. 
930 The full article 14 of the law reads, “Nell’ambito e in prossimità dei luoghi e delle cose 
contemplati dall’art. 1 della presente legge non può essere autorizzata la posa in opera di 
cartelli o di altri mezzi di pubblicità se non previo consenso della competente regia 
soprintendenza ai monumenti o all’arte medioevale e moderna, alla quale è fatto obbligo 
di interpellare l’ente provinciale per il turismo. Il ministro per l’educazione nazionale ha 
facoltà di ordinare per mezzo del prefetto, la rimozione, a cura e spese degli interessati, 
dei cartelli e degli altri mezzi di pubblicità non preventivamente autorizzati che rechino, 
comunque, pregiudizio all’aspetto o al libero godimento delle cose e località soggette alla 
presente legge.  È anche facoltà del ministro ordinare per mezzo del prefetto che nelle 
località di cui ai nn. 3 e 4, dell’art. 1 della presente legge, sia dato alle facciate dei 
fabbricati, il cui colore rechi disturbo alla bellezza dell’insieme, un diverso colore che con 
quella armonizzi.  In caso di inadempienza, il prefetto provvede all’esecuzione d’ufficio 
ai termini e agli effetti di cui all’art. 20 del vigente testo unico della legge comunale e 
provinciale.” See Art 14, L. n. 1497/1939.  
931 Letter from F.to Papini, Consul General of Italy to Mr. Albert S. Bard, November 14, 1952, 
Copy n. 29099 enclosed in a Letter From the Consul General of Italy to Albert S. Bard, 
dated June 3, 1953 (“we are forwarding you, herewith enclosed, copy of the letter we 
mailed to your address on November 14, 1952 containing information on the law which 
regulates outdoor advertising in Italy”). Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives 
Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 102, 
Folder 4. 
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Your letter of Nov. 14 quotes The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome 
as stating that the Authorities administering the road, whether State, 
provincial or communal issue permits for outdoor advertising. It would 
seem from the comment by my correspondent which I quoted to you in 
my letter of May 27, that the administrative officers who have authority 
to issue or refuse permits are over-generous to the advertisers and 
negligent toward the beauty of Italy. Seemingly their authority needs 
serious limitation by legislative action or ordinance. If you are able to 
obtain without too much trouble the provisions of the law governing the 
issue of permits, I should be interested to see them. So far as the 
statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome goes the highway 
authorities seem to have complete discretion- a discretion they have 
abused, if my correspondent is correct. I should be interested to have any 
further comment or information as to the situation referred to.932 
 
Here, Bard’s copy of the correspondence in the New York Public 
Library archives ends, but it allows us to make a few comparative 
observations and raise unanswered questions. While there is no 
hard evidence that Bard knew of Italy’s law n. 1089 of 1939 
protecting movable works of artistic or historic interest, it is for 
certain that Bard was aware of law n. 1497 of 1939. In addition, Bard 
was aware of Italy’s law on the books and also of its limitations. Did 
this further influence his work and activism for early forms of 
historic preservation legislation? Did Bard satisfy his curiosity and 
look further into Italy’s cultural property law in English translations 
and did that influence the wording of the 1956 Bard Law for “works 
of art and other objects having a special character, or special 
historical or aesthetic interest”? A definitive answer to this question 
has not appeared, and Bard’s other work with the New York City 
Chapter of the American Institute of Architects and the New York 
Regional Chapter of the Institute of Planners from 1954 to 1956 does 
not particularly concentrate on Italian law. 933 
 
                                               
932 Letter from Albert S. Bard to Italian Consul General, June 4, 1953, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 102, Folder 4. 
933 See Planning for Community Appearance, Report of the AIA-AIP New York area joint 
Committee on Design Control (edited by Henry Fagin and Robert C. Weinberg) February 
26, 1958 at p. i. Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York 
Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundation. Box 138, folder 1. Although the 
report mainly considers European laws in effect through Germany and France with 
accompanying translations, some Italian references are included in the bibliography. One 
article is entitled “Architectural Control over Town Development in Italy.” See Part IV 
and Bibliography in Id.  
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Passed in 1956, as the culmination of Bard’s and other New York 
activists’934 many efforts, the text of the Bard Act read,  
 
To provide for places, buildings, structures, works of art and other 
objects having a special character, or special historical or aesthetic 
interest or value, special conditions or regulations for their protection, 
enhancement, perpetuation or use, which may include appropriate and 
reasonable control of the use or appearance of neighboring private 
property within public view, or both. In any such instance, such 
measures, if adopted in the exercise of the police power, shall be 
reasonable and appropriate to the purpose, or, if constituting a taking of 
private property, shall provide for due compensation, which may include 
the limitation or remission of taxes.935  
 
The inclusion of “works of art” in the Bard Act as objects to be 
protected might be due to Bard’s awareness of the presence of art 
objects in architectural buildings and as part of urban spaces, both 
in the United States936 and in Italy.937 It could be related to the 
perspective that architecture is art, although the placement of 
“works of art” after “building” and “structures” makes this 
hypothesis less plausible. While vagueness might have been 
unwanted, terms which would allow a broad scope of subject 
matter and broad application of the law seemed to have definitively 
been on Bard’s mind. When presenting the law’s passage in both 
houses of the New York State Congress and Governor Harriman’s 
request for more details before signing it to the Municipal Art 
                                               
934 It is important to note here that Robert Moses’ proposed actions in much of New York 
City during this time led to many grass roots efforts which also culminated in the 
legislative action. An analysis of these events is beyond the scope of the dissertation, but 
for details see The Bridge, The Castle, and Moses in WOOD, supra note 875.  
935 THE NEW YORK PRESERVATION ARCHIVE PROJECT, supra note 923.  
936 In a letter from 1956 Bard observes “I think the Sculpture Society and the Fine Arts 
Federation should both take up the matter of the illegal removal and destruction of the 
figure of Mohamed from the top of the Appellate Division Court House.” Letter from 
Albert S. Bard to Miss Katherine Thayer Hobson, June 12, 1956, Albert S. Bard papers. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and 
Tilden Foundations. Box 54, Folder 6.   
937 A 1930 letter about decorations for a festival in Santa Barbara points Bard to decorations 
in the Palazzo Davanzati in Florence. Letter from Harry B. Brainerd to Albert S. Bard, 
February 24, 1930, Albert S. Bard papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New 
York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. Box 13, Folder 9 (“Pursuant to 
our telephone conversation relative to street decorations for the Santa Barbara summer 
festival…In the field of archeology you will find an illustration of provision for street 
decorations in a book entitled The Davanzati Palace, Florence, Italy a restored palace of 
the Fourteenth Century measured and drawn together with a short descriptive text by 
Louis Conrad Rosenberg, published in 1922 by the Architectural Book Publishing 
Company of New York.”) 
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Society, Bard observed to members that “To have included details 
would have been entirely inconsistent.”938 
 
In any event, the exploration of Bard’s work, the advent of the Bard 
Act, and other laws protecting objects of antiquity which came into 
force in the early 20th century contemporaneous to developments in 
Italy point to how U.S. historic preservation law, at its heart, 
answers the issues surrounding what counts as cultural property 
and how to identify it in a way similar to that of Italian cultural 
property law throughout its history. Both link the reason the State 
should regulate the subject matter to a public interest, and reflect 
that the public interest, while linked to aesthetics and history, is in 
actuality related to the needs of society and the collective and 
naturally evolves with society. Certain threads of U.S. historic 
preservation history reveal, despite the deftly drawn boundaries 
between the United States as a market nation and Italy as a source 
nation, a similar foundation for regulation: the public interest.  
 
1.1.2 Time Mechanisms and Things too? 
 
Just as the time thresholds of Italian cultural property law are not 
bright lines, so historic preservation law in the U.S. also presents us 
with time thresholds that indicate the complex decision making 
process behind the identification of a public cultural interest in 
certain tangible properties. Indeed, just as with Italian cultural 
property, there is a relationship between types of historic properties 
and time thresholds in U.S. historic preservation law, especially for 
New York Landmarks Law.  
 
After the passage of the Bard Act, and after the protests of many 
New Yorkers who opposed Robert Moses’ development plans in the 
city, and almost contemporaneous to the demolition of Penn 
Station, Mayor Wagner created a Committee for the Preservation of 
Historic and Aesthetic Structures in June of 1961.939 This committee, 
in turn, recommended the establishment of a temporary940 
                                               
938 Special Business Section, Meeting Minutes, April 25, 1955, Municipal Art Society 
Archives, at 3.  
939 Press Release, Sunday July 1, 1962, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, New York 
City Department of Records, Mayor Wagner files, Landmark Preservation at 2.  
940 The description of the Commission as such was made in an essay in the newsletter of 
the Municipal Art Society announcing passage of the Landmarks Law in 1965. Edward R. 
Finch, Jr, The Municipal Art Society and the Landmarks Preservation Commission in THE 
MUNICIPAL ART SOCIETY NEWS, June 1965 News, Municipal Art Society Archives at 2. The 
Municipal Art Society was quite active in the passage of the Landmarks Law in New York 
City at this time. Indeed, Geoffrey Platt, the eventual head of the Landmarks Commission, 
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Landmarks Preservation Commission. The Commission was 
instituted by the Mayor in April of 1962, with the words  
 
Our heritage and local traditions provide the basis for that vital sense of 
continuity [as a City that is always looking to the future, but must never 
forget that we are always building on the past], stability and pride which 
stimulates sound growth and development.941 
 
The Commission was tasked both with “designat[ing] for preservation 
buildings, structures, monuments, statues and works of historic and/or 
esthetic importance and their surroundings” and “prepar[ing] for the 
Mayor a detailed legislative program for the effective protection of public 
landmarks.”942 In May of 1964, the Commission shared their 
legislative proposal with the Mayor.943 From the Fall of 1964 to the 
Spring of 1965 hearings were held on the bill and the city record 
reporting on these hearings and the status of the bill in March of 
1965 made some observations on the Landmark Law’s evolution. It 
noted an inclusion of a specific age requirement where before there 
was none. 
 
The original bill authorized designation of any building without regard 
to age. The bill as revised provides that only buildings which are 30 
years old or older shall qualify for designation. The reason for the change 
was that the most immediate need is to preserve our older historic and 
architectural qualifying structures. Newer buildings which qualify, it 
was agreed by the Commission, are very unlikely to be affected 
by…demolition in the foreseeable future. In those isolated cases which 
may arise the Committee agreed to recommend to the Council that 
suitable amendment to the law would be considered upon 
recommendation of the Commission.944   
 
Age here is, like in the Italian case, a number which is related to 
practical concerns germane to the category of objects at issue.  
 
                                               
was a member of the Municipal Art Society. See also August 1964 Newsletter, Municipal 
Art Society Archives.   
941 Press Release, Sunday July 1, 1962, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, New York 
City Department of Records, Mayor Wagner files, Landmark Preservation at 1. Among 
those on the Commission were members of the Municipal Art Society and Fine Arts 
Federation, including Geoffrey Platt.  
942 Press Release, Thursday February 6, 1962, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, , New 
York City Department of Records, Mayor Wagner files, Landmark Preservation at 1. 
943 Letter from Geoffrey Platt to Mayor Robert Wagner, October 28, 1964 at 2 in New York 
City Department of Records, Mayor Wagner files, Landmark Preservation.  
944 The City Record, Thursday March 25, 1965 in New York City Department of Records, 
Mayor Wagner Files, Landmarks Preservation at 1993. 
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In the presentation of the 1939 law in Italy, Bottai had highlighted 
the links between the choice of fifty years, non-living authors and 
the importance of allowing the passage of time to concretize a 
cultural judgment by the collective while balancing public and 
private interests in the objects of artistic or historic interest. Here, 
similar concerns for immediate preservation, with the possibility 
that newer buildings may also qualify as landmarks under the law, 
also indicate a link to cultural consensus. Thirty years is related to 
collective cultural consensus and demolition just as fifty years, 
seventy years, and in some case no age limit, is in Italian cultural 
property law. 
 
The 1966 National Historic Preservation Act also indicates a 
dependency on age. Today, this federal law requires a minimum of 
fifty years while also allowing certain properties to be classified as 
historic property before they reach fifty years of age if they are of 
exceptional significance.945 During debates and hearings of the Act, 
the question of a particular age seems not to have come up. Indeed, 
histories of the fifty year requirement reveal that it originated from 
the criteria that properties date to before 1870 during the Historic 
Sites Survey, part of the National Historic Sites Act of 1935.946 The 
specific criteria of 50 years was later crafted in the 1950s during a 
review of the Historic Sites Survey and was incorporated as a 
criteria for historic property on the National Register in 1965.947 
Enshrined in the regulations set by the Ministry of the Interior in 
charge of the National Register, fifty years is characterized much 
like fifty years in Italian cultural property. “‘[T]he time needed to 
develop historical perspective and to evaluate significance’ .”948 
Commentators have further noted that while “there is no evidence in 
the record as to why 50 years was initially chosen as a waiting period”… 
“[t]he criterion limited pressure to review or designate properties 
                                               
945 54 U.S. Code § 300308 defines historic property in relation to which properties are 
eligible to be listed on the National Register. See also NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
LAW supra note 362 at 50-51. 
946 Preservation Leadership Forum, 50 Years Reconsidered, FORUM JOURNAL AND FORUM 
FOCUS, September 12, 2015 5:35 pm, https://forum.savingplaces.org/viewdocument/50-
years-reconsidered, (citing to John H. Sprinkle, Jr. “ ‘Of Exceptional Importance’: The 
Origins of the ‘Fifty-Year Rule’ in Historic Preservation”, The Public Historian 29, No. 2 
(Spring 2007), 82). For a more detailed history of The Historic Sites Act see generally 
CHARLES BRIDGHAM HOSMER, PRESERVATION COMES OF AGE: FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO THE 
NATIONAL TRUST, 1926-1949, VOLUME I (1981).   
947 Preservation Leadership Forum, 50 Years Reconsidered, supra note 946.  
948 Preservation Leadership Forum, 50 Years Reconsidered, supra note 946 (citing to 
Marcella Sherfy and W. Ray Luce, Guidelines for Evaluating and Nominating Properties that 
Have Achieved Significance Within the Past 50 Years; available 
from www.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/nrb22/; accessed 4/2010.) 
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associated with contemporary values and living persons.”949  
 
The New York Landmarks Law as it was proposed and then 
enacted also exhibits changes to its subject matter. The report in the 
city record notes that “The bill originally provided that a member of the 
Landmarks Commission [should include] a practitioner of the fine arts.”950 
Indeed, the temporary commission had included a practitioner of 
the fine arts.951 The report went on, however, to explain the change 
of the types of commission members with reference to the subject 
matter the bill intended to regulate.  
 
The bill as originally developed and as now proposed…enacted into law 
is to apply to exteriors. Therefore, it was recommended to the Committee 
by the Commission that the provision restricting one of the members [of 
the] permanent Commission to be a practitioner of the fine arts was 
unnecessary…in the limited cases where the Commission needs advice 
on the interior of buildings, it can retain consultants in fine arts.952 
 
This initial limit on the subject matter of the Landmarks Bill is just, 
as the report suggests it is, a temporary limit. Like Italian cultural 
property law, Landmarks Law in New York City evolved. Over 
time, however, it evolved to explicitly include interiors of buildings 
as well as exteriors.953 
 
Today, landmarks as interiors are defined as  
 
[a]n interior, or part thereof, any part of which is thirty years old or 
older, and which is customarily open or accessible to the public, or to 
which the public is customarily invited, and which has a special 
historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, 
heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation, and which 
has been designated as an interior landmark pursuant to the provisions 
                                               
949 Id. (citing to John H. Sprinkle, Jr. “ ‘Of Exceptional Importance’: The Origins of the 
‘Fifty-Year Rule’ in Historic Preservation”, The Public Historian 29, No. 2 (Spring 2007), 82 
at 83).  
950 The City Record, supra note 944 at 1993.  
951 The Press Release instituting the temporary commission names Karl Gruppe, a sculptor. 
Press Release, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, New York City Department of 
Records, Mayor Wagner Files, Landmarks Preservation at 2.  
952 The City Record, supra note 944 at 1993.  
953 A Local Law to amend the New York City charter and the administrative code of New 
York, in relation to the establishment and regulation of landmarks, landmark sites, and 
historic districts, n. 779-883, at 207.10(i) in New York City Department of Records, Mayor 
Wagner Files, Landmarks Preservation at 5 (although defining an improvement as “Any 
building, structure, place, work of art, or other object constituting a physical betterment of such 
property, or any part of such betterment.”) 
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of this chapter.954  
 
As in Italian cultural property law, it seems historic or aesthetic 
interest can apply to various types of tangible properties.  
 
Other parts of the New York Landmarks Law on their face also 
indicate that the landmark status of tangible properties is linked to 
case by case determinations of intangible historic and aesthetic 
interest. Like Italian cultural property’s concern with decoro, the 
New York Landmarks Law also issues certificates of 
appropriateness for changes to tangible properties.955 While drawing 
perhaps more bright lines than Italian cultural property law956, the 
law still notes that consideration of appropriateness includes “the 
factors of aesthetic, historical and architectural values and 
significance, architectural style, design, arrangement, texture, 
material and color.”957 Here, like in Italian cultural property law, the 
Commission must decide how intangible cultural interests 
embodied through historic and aesthetic interest match tangible 
properties, both at the outset of its regulation and after it has been 
declared a landmark.  
 
The changing types of landmarks indicate a continuing negotiation 
of what tangible properties might exhibit intangible cultural 
interest, but it also indicates that landmark is a liminal notion itself. 
                                               
954 N.Y. City Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Landmark Preservation and Historic 
Districts, § 25-302, 
http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/New%20York/admin/title25landuse/chap
ter3landmarkspreservationpreservatio?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:new
york_ny$anc=JD_T25C003. Today’s Code does not have a definition of what types of 
professionals may be on the Commission, but simply states “The agency is comprised of a 
panel of 11 commissioners who are appointed by the Mayor and supported by a staff of 
approximately 80 preservationists, researchers, architects, historians, attorneys, 
archaeologists, and administrative employees.” See also About LPC, NYC LANDMARKS 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMMISSION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/lpc/about/about-lpc.page.  
955 N.Y. City Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Landmark Preservation and Historic 
Districts, § 25-307, 
http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/New%20York/admin/title25landuse/chap
ter3landmarkspreservationpreservatio?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:new
york_ny$anc=JD_T25C003. 
956 Id. at § 25-307b(3) (noting “the commission, in making any such determination, shall not 
apply any regulation, limitation, determination or restriction as to the height and bulk of 
buildings, the area of yards, courts or other open spaces, density of population, the 
location of trades and industries, or location of buildings designed for specific uses, other 
than the regulations, limitations, determinations and restrictions as to such matters 
prescribed or made by or pursuant to applicable provisions of law, exclusive of this 
chapter.”) 
957 Id. at § 25-307b(2). 
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In order to decide what is a landmark, not only do you determine 
based on the public interest, but you also need to implicitly seek the 
advice of experts in the field. Other disciplines inform what a 
landmark is under local law in the United States, just as other 
disciplines inform what counts as cultural property under Italian 
cultural property law. 
 
What still remains an open question is whether “works of art” 
defined as part of improvements could ever evolve into the 
protection of movable works of art by the Landmarks Commission. 
Certainly individual works of art that are fixtures (consider a 
chandelier) might be considered sufficient qualifying parts of an 
interior.958 Clocks, for example, although larger in scale than fashion 
design objects, have been considered historically significative 
enough to be determinative for interiors’ classifications as 
landmarks in New York City.959 Of course, fixtures may not always 
be fixed. Arabella Worsham’s Gilded Age closet, for example, has 
been installed in The Metropolitan Museum of Art, along with the 
historic fashion design objects in it.960 Other examples, such as 
Isabella Stewart Gardner’s framed Worth gown underneath her  
favorite painting Rape of Europe by Titian, provide an example as to 
how a fashion design object, or a piece of it, might become a work of 
art and a fixture eligible as an improvement or an interior 
landmark.961 The painting still hangs in Stewart Gardner’s house 
museum today. 
 
Federal law makes the questionable scope of local historic 
preservation laws such as New York City’s even more pertinent for 
our purposes. Objects are considered a type of property under 
National Register Guidelines, but only insofar as these objects are 
                                               
958 Some things which we might consider largely movable but also immovable have been 
considered landmarks. Two trees have been designated. See Dana Schulz, The Only Two 
Living Things in NYC to Have Been Landmarked Are Trees, 6SQFT, February 25, 2015, 
https://www.6sqft.com/the-only-two-living-things-in-nyc-to-have-been-landmarked-
are-trees/. As have some sidewalk clocks. See Landmarked Sidewalk Clocks, 12 of NYC’s 
Most Unusual Landmarks, UNTAPPED CITIES, February 22, 2016, 
https://untappedcities.com/2016/02/22/12-of-nycs-most-surprising-landmarks/7/.  
959 Save America's Clocks, Inc. v. City of New York, 33 N.Y.3d 198 (NY. Ct. of Appeals, 
March 28, 2019) (discussing the ramifications of certificates of appropriateness and 
alterations as applied to interiors when an interior containing a clock was to be closed to 
the public).  
960 A few years ago, Worsham’s closet provided a cultural dialogue with another modern 
closet containing clothes as part of a temporary exhibition. See Sara Berman’s Closet, THE 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, March 6 2017- November 26, 2017, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/listings/2017/sara-berman-closet.  
961 For an exploration of the piece and its history see Anne Higonnet, Museum Sight in ART 
AND ITS PUBLICS 133- 147 (A McLellan, ed., 2004).  
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still connected to a physical place.962  In terms of fashion, some 
immovable structures can exhibit historical significance linked to 
the fashion industry. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory or the Brown 
Building in New York, for example, is listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places “as a reminder of both the triumph and 
the tragedy of the labor movement in early twentieth century 
America.”963 The Macy’s Department store on 34th Street in New York 
City is also on the National Register of Historic Places, noted for its 
impact on “American retailing.”964  
 
The protection of such buildings does not, however, equal the 
protection of an individual fashion object. This is a limit that is 
potentially evident in Italian cultural property law as well, despite 
its regulation of movable objects. Indeed, presentations of “Fashion 
Law” in Italian scholarship mention cultural property law as 
something to be aware of only when seeking permission to use a 
historic building during a photoshoot.965 
 
While U.S. historic preservation law seems to answer cultural 
property dilemmas in a similar way to Italian cultural property law. 
It focuses on public interest, uses changing and constant time 
thresholds as a standard, and allows aesthetic and historical 
interests to both actuate the public interest and also link historic 
preservation to other disciplines in the humanities. At the same 
time, it does not yet have a space for movable objects of artistic, 
historic, or other cultural interest like modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects. As a result, other legal regimes in the 
                                               
962 NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW supra n. 362 at 42. This is why monuments and 
statues are considered, but usually not objects relocated to a museum. Id.  
963 The factory was affected by a terrible, devastating fire in 1911 in which many women 
workers lost their lives. See the historical significance described NPS/NRHP Registration 
Form, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, 
https://npgallery.nps.gov/pdfhost/docs/NHLS/Text/91002050.pdf. Other buildings 
noted as Department Stores are also listed. See, for example the Bon Marché Department 
Store now Macy’s in Seattle, United States Department of the Interior, National Register of 
Historic Places Form, Bon Marche Department Store, 
https://www.nps.gov/nr/feature/places/pdfs/16000830.pdf.  
964 United States Department of the Interior, National Register of Historic Places Form, 
R.H. Macy and Company Store, 
https://npgallery.nps.gov/pdfhost/docs/NHLS/Text/78001873.pdf.  
965 SEGNALINI, supra note 61 at 79 (“Anche i location scouters non dimentichino di 
consultarlo se la scelta della sede del servizio fotografico o della sfilata è caduta su una 
dimora storica: caso in cui potrebbe essere necessaria, per lo svolgimento dell’evento, 
l’autorizzazione del sovrintendente (o di chi per lui) ai sensi del nostro Codice dei beni 
culturali e del paesaggio (circostanza quest’ultima, che, insieme ai dettagli del luogo 
prescelto, andrebbe ben evidenziata anche nella didascalia della foto o nel paper della 
sfilata, con formule del tipo: “Palazzo Rossi, per gentile concessione del Mibac”…). 
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United States might allow us to protect movable objects which are 
themselves of historic or aesthetic interest. 
  
1.2 “Art Law” beyond Things   
 
Italian fashion design objects could also be recognized as tangible 
objects of public cultural interest in the United States through 
various regulations of public property. Foreign gifts or donations 
accepted by United States Presidents are understood, for example, 
as the property of the American people, to paraphrase Charlie 
Young in an episode of The West Wing.966 If the President were 
gifted a fashion design object, it would be protected, at the very 
least, as public property, much as Amelia Earhart’s suit or Jackie 
O’s Chanel suit in the Smithsonian are through other regulations. 
Museum collections, public trusts, and easements are also ways in 
which to conceptualize protecting individual fashion design objects 
as cultural property in the United States.967  
 
Sui generis laws are also an option. The California Art Preservation 
Act968, for example, seems to regulate art and purport to make 
decisions of preservation like the rules enshrined in cultural 
property. In Section 989, while grounding the public interest in 
preserving an “integrity of cultural and artistic creations”969 and not a 
historic or aesthetic interest, the law allows an organization970 acting 
in the public interest to “commence an action for injunctive relief to 
preserve or restore the integrity of a work of fine art from”971 anyone 
“intentionally commit[ing], or authoriz[ing] the intentional commission 
of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work 
of fine art.”972 The Act defines fine art as “an original painting, 
sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized 
                                               
966 5 U.S.C. §7342(c)(B)(1). The West Wing, A Change is Gonna Come, Season 6, Episode 7 
(Warner Brothers, 2004). 
967 See supra. 
968 The observation that such art preservation laws are based on a public interest like 
cultural property law in source nations has been made before. John Henry Merryman 
noted as much in Merryman, Public Interest supra note 375 at 349 (“ ‘art preservation’ laws 
in California and Massachusetts give further evidence of the public interest in cultural 
property…”).  
969 California Art Preservation Act, CA. CIV. CODE § 989(a) (1980).  
970 Defined as “a public or private not-for-profit entity or association, in existence at least 
three years at the time an action is filed pursuant to this section, a major purpose of which 
is to stage, display, or otherwise present works of art to the public or to promote the 
interests of the arts or artists.” CA. CIV. CODE §989(b)(2).  
971 CA. CIV. CODE §989(c)(3). 
972 CA. CIV. CODE §987(c)(1). 
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quality, and of substantial public interest.”973 To determine what 
constitutes a work of fine art, the judge or jury974 “shall rely on the 
opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art 
museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of 
fine art.”975  
 
On its face, this law sounds quite similar to what has been observed 
in cultural property law and in historic preservation law. Works of 
fine art is a liminal notion, defined according to expert opinions. 
Preservation is founded on a public interest. The Section applies to 
works of art no matter their age.976 While different from the general 
requirement that individual objects of historic or artistic interest be 
at least seventy years of age under Italian law or usually at least 
fifty years of age under U.S. historic preservation law, the lack of a 
time threshold under the California Preservation Act reflects how 
malleable the marriage between time thresholds and public interest 
can be as applied to works of art, one slice of a later cultural 
property pie. 
 
Like Italian cultural property law, the California Preservation Act 
seems to apply to works of fine art that reveal an unicum between 
their intangible and tangible qualities, properties to which a public 
cultural interest attaches because of a union of this tangibility and 
the intangible public cultural interest. While moral rights might be 
thought of as actuating a similar type of protection, the fact that, as 
Grisolia has said, these rights follow the artist and not the object 
make them problematic as substitutes for cultural property law. 
Some authors have already even suggested that moral rights might 
step in as an alternative to more aggressive landmarking to protect 
public art, architecture and perhaps therefore movable works of 
artistic interest.977 Other American legal scholars have proposed 
protecting new forms of visual art, like street art, as cultural 
property through additions to the Visual Artists’ Rights Act.978  
These, however, do not seem to capture the importance of an object 
which Italian cultural property law emphasizes and they also 
                                               
973 CA. CIV. CODE §989(b)(1).  
974 The statute refers to “the trier of fact.” CA. CIV. CODE §989(d)(3) and §987(f). 
975 CA. CIV. CODE §987(f). 
976 CA. CIV. CODE §989(h).  
977 Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist, supra note 78 at 433, 464. Merryman noted that ““Moral 
right" laws in some nations and "art preservation" laws in California and Massachusetts 
give further evidence of the public interest in cultural property.” Merryman, Public Interest 
supra note 375 at 343- 344.  
978 Griffin M. Barnett, Recognized Statute: Protecting Street Art as Cultural Property, 12 Chi.-
Kent J. Intell. Prop. 204 (2013).  
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propose to make the protection of objects more complicated by 
giving their authors rights in the object over and above a public 
cultural interest.  
 
 
2. Fashion Designs in a Negative or Sui Generis Legal Space  
 
Fashion design objects of public cultural interest could be protected 
as cultural property in the United States through an extension to 
various historic preservation acts at the state and federal levels. 
Fashion design objects might be compared to art so that they fall 
within the jurisdiction of sui generis statutes which now contemplate 
a protection of a public interest in certain kinds of fine art. The 
public trust doctrine could be applied to hold some part of fashion 
design objects for the benefit of the public. Contractual conditions 
or easements could be placed on individual fashion design objects. 
Some tort remedies do acknowledge that historic or artistic value is 
important when they allow increased damages when private 
property of historic/literary or artistic value is destroyed.979 Despite 
all these possibilities, fashion designs might still be assigned to 
some sort of negative legal space that disavows their attachment to 
tangible properties and therefore an ability to regulate them or 
preserve them through objects.  
 
In the realm of copyrights, such a negative space often leads to what 
might be termed social enforcement mechanisms, like naming and 
shaming and calling out on social media.980 The challenges of course 
with this naming and shaming, which is also often engaged in to 
protect intangible cultural heritage981, is that legal standards are 
usually not used to frame a discussion of what counts as creative, 
what counts as of cultural interest and why one design may not 
satisfy either of these bars. Indeed the flexibility of the standard of 
creativity and cultural interest in naming and shaming activities 
often seems related to the untouchable cool factor of a brand at a 
given moment, the social acceptance of the trends it is creating. 
While there may be some red lines that surround the acceptance of 
some fashion designs982, the nature of fashion, and fashion designs, 
                                               
979 2nd Restatement of Torts Section 242 comment a. 
980 Diet Prada here being the premiere example of such regular naming and shaming that 
often produces results. DIET PRADA, https://www.dietprada.com. See critiques of Diet 
Prada’s methods in Jonah Engel Bromwich, We’re All Drinking Diet Prada Now, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/fashion/diet-prada.html.  
981 See the acknowledgment of the kimono and Kim Kardashian West controversy infra.  
982 As when Gucci created a turtleneck that seemed to promote blackface. See Tiffany Hsu 
and Elizabeth Patton, Gucci and Adidas Apologize and Drop Products called Racist, N.Y. TIMES, 
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as fluid and changeable, even increasingly in luxury circles, often 
means that the ability to “fix” the cultural meaning of certain 
designs to specific objects is almost impossible.  
 
That having been said, as evidenced in the example of Rosa 
Genoni’s Pisanello mantle above, it is possible to recognize specific 
cultural values in specific fashion design objects, despite the fact 
that the cultural meaning of their design is not inherent to the 
material upon which or in which it is embodied.    
 
Many fashion brands seem to have created a type of sui generis 
regime for themselves by deploying a mix of trademark law, patent 
law, contract law and, where appropriate, copyright law, to protect 
and regulate the use of their own designs and products that may 
otherwise fall into a negative legal space. This form of “self-help”, 
however, risks not only intimidating and freezing the otherwise 
legal actions of third parties who may wish to embrace or contest 
certain fashion designs’ cultural interest, but it also confuses an 
understanding of what the actual legal rules are in the first place. 
This confusion is especially visible when fashion designs go digital 
and digital actors like Instagram affect the cultural reception of 
fashion designs by insisting that members of the public seek 
permission from their “Brand Resources”983 site without even 
offering an option for educational uses or other actors in the 
cultural field or admitting the scope of the rights in their intellectual 
property. In this sense, trademark is often confused for copyright by 
consumers, and almost chilling effects are created in the cultural 
sphere. One of the key elements of contemplating how fashion 
designs are to be protected and regulated like cultural property is 
to, at the very least, imagine how to raise awareness of the improper 
sui generis legal regimes that digital giants and members of the 
fashion industry are creating around their products.  
 
  
                                               
February 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/business/gucci-blackface-
adidas-apologize.html. 
983 To see this site which regulates the permission process from Instagram as applied to 
commercial use, see INSTAGRAM BRAND RESOURCES, https://en.instagram-brand.com 
(giving guidelines for use as well).  
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CONCLUSION: INHERITING ITALIAN FASHION FOR 
OUR FUTURE  
1. Towards a Legal Framework for Italian Fashion as Cultural 
Property 
 
Thinking of Italian fashion as cultural heritage might seem increasingly 
common today as Italian fashion brands archive their products, found 
museums and stage exhibitions of their products alongside traditional 
cultural properties. Tradition and heritage, a hallmark of luxury in some 
management circles984, has, just in the last few years, become almost 
ubiquitous for certain Italian brands and their fashion strategies. Fendi 
has celebrated its 90th anniversary by staging a fashion show in which it 
presented its fashion products not only alongside but within the Trevi 
Fountain in Rome.985 Under Alessandro Michele’s direction Gucci has 
played with the past designs of the Bamboo Handle and its green and 
red and blue and red stripes in its archive to create a new, bohemian 
fashion which has only increased the brand’s relevance.986 Donatella 
Versace has re-issued designs by her brother Gianni Versace, with few 
to no alterations.987 And these are just a few of many more examples.  
 
The links between fashion and culture have, of course, been present on 
the Italian territory since the Greeks settled parts of Sicily along with 
their mythology of Pandora and the peplos988, since the Romans wore 
                                               
984 MANAGING FASHION, supra note 18 at 27.  
985 Fiona Sinclair Scott, Models walk on water as Karl Lagerfeld makes history, CNN, August 15, 
2016, https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/fendi-historical-couture-show-trevi-
fountain/index.html.  
986 Susannah Frankel, “People Need Reality” Alessandro Michele on his Gucci, ANOTHER MAG, 
February 15, 2018, https://www.anothermag.com/fashion-beauty/10576/people-need-
reality-alessandro-michele-on-his-gucci.  
987 See infra Chapter 1.  
988 Marco Brunetti has brought this historical information to my attention. As Marco has 
explained, Ancient Athens used the myth of Pandora in a non-traditional way, holding 
Pandora up as the first artisan who learned the art of weaving textile from the goddess 
Athena herself. See Laslo Berczelly, Pandora and Panathenaia. The Pandora Myth and the 
Sculptural Decoration of the Parthenon, in ACTA AD ARCHAEOLOGIAM ET ARTIUM HISTORIAM 
PERTINENTIA [JOURNAL PERTAINING TO ARCHEOLOGY AND ART HISTORY] VIII 53- 86, 80 
(1992) (“In my opinion, the Attic tradition concerning the first Panathenaic peplos tells us 
something about the origin of the ritual practice, but it does not directly answer the 
question of why the votive offering of the peplos has to be made. Only the Pandora myth 
gives us the mythical explanation: the peplos had to be woven by a team of maidens 
because the patron goddess of the city could be suitable propitiated and thanked by such 
an offering. Deep in the mythical past the first Attic woman, Pandora, had learnt the art of 
weaving peploi from her, and from that time onwards the handcraft has been inspired 
and protected by Athena. It became in this way the pride of Attic women, and in a certain 
sense the pride of Athens itself.”)   
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their togas with political implications989, since Italian city-states passed 
sumptuary laws to regulate what could be worn in public990, since 
Baldassare Castiglione wrote on sprezzatura as a complex of actions, 
clothes and aesthetics that created a style991, since Cesare Vecellio 
observed the habits of dressing of peoples992, since Italian women in the 
early 1800s began to wear the Pamela hat993, since Rosa Genoni designed 
her gowns taking inspiration from Botticelli and Pisanello994, since 
Salvatore Ferragamo learned his craft in his small town outside of 
Naples. Italian fashion’s relationship to Italian culture has always been 
present, almost as long as mankind has existed and adorned itself, and 
time has allowed us to cherish Italian fashion as not only of artistic 
significance but also as of historic significance for our civilization. 
 
The intuition that fashion is a part of our cultural heritage and its long 
history on the Italian territory does not, however, answer the complex 
question of how fashion is cultural heritage, especially under the law. 
There are, in fact, a few ways to think about Italian fashion generally as 
part of our cultural heritage through cultural heritage law. The majority 
of these ways are dependent both on the chosen legal instrument and on 
how to define fashion. It could be considered for example that fashion is 
really defined by an intangible process- both in its making and in its 
acceptance. In this sense, the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage, which defines intangible cultural heritage as  
 
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as 
the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith 
– that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as 
                                               
989 Miscellany: Loosely Belted, LAPHAM’S Q., 
https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/fashion/miscellany/loosely-belted.  
990 Sumptuary Laws and Fashion: Between Uniformity and Change in PAULICELLI, supra note 102 
at 31-42.  
991 PAULICELLI, supra note 102 at 54 (noting how sprezzatura in Castiglione’s work “takes on 
different meanings depending on its context. It can be associated with the concealing of 
artifice, looking natural, projecting a constructed or ‘gained naturalness’ or simply with 
being graceful. In other circumstances, it can mean to be cool and calm even in the most 
trying of situations, without ever sacrificing style and distinction in dress and demeanor. 
The complexity of the term alerts us to two basic tenets of Castiglione’s argument in The 
Courtier: the defining of a set of aesthetic and political rules that create a je ne sais quoi of 
style that lies somewhere between informality and elegance, and the difficulty of 
capturing it in works or teaching it.”) 
992 CESARE VECELLIO, DE GLI HABITI ANTICHI ET MODERNI DI DIVERSI PARTI DEL MONDO [ON 
ANTIQUE AND MODERN DRESS FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD] (1590). 
993 See supra, Section 2.1 in Chapter 2.  
994 Rosa Genoni (1867-1954), ARCHIVI DELLA MODA DEL NOVECENTO, 
http://www.moda.san.beniculturali.it/wordpress/?percorsi=rosa-genoni-1867-1954-2.  
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part of their cultural heritage995 
 
and one of its manifestations as “traditional craftsmanship”996 might 
adequately apply to Italian fashion. It could be argued that, like the art 
of the Neapolitan pizzaiuolo997, the artisanship of Italian fashion “fosters 
social gatherings and intergenerational exchange, and assumes a 
character of the spectacular” with “knowledge and skills [that] are 
primarily transmitted in the ‘bottega’.”998 Classifying Italian artisanship 
like the recent Venetian practices which produced Dolce & Gabbana’s 
Alta Moda dresses999 as intangible cultural heritage would encourage 
Italy to foster even more safeguarding mechanisms for these processes 
and would also potentially allow for the protection of certain examples 
of the Venetian practice of soprarizzo velvet creation under Article 7-bis 
of the Italian Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape.  
 
Such an initial hypothesis of protecting Italian artisanship or practices of 
Made in Italy as intangible cultural heritage necessarily brings up, 
however, crucial questions and reveals the complexity of legally 
protecting Italian fashion as cultural heritage at the international level 
and at the national level. Can the cultural interest underlying 
considerations of Italian fashion as part of cultural heritage be separated 
into processes of artisanship and the Made in Italy on one hand and the 
tangible iterations of those processes on the other? If it is decided that 
higher safeguards should be imposed for Italian artisanship, what does 
that mean for Italian fashion brands today, like Dolce & Gabbana, and 
the wider fashion industry, who still use and even define themselves 
through this artisanship? Is it possible to divorce a cultural interest from 
one designer and assign it to a collective group of artisans? Can we 
assign a public cultural interest to a fictional brand or company in order 
to protect both or something else other than designers or artisans? What 
effect might protecting Italian artisanship and its manifestations as 
intangible cultural heritage mean for the creativity of Italian fashion 
                                               
995 Art 2(1), United Nations’ Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (2003), October 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 42671 (see also 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html).  
996 Id. at Art. 1(2)(e).  
997 Art of Neapolitan ‘Pizzaiuolo’, UNESCO, https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/art-of-
neapolitan-pizzaiuolo-00722.  
998 Id.  
999 One of the gowns was made by Bevilacqua Weaving in Venice from “handmade 
soprarizzo velvet…an ancient handcraft renowned for its use of two different irons: an 
intricate and delicate process that enhances the homespun manufacturing of this unique 
textile.” See a video of the process on Dolce & Gabbana’s Facebook page from July 11, 
2019, https://www.facebook.com/DolceGabbana/.  
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designers today- is Dolce & Gabbana culturally appropriating Venetian 
heritage? Would that perpetuate a Northern versus Southern Italian 
hierarchy, an urban over rural reality? What is the difference between a 
contemporary Dolce & Gabbana fashion design object and a Venetian 
artisan’s work? What ramifications do drawing such differences mean 
for the originality of Dolce & Gabbana’s fashion designs and their 
protection under intellectual property law? Do different cultural 
interests exist in each product? Are they different parts of our cultural 
heritage?  
 
A legal framework for Italian fashion as cultural heritage necessarily 
leads to questions about Italian fashion’s products, about Italian fashion 
design objects. Answering how Italian fashion design objects are one 
piece of the cultural heritage pie under the law - cultural property- can 
help us understand whether there is a way to protect Italian fashion in 
its most elemental and present part- in its objects- as part of cultural 
heritage for the future. 
 
Drawing this legal framework reveals that there are considerable 
overlaps and intersections between different bodies of law. As detailed 
above, intangible cultural heritage law overlaps with national cultural 
property law. National cultural property law also overlaps with 
property law and constitutional law: constitutional articles can enable or 
frustrate the protection of fashion design objects as cultural property by 
allowing for its protection, privileging private property, or striking 
some delicate balance in between. This is the case in Italian 
constitutional law where Article 9 protects Italy’s cultural heritage, but 
Article 42 protects private property within certain limits.1000 At the same 
time, cultural property law in Italy predates constitutional law in Italy, 
and so this body of law shapes constitutional law and the property in 
question. But to which category of property Italian fashion design 
objects belong is also fundamental question. Italian fashion design 
objects are certainly of a public cultural interest like a Botticelli painting 
or the Trevi fountain, and they are accepted items of Italian cultural 
property through museum collections. But where is the public cultural 
interest in these fashion design objects located? Depending on where it 
is, two different categories of property may be in play- real property or 
intellectual property. An intangible intellectual property fixed in a 
tangible fashion design object might be masquerading as cultural 
property, or a tangible real property with intangible elements may be 
cultural property and of cultural interest. Deciding which category of 
legal subject matter is crucial. Cultural property is not only ruled by the 
                                               
1000 See supra Chapter 2 (Massimo Severo Giannini, Basi Costituzionali della Proprietà Privata, 
SCRITTI, VOL VI ,187- 245 (2005)).  
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tyranny of things under Italian cultural property law1001, but some 
jurisdictions, like the U.S., largely understand fashion designs, and the 
objects of which they are a part, as belonging to the realm of intellectual 
property and not cultural property. Deciding on real property or 
intellectual property also brings up questions of how to decide and who 
should decide. Administrative law here provides rules and procedures 
that govern the recognition and declaration of cultural property in 
Italian law, as well as its regulation. Administrative law also plays a 
crucial role in intellectual property protection in the United States 
through registration processes and guidelines. The rules and procedures 
affecting fashion design objects as real or intellectual cultural property 
are certainly not confined to the local or national level. The rules and 
procedures could also be supranational, as with the European Union’s 
rules on design rights. They could be international beyond cultural 
heritage law itself, as, for example, through use of the Berne 
Convention. Still other bodies of law that are defined by subject matter, 
like Fashion Law and Art Law, might offer their own legal 
methodologies for a legal framework of Italian fashion design objects as 
cultural property under the law. 
 
So, what is the legal framework for Italian fashion design objects as 
cultural property exactly? What are its institutions, its rules, its 
procedures, its interests, its functions and its terms? Is it the same as 
cultural heritage law today? Are current cultural heritage law rules and 
norms enough, or does the law need to evolve? Can other legal fields, 
like Fashion Law, provide the necessary tools or would they hinder the 
protection and regulation of Italian fashion design objects as cultural 
property? Are legal rules and norms to protect Italian fashion design 
objects as cultural property even needed?  
 
1.1 Can Cultural Property Law fully embrace Italian Fashion 
Design Objects?   
 
The most appropriate legal regime to answer how to recognize, 
protect and then regulate Italian fashion design objects as cultural 
property seems to be Italian cultural property law. One part of a 
larger legal framework for the protection of cultural heritage and 
landscape on the Italian territory, Italian cultural property law 
brings with it a historic consideration of what characteristics 
indicate what is cultural property under the law. It also brings a 
framework of institutions charged with recognizing, protecting, and 
regulating cultural property. The Ministry of Cultural Heritage and 
                                               
1001 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3.  
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its relevant field offices declare private property to be cultural 
property; they also work with museums in charge of the cultural 
property in various public collections. At the same time, 
constitutional clauses, Italian doctrine and case law assign 
preservation of cultural property to the State while distinguishing 
between preservation and valorization. This allows both Regions 
and the State to concurrently promote cultural property and to 
work together while balancing sometimes diverging interests. 
Likewise, Italian cultural property law provides an accompanying 
judicial appeals process to these administrative procedures, with 
established rules for reviewability and deference to administrative 
decisions.  
 
At the same time, however, as Italian cultural property law gives us 
these institutions and procedures, its fundamental legal institute, 
the term cultural property, is characterized by dilemmas which, 
when applied to Italian fashion design objects, are both manageable 
and problematic. First, cultural property is of a potentially 
boundless cultural interest.1002 Evolving from an emphasis on 
aesthetics, art and antiquity alone, Italian cultural property is now 
defined by multiple interests, from ethnoanthropological to 
numismatic, art-historical and the broad ability of a property to be a 
testament having the value of civilization. At the heart of these 
multiple interests is not a definitive social function, one social 
purpose or even a social use of the property in question alone. 
Cultural property does not conceive of the property as belonging to 
the commons. Rather, a public cultural interest beyond the 
property’s ownership is what defines cultural property under 
Italian cultural heritage law. The public, members of society, 
converge their cultural interest on a property and it is they who 
decide that it is of public cultural interest to them, as a whole. A 
public cultural interest seems to already attach to fashion in Italy 
under certain circumstances, as when a building expropriated by 
the Region of Lombardy was deemed put to a proper use as a future 
fashion museum within the context of the city of Milan.1003 Certain 
Italian fashion design objects like Rosa Genoni’s Pisanello-inspired 
Mantello are already presumed to be of a public art-historical 
interest or to be testaments having the value of civilization when 
they are treated as cultural property by the institutions and 
museums which hold them.1004 Here, public cultural interest seems to 
include what might be called a public fashion history interest in 
                                               
1002 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.1.  
1003 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
1004 See supra Chapter 1, Section 2. 
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certain Italian fashion design objects.  
 
At the same time, a boundless cultural interest is also potentially 
problematic for the classification of Italian fashion design objects as 
cultural property. How fashion design objects come to be cultural 
property, how a public fashion history interest is recognized in 
fashion design objects or presumed to exist, is a complex process.  
Doctrine tells us that it is the public that decides the cultural interest 
of an object and that the administration actuates that cultural 
interest for the public. But is it realistic to think that the public 
administration can objectively decide what Italian fashion design 
objects the public has a cultural interest in without potentially 
succumbing to the whims of a specific Italian brand, its popularity 
and even its marketing strategy? While needing a public cultural 
interest might mean that not all or every Italian fashion design 
object is cultural property, a potential battle of the experts is on the 
horizon here. There is a risk of perpetuating certain hierarchies in 
the Italian fashion industry. Might the administration be more apt 
to recognize a dress of Dolce & Gabbana as cultural property than 
the same dress made by Bevilacqua Weaving alone? Italian cultural 
property law does place limits on administrators’ discretion, 
requiring them to motivate their decisions- simple sentimental 
judgments are not enough.1005 At the same time, however, as Dolce & 
Gabbana, or Gucci or Ferragamo, continue to lay claim to a piece of 
fashion history in Italy, how could their Italian fashion design 
objects not be considered of sufficient public cultural interest in the 
future, if they are not already? This also brings up the issue of 
authenticity as one cultural interest out of many. A public cultural 
interest may attach to a property for many reasons- the author may 
be of interest, the time period may be important, the provenance, 
the design apart from its creator. Often, cultural properties are 
celebrated because they reflect the hand or touch of the artist. But 
how does the public administration decide what is this authorship, 
authenticity or other interest that might found our public cultural 
interest as applied to Italian fashion design objects? Who, in effect, 
decides? If Salvatore Ferragamo designed the Invisible Sandal in 
19471006, [Figure 31] but the company continues to make it, does that 
affect how to decide if an Invisible Sandal made today is cultural 
property seventy years from now? Can architecture here provide 
guidance; is such a comparison proper? What about the public’s 
                                               
1005 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
1006 See supra Chapter 1, Section 2. 
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opinion- should that affect conceptions of authorship?1007 What 
should the public administration do about counterfeits? Should 
they treat them as unable to be cultural property or see them as 
variations with their own, different, potential cultural interest, like 
copies of celebrated works of art might still be recognized as 
cultural property themselves? Where does a public cultural interest 
end- is a fashion illustration enough or is a finished accessory 
needed? These challenges also highlight the liminality of public 
cultural interest and implies potential relationships to other legal 
regimes. Should protection by copyright be some sort of indicator of 
public cultural interest and later cultural property protection? How 
far should we redraw borders between different types of laws, if at 
all? The requirement of a public cultural interest allows Italian 
cultural property law to embrace Italian fashion design objects as 
part of cultural property. At the same time, there are ever-present 
concerns about hierarchies, about selective cultural preservation, 
and even about the fear of losing future cultural property by 
applying outdated metrics when the time is ripe.  
 
Time- this is another manageable yet problematic dilemma for 
Italian fashion design objects as cultural property. The bottom line 
is that while Italian fashion might be now be considered cultural 
heritage, while museums might be visited to see fashion’s tangible 
products, current Italian cultural property law cannot yet stop the 
vast majority of tangible fashion design objects of public cultural 
interest from disappearing into a private archive or collection and 
never potentially being seen again. The reason for this is that simply 
not enough time has passed for most Italian fashion design objects. 
Private owners cannot yet be required to conserve the Italian 
fashion design object, nor could they potentially be required to 
make it accessible to the public.1008 On one hand, this makes sense. 
For individual Italian fashion design objects that are not part of a 
public or not for profit collection, for those that are either in private 
hands or even owned by an Italian fashion brand, these Italian 
fashion design objects may still provide inspiration for 
contemporary designs as part of business activities. The fashion 
design objects might even still be worn. The purpose of time under 
cultural property law is to foster and support cultural consensus. 
Some Italian fashion design objects may still be too cutting edge or 
of too uncertain cultural impact to classify as cultural property. 
                                               
1007 As has been recently suggested for the issue of authorship in copyright law. See 
Timothy J. McFarlin, Shouting the People: Authorship and Audience in Copyright, 93 
TUL. L. REV. 443 (2019).  
1008 See Art. 53, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. 
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Cultural consensus about certain fashion design objects may not yet 
be crystalized. Notwithstanding this there are certain categories of 
Italian cultural property which do not need a certain amount of 
time to pass at all. Think of the designs by Versace presented soon 
after his untimely death, or the suit Armani designed for Richard 
Gere in American Gigolo.1009 Would these Italian fashion design 
objects be of such public interest immediately, so soon after their 
initial creation and production, as to be appropriately included 
alongside Michelangelo’s David or Caravaggio’s Bacchus? Italian 
cultural property law also usually requires an unicum of a non-
living author and seventy years for individual objects in private 
collections to be declared or for individual objects in public or not 
for profit collections to be verified as cultural property. Not only are 
most designers still living but brands potentially never die. 
Returning to our example of Salvatore Ferragamo’s Invisible Sandals, 
is the first pair of Invisible Sandals created in 1947 eligible to be 
cultural property because Salvatore Ferragamo is no longer living, 
or is it definitive that he created them as part of Salvatore 
Ferragamo the brand and not the man? Does it matter? Should we 
compare the Invisible Sandals to individual documents or other 
things of public cultural interest that do not need a specific time 
threshold because they refer to literary, artistic or other categories of 
history?1010 Should we apply this category to Italian fashion design 
objects? Do Italian fashion designers need to be no longer living? 
Can an Italian fashion brand still survive and produce cultural 
property? Right now, the mechanisms of time might allow some 
Italian fashion design objects to be embraced as Italian cultural 
property, but they are not completely definitive for all categories of 
Italian fashion design objects. The existence of some time thresholds 
acoompanied by the lack of them frustrates a bright line rule for 
how fashion design objects are or may become cultural property. 
These time thresholds reveal how important case-by-case 
determinations and evaluations of fashion design objects’ cultural 
interest in defined circumstances may be. 
 
Perhaps the most problematic and least manageable dilemma for 
Italian fashion design objects is what was referred to as the tyranny 
of things, a hallmark of the notion of cultural property under Italian 
law.1011 Despite a detour into possibly protecting intangible 
properties like text in the 1999 Testo Unico and the inclusion of 
Article 7-bis in the 2004 Code to comply with its obligations under 
                                               
1009 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2.  
1010 Art 10(2)(d), CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. 
1011 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.3.  
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the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage, Italian law circumscribes the legal category of cultural 
property to tangible things. At the same time, as Giannini said, the 
intangible public cultural interest is what is definitive of the legal 
notion of Italian cultural property .1012 It is, therefore, the relationship 
between the intangible public cultural interest and tangible 
properties that seems to be the true hallmark of the notion of Italian 
cultural property under Italian law.  
 
Far from being confined to tangible properties, our public cultural 
interest in properties can attach to tangible properties that have 
intangible elements- think of a painting. While cultural property 
law might protect the unicum of a painting that is reproducible 
(whether through photography or other digital or non-digital 
means) and its physical canvas, our public cultural interest might 
attach to the intangible element of the painting more than to its 
tangible element. The composition, seen on a slide show or on 
another support, might be the definitive reason for a tangible 
properties’ classification as cultural property.1013 The limit here is not 
that our intangible public cultural interest only attaches to tangible 
properties, but that cultural property law in Italy only recognizes 
and protects the tangible unicum of an intangible property and its 
tangible property even when the public cultural interest attaches to the 
intangible, reproducible elements of a property. If there is no unicum, 
then cultural property law in Italy does not apply. Activities, 
cultural expressions or manifestations unmoored to physical 
objects, despite perhaps benefiting from other safeguarding 
mechanisms or financial incentives, cannot be protected as cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law. The only exception 
seems to be for objects that are classified as testaments having the 
value of civilization. For this category there need not be an unicum 
between a tangible property and its intangible elements, but the 
tangible property is rather considered, despite the ability of its 
intangible parts to be reproduced and culturally significant 
elsewhere, as representative of the physical touch of an author, or a 
community, a spark of creativity, or even a cultural moment.1014 For 
Italian fashion design objects this tyranny of things creates a 
crucially problematic issue: when should the public administration, 
acting for the public, decide that an intangible, reproducible fashion 
design is part of an unicum with its tangible accessory, purse, dress 
or shoe? The administration, without having to identify whether a 
                                               
1012 Id.  
1013 Discussed in categories infra Chapter 4.  
1014 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.3.  
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public cultural interest lies in a fashion design itself, might of course 
bypass this issue by conceiving of an Italian fashion design object as 
a testament having the value of civilization, much as it already 
seems to implicitly do with Rosa Genoni’s Mantello or Primavera 
dress. 
 
One of the ways to conceptualize the different categories of cultural 
property and the way they might apply to Italian fashion design 
objects’ classification as cultural property under Italian law is by 
thinking of a spectrum of tangible text, visible images, intangible text 
and intangible images, and testaments having the value of civilization. 
There are some categories of text which, although first thought of, 
like fashion design, as presumably reproducible and the same no 
matter in what accessory or dress they are embodied, are materially 
dependent. The messages of these texts change and their cultural 
significance differs based on the material support upon which they 
are placed. As discussed above, some ancient Greek examples of 
text on funerary monuments and symposium cups fall in to this 
category.1015 Fashion designs that incorporate text reveal how fashion 
designs, which might be thought of as completely intangible like 
most texts, can also be materially dependent. Moschino’s statement 
on its evening gown, or the “REAL GUCCI” placed on a Gucci bag 
are examples.1016 Intangible fashion designs that fall into the tangible 
text category can be an unicum that satisfies the legal institute of 
cultural property. Here, fashion design objects can satisfy a tyranny 
of things. Still other fashion designs, however, seem to be on the 
edge between tangible text and visible images, like Valentino’s dress 
with the Dante text. 
 
Other fashion designs can be like visible images and therefore 
cultural property. They can also be like intangible images and not 
cultural property. At the same time as Matsuda’s letters falling in to 
a shirt pocket might be materially dependent, Zuccoli’s design with 
Santa Maria Novella might be a visible image or Moschino’s 
McDonalds’ Ms might be intangible images. Moreover, when trying 
to categorize these fashion designs, the issue of the scope of cultural 
interest arises. Should the public administration consider that there 
are different, separate cultural interests in Zuccoli’s use of the Santa 
Maria Novella façade as part of a dress and in the Santa Maria 
Novella façade on the Santa Maria Novella church itself? Should 
Poiret’s dress, Armani’s iteration, and Isabelle de Borchgrave’s 
iteration all be of different cultural interests and therefore each a 
                                               
1015 See supra Chapter 3, Section 2.  
1016 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.    
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cultural property?1017 Or, should the public administration consider a 
cultural interest to be so tied to the intangible design of the Santa 
Maria Novella façade no matter where it is placed, so tied to Poiret’s 
design no matter who reinterprets it or who “copies” it in an 
innovative manner? In that case, the public cultural interest would 
therefore attach to an intangible property meant to travel and not be 
“frozen” in a material iteration as cultural property under current 
Italian cultural property law. Poiret’s dress, Armani’s iteration, and 
Borchgrave’s iteration might all exist in a negative space of cultural 
property law.  
 
We could also reframe this problematization of the existence of 
cultural interest in fashion design objects in terms of scope or 
claiming, terms often used by design law scholars.1018 We might, for 
example, at first claim that cultural interest may attach to Armani’s 
entire skirt and pants design, but comparing it with what was 
designed before by Poiret and what has been done afterwards by 
Borchgrave may limit what exactly we may find of public cultural 
interest in Armani’s version. In this sense, the borders of other laws 
may aid a determination of public cultural interest. If copyright law 
would see the design of a skirt and pants combination as like scenes-
a-faires, or unprotectable subject matter, then perhaps cultural 
property law should as well. In this sense, the borders of different 
legal regimes as applied to certain fashion design objects may 
match. 
 
For some Italian fashion design objects these questions of the 
existence and scope of cultural interest are not easy or obvious. 
Their inclusion in the proverbial cultural property “box” would 
likely depend on a standard which would evaluate the relationship 
between a fashion design and a fashion design object in terms of the 
public cultural interest according to a particular circumstance and 
in light of the fashion design’s specific place, support, message, and 
at times context.1019 Incorporating such a legal standard into the legal 
                                               
1017 See supra Chapter 3, Section 1.    
1018 Mark A. Lemley and Mark P McKenna, Scope, 57(6) WILLIAM AND MARY L. REV. 2197 
(2016) (defining scope as the extent of a right, or “the range of things the IP right lawfully 
protects against competition” and proposing “a unified scope regime” across intellectual 
property law); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
123, 161 (2018) (discussing what parts of designs different intellectual property law 
regimes effectively identify as their protectable subject matters and how, noting that in 
copyright “the copyright work itself is used as the prototype against which all allegedly 
infringing works are compared…” and exploring how an automatic protection of 
copyright in part frustrates a claiming methodology). 
1019 See supra Introduction, Section 4 and Chapter 3, Section 1.    
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institute of cultural property might allow the public administration 
to determine when and how specific Italian fashion design objects 
could be classified as cultural property under current Italian 
cultural property law, with or without reference to the catch-all or 
implicit category of testaments having the value of civilization. 
 
Of course, this legal standard brings up still further questions. What 
is context? How exactly might the public administration determine 
the message of a fashion design and/or fashion design object? Is it 
possible for the public administration to be content-neutral in 
practice when making these decisions? In pinpointing the intangible 
cultural interest, can procedural mechanisms and constitutional 
protections stop the public administration from recognizing or 
giving more proverbial cultural space to certain messages over 
others? What is the difference between recognizing a public cultural 
interest and privileging a specific cultural communication? The 
concepts of style or schema might already place a limit on the public 
administration, effectively stopping it from protecting fashion 
designs that are so intangible, so common to multiple objects and 
even so stereotypical1020 that, despite their historic importance or 
archetypal nature1021, they need to travel unrestricted both 
proverbially and practically. At the same time, however, allowing 
certain intangibles like certain fashion designs to always be outside 
the cultural property box does not begin to parse how these fashion 
designs become of such great cultural interest to us with or without 
cultural, legal and even political processes.  
 
Italian cultural property law, with its legal institute of cultural 
property and the complex of norms and legal requirements which 
characterize it, including preservation, valorization, mechanisms of 
time and authorial requirements, things, public cultural interest, 
and limits of intangibility, to name a few, seems able to embrace 
some but not all Italian fashion design objects as cultural property. 
While this result seems to leave out some important objects which 
might be of public cultural interest, it is not necessarily a 
counterintuitive result. Such an inapplicability of cultural property 
law might not, however, be counter to the purpose of the legal 
institute of cultural property itself. Nor might it frustrate the 
preservation of Italian fashion. A classic Valentino red dress 
designed in a simple silhouette should perhaps be as unclassifiable 
as Dante’s text currently is. To protect a design alone as cultural 
property might prohibit its very cultural existence, let alone be 
                                               
1020 See supra Chapter 3, Section 1 and Section 4.  
1021 See supra Chapter 3, Section 4. 
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almost practically impossible. Indeed, to embrace all Italian fashion 
design objects as cultural property might frustrate a proper 
discernment of cultural consensus and a public cultural interest. To 
not differentiate based on the passage of time might improperly 
classify certain trends as cultural property. The partial embrace of 
Italian fashion design objects currently proposed under Italian 
cultural property law might correctly satisfy and substitute, in fact, 
for a full embrace at first sought.   
       
1.2 The Key Role of Copyright in the Protection of Fashion 
Design Objects as Cultural Property 
 
As noted above, the marriage of a public cultural interest with 
fashion designs unmoored to any tangible fashion design object, in 
other words fashion design’s inherent intangibility, likely leads to 
an inability to protect most fashion design objects through the legal 
institute of cultural property under Italian cultural property law. 
Time thresholds further frustrate the application of the legal 
institute of cultural property to many fashion design objects. This 
inapplicability is logical in some sense. Most fashion designs are 
repeatable, necessary tools for the very understanding and 
dissemination of their cultural interest as part of fashion. At the 
same time, the inability to classify some fashion design objects as 
cultural property due to their designs’ fundamentally intangible 
nature might not lead to a completely negative legal space.  
 
First, international cultural heritage law regulating intangible 
cultural heritage might apply to these fashion designs. With its 
safeguarding mechanisms and its use as part of naming and 
shaming1022 such intangible cultural heritage law still leaves a gap for 
the modern and contemporary Italian fashion design that is created 
apart from and alongside Italian artisanship and craftsmanship. We 
might think of Dolce & Gabbana’s fashion design, for example, with 
its use of Venetian, Sicilian and Neapolitan artisanal traditions, to 
                                               
1022 As one example of successful naming and shaming with reference to intangible cultural 
heritage see Kyoto, Japan’s letter to Kim Kardashian West, protesting the use of the term 
Kimono as detrimental to the actual kimono-making process and kimono objects of Japan, 
which it is seeking to register as Intangible Cultural Heritage. Letter from Daisaku 
Kadokawa, Mayor of Kyoto to Kim Kardashain West, June 28, 2019, 
https://www.city.kyoto.lg.jp/sankan/cmsfiles/contents/0000254/254139/Letter_from_
Mayor_Kadokawa(ENG)rev.pdf (“Kimono is a traditional ethnic dress fostered in our rich 
nature and history with our predecessors’ tireless endeavours and studies, and it is a 
culture that has been cherished and passed down with care in our living. Also, it is a fruit 
of craftsmanship and truly symbolizes sense of beauty, spirits and values of Japanese… 
We are currently undertaking initiatives nationally to make “Kimono Culture”, symbol of 
our culture and spirits, registered to UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage list.”)   
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name just a few, as intangible Italian cultural heritage like the art of 
Neapolitan pizzaiuoli. But there are still aspects of such a possible 
protection which seem problematic and counterintuitive for the 
nature of fashion and the fashion industry. Can the business 
activities of Italian fashion brands be thought of as intangible 
cultural heritage? What would safeguarding look like in this 
circumstance? How would one negotiate between safeguarding and 
improper restrictions on businesses? Would such protection 
perpetuate hierarchies, further protecting luxury brand goods and 
modern and contemporary urban fashion over traditional, more 
rural or regional realities? 
 
Intellectual property law is sometimes seen as filling the legal space 
where intangible cultural heritage protections might fail. While 
most scholarship envisions how patent, trademark, or copyright 
might function as protections for indigenous cultural heritage or 
property and even, in some circumstances, cultural products1023, 
intellectual property law might also first protect the cultural interest 
which is later identified as cultural property. This can occur whether 
or not this is the stated aim or goal of intellectual property law. 
Indeed, this protection of cultural interest may even be improper. 
Nevertheless, the use of intellectual property law to restrict or shape 
the cultural interest in fashion designs and fashion design objects 
seems to occur when certain fashion design objects exist as visible 
images and also for those fashion design objects that are prized for a 
cultural significance in the unicum of the intangible and tangible.1024  
                                               
1023 See Introduction, Section 1 and the discussion of Susan Scafidi’s work in WHO OWN’S 
CULTURE?  
1024 Amy Adler and Jeanne Fromer have recently published an article that seems to hint at 
this phenomenon while not engaging it directly. Taking Intellectual Property into their own 
hands explores how intellectual property owners with rights to subject matter “well within 
the heartland” of protection act in the shadow of their rights outside the traditional legal 
system to stop the appropriation of their work and seek attribution, among other 
remedies. Adler and Fromer note that “Reappropriations, at their core, provide society 
with new artistic creations. Reappropriators turn the intellectual property paradigm on its 
head by seeing infringement as an impetus for creativity rather than an obstacle to it.” 
Amy Adler and Jeanne Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into their own hands, 107 CAL. L. 
REV. 1455, 1459 (2019). Adler and Fromer spotlight the Gucci and “Trouble” Andrew or 
GucciGhost case as an example of “retaking the copy”, where Alessandro Michele’s 
decision to work with Andrew and appropriate his work into Gucci fashion design objects 
exhibits a self-help act of a rights-holder to avoid misattribution. How, however, Gucci’s 
choice to work with Andrew, in the shadow of their intellectual property rights, might 
have shaped the cultural interest assigned to Gucci’s GG logo, is not explicitly addressed. 
As the authors acknowledge, Alessandro Michele “loved the possibility of playing with 
the theme of ‘what is real and unreal.’” Id. at 1473. An analysis of the relationship between 
“retaking the copy” in the shadow of rights, and exercises of cultural speech or 
assignments of cultural interest would be particularly interesting given the opposite, 
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The fact that a relationship and potential overlap might exist 
between intellectual property law and cultural property law for some 
properties in some circumstances is already hinted at by Italian cultural 
property law itself when it acts like one part of intellectual property 
law, copyright law. Despite arguments that Italian cultural property 
law should not and does not apply to intangible properties alone1025, 
the law carves out a space in which it purports to regulate only an 
intangible element of cultural properties, their reproduction. Such a 
regulation is evident in the requirement that commercial 
reproductions of Italian cultural properties in the hands of the State 
receive permission from the relevant holding institution.1026 It is also 
evident in the requirement that certain cultural property’s decoro be 
preserved and that only appropriate actions take place within 
them.1027 In regulating reproductions, Italian cultural property law 
notes that it acts with respect to Italian copyright law, diritto 
d’autore.1028 But how can the legal institute of cultural property 
purport to only recognize and protect the attachment of our public 
cultural interest to intangible elements as they exist within a 
tangible property at what would be called, in intellectual property 
terms, the validity stage, only to extend the scope of cultural 
property to the relationship between our public cultural interest 
and an intangible property wherever it is at a second “infringing” 
moment?1029 Here it would seem that Italian cultural property law 
wishes to act like a copyright regime in certain circumstances, when 
copyright no longer applies. Cultural property law’s applicability 
here effectively brings intangible properties like images, and even 
therefore designs, into the legal institute of cultural property. In 
certain circumstances, the legal institute of cultural property seems 
not just about protecting the relationship between the public 
cultural interest and certain properties, but also about controlling 
the intangible public cultural interest itself.1030  
 
In this sense, it seems that copyright law, when incorporated as a 
set of legal norms into the legal institute of cultural property in 
Italian law, is an improper partner to the protection of cultural 
property. Copyright norms within the legal institute of cultural 
                                               
negative reactions to other examples of Gucci’s “retaking of copies”, as in the Dapper Dan 
example. Id. at 1470 – 1479.  
1025 See discussion of Giannini in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and Chapter 4.   
1026 See discussion in Chapter 2, Section 3.  
1027 Id.  
1028 See Introduction.  
1029 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 3. 
1030 See discussion of David example in Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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property might effectively allow for a control of public cultural 
interest instead of its actuation. This might be especially so given 
the expectation that copyright expires after a certain period of time, 
that copyright only regulates relationships between private actors in 
relation to certain creative works, and that copyright does not 
regulate relationships between private actors and the State. 
 
At the same time as this improper partnership, in other legal 
jurisdictions where the legal institute of cultural property does not 
exist as such or not in the same way as it does on the Italian territory, a 
partnership between copyright and cultural property might be 
proper. Indeed, copyright might function as an ex ante cultural 
property regime in practice, albeit by assigning rights to authors 
instead of to the public administration and controlling intangible 
properties before they are of the necessary cultural interest and 
before a cultural consensus.  
 
Fashion design objects provide us with a stage on which to explore 
the overlap and the partnership between copyright law and cultural 
property law. Unlike intangible cultural heritage which divides 
properties into intangible activities and tangible manifestations, the 
legal institute of cultural property in Italy, with its emphasis on 
tangible properties which might contain culturally significant 
intangible elements, provides a ready comparison to copyright, 
which protects intangible expressions fixed in multiple tangible 
mediums, first in one and then in other copies.1031 Indeed, one 
category of U.S. copyrightable subject matter, pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works seems to negotiate the entrance of the designs of 
useful articles into its purview through the conceptual separability 
test by asking whether these design are like visible images, thereby 
implicating the identification of a possible public cultural interest.  
 
Courts both in Italy and in the United States have grappled with the 
separability test for designs of useful articles.1032 Over time, however, 
these courts, deciding whether certain designs of useful articles, 
including fashion design objects, were copyrightable subject matter 
or not, have seemed to move towards the use of explicit and 
implicit barometers of cultural significance to arrive at their 
decisions. Italian copyright law, for example, has eventually moved 
to an unicum evaluation.1033 Italian courts do not today engage in any 
                                               
1031 For these definitions see supra, Chapter 2, Section 2 and Chapter 4, Section 2.  
1032 Chapter 4, Section 1, Section 2 and Section 3. 
1033 For a description of this evolution thanks to supranational law see supra Chapter 4, 
Section 3. See also Reichman, Design Protection supra note 728 (exploring Italy’s 
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separative analysis for models of industrial designs in order to 
determine whether they have the necessary creative character or 
artistic value. Today’s analysis, which evaluates the corpus mysticum 
(work of art) and a corpus mechanicum (material support)1034 together, 
led one Milanese court in 2016 to declare the Moon Boots of 
sufficient artistic value and creative character, in part because they 
had changed the course of design history through the impact of 
their iconic design.1035 Prior to a clear acceptance of these items, 
created only in 19701036, as cultural property but within the earlier 
copyright term, the Italian court extended rights in the intangible 
fashion design and control over its embodiment in tangible 
materials for the life of its author and seventy years thereafter.1037  
 
In the United States, the recent Star Athletica v. Varsity case 
addressed whether certain features of the designs of certain 
cheerleading uniforms – stripes, chevrons, and zig zags – were 
copyrightable subject matter. The Court abandoned the physical 
separability test, noting the standard for when features of the 
designs of useful articles were sufficiently pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works was only one of conceptual separability.1038 In their 
legal reasoning holding the stripes, chevrons and zig zags to be 
sufficiently eligible for a classification only as copyrightable subject 
matter, the Court in part compared them to a fresco and its own 
intangible elements. The chevrons, stripes, and zigzags were like 
the fresco’s composition, not the tangible unicum of composition 
and dome. Drawing a line between corresponding to the shape of a 
useful article and replicating it, the Court seemed to recognize as 
copyrightable subject matter the same type of intangible elements in 
a tangible property on a fashion design object as would be 
copyrightable on a painting- the fashion design was comparable to 
a composition. Deliberately rejecting the dissent’s notion that they 
                                               
separability test in comparison to the United States’ conceptual separability and the theory 
of “dissociation” in the Italian test).  
1034 For the use of these terms see Tecnica v. Anniel, Tribunale Sez. Spec. Impresa, - Milano, 
12/07/2016, supra note 845. 
1035 For a discussion of the case see supra Chapter 4, Section 3.   
1036 For this date see the catalog of ITEMS: IS FASHION MODERN?, supra note 604 at 181- 182, 
referenced in infra Chapter 3, Section 1.   
1037 While the case does not mention Giuseppe Zanatta as the designer, creator or author, 
but only Tecnica, the sports company Zanatta co-founded, the terms of copyright under 
Italian copyright right are based on authors, who may be single, joint, or a group, and not 
companies. See GAUDENZI, supra note 567 at 90-93 (citing to art. 23- 26 of L n. 633/1941). 
Italian copyright law seems to have abrogated its work for hire doctrine. See Art. 12-ter in 
L n. 633/1941. 
1038 For further discussion of the case and for reference to the description in the next few 
paragraphs see Chapter 4, Section 2.  
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were attempting to extend copyright to tangible, material properties 
by protecting a picture of the cheerleading uniform, the Court noted 
the narrowness of its holding. The Court did not seek to extend 
protection to the unicum of intangible fashion design and tangible 
fashion design object, nor did it seek to extend protection to an 
entire fashion design which could be reproduced in any material 
and sold as such on the fashion market.1039 It did not seek to protect 
the shape, cut, or the style or schema, of the fashion design object. 
Rather, the Court only seemed interested in deploying its own 
public judgment to identify which parts of the design could be like 
a fresco’s composition, divorced from the functionality or tangibility 
of its support.  
 
Read in comparison to the recent Italian copyright case deciding 
how Moon Boots are copyrightable, in comparison to Italian 
cultural property law’s requirements, and even within the evolution 
of U.S. copyright subject matter and the separability test, the Star 
Athletica case seems to indicate that, to decide how certain fashion 
designs are pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, U.S. courts 
should concentrate on identifying the intangible part of a fashion 
design object which may be of public cultural interest, without 
protecting its shape or cut, its silhouette, its style or schema. While 
the Court in Star Athletica did not explicitly mention a historical or 
iconic nature of the designs, other recent cases seem to be moving 
towards such factors or, at least, towards a consideration of what is 
the uniquely repeatable, and therefore the relevant intangible part, 
of a useful article such that it may be copyrightable without being 
an unicum of intangible and tangible properties.1040  
 
This comparison between conceptual separability and the test for 
artistic value and creative character in Italy is not necessarily to 
urge a unity of art theory of copyright in the United States or to say 
that the United States may effectively become an Italian diritto 
d’autore regime. Rather, the point is to emphasize, through the 
                                               
1039 See supra Chapter 4, Section 2. 
1040 See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94489; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P31,113; 123 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 
1285 (C.D. Ill., June 20, 2017) at *1286- *1287 (holding a bird silhouette first on a clothespin 
copyrightable by noting “The bird portion of the Sparrow Clips, when identified and imagined 
apart from the useful article--the clothespin--qualifies as a sculptural work on its own.”) See also 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201498 (C.D. CAL. , May 8, 2017) at *8 - *9 (holding a hookah bottle 
design uncopyrightable but in dicta noting a Noguchi table likely copyrightable, “composed 
of unique geometric shapes variations or unique combinations of geometric shapes that might pass 
muster under the Star Athletica test. It is only to say that the water container at issue here is no 
Noguchi Table. [“The Noguchi Table was designed by Isamo Noguchi in 1939 for the then 
president of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, the original remains in the museum's 
permanent collection.”]”). See supra Chapter 4, Section 2.  
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comparison, that United States copyright law may be existing at the 
border between Italian diritto d’autore and Italian cultural property 
law in its own jurisdiction. Other scholars have proposed that 
conceptual separability is about conceivability1041 or have explored 
the historic similarities between the United States’ copyright law’s 
application to design and Italy’s previous scindibilità test1042. In a 
similar comparative and theoretical way, so here it is argued that 
conceptual separability may be about identifying cultural interest. 
In this sense, copyright law in the United States seems to act as the 
closest thing to a cultural property law regime when considering 
fashion designs within the category of pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works, since a cultural property regime for individual 
movable objects does not exist in the United States as it does in 
source nations. 
 
Unlike in Italy, where copyright like-norms may control the public 
cultural interest instead of actuating it, in a jurisdiction like the 
United States where movable non-indigenous objects in private 
property are not protected as cultural property, copyright law, and 
the legal institute of copyrightable subject matter, might take 
cultural property’s place ex ante. The legal institute of copyrightable 
subject matter might foster an assignment of the public’s cultural 
interest in certain intangible elements of tangible properties. Here, 
U.S. copyright law might give authors the ability to protect certain 
fashion designs in order to support the development of a public 
cultural interest which may later attach to them.     
 
There are of course limits for considering fashion designs as 
copyrightable subject matter but not necessarily to the partnership 
between cultural property law and copyright law and, therefore, to 
the presentation of U.S. copyright law as an ex ante cultural 
property law regime. Fashion designs may be so equal to the idea of 
                                               
1041 Mala Chatterjee, Conceptual Separability as Conceivability, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 558 (2018) 
(seeing the Courts test in Star Athletica as not resolving the conceptual separability issue 
and proposing a test for conceptual separabilty drawn from philosophy that is practically 
the opposite of the Court’s test, “’When you conceive of the article as lacking the design 
element in question, is the article you imagine functionally identical to the actual article?’”, 
where functionally identical means “central, legitimate utilitarian aspects”. Id. at 580. While 
Chatterjee emphasizes functionality in terms that are not explicitly cultural, and also 
seems to fall into the claiming issues at the heart of understansding what are the pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural elements in question of a useful article, at times her analysis seems 
to implicitly approach a consideration of the tangible and intangible divide that is at the 
heart of the test proposed here. See Id. at 568- 569 (discussion of camoflauge).)  
1042 Reichman, Design Protection supra n. 728; Reichman, Design Protection supra note 728; 
and J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law--A 
Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387 (1993).  
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the design they visually represent that they cannot be copyrightable 
at all under the merger doctrine or the idea/expression dichotomy. 
In addition, fashion designs as copyrightable subject matter, no 
matter their cultural interest, may be infinitesimally small in scope, 
raising questions as to how to treat these potentially fully 
copyrightable fashion designs at the infringement stage. Italian 
cultural property law, however, might make similar decisions as to 
validity and scope in its own legal terms and own legal institutes 
and processes.  
 
In addition to the issue of whether U.S. copyright is meant to 
actuate the public cultural interest in a manner similar to Italian 
cultural property law in the first place1043, the fact that U.S. copyright 
may act as a partner to an invisible cultural property regime in the 
U.S., or the public domain1044, brings up issues of control of the public 
cultural interest by private parties and not the State. While the 
doctrines of fair use and exceptions for certain cultural institutions 
under copyright law in Section 108 might be enough to foster 
cultural dialogue around certain intangible properties, copyright 
law might also frustrate the public’s ability to have a cultural 
consensus around these objects. Authors may control their works to 
such an extent that it is impossible to publicly comment on them or 
use them for critique, especially when practical concerns like 
litigation costs may produce chilling effects. The possibility to 
control what may be termed counterfeits, for example, is potentially 
chilling not only for a recognition of the cultural significance of 
certain fashion design objects, but also for their critique and 
comment. It may be for this reason that fashion designs in 
particular, which need to be used and embodied in multiple copies, 
are mostly deemed outside of U.S. copyright law. 
 
Some fashion designs, like Gucci’s Flora, might seem like visible 
images, as properly copyrightable because they are like the 
composition of a painting. Such fashion design objects have an 
intangible reproducible element that can be applied to many other 
objects, thereby fostering our public cultural interest. Other fashion 
designs that are like intangible texts or intangible images, which might 
theoretically be properly in the purview of copyright, but are, 
however, not. The proposal is that this is so because extending 
protection to these fashion designs, unlike extending protection to 
an intangible text or intangible image, would frustrate the very 
                                               
1043 Addressed at certain points of Chapter 4 supra.  
1044 Following Giannini’s comments explored in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.  
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cultural consensus and dialogue that is definitive of fashion itself. 
The difference between visible images and intangible images is, 
however, difficult to draw. It is a fine line to decide what makes a 
Flora design different from a suit or the silhouette of a Flora shirt 
[Figure 32], and to, therefore, identify which fashion designs are 
unable to be copyrightable subject matter. U.S. copyright law in this 
sense, with all its potential faults and debatable standards, might in 
fact be doing fashion design and the public cultural interest in 
fashion design objects a favor in principle by not allowing the 
majority of fashion designs to be copyrighted. In this sense, U.S. 
copyright law might be a necessary partner to an invisible or non-
existent cultural property law or even an invisible or non-existent 
cultural property law. By allowing “counterfeits”, “fakes”, 
imitations, close copies, or whatever else they might be called for 
the majority of fashion designs, U.S. copyright law might be acting 
as a necessary partner in the ascertainment of the public cultural 
interest in certain fashion design objects.    
 
1.3 Filling the Gap? The Interactions between Fashion Law and 
Cultural Heritage Law  
 
The appearance of “Fashion Law” in the early 21st century in the face 
of a gap in copyright protection for fashion design, albeit after laws 
and norms governing fashion have been present for as long as 
mankind has clothed itself and still after the appearance of other 
rules and norms characterized as design law1045, begs the question of 
whether Fashion Law as a legal discipline might step in to offer 
legal solace to fashion designs where cultural heritage law might 
not.  
 
The legal disciplines and norms included in Fashion Law are touted 
as intellectual property law, business law, international trade law 
and government regulations, and the laws governing consumer 
culture and civil rights.1046 In addition, these norms and Fashion Law 
itself also purport to include public law.1047 The legal institutes of 
Fashion Law might be deemed, therefore, to include the many that 
are already included in these disciplines such as property, contract, 
freedom of expression, businesses and associations, products, 
employment, and even human rights.1048 Perhaps the primary legal 
institute of Fashion Law might be fashion itself, with all the liminal 
                                               
1045 See supra Introduction.  
1046 See Scafidi’s description of the four pillars in Introduction infra.  
1047 See Jimenez and Kolsun’s description of Fashion Law in Introduction supra.   
1048 See Figure 1-1 in FASHION LAW: CASES, supra note 13 at 6.   
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issues that brings along with it, just as the legal institute of cultural 
property does.1049 Up until now, despite mentions in passing of how 
fashion might be a cultural product and how Fashion Law is broad 
enough to include all legal disciplines, the relationship between 
cultural heritage law and fashion in Fashion Law has been, at the 
very least, undervalued and underexplored.1050   
 
One of the reasons for this undervaluation might be the strong links 
between the fashion industry and Fashion Law1051, despite the fact 
that Fashion Law can, of course, apply in areas where members of 
the fashion industry are not particularly present.1052 But Fashion Law 
finds itself particularly amenable now to a consideration of cultural 
property as one of its legal institutes and to an inclusion as part of 
cultural heritage law because so many fashion businesses and 
members of the industry are interacting with cultural institutions on 
a more regular basis, lending their products to museums, 
sponsoring exhibitions, giving donations, and archiving their own 
products and touting their historical significance. As of right now, 
Fashion Law does not explicitly have the tools to address the 
public’s cultural interest in fashion products under the law apart 
from the interests of fashion products’ creators, designers and first 
owners who are not necessarily all consumers. Fashion Law is able 
to tell a designer how they might copyright (or not) their fashion 
design, how to gain design patent or utility patent protection, or 
how to trademark their logo. Fashion Law can tell a group of 
investors or a designer how to incorporate, how to sell their 
products, how to employ people, how to negotiate retail spaces, 
how to license and advertise. Fashion Law could also tell consumers 
how to protect themselves against discrimination by fashion 
companies, how they are legally entitled to wear certain fashions 
and are protected from unwarranted searches or other acts related 
to what they are wearing. Fashion Law might, because it envisions 
itself as including customs law, be able to tell a fashion company’s 
museum whether or not their importation of certain vintage fashion 
objects for an exhibition will result in a customs fee. Fashion Law 
                                               
1049 For the discussion of cultural property as a liminal notion see Chapter 3, Section 4 supra 
(citing to Cassese).  
1050 See supra Introduction.  
1051 See The Need for Fashion Law, in FASHION LAW: CASES, supra note 13 at 3-4 (noting how 
fashion law is “a business-focused combination of legal disciplines”, its “growing social 
and economic importance in the fashion sector” and “the concerted attempt, led by … 
[the] (CFDA), to expand U.S. copyright law to include fashion designs.”).  
1052 As in Fashion Public Law, which Jimenez and Kolsun note as including “freedom of 
expression”, “religious freedom and attire”, “criminal law: strip searches, decency laws.” 
Figure 1-1 in FASHION LAW: CASES, supra note 13 at 6.  
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might even be able to tell a corporation how to properly negotiate 
with a museum, how to manage conflicts of interests, and how to 
sponsor exhibitions. Fashion Law cannot yet, however, tell a 
consumer or a designer or a fashion brand or corporation how a 
specific fashion design object is cultural property or even why, from 
a cultural heritage perspective, some fashion designs are not 
copyrightable. Fashion Law does discuss cultural appropriation, but 
that does not apply to modern and contemporary fashion design 
objects themselves as part of cultural heritage but rather to modern 
and contemporary fashion design objects’ improper use of 
indigenous and other cultures’ heritage.1053 Fashion Law today 
cannot fill what might be called a cultural heritage law gap, 
especially as Fashion Law operates in the United States, because it 
undervalues how cultural heritage law is applicable to the very 
modern and contemporary fashion design objects created by today’s fashion 
industry which Fashion Law seeks to primarily protect.  
 
It is for this reason that Fashion Law might fruitfully be included in 
cultural heritage law and also why the dilemmas of cultural 
heritage law, and of Italian cultural property law in particular, are 
so relevant for Fashion Law. As time passes and fashion design 
objects, especially those belonging to Italian fashion brands in Italy, 
increasingly become recognized as relevant to fashion history and 
as testaments to certain cultural moments of inspiration and 
innovation, Fashion Law will need to have the tools to understand 
how to negotiate and deal with a public cultural interest in fashion 
design objects. The same, however, is potentially true of intellectual 
property law more generally: design objects like an Alessi juicer or 
Ferrari car are just as susceptible to our public cultural interest as a 
Dolce & Gabbana or Versace dress. The reasons to protect cultural 
property or not, how to identify it, who decides and when, are all 
answers which cultural heritage law can give or, at the very least, 
for which cultural heritage law can provide procedures and 
answers.    
 
2. Cultural Property Protection and Fighting Counterfeits 
 
One thing Fashion Law does contemplate today, in fact one of the 
things it prides itself on, is authenticity and fighting against fakes. The 
comparison between U.S. copyright law, whose explicit statutory 
protection would be the fashion industry’s dream golden ticket, and 
cultural property law begs the question of whether thinking of modern 
                                               
1053 For a discussion of cultural appropriation see supra Introduction.  
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and contemporary Italian fashion design objects as cultural property in 
some instances helps or undermines the fight against fakes. Is cultural 
property protection a tool in the fight against counterfeits or a wrinkle?  
 
To problematize this question let us take the case of an Italian fashion 
design object which might be protected as a cultural property under 
Italian cultural property law. As discussed above1054, Italian fashion 
design would likely be eligible as part of a cultural property when it 
exists as a tangible text, like the “REAL GUCCI” or “REAL GG” on 
Alessandro Michele and “Trouble” Andrew’s recent Gucci bag, or as a 
visible image, like Valentino’s dress with Dante’s text or Matsuda’s shirt 
or tie with flock-printed letters. If the unicum of intangible design and 
tangible property of such fashion design objects is considered cultural 
property under Italian cultural property law, however, this does not 
mean that the fashion design is necessarily copyrightable subject matter 
under U.S. copyright law. Recalling that Italian cultural property law 
would recognize the tangible object with this text as cultural property, 
and that U.S. copyright law would only protect the tangible text as it 
exists apart from the material and repeated in others, the scope of a 
copyright in the “REAL GUCCI” or “REAL GG” design, which has been 
copyrighted1055, may be potentially so thin as to be non-existent or be 
interpreted broadly. In this sense, the relationship between cultural 
property and counterfeits, and the scope of each in comparison to the 
other, might depend on our understanding of the fashion design’s 
cultural communication and interest. 
 
Following the Court’s conceptual separability test, looking at this Gucci 
bag, some “pictorial” or “graphic” elements can be spotted. Much like 
“Trouble” Andrew’s previous graffiti on a wall, the “REAL” has similar 
pictorial elements like dripping text and the letters are drawn 
particularly, with the A an upside down V and the letters askew, while 
the Gucci is embossed. This pictorial work can also be apart from the 
bag and on another material or in another medium. Indeed, just imagine 
“REAL GUCCI” placed on a wall as “Trouble” Andrew did as part of 
his installation in the Gucci Galleria, or on a scarf, as in the foulard 
Gucci Ghost.1056 At the same time, however, alongside the knowledge 
that the “REAL GG” design has been copyrighted, recall how the Star 
Athletica court limited the copyrightability of the pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural features of designs of useful articles. The Court said that an 
                                               
1054 See Chapter 3.  
1055 Registration Number VA 2-002-720, February 24, 2016, U.S. Copyright Office.   
1056 For an image of the wall see In conversazione con Trouble Andrew, GUCCI, 
https://www.gucci.com/it/it/st/stories/inspirations-and-
codes/article/agenda_2016_issue05_guccighost_collection_trouble_andrew_qa.   
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author could only have a copyright in the features of the design 
inasmuch as the features of the design did not stop the production of 
objects of the same shape, style, or dimensions. In the Star Athletica case 
such a limitation made sense because the chevrons, stripes, and zig zags 
at issue effectively tracked the style or schema, the outline, the 
stereotype, of the cheerleading uniform. Here, that is not the case. So, 
should a Court see the scope of Gucci’s copyright as broad or thin? 
Should a Court allow the cultural message evident in the unicum of the 
design and bag, which may be protected through cultural property law 
and communicates authenticity, to inform the scope of the copyright? 
How do we parse the cultural interest of the message of authenticity 
here? If a Court were to decide the scope of copyrightability with 
reference to the design’s cultural message at it appears on the Gucci 
material, it might say that because the specific message of the design is 
so materially-dependent, Gucci could arguably not prevent other 
producers of bags from putting “REAL GUCCI” on other materials 
because the same message would not be conveyed. The message of 
authenticity would be different and, therefore, “REAL GUCCI” on 
another bag would be another non-infringing work of authorship fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression. Irony or sarcasm would be 
communicated, and not authenticity. This is, in a way, like the fair use 
or parody defenses to copyright infringement. At the same time, if the 
Court did not allow an understanding of the cultural interest of this 
fashion design object to inform the scope of copyrightability, Gucci’s 
copyright might be broad. After all, the Court seems to allow for a 
copyright which corresponds to the shape of the bag, but which does 
not replicate it, and its decision is based on the fact that a design may be 
reproduced in other materials. Is Gucci’s ability to reproduce “REAL 
GUCCI” on any other material indicative of an ability to communicate 
this message of authenticity or design integrity on any Gucci or non-
Gucci material? Is the placement of “REAL GUCCI” or “REAL GG” on 
other objects the production of derivative works? If the Court is indeed 
spotting a potential public cultural interest as part of its conceptual 
separability test, courts might need to consider how the 
communications at the heart of cultural interest might affect tests for 
infringement.1057 In this sense, the borders between copyright law and 
                                               
1057 A full proposal for how public cultural interest might shape different tests for 
infringement is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but lower courts do seem to have 
begun to implicitly explore potential differences in the cultural communications between 
similar copyrightable features of copyrightable designs when discussing the merger 
doctrine, although there seems as yet to be no court that has explicitly ruled on the issue 
of infringement. For a discussion of how close reading and distant reading might affect 
the infringement analysis see Zahr Said, Close and Distant Reading in Copyright’s 
Infringement Analysis, working paper presented at the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars’ 
Conference.  
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cultural property law may be porous. While acting at different times 
during the life of a work or property, each may draw from each other 
when understanding the cultural aspects of a fashion design and how it 
relates to its fashion design object. In the case of the “REAL GUCCI”, 
the test for the fashion design object as cultural property proposed here 
which sees the cultural interest of the design as a tangible text may 
allow other fashion design objects traditionally considered counterfeits 
to exist. 
 
Let us take another example of Gucci’s, the Flora design on a scarf. 
Negotiating the relationship between the intangible Flora design and the 
tangible scarf, it is apparent that the appreciation of the design’s 
message and representation may not necessarily be dependent on the 
scarf itself. Unlike text, whose material dependency may be more 
evident, the visual representation of flowers, butterflies, and other 
elements of nature is susceptiple to multiple cultural interests. The fact 
that the Flora design has been repeated on numerous other tangible 
objects, including on Gucci bags, dresses and shoes hints that it may or 
may not be like a visible image. Its cultural interest may be related to the 
source of it- Gucci, the brand- than an artistic interest in the rendering of 
the flowers, butterflies and other elements of nature which, like a 
composition of a painting, might be attached more readily to the 
tangible scarf. At the same time as the Flora design falls into two 
potential categories of cultural property, the Flora design is 
copyrightable subject matter under U.S. copyright law.1058 Here the U.S. 
Copyright Office seems to have made the hard decision that may also be 
requested of a Ministry Field Office or administrative judge as the case 
may be at a later date when the time threshold is met: this scarf design 
is like a visible image and not an intangible text or intangible image. No 
matter if it is applied to a scarf, it is not the scarf nor is it the silhouette of 
a scarf. The Flora design is like the composition of a painting, the 
composition of a fresco, the outline of a guitar placed on another 
material support. It is much like the image of a stained glass, whether 
placed on a window or on a dress [Figure 32]. The pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural features of the scarf design, the flowers, butterflies and 
dragonflies, are easily identifiable as pictorial, notwithstanding the fact 
that they may correspond to the shape of a scarf. The Flora is easily 
repeatable in other materials. These elements are original enough: the 
Flora has similarities to other still life paintings and, therefore, this Flora 
design will be copyrightable and not just copyrightable subject matter. 
According to the Court’s opinion in Star Athletica its author, Gucci, may 
prohibit its placement on any material, except inasmuch as it attempts 
                                               
1058 Gucci has in fact copyrighted the design as a PGS work. See Form GATT, VA 1-433- 
237, July 13, 2012, U.S. Copyright Office.  
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to stop the production of scarves of the exact same shape, dimension 
and style of the square Flora design. Here, Gucci is given a thick 
copyright but perhaps no cultural property protection. While 
provenance and authenticity may not be regulated, nor copies for 
commercial use, unauthorized copies, or counterfeits, are regulated 
under copyright law. Here, there is potential, but not certain, unified 
action by U.S. copyright law and Italian cultural property law. We 
might interpret this as U.S. copyright law allowing the author, for their 
life and seventy years, a voice in the cultural messages and 
communications, in the collective’s shaping of its cultural interest in the 
Flora design. In a possible negative space of cultural property law, 
copyright law might be in fact choose to be a sort of ex ante cultural 
property law regime. But this also brings up concerns about the borders 
between these types of law. Does Gucci’s ability to protect against 
counterfeits, unauthorized copies of its Flora design on other materials, 
mean that one iteration of the Flora design in a fashion design object 
might eventually gain the necessary cultural consensus to be deemed a 
testament having the value of civilization, a cultural property under 
Italian law? Can the public adequately decide that one of the first 
iterations of the Flora scarf is cultural property if Gucci shapes the 
cultural conversation around the Flora design?  
 
The porous boundaries between cultural property and copyright may 
not be the same in all copyright regimes. In other words, the 
determination of copyrightability in one jurisdiction and a prohibition 
on unauthorized copies may not occur in another. Just because an 
Italian fashion design object is in part eligible for copyright protection 
under U.S. copyright law does not mean that a fashion design is 
copyrightable subject matter under Italian copyright law, or vice versa. 
Indeed, as evidenced by the Moon Boots case, Italian courts engage in 
cultural property like evaluations- looking at design impact, iconic 
status, and even aesthetic and artistic dimensions to decide 
copyrightability. Looking at our previous examples, has the Gucci bag 
with “REAL GUCCI” or “REAL GG” changed the course of design, like 
the Moon Boots? The “REAL GUCCI” bag’s inclusion in some exhibits 
might be enough, but, thus far, it seems to only have been included in 
the Gucci Galleria, which might not rise to a level similar to the 
classification of the Moon Boots as an exemplary design by the Louvre.1059 
There may not yet be an answer. As a result, a determination of Italian 
copyright protection for certain designs may be more time-sensitive, or 
at least more related to the timing of cultural property classification, 
than the entrance of certain designs to categories of copyrightable 
                                               
1059 Tecnica v. Anniel, Tribunale Sez. Spec. Impresa, - Milano, 12/07/2016, supra note 845.  
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subject matter in other jurisdictions like the United States. While 
copyright law exists from creation, the copyrightability of the fashion 
designs of some fashion design objects, or designs of useful articles, in 
Italy may in reality need to be ascertained some time after their creation 
but before their eligibility as cultural property. This may effectively 
mean that a prohibition on counterfeits in one jurisdiction is more 
linked to cultural interest than in another, leading to a potential 
asymmetry of cultural interest in different locations for the same fashion 
design object. This is so notwithstanding plaintiffs’ use of the word 
“iconic” to justify their intellectual property rights in the United States.1060 
As a result, the nature of counterfeits and their regulation may differ 
depending on the jurisdiction, with ramifications for fashion design 
objects’ cultural interest. Does creativity’s present historical impact, or 
artistic value, for fashion design objects always require time, a 
development of an iconic status, to fight against counterfeits? How can 
a fashion design object obtain iconic status if it is copied without 
authorization, or do these counterfeits necessarily communicate iconic 
status? Does being a cultural property preclude the existence of 
counterfeits under other laws, or does being copyrightable subject 
matter dictate later cultural property because of a control over 
counterfeits? Again, the use of cultural interest here may not necessarily 
be a tool to fight counterfeits.  
 
The porous boundary between cultural property law and copyright law 
may also explain why some fashion designs are in a negative space of 
copyright. Within the collective and social nature of cultural property, 
creativity and fashion, why necessarily extend copyright at all if an 
intangible cultural interest cannot be further developed by its author? 
Where creativity meets an exact cultural communication that will not 
change over time, is there a need for U.S. copyright or even a thin 
copyright? Cultural property law might indicate when a cultural 
interest need not be protected, or even incentivized, through copyright 
law. In this sense, the boundary between cultural property and 
copyright may indicate some fashion designs and, therefore, fashion 
design objects, that are neither cultural property nor able to be protected 
from counterfeiting in Italy or the United States. Despite Giannini’s 
supposition that intangible text is outside the purview of Italian cultural 
property law and that intangible text might best be protected by 
regulating the relationships of private actors with the intangible text1061, 
                                               
1060 Complaint at 4, 6, Gianni Versace, Srl v. Fashion Nova, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-1007 (C.D. 
Cal. November 25, 2019) (a recent lawsuit by Versace against Fashion Nova for infringing 
the copyright of the print of the dress Jennifer Lopez wore to the Grammys in 2000 
designed by Versace describes that copyright as “iconic”).  
1061 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.3.  
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U.S. copyright law does not protect fashion designs that are like 
intangible text. In this sense some Italian fashion design and Italian 
fashion design objects are both in a negative space of cultural property 
law and copyright law and are, therefore, susceptible to being 
counterfeited. Fashion designs and their accompanying objects 
unprotected as cultural property are not regulated for provenance or 
authenticity, and fashion designs unprotected by copyright may be 
freely copied.  
 
At the same time, some designs might still be protected under Italian 
cultural property law as testaments having the value of civilization 
whether a fashion design is tangible, intangible or not. The ope category 
of testaments having the value of civilization potentially complicates the 
border between cultural property and copyright as applied to fashion 
designs. Italian cultural property law regulates the sale of cultural 
property on the market, including its provenance and authenticity1062, but 
is this necessarily the same as prohibiting counterfeit fashion design 
objects?    
 
The porous borders between cultural property law, copyright law, and 
the legal institutes of cultural property and an unauthorized copy (or 
counterfeit) are illustrated by the Flora example. A specific scarf may be 
a cultural property, if not as a visible image, then as evidence of a specific 
creative moment of Vittorio Accornero, or as a testimony to the 
relationship between the celebrity Grace Kelly and an Italian brand at 
that time. Such a classification might allow a modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design object to cultural property in its first iteration; 
copyrightable subject matter in its intangible elements, like a visible 
image or painting with a conceivably reproducible composition; and also 
copyrightable subject matter under Italian copyright law because it 
could be argued that the Flora design is of historic and artistic interest 
and effectively has iconic status. Here, the ability to protect the same or 
similar parts of the object in the different legal regimes of cultural 
property law and copyright law in different jurisdictions begs the 
question of how to deal with these overlaps. Would prohibiting exact 
copies of the Flora design in contemporary iterations by infringing 
actors make the first iteration of the Flora scarf more culturally valuable? 
Does the fact that one iteration of a Flora design object is recognized as 
cultural property make counterfeits, or unauthorized copies, less 
problematic?   
 
There are still other modern and contemporary Italian fashion design 
                                               
1062 Art 64, CODICE, D.L. n. 42/2004. 
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objects which embody these overlaps and also pose challenges to the 
drawing of those very overlaps. Ferragamo’s Invisible Sandals, for 
example, would most likely be considered of sufficient iconic, artistic 
and historic importance at the time of their creation, within their 
specific context, to be copyrightable subject matter under Italian law. At 
the same time, it is an open question whether or not the Invisible Sandals 
would qualify as an individual cultural property under Italian cultural 
property law or as a testament having value for civilization. The 
intangible cultural message of the Invisible Sandal, its innovativeness 
and historical importance, is caught up in the tangible shoe itself and in 
its materials. Yet, at the same time, that intangible cultural interest can 
change depending in which of the many tangible Invisible Sandals the 
design is included. Some tangible iterations show the use of one specific 
patented process, while others show another.1063 Furthermore, under U.S. 
copyright law it may be impossible to separate any sculptural aspects of 
the nylon straps, for example, from their material, from the unique 
transparency on the foot thanks to how that transparency relates to one 
specific material. Where shold we draw the lines then, if any, between 
these laws? Should Italian cultural property law protect each individual 
shoe, based on these variations, or none of them individually, because 
the intangible cultural interest is repeated across different materials? An 
image of the Invisible Sandal can, and has been, placed on scarves. Does 
this mean that its design is sufficiently non-replicable of the underlying 
useful article for U.S. copyright law? How far can the conceptual 
separability test and its relationship to cultural interest go and, 
therefore, compromise the efficacy of these overlaps ?  
 
In some circumstances the blurred lines between these three legal 
regimes, and their support or frustration of counterfeits, seem to be 
even more uncertain. While U.S. copyright law does not purport to 
examine historic or artistic interest of a design to determine its 
copyrightability, in a recent case, the District Court for the Central 
District of California denied protection to any features of the design of a 
hookah bottle because they could not identify any as copyrightable 
subject matter. As part of their explanation of why copyright did not 
apply, the court noted,  
 
                                               
1063 See Patents n. 426001 (invenzione), of October 17, 1947; n. 26446 (modello d’utilità) of 
March 29, 1947 and n. 26655 (modello industrial) of May 10, 1947. Archivio Ferragamo. 
These observations are the result of a close Object Analysis of the shoes in the Ferragamo 
Archive in December 2018 and February 2019. For a full list of the Invisible Sandals 
examined in the Ferragamo archive see Appendix B, Archivio Salvatore Ferragamo varianti 
modello Invisibile.  
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there is nothing distinctive or artistic about the individual features--
despite Inhale's flowery language describing the features, they are 
essentially geometric shapes of the most common type. Inhale itself 
recognizes that ‘each individual geometric figure is not likely 
protectable.’…Combining two or three of these common geometric shapes 
together does little to improve the situation--the components of the water 
container at issue are simply not works of art in even the broadest, most 
liberal sense. See Compendium of Copyright Office Practices II § 503.02(b) 
( "[t]he [minimal] creative expression . . . [necessary for sculptural works] 
must consist of something more than the mere bringing together of two or 
three standard forms or shapes with minor or spatial variations.") This is 
not to say that there are not some, if not many, useful articles composed of 
unique geometric shapes variations or unique combinations of geometric 
shapes that might pass muster under the Star Athletica test. It is only to 
say that the water container at issue here is no Noguchi Table. [“The 
Noguchi Table was designed by Isamo Noguchi in 1939 for the then 
president of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, the original 
remains in the museum's permanent collection.”]1064 
 
The nature of cultural property and unauthorized copies are not 
necessarily two sides of the same coin. The possible artistic and 
historical interest in pictorial, graphic and sculptural features of designs 
of useful articles may not always be definitive for all copyright regimes. 
Likewise, the relationship between cultural interest, copyright, and 
cultural property may not be the same across jurisdictions. As a result, 
how cultural property law and copyright law should interact, if only to 
avoid an asymmetry of cultural interest between laws to the detriment 
of society at large, is an open question. What does seem evident, 
however, is that a cultural property theory of copyright law may not 
help fashion and luxury brand goods companies attain the restrictions 
on counterfeits that they ideally want. Emphasizing the broad cultural 
interest of a fashion design and fulfilling the proposed test for fashion 
design objects as cultural property under Italian law may mean that a 
copyright in a fashion design is so small in scope that counterfeits 
effectively do not or cannot exist.  
 
3. Beyond Cultural Heritage Law? An Emerging Field for the 
Protection of Fashion Design Objects as Cultural Property 
 
While this dissertation has proposed a legal standard for when certain 
Italian fashion designs may be considered fashion design objects eligible 
for classification as cultural property under Italian cultural property 
                                               
1064 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201498 (C.D. CAL. , May 8, 2017) at *8 - *9.  
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law, there are many questions which follow. How is copyright law, both 
in the U.S. and in Italy, related to cultural property law as applied to 
fashion design objects when determinations of copyrightability seem to 
look to similar objects and use similar descriptive language as cultural 
property law? What effect, if any, might an overlap between Italian 
cultural property law and other copyright regimes have for the 
prevention of counterfeit, or unauthorized copies of, fashion design 
objects? What role may Fashion Law have or not have as part of cultural 
heritage law in addressing the public cultural interest in fashion design 
objects in the future?  
 
One of the legal spheres this dissertation did not touch on, mainly 
because Italian cultural property law seems not to explicitly envision it 
as part of its legal sphere, are other intellectual property regimes like 
design rights and trademark. Design rights and trademark are 
important in a discussion of a public cultural interest in fashion design 
objects because they, often more than copyright, shape the public’s 
perception of fashion design objects by giving owners exclusivity to 
their design for a period of time, or by assigning a narrow or broad 
right to proverbially speak on the market through fashion design objects 
and the symbols on them. Design patent law and trademark law also, 
moreover, have negotiations between the tangible and intangible 
inherent in their regimes. Design patent law requires the interpretation 
of drawings of objects to identify the ornamental, new and non-obvious 
protected parts which are also non-functional1065, while trademark 
registrations are based on considerations of the types of material goods 
to which the mark is applied. The overlaps between cultural property 
law and these other legal regimes might be especially relevant for other 
categories of subject matter that are also of cultural interest, but that are 
not necessarily fashion designs or fashion design objects. In this sense, 
the relationships between trademark law and cultural property law, and 
design patent law and cultural property law, seem particularly 
important to inherit other designs and design objects as cultural 
property, including certain machines; other tangible examples of 
processes; or even the everyday design objects which are not part of 
fashion. Just like fashion design objects, these machines, tangible 
examples of processes, and everyday design objects may already be 
accepted as part of cultural heritage. Not only do museums such as the 
Museo Nazionale della Scienza e della Technologia in Milan already exist to 
preserve and valorize such objects, but even categories like 
photography and film are already protected under Italian cultural 
                                               
1065 See generally, EDWARD LEE, MARK MCKENNA AND DAVID SCHWARTZ, THE LAW OF 
DESIGN: DESIGN PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 46- 49 (West Academic, 2017).  
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property law through tangible examples of their processes. As we 
inherit outdated iPods, computers, televisions, and phones as part of 
our cultural heritage future, might design patents play a similar role as 
that here proposed by copyright in promoting (or frustrating) cultural 
consensus around these objects? Can design patent law at times, albeit 
for a shorter period of time, also act like an ex ante cultural property law 
regime both in the United States and in other territories that have more 
robust design law? The same questions may apply to an overlap 
between the legal notion of trademark and cultural property. As we 
increasingly inherit old websites and interfaces as part of our cultural 
heritage, can trademark law function as an ex ante cultural property 
regime to foster cultural consensus around certain intangible properties 
on the market? The fact that trademark is based on use and has no 
mandated expiration date means that the potential for overlap with the 
legal notion of cultural property may be even greater than with the legal 
notion of copyrightable subject matter. A trademark may continue to be 
used on the market to identify source and be protected long into 
cultural property law’s time threshold. Does trademark law provide 
content-based restrictions on cultural consensus about the products to 
which it may apply? Are there doctrines, like copyright’s merger and 
idea/expression, that may provide relief? How should these concerns 
be addressed? What is the difference, moreover, between the subject 
matter of trademark law and cultural property law, between identifying 
source on the market and the cultural messages and public cultural 
interest which Italian cultural property law is concerned with 
preserving? What is the line between source identification on the 
market and an identification of cultural value inside and outside of the 
cultural sphere for fashion design objects? Are there similarities 
between certain trade dress and fashion designs that are eligible for 
inclusion in the cultural property “box”? 
 
Including certain fashion designs that are like tangible texts within the 
sphere of cultural property also begs the question of whether the 
institutions and regulatory agencies of cultural property should be 
expanded too. Should luxury brand goods companies be seen under the 
law as trustees for certain parts of their fashion products? How might 
this change their behavior? What about the administrative agencies that 
do not purport to regulate cultural property now, but regulate parts of 
intellectual property instead? Should these agencies be fully included 
within a framework for administrative action towards cultural 
property? How might this affect other areas of our cultural heritage that 
may also be in the tangible text realm, like literature?  
 
Passing a proverbial cultural property torch to luxury brand goods 
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companies and administrative agencies who do not operate or conceive 
of themselves as the protectors of a public cultural interest comes with 
challenges. The guidelines in place for companies and even foundations 
may not be enough at the moment to facilitate the preservation and 
valorization of cultural property that is contemplated under cultural 
property law. The management of intellectual property rights may not 
be the same as the management of cultural property. On the other hand, 
some fashion brands and luxury brand goods companies have already 
accepted the important task of preserving, valorizing and making their 
historic fashion design objects available to the public. In some cases, 
imposing some sort of trustee-like standard, more than a business 
judgment rule, may be needed for the directors and boards of luxury 
brand goods companies when they make decisions affecting their 
fashion products that are considered historic. In other cases an elevated 
standard might not be necessary. Administrative agencies tasked with 
issuing trademarks and patents, and registering copyrights, may need 
to at least think about the ramifications that their actions have for 
cultural heritage and cultural consensus more broadly, apart from an 
already present consideration of the public domain of expired design 
rights, abandoned trademarks, or expired or even unregistrable 
copyrights. At the same time, such considerations by administrative 
agencies may lead to restrictions on speech or even on creativity itself. 
 
Of course, one of the primary questions for an emerging field of 
protection for fashion design objects as cultural property is whether or 
not a traditional protection or regulation of Italian fashion design 
objects as cultural property is even needed. The recent Commission 
established by the Italian Minister of Cultural Heritage to study the 
matter seems to have sidestepped the issue of explicitly protecting 
fashion design objects in their tangibility, preferring to concentrate on 
the role of institutions.1066 In its summary, the Commission emphasized 
the importance of corporate archives and networks to support 
artisanship and the creation of Italian fashion. The status of Italian 
fashion as a living, breathing activity that incorporates many different 
types of objects and iterations, as well as the importance of Italian style, 
seems to have led the Commission to privilege institutions and dynamic 
relationships over a separate “freezing” of objects. According to this 
summary report, the preservation of fashion design objects should, it 
seems, occur alongside a multitude of other initiatives. The subject 
matter of Italian cultural property is uniquely tangible and intangible. It 
seems it cannot be protected, according to members of the industry 
investigating the matter for the Ministry, except through a complex 
                                               
1066 For further discussion of the report see supra Chapter 1, Section 3.  
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network of Italian fashion between digital and physical archives, 
networks and institutions, archives and museums. At the same time as 
this report is revelatory, dodging the explicit question of where exactly 
to locate the public cultural interest of modern and contemporary 
Italian fashion design objects and how that assignment relates to other 
legal regimes like copyright may only be avoiding the question that 
must one day be directly answered. The cultural significance of certain 
modern and contemporary Italian fashion design objects might risk 
being lost if fashion design objects are not preserved or regulated as 
individual objects through Italian cultural property law. It is this 
cultural significance which must drive considerations of how fashion 
design objects are to be protected or treated as cultural property and the 
borders between different laws as we consider how to inherit Italian 
fashion design and its objects for our future.  
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Figure 1 
Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda Fashion Show, July 2019 
Source: Anders Christian Madsen, Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda, 
Autumn/Winter 2019, VOGUE UK, 6 July 2019, 
https://www.vogue.co.uk/shows/autumn-winter-2019-
couture/dolce-gabbana-alta-moda. 
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Figure 2 
Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda, Dresses, July 2019 
Source: Anders Christian Madsen, Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda, 
Autumn/Winter 2019, VOGUE UK, 6 July 2019, 
https://www.vogue.co.uk/shows/autumn-winter-2019-
couture/dolce-gabbana-alta-moda. 
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Figure 3 
Dolce&Gabbana Alta Moda, Hats, July 2019 
Source: Andrea Tenerani (@andreatenerani), INSTAGRAM, 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Bzi88efIgqQ/?igshid=1vep4
d5els68c (last visited July 16, 2019).  
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Figure 4 
Example of scheda from the Archivio della Moda del Novecento 
Source: ARCHIVIO DELLA MODA DEL NOVECENTO, 
http://www.moda.san.beniculturali.it/wordpress/ (last 
visited July 17, 2019). 
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Figure 5   
Gucci Forever Now Campaign, 2010 
Source: GUCCI: THE MAKING OF 368 (Frida Giannini, et al eds., 
2010).   
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Figure 6   
Ferragamo Runway Show, Piazza della Signora, June 2019 
Source: Getty Images, shared with the article Ferragamo al 
Pitti, la sfilata in piazza della Signoria, CORRIERE.IT, 
https://www.corriere.it/foto-gallery/moda/pitti-uomo-
2019/19_giugno_12/ferragamo-pitti-sfilata-piazza-signoria-
3b8ca9fa-8cee-11e9-98ba-037337dafe50.shtml (last visited July 
16, 2019). 
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Figure 7   
Gucci Pre-Fall 2019 Fashion Ads in Selinunte, Sicily  
Source: @Gucci, TWITTER, May 2, 2019, 
https://twitter.com/gucci/status/1123897032840753153. 
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Figure 8   
Venetian Shoes in the Palazzo Davanzati, Florence, Italy 
Source: Photo by author 
314
Figure 9   
Futurist Fashion Vest, 1930 
Source: ACROSS ART AND FASHION (Stefania Ricci, ed., 2016). 
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Figure 10  
Rosa Genoni’s Primavera Dress, 1906 
Source: ARCHIVIO DELLA MODA DEL NOVECENTO, 
http://www.moda.san.beniculturali.it/wordpress/ (last 
visited July 17, 2019). 
316
Figure 11   
Rosa Genoni’s Tanagra Dress, 1909 
Source: EUGENIA PAULICELLI, ROSA GENONI LA MODA È UNA 
COSA SERIA: MILANO EXPO 1906 E LA GRANDE GUERRA (2015). 
317
Figure 12  
Comparison between Botticelli’s Primavera and Rosa Genoni’s 
Primavera Dress; Rosa Genoni’s Pisanello Mantle and 
Pisanello’s Drawing 
Source: ARCHIVIO DELLA MODA DEL NOVECENTO, 
http://www.moda.san.beniculturali.it/wordpress/ (last 
visited July 17, 2019). 
318
Figure 13  
VOGUE 1946 Article with Gucci and Ferragamo accessories in 
front of the Ponte Vecchio 
Source: The Italian School, 108 VOGUE No. 9, November 15, 
1946 at 166-167 (also reproduced in GUCCI: THE MAKING OF at 
28) (also referred to in the VOGUE Database as part of a larger
article entitled British Appointments).
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Figure 14 
Missoni Prints 
Source: Lindsay Talbot, Inside Angela Missoni’s Rainbow 
Colored World, N. Y. TIMES, August 14, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/t-magazine/angela-
missoni-fashion-designer-inspiration.html    
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Figure 15  
Gucci Flora prints in former GUCCI MUSEO, Piazza della 
Signora, Florence, Italy. 
Source: Photos by author  
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Figure 16 
Valentino Garavani Museum still 
Source: Screen capture from VALENTINO GARAVANI MUSEUM, 
http://www.valentinogaravanimuseum.com/ (last visited 
July 17, 2019). 
322
Figure 17 
Versace dress referred to as a Landmark by Richard Martin 
Source: RICHARD MARTIN ET AL, GIANNI VERSACE 30- 31 
(Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1997), 
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/metpublications/Gianni_
Versace. 
323
Figure 18 
Design Patent n. 73796 of 1958, image of one of many Gucci 
“Bamboo Bags”, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome, Italy  
Source: Photo by author 
324
Figure 19 
Moschino “I had nothing to wear” dress Pre-Fall 2015 
Source: Photo by author 
325
Figure 20 
Ferragamo Rainbow Sandal, 1938 
Source: Collezione, MUSEO SALVATORE FERRAGAMO, 
https://www.ferragamo.com/museo/it/ita/scopri/collezion
e_scarpe/ (last visited July 17, 2019).  
326
Figure 21 
Giorgio Armani Dress from 1990, Poiret style/1911 Poiret 
dress in the Costume Institute/1913 Poiret dress at the 
Museum at FIT/2016 Isabelle de Borchgrave Poiret work (left 
to right, from top to bottom) 
Source: Photo by author (Armani); Fancy Dress costume, 1911, 
Paul Poiret, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/81781?
&searchField=All&sortBy=Relevance&ft=paul+poiret&offset
=0&rpp=80&amp;pos=1 (last visited July 17, 2019) (Poiret); 
Evening Dress, THE MUSEUM AT THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, http://fashionmuseum.fitnyc.edu (last visited 
April 9, 2019) (Poiret); MODA DI CARTA: ISABELLE DE 
BORCHGRAVE A VILLA NECCHI CAMPIGLIO 77 (2016) (left to 
right, from top to bottom).  
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Figure 22 
Mary Ping installation in Items: Is Fashion Modern?, MUSEUM 
OF MODERN ART, New York, New York, U.S.A. 
Source: Photo by author 
328
Figure 23 
L.H.O.O.Q., Marcel Duchamp, 1919
Source: ArtStor, © 2008 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New
York / ADAGP, Paris / Succession Marcel Duchamp (using
under fair use principles, access through IMT School for
Advanced Studies Lucca Library)
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Figure 24 
“REAL” Gucci, Autumn-Winter 2016 
Source: Photo by author, GUCCI GALLERIA, Florence, Italy 
330
Figure 25 
Valentino Dress with Dante Text, Spring 2015 Couture 
Source: Larry Busacca/Getty Images, "Manus x Machina: 
Fashion In An Age Of Technology" Costume Institute Gala – 
Arrivals, GETTY IMAGES, 
https://www.gettyimages.it/immagine/rachel-mcadams-
valentino-
manus?phrase=rachel%20mcadams,%20valentino,%20manus
&sort=best#license (last visited July 17, 2019) (used under fair 
use principles) 
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Figure 26 
Matsuda tie and shirt, 1988 and 1989 
Source: Photos by author, with permission to take and use in 
dissertation but not to publish online from the Museum at 
FIT. 
332
Figure 27 
A rhapsode… 
Source: Neck-amphora, THE BRITISH MUSEUM, 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/
collection_object_details.aspx?assetId=221978001&objectId=39
9287&partId=1 (last visited July 17, 2019) (describing as 
“Amphora Made in Attica, Attributed to the Kleophadres 
Painter, 490- 480 BC, Collection of the British Museum, 
Roman and Greek Antiquities” ).  
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Figure 28 
Zuccoli Dress with Santa Maria Novella Façade, 1990 
Source: Photo by author, MUSEO DELLA MODA E DEL COSTUME, 
Florence, Italy.  
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Figure 29 
Moschino McDonald’s Fall 2014 Ready-to-Wear 
Source: Photo by author, with permission to take and use in 
dissertation but not to publish online from the Museum at 
FIT.  
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Figure 30 
Designs of Cheerleading Uniforms at issue in the Star Athletica 
case 
Source: Varsity Brands et al v. Star Athletica, No. 14-527, slip. 
op (6th Cir., August 19, 2015). 
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Figure 31 
Invisible Sandals in the Archivio Ferragamo 
Source: Photos by author, with permission to take and use in 
dissertation from Archivio and Museo Salvatore Ferragamo. 
337
Figure 32 
Gaultier and Stained Glass (top), Gucci Flora Shirt (bottom) 
Source: Photo by author, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART 
CLOISTERS, New York, New York, U.S.A.; GUCCI.COM 
(previously available for sale)  
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